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Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

nobody - from the ukranian and russian to military to the CIA and not even internet "experts" - can accurately predict how the ukranian offenisive will pan out. What we do know is that it has been three months of grim attritional grind with very marginal advances and a shit load of death and destruction.
So far there have been no breakthroughs and the russian defences have done their job. however the ukranians are still attacking. Meanwhile the Russians are on the offensive in the east - so far the Ukranain lines are holding - but they are under heavy pressure.
In two weeks - or two months - time it may be the russian pressure results in Ukraniane calling off their offesnsive to protect their eastern flank. It may be that Ukraine breaks through in the south and the opposite happens. It maybe that Russian logistics become so degraded that they have to pull back. Or that a Ukranian breakthrough sparks a complte collapse in moral and the Russian army disintergrates. Or Ukraniane has over comitted its forces and has to significently pull back in the east and go completely on the defensive. Or both sides fight each other to a standstill and we end up with a ceasefire.
You can probably find evidence for all of these scenarios being the most likely outcome.
Key factor is probably resiliance of russian logistics and moral vs Urkainian ability to continue their offensive.

I think the fact is there are too many factors and elements of chance to predict anything with absolute certainty. Even if everything seems to be in place for Russia or Ukraine a series of unpredictable human errors and fuck ups could still have an impact on the overall picture.

I don't think anyone predicted Wagner's rebellion for instance, or Putin could suddenly drop down dead, there's all sorts of things that could have an impact.
 
then there's the scenario what if the Ukraine army actually DOES successfully makes a breakthrough at any one point, throw all the weaponry being held back and break Russian supplies lines, lets say at the areas they are 'testing'....lets say they make it half way to Mariupol....they will then be pincered from left and right and below by now more desperate russian forces. Biden's comment today about the Russian nuclear threat being "real" adds mood music to all this.

I'm absolutely no military historian but seems to me the scale of what would need to happen to reconquer all this territory is one thing in a WW2 style total war situation with every ally throwing everything they have to make it happen and fuck the consequences, but that's not what is happening here. Head US general Mark Milley has said as much that it is not a realistic possibility. From what i can see this is all infinitely more guarded and drip drip.

My reading is the US knows this, and is calculating on a relatively limited counteroffensive, carefully managed not to create a reactionary escalation from Russia, and going by earlier reports from the FT leading to a more official resignation to this new territorial reality by the end of the year. Or, they intend to continue with the slow blood letting for years to come < which would be deeply cynical IMO and achieve nothing but more death and suffering

The US' concern is with Russia, not Ukraine. It's never been with Ukraine, not in the 90s and not in 2014. In fact, I think it's curious that the US and NATO are wanting Zaluzhny to push harder and in one specific area. Zaluzhny has refused. He's doing this according to his plan - whatever that is. The US and NATO know more about Russia as in real-time intelligence, and they probably know Russia's weaknesses, true. I believe Ukraine have a better understanding of themselves, though, and that could be why Zaluzhny is doing what he's doing. NATO is certainly spying on Ukraine during all of this, but Ukraine's operational security is said to be pretty damn good considering the era we're living in where the best battlefield info comes from soldiers themselves, geolocation, and Russian bloggers. I don't trust the US in this. This is the Afghanistan exit crew. They're in over their head. I think you're correct about those efforts being carefully managed. I have a hard time putting together the fear of escalation with helping Ukraine achieve battlefield success.
 
It's strange to be on the cusp of an era where we can all say "Wagner, remember them?"

There are rumours that some of the remaining Wagner fighters are being issued with Belarusian passports and false identities enabling them to access the EU via Lithuania / Poland. This is leading to alarmed consideration of closing all borders between the EU and Belarus.

However the move to Lukashenko's backyard has now been revealed as the absurd melodrama that it was; most have gone back to Russia, en route to tasks unspecified in Africa, integration with the Russian MoD, or in some cases, jail. Whether they will be paid what they are due from a rapidly-dismantling corporate apparatus is an open question.
 
And when the attackers ie the salient makers have the werewithall to reinforce those sides and actually widen them ... then it becomes a breakthrough ...

In this case, the salient at Robotyne / Verbove is leading up to the next line of defence.
There's already geolocated evidence of ukr troops past the defences at Verbove, so it looks like that widening is already in progress.
 
The article doesn't predict outright victory in 10km, but predicts that Ukraine might be close to a major breakthrough on the Melitopol front, which means the position of the Russian army west of Melitopol will become untenable and the Russian land bridge to Crimea will be broken. It will be less of a breakthrough than last year's counter-offensive in terms of territory regained (probably, I haven't done the maths) and even if it is right that Ukraine can soon break down Russia's supply routes in the south, Russia will still control Crimea and most of Donetsk and Luhansk so the war will still be far from over.

It may be wrong, but it doesn't seem incredibly far fetched to me either.
It uses the word and concept of Victory though, and suggests it's nearer than we think. The short termism of this One More Push thinking is scary to me, I can't help thinking of WW1 and it'll all be over by Christmas
 
What will Putin throw at it? The belief in Russia's might is so strong despite everything in the news and reports from Ukraine and Russia that people still think railcars of T-90s are going to come riding up when things get serious.

Neither of us has real accurate military intelligence.
You were asked yesterday for the source of your particular big claims (squadrons without leaders etc) but didn't provide them.
My impression, based on US intelligence, is both sides are depleted but it remains objectively true that the Russian army is still statistically far bigger than Ukraines, and winning is existential for Putin. Retreat won't come easy and the level of conflict could get uglier yet.
 
Sure, but the reality isn't 'aha, I think these people - people roughly London to Edinburgh from Volgograd, or London to Newcastle from Kursk - haven't noticed that their salient might be vulnerable'. Nor is it 'oh, Putin will just deal with this'. The reality is a mess of logistic chains, compromises on other parts of the front, husbanding of supplies etc. It is really hard to know what will happen here, but everyone from walts to milbloggers has looked at a map and gone 'oh, this is the obvious axis of advance'. Russia has been well aware of this for a long time, hence all the defences. And yet there is a salient. Maybe it's a fully pyrrhic situation with an unsustainable cost in lives to Ukraine. Maybe it's... not that. Those are the realities we don't know. But you're indulging in speculation as much as everyone else.

Yes it's all speculation, that is true.
Difference is I can well imagine the worst outcomes, whilst there are voices like that Keir from Chatham House several thousand miles from the frontline who can't fathom why the war isn't on an even bigger scale yet.
 
Moral at Russian TV seems to be at a bit of a low, as Ukrainian drone attacks appear to be causing some irritation. I don't know how much dissent and dissatisfaction there actually is in Ukraine, but the authorities there much better at keeping a lid on it than the Russians.

 
Moral at Russian TV seems to be at a bit of a low, as Ukrainian drone attacks appear to be causing some irritation. I don't know how much dissent and dissatisfaction there actually is in Ukraine, but the authorities there much better at keeping a lid on it than the Russians.


This is not a video of an irritated man who can't hold his tongue any longer. It's a video of a man acting irritated because that is his job.
 
Neither of us has real accurate military intelligence.
You were asked yesterday for the source of your particular big claims (squadrons without leaders etc) but didn't provide them.
My impression, based on US intelligence, is both sides are depleted but it remains objectively true that the Russian army is still statistically far bigger than Ukraines, and winning is existential for Putin. Retreat won't come easy and the level of conflict could get uglier yet.

Neither of us has real accurate military intelligence. My impression, based on US intellegence is...
 
Moral at Russian TV seems to be at a bit of a low, as Ukrainian drone attacks appear to be causing some irritation. I don't know how much dissent and dissatisfaction there actually is in Ukraine, but the authorities there much better at keeping a lid on it than the Russians.


11+ minutes is a bit long, but I'm pleased he's binned his Bond villain jacket for a soviet trackie.
 
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You missed the conference where the west just bought Ukraine then

It's worth reading what Karmina from Slovakia have to say about that in Insurgent Notes from their piece here Response to John Garvey’s “Against the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, for the Successful Resistance of the Ukrainian People” | Insurgent Notes

"Unlike some comrades, we are not too concerned about “Western capital” coming to Ukraine to “plunder its resources” and “exploit its cheap labor power.” For one, Ukraine has had its share of experience with a nationally-oriented model of capitalist development which not only plundered and exploited it, but also did very little to develop the economy in a purely “rational capitalist” sense, such as by investing in fixed capital. The years since 2014 were at best a slight improvement. Also due to the ongoing war in the Donbass, Ukraine could not benefit from the economic boom of those years (unlike, say, neighboring Slovakia, where unemployment fell to 5 percent for the first time since 1990).

Other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including our own, have also seen experiments, albeit much shorter, with models of “national capitalism” in the early 1990s. When this came crashing down, the countries opened up to Western FDIs, implementing EU-accession-related or other “neoliberal” reforms. This period brought a lot of suffering, especially to some strata of the working class (sections of the public sector, “post-socialist” legacy industries, the unemployed, and the racially excluded). On the other hand, the process was not completely unambiguous. Since then, there have been stretches of continually rising real wages and declining unemployment, reflected in improving living standards (comparisons across the former Eastern bloc using indicators like life expectancy are also telling). In other words, Western-oriented integration brought about “normal,” contradictory capitalist development. This is a slightly different trajectory than, say, in Germany, where real wages have been largely stagnant for the past two decades. Perhaps the us is similar. This should also be taken into account when thinking about what the working class in our region can hope for and what stakes it has in continued capitalist development.

Those who warn that the same is about to happen to Ukraine should also clearly list the alternatives: (a) world revolution and full communism (not on the cards for 2023 if you ask us), (b) continued “development to nowhere,” i.e., a fantasy of a strong, independent national economy acting as a “bridge between the East and the West” etc., or (c) an orientation toward Russia in the position of a subservient client state. Mixes of (b) and (c) have already been tried in Ukraine with little success in terms of standard indicators of capitalist development, even when compared to other post-Soviet countries. It is no wonder that many working-class Ukrainians want a “Poland at home,” so that they do not have to become migrant workers and only see their family every few months. Of course, whether a “Ukrainian Poland” is really possible, even with eu membership, is another matter. It is not 2004, the year of many cee countries’ accession, and the eu faces a plethora of its own issues. But those who are up in arms about the circa 1,000 state-owned enterprises still operating in Ukraine being privatized should reassure us (and the Ukrainians) about a path to (a), hopefully one where the working people of Ukraine are not expected to do all the work, including stopping a war by confronting both belligerent states head-on and at once. Alternatively, they should describe how (b) will be made to work this time—given all the world market constraints—and secure some actual capitalist development. Where is the capital going to come from that is needed for dealing not just with the decayed industrial base of the Ukrainian economy pre-2022, but even more so with all the destruction brought about by the war?

Again, none of this means we have to become cheerleaders for EU-accession or start organizing investment for Western corporations interested in Ukraine as the next frontier. But if our analysis is to be not even appealing but at least understandable and realistic-looking to people in the region, these conditions, possibilities and hopes have to be taken into account. It is arrogant and patronizing to preach about the dangers of “colonization” by the EU from a position of EU living standards and freedoms, either in the core countries or in the more recently added states."
 
Am more worried about our neighboring countries (or rather their leaders) than some failed politician in the UK. Hasn't he had several posts in a really short time frame?

Yes.

He previously served as Secretary of State for Transport in the Johnson government from 2019 to 2022, Home Secretary during the final six days of the Truss premiership in October 2022, Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from October 2022 to February 2023 and Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero from February to August 2023. LINK
 
Mowing the lawn can be a risky business :hmm:

Mowing the lawn you say :facepalm:
 
Mowing the lawn can be a risky business :hmm:

Special gardening operation :hmm:
 
Mowing the lawn can be a risky business :hmm:

They could have made people think it was Putin's work if they'd dropped a window on him. :)
 
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