Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

[TopCat]

It's all he's got. Namecalling, and tired, lazy stereotypes.

If you go back on the thread the insults started from you lot. Putin apologist as I recollect.

 

[existentialist]

If you go back on the thread the insults started from you lot. Putin apologist as I recollect.

That was, TBF, more of a description than an insult.

 

[existentialist]

In other, non-TopCat, news, I've been reading Mike Martin's "How To Fight A War". It is thought-provoking, particularly his emphasis on the role of psychology in the whole business. He argues that warfare itself is an essentially psychological activity, and (4 chapters in) is clearly more about the psychological necessities and impacts than any of the stuff which goes "bang", which he evidently regards as a secondary consideration.

OK, I'm now off to trim my neckbeard.

 

[TopCat]

That was, TBF, more of a description than an insult.

I could do a list but the gist is true. Name calling, insults, projection, false quotes. This has been a consistent theme from the proxy war supporters on this thread.

 

[existentialist]

I could do a list but the gist is true. Name calling, insults, projection, false quotes. This has been a consistent theme from the proxy war supporters on this thread.

I'm sure it's pure coincidence, but I find the self-pitying stuff to be remarkably similar to the line Russia (and, actually, most extremists) take when things aren't going their way.

 

[TopCat]

One minute you're loudly trumpeting that you're got me on ignore, the next you're namechecking me in your increasingly bizarre pro-Putin, pro war crimes, pro mass slaughter of civilians insane rhetoric with a bit of casual ageism thrown in the mix - like you're so much younger.

Don't do it again, please.

I prefer having you on ignore but occasionally have a look especially when you pop into the thread to like some gung ho post. I note you don’t assert much here since others started giving you history lessons.

Asking pro war supporters inc you if they would go and fight if troops go in seems perfectly reasonable to me.

 

[Pickman's model]

In other, non-TopCat, news, I've been reading Mike Martin's "How To Fight A War". It is thought-provoking, particularly his emphasis on the role of psychology in the whole business. He argues that warfare itself is an essentially psychological activity, and (4 chapters in) is clearly more about the psychological necessities and impacts than any of the stuff which goes "bang", which he evidently regards as a secondary consideration.

OK, I'm now off to trim my neckbeard.

i'd suggest you have a look at friedman's 'on tactics: a theory of victory in battle' (reviewed in infantry here: https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2018/APR-JUN/PDF/16) Book4-OnTactics.pdf). sure, war is largely if not exclusively a psychological thing (friedman has some interesting things to say about the moral factor in war) - sun tzu basically says as much. in many ways what armies get up to is aimed as much at the enemy commander - if not more so - than at the actual opposing troops, who do after all have to obey their superiors' orders (or generally face some sort of penalty) and don't have the freedom of movement they might desire. sun tzu says all warfare is deception, pretty much in those words iirc, attempts to persuade the opposing decision-maker to take - or not take - some action. clearly there are different psychological pressures on commanders and on their subordinate cannon-fodder echelons. but yeh much of it's a mind game.

 

[existentialist]

I prefer having you on ignore but occasionally have a look especially when you pop into the thread to like some gung ho post. I note you don’t assert much here since others started giving you history lessons.

Asking pro war supporters inc you if they would go and fight if troops go in seems perfectly reasonable to me.

It might be "reasonable", but it's also pointless. I have views on rape, for example, but I don't feel my position on rape is invalidated by the fact that I am neither a perpetrator nor a victim. It is possible to hold views on things you don't, or wouldn't, actually do.

 

[Pickman's model]

It might be "reasonable", but it's also pointless. I have views on rape, for example, but I don't feel my position on rape is invalidated by the fact that I am neither a perpetrator nor a victim. It is possible to hold views on things you don't, or wouldn't, actually do.

so much of what we do here is pointless. but less pointless than what we're trying to avoid doing in the real world.

 

[LDC]

This has been a consistent theme from the proxy war supporters on this thread.

Do you think it can all be reduced to being solely a 'proxy war' or do you think it's more complicated or layered than that? Please explain either way.

I mean I have follow-on questions for both your answers, but I'll eat my NATO issued helmet if you engage sensibly and have a discussion.

 

[TopCat]

I will give a full answer later

 

[Magnus McGinty]

I love this thread, as a casual observer. Mostly because it’s a war about a war.

 

[editor]

I prefer having you on ignore but occasionally have a look especially when you pop into the thread to like some gung ho post. I note you don’t assert much here since others started giving you history lessons.

Asking pro war supporters inc you if they would go and fight if troops go in seems perfectly reasonable to me.

You're the most pro war supporter here.

I'm strongly anti war but also pro 'the right to defend yourself if illegally invaded by a war crime committing country that targets hospitals, schools, homes, rapes women and abducts young children.'

 

[The39thStep]

I love this thread, as a casual observer. Mostly because it’s a war about a war.

within a war

 

[The39thStep]

In other, non-TopCat, news, I've been reading Mike Martin's "How To Fight A War". It is thought-provoking, particularly his emphasis on the role of psychology in the whole business. He argues that warfare itself is an essentially psychological activity, and (4 chapters in) is clearly more about the psychological necessities and impacts than any of the stuff which goes "bang", which he evidently regards as a secondary consideration.

OK, I'm now off to trim my neckbeard.

Didn't you start reading this two months ago or was that another Mike Martin book ?

 

[existentialist]

Didn't you start reading this two months ago or was that another Mike Martin book ?

No, this is the first Mike Martin book I've read. But I may have quoted him, as he has appeared on a number of the podcasts I listen to.

 

[kebabking]

He wrote An Intimate War, which is worth a read if you fancy a reading-through-the-gaps-between-your-fingers excoriation of objectives, strategy, and operations in Afghanistan.

I was in it, though thankfully without my name attached - which is why I still have a job...

 

[Sweet FA]

within a war

Round like a circle in a spiral, like a wheel within a wheel
Never ending or beginning on an ever spinning reel

 

[The39thStep]

Saw a bit of this last night on Portugals CNN. Whether drones are the future I'll leave it to others to decide . There's a lot to unpack here though .

 

[Pickman's model]

Saw a bit of this last night on Portugals CNN. Whether drones are the future I'll leave it to others to decide . There's a lot to unpack here though .

Yes,they are. Seven seconds to die, John antal

 

[Fez909]

what's really peculiar is that the traditional way of war in the forces the ukrainians have been trained by in recent years isn't 'let's start slow and build up big' but to attack with overwhelming firepower and, as TopCat mentions, air superiority. even without air superiority attacking with great land forces - starting your offensive with as large an army as you can field with the newest weaponry etc - is how things have been done not only in the western way of warfare but in the former soviet union, as anyone who has read overy's book on the battle of berlin will recall (or the book by cornelius ryan, too). saying now some weeks into the 'counteroffensive' that the bulk of the force assembled still awaits deployment makes me, if no one else, wonder how ambitious or likely to succeed the current ukrainian campaign is.

it is of course possible that the ukrainian plan calls for breaching russian lines and then the 'hundreds of western tanks and thousands of armoured vehicles' are hoped to flood through. as the commentator suggests by talking of the optimal location to strike. one famous tactic from iraq and syria the russians might have learned is the use of artillery shells as ieds - i wonder if such things will have been prepared for use in any breach. sure we all recall the great number of casualties suffered by the us and allied forces in iraq, where the vehicle might have remained in one piece and no one actually killed but catastrophic injuries suffered by personnel within tanks etc. nonetheless, i can't help feeling that the way things have turned out in the past number of weeks suggests the ukrainian assault isn't going to easily provide the opportunity bielieskov hopes for. even the removal of many wagner forces from the fray hasn't allowed great breaches to be made, yet, in the russian defences. the rate at which the ukrainian forces expend munitions and the introduction of cluster bombs as a stopgap measures while artillery shells are manufactured and shipped out indicates to me that the sort of overwhelming firepower - the shock and awe if you will - which western forces would open with simply isn't going to happen for at least some time to come.

you don't need to tease out stories suggesting things aren't going so well for ukraine when despite their great advantage in accurate missiles, top-notch anti-tank missiles, western manpads and so on, not to mention military training from a range of western armies, the current campaign isn't turning the war as much as you may have expected.

I'm no military buff, but from what I've picked up reading the various commentary on this war, the issues are these:

1. Mines - Moving through minefields is inherently slow. There's no quick way to do this without heavy equipment and Russia has KA-52 helicopters picking off anything in the open, so no de-mining machinery is viable.
2. Artillery - Same as it's been for months. Russia just shoots shit loads of shells, overwhelming amounts. They're not accurate, but who cares - they've got loads. These also get fired at anything big and slow moving in the minefields.
3. Lack of air superiority. You've covered that, so not worth going into, but that's not going to change. Even if the F15s ever appear.

So, what Ukraine can and has been doing is making small, probing incursions into the mine fields to look for weak spots. If they sustain artillery fire, then they send counter-battery fire to the Russian positions, which are not as mobile and easily taken out by the more accurate HIMARS/M270/etc. systems. If they discover some radar/AA equipment in their probes, even better as this gives more space for drones to work behind the lines instead of risking man power.

So, assuming all this is true (big 'if') they're softening up Russian defenses in a similar way that NATO doctrine calls for with weeks of bombing etc before sending in the tanks and boots on the ground. If you see this as preperation for the offensive, rather than the offensive itself, then it might still be kind of true that they go in hard and big on Day 1, with all the firepower available.

As to when Day 1 is, who knows.

 

[Pickman's model]

I'm no military buff, but from what I've picked up reading the various commentary on this war, the issues are these:

1. Mines - Moving through minefields is inherently slow. There's no quick way to do this without heavy equipment and Russia has KA-52 helicopters picking off anything in the open, so no de-mining machinery is viable.
2. Artillery - Same as it's been for months. Russia just shoots shit loads of shells, overwhelming amounts. They're not accurate, but who cares - they've got loads. These also get fired at anything big and slow moving in the minefields.
3. Lack of air superiority. You've covered that, so not worth going into, but that's not going to change. Even if the F15s ever appear.

So, what Ukraine can and has been doing is making small, probing incursions into the mine fields to look for weak spots. If they sustain artillery fire, then they send counter-battery fire to the Russian positions, which are not as mobile and easily taken out by the more accurate HIMARS/M270/etc. systems. If they discover some radar/AA equipment in their probes, even better as this gives more space for drones to work behind the lines instead of risking man power.

So, assuming all this is true (big 'if') they're softening up Russian defenses in a similar way that NATO doctrine calls for with weeks of bombing etc before sending in the tanks and boots on the ground. If you see this as preperation for the offensive, rather than the offensive itself, then it might still be kind of true that they go in hard and big on Day 1, with all the firepower available.

As to when Day 1 is, who knows.

The thing is, time favours the defence. Meantime the people sent in lose limbs, the mines damage Bradley's and so on, and the Ukrainians are paying a heavy price. The defence gets time to improve their facilities and so on. At some point the season for sending heavy vehicles in will end as the autumn and winter approach. Plus, as I mention above, the russians have time to develop killing zones, to put in all sort of nasty surprises. This summer may end up being a lost opportunity for zelensky

 

[StoneRoad]

Now wondering if & when the Crimea bridges / causeways - not just Kerch - will be in range of missiles such as Storm Shadow / scalp ...

According to a line in BBC report today, the answer to this is Yes, the Kerch Bridge is well within range.

As the rail line is elevated, a decent "hit" on that will be harder to repair, and the more important route for armour & supplies, then I'm going to assume that it will be targeted with these, sooner rather than later ...

As is their usual practice, Ukraine are continuing to target ammunition / fuel dumps as well as command & control functions.

 

[agricola]

The thing is, time favours the defence. Meantime the people sent in lose limbs, the mines damage Bradley's and so on, and the Ukrainians are paying a heavy price. The defence gets time to improve their facilities and so on. At some point the season for sending heavy vehicles in will end as the autumn and winter approach. Plus, as I mention above, the russians have time to develop killing zones, to put in all sort of nasty surprises. This summer may end up being a lost opportunity for zelensky

TBF that isn't always the case - if the defender is not interrupted and they devote a lot of attention to something then the defence is improved, but often those two things do not happen (as men and materiel are moved away from quieter areas to more active ones) and an area becomes vulnerable.

The big question for Ukraine is when does the threat of damage to their forces in being (and so their ability to maintain their ongoing existence as a state) become more of a threat than freezing this conflict via a negotiated settlement is.

 

[strung out]

According to a line in BBC report today, the answer to this is Yes, the Kerch Bridge is well within range.

As the rail line is elevated, a decent "hit" on that will be harder to repair, and the more important route for armour & supplies, then I'm going to assume that it will be targeted with these, sooner rather than later ...

As is their usual practice, Ukraine are continuing to target ammunition / fuel dumps as well as command & control functions.

Not sure if you're misunderstanding something, but the Kerch Bridge is what was hit today, and last year. Last year with a truck bomb, today with drones.

Last year's explosion put the rail line out of action for months, as well as dropping one of the road lanes. Today's attack looks to have damaged the road section badly, though the trail section appears to have no/minimal damage.

 

[StoneRoad]

Not sure if you're misunderstanding something, but the Kerch Bridge is what was hit today, and last year. Last year with a truck bomb, today with drones.

Last year's explosion put the rail line out of action for months, as well as dropping one of the road lanes. Today's attack looks to have damaged the road section badly, though the trail section appears to have no/minimal damage.

Sorry for any confusion.

Yes, I know the history of the attacks on the Kerch Bridge; It is likely that the truck blast in October '22 [if that's all it was] and today's effort both probably involved marine surface drones. Catching the fuel tankers last year could have been a bonus.
I was speculating that since the bridge was well within storm Shadow range, that those specific missiles could become another means of attack, sooner rather than later.

As a person with some background in railway operations I was also commenting that a destroyed elevated railway section is much harder to repair, and since it is used to supply fuel, ammo and transport armour etc, then it would be a useful target to take out in the interdiction campaign - I was suggesting the bridge would make a good target for Storm Shadow / SCALP

 

[The39thStep]

Interesting snippet from BBC Russia .

Bit of a contrast to the 'they only have shovels, rusty rifles , and vodka fuelled drunks ' sort of stuff in a lot of the Western media

https://shorturl.at/jCNXZ

 

[SpookyFrank]

The last time they did this a huge wave of drone and missile attacks came down on them.

Better to not fight back at all then I guess.

 

[Dogsauce]

Not sure if you're misunderstanding something, but the Kerch Bridge is what was hit today, and last year. Last year with a truck bomb, today with drones.

Last year's explosion put the rail line out of action for months, as well as dropping one of the road lanes. Today's attack looks to have damaged the road section badly, though the trail section appears to have no/minimal damage.

One line of the railway is out of action, though repairs are not expected to take long, I suspect perhaps damage to signal cables or ‘soft’ stuff like that rather than structural. Last year’s hit did a lot of damage because they ignited a fuel train which burned at a high temperature and caused serious structural issues. I still don’t know if this was a very fortunate coincidence or part of the planned operation.

The current Ukraine counteroffensive operation is more like the Kherson operation late last year, that was quite attritional with some back and forth, meanwhile supply lines and assets were attacked with longer range artillery and missiles and eventually Russia gave up and fled. Currently they’re doing the same, taking out logistics nodes, dropping bridges and wiping out a lot of artillery, rocket systems, air defences and command centres. At some point (providing this can be sustained with supplies) that might make holding some of the territory untenable. But for now this is difficult, and Russian reinforcements are still flowing in and pushing back a little in places.

 

[Raheem]

One line of the railway is out of action, though repairs are not expected to take long

Last time it was hit, it was expected to be fully open again by the end of the day, Moscow time, iirc.