Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

Was it a retreat in contact or did the Russians just take advantage of the UA’s natural caution to assault Kherson and get out of dodge while the going was good?

How on their heels were the UA? I know they’ve absolutely swept through Kherson Oblast in the last 24 hours but had the impression they were holding off a bit (artillery excepted) so as to not get drawn into a trap.

ngl first time I ever heard the phrase retreat in contact so don’t want to pretend otherwise.
 
I can't remember where I read it now, so apols for not providing a source, but I'm fairly sure Ukraine has said they don't need any more soldiers for the moment, as the strength of their forces and reserves were sufficient enough not to need to call up any more.

The restricting force for Ukraine has always been hardware and ammunition rather than people, while the opposite is true for Russia - hence mobilisation of untrained and unmotivated civilians. Like kebabking says though, even the disparity in hardware is changing though, as Ukraine gets more tooled up.
I daresay if the Ukrainians face a decently led force they could be made to pay a very high price for taking the fight to the east of the dnipro. So they may yet need more soldiers. As to the disparity in weaponry, h John Poole has written widely on light infantry tactics that may be used to counter the US advantage in firepower, and there's no reason I can see why an imaginative Russian commander couldn't adopt some of these for use against the Ukrainian army. But as you note I said, as time passes the initiative passes to kyiv - but if Russia changes its m.o. the war might take on a different complexion
 
The only thing they’ve successfully defined is how to get your arse kicked over a river. And out of several 1000 sq km of occupied Ukraine.

Sorry but I don’t agree that this is anything but bad for the Russians.

This is quite something.


Heh, they're singing the red viburnum song. ❤️
 
Hadn't even thought of this, pointed out by Maksym Eristavi - loads of those flags being held up in Kherson today will've been hidden by people at great risk to themselves. All the mundane things that will have taken great courage, all the stuff these people have been through, just for trying to live their lives, I just hope they'll get the help and support they need.
 
Hadn't even thought of this, pointed out by Maksym Eristavi - loads of those flags being held up in Kherson today will've been hidden by people at great risk to themselves. All the mundane things that will have taken great courage, all the stuff these people have been through, just for trying to live their lives, I just hope they'll get the help and support they need.
Yes, the same thought occurred to me.
 
I daresay if the Ukrainians face a decently led force they could be made to pay a very high price for taking the fight to the east of the dnipro. So they may yet need more soldiers. As to the disparity in weaponry, h John Poole has written widely on light infantry tactics that may be used to counter the US advantage in firepower, and there's no reason I can see why an imaginative Russian commander couldn't adopt some of these for use against the Ukrainian army. But as you note I said, as time passes the initiative passes to kyiv - but if Russia changes its m.o. the war might take on a different complexion

Where are they going to find this decently lead force that up till now has been some what absent?
 
A lot has been made about the relative slowness and lack of flexibility of the Russian Army, but people seem to forget that even a total nincompoop will tend to get better with practice. As it stands Russia's had eight months of:
  • Getting punished for stupid ideas
  • Firing the people who are most obviously unable to get results
  • Learning the lay of the land
  • Observing the favoured tactics of Ukrainian (and US) doctrine
  • Seasoning hundreds of thousands of troops
All of which also applies to Ukraine of course, but what it definitely means is that the most skilled and veteran part of the Russian Army will be considerably more capable than it was prior to facing a modern army in a major theatre of war. And anecdotally quite a lot of those troops were in Kherson, so would be the ones picking off Ukrainian troops attempting to cross a major natural barrier. I'd be very surprised if that was the course the UA took.
 
Sure, I'm not saying their logistics have been sorted, but I think there's a tendency to lean into a vision of Russia being terminally incapable when it isn't. In fact its more recent moves have been pretty sensible (draw down in defensible positions for winter, force UA to take the fight to you rather than make a grandiose and ultimately futile effort to expand beyond what's already been taken).
 
I don’t think anyone is suggesting the Ukraine army can just rush over the river and retake the rest of the region. It is going to be very hard to do anything of the sort.

The “expert” being interviewed on newsnight last night was very positive about ukraine being able to do just that.
 
Yeah this could lead to a very protracted phase. Russian army dug in has built defences along the river. Now effectively fighting a defensive war.
 
A lot has been made about the relative slowness and lack of flexibility of the Russian Army, but people seem to forget that even a total nincompoop will tend to get better with practice. As it stands Russia's had eight months of:
  • Getting punished for stupid ideas
  • Firing the people who are most obviously unable to get results
  • Learning the lay of the land
  • Observing the favoured tactics of Ukrainian (and US) doctrine
  • Seasoning hundreds of thousands of troops
All of which also applies to Ukraine of course, but what it definitely means is that the most skilled and veteran part of the Russian Army will be considerably more capable than it was prior to facing a modern army in a major theatre of war. And anecdotally quite a lot of those troops were in Kherson, so would be the ones picking off Ukrainian troops attempting to cross a major natural barrier. I'd be very surprised if that was the course the UA took.
They’ve also had eight months of C&C being degraded, their best troops and equipment pummelled or worn out. In some areas they are just repeating costly frontal attacks over and over again, like smashing their heads against a brick wall. Troops commenting on their commanders abandoning them, no instructions or support. It’s still a shit show.

Wagner are making gains around the eastern front at the moment (Bakhmut etc), using an artillery advantage that may have been enhanced by material already arrived from the Kherson withdrawal. The shell shortage from a few months back when HIMARS was detonating huge ammo dumps has been solved by prioritising attacks from places with shorter supply lines, and by bringing supplies direct to units from railheads rather than concentrating them in depots. Lessons are learned. However, I suspect redeployment of Ukrainian kit from the southern front (plus additional supplies) might start pushing back these gains. Note that Ukraine equipment is more mobile and can be redeployed quicker, HIMARS and a lot of self-propelled artillery are on truck chassis so can just drive there, some of the Russian equivalents can only be moved any distance by rail or low loader.
 
I daresay if the Ukrainians face a decently led force they could be made to pay a very high price for taking the fight to the east of the dnipro. So they may yet need more soldiers. As to the disparity in weaponry, h John Poole has written widely on light infantry tactics that may be used to counter the US advantage in firepower, and there's no reason I can see why an imaginative Russian commander couldn't adopt some of these for use against the Ukrainian army. But as you note I said, as time passes the initiative passes to kyiv - but if Russia changes its m.o. the war might take on a different complexion

Countering US advantages comes from them sticking bases in places they're not supposed to be though. Terrain and conditions they aren't familiar with, languages they aren't familiar with, hostile or at best ambivalent locals. An insurgent is used to the land, able to take advantage of local networks, potentially aware of food and water sources; basically able to live flexibly away from fixed supply lines. Technology has changed significantly even over the last decade too... Guided artillery systems, long-range precision artillery (HIMARS etc), better availability of night vision equipment etc. Also Ukraine is a factor here. The land I mean. Distinct lack of jungles, mountains, cave systems etc. Lot of fields. Russia undoubtedly does have access to more flexible troops - Wagner, probably a bunch of the troops that have just left Kherson etc. But how effectively it can leverage those to train recruits is anyone's guess... And equipment is going to remain a huge problem for them. Long and the short of it being that currently Russia is in the position the US is usually in, I'm not sure there's any reason to believe they'll be better at dealing with it, and there are plenty of reasons to believe they'll be worse.
 
Hadn't even thought of this, pointed out by Maksym Eristavi - loads of those flags being held up in Kherson today will've been hidden by people at great risk to themselves. All the mundane things that will have taken great courage, all the stuff these people have been through, just for trying to live their lives, I just hope they'll get the help and support they need.
I'm sure the Ukrainian forces would have brought plenty of spare flags to distribute to anyone wishing to celebrate liberation.
 
And on experienced troops, combat fatigue has been a huge issue for many armies. Some of the most effective units active in early WWII just stopped being able to function properly... Monty's Desert rats, the 51st highland division etc. Need to be properly rotating men, making sure you deal with psychological stress, making sure they're only on rations for limited periods etc. Not sure I trust Russian command to be doing that. Course UA may not either, but it's probably more likely.
 
Countering US advantages comes from them sticking bases in places they're not supposed to be though. Terrain and conditions they aren't familiar with, languages they aren't familiar with, hostile or at best ambivalent locals. An insurgent is used to the land, able to take advantage of local networks, potentially aware of food and water sources; basically able to live flexibly away from fixed supply lines. Technology has changed significantly even over the last decade too... Guided artillery systems, long-range precision artillery (HIMARS etc), better availability of night vision equipment etc. Also Ukraine is a factor here. The land I mean. Distinct lack of jungles, mountains, cave systems etc. Lot of fields. Russia undoubtedly does have access to more flexible troops - Wagner, probably a bunch of the troops that have just left Kherson etc. But how effectively it can leverage those to train recruits is anyone's guess... And equipment is going to remain a huge problem for them. Long and the short of it being that currently Russia is in the position the US is usually in, I'm not sure there's any reason to believe they'll be better at dealing with it, and there are plenty of reasons to believe they'll be worse.
don't talk such rot. american advantages mainly come from their vastly superior firepower. not their infantry tactics. i've named an author, you clearly haven't spent one moment looking at his works, be that the last hundred yards, phantom soldier, super squad... he writes about eg the german storm troopers of the first world war, the sort of light infantry tactics that the russians used in ww2, the north vietnamese, things the americans have forgotten. i've been banging on about the american pivot some years back to prepare for war with peer- and near-peer opponents, you're still farting on about insurgents like that's who the americans will face in the next big war.

e2a: turning to the land, if you look upthread a bit there's a map showing the ukrainians are engaging in partisan warfare around melitopol. seems to me that partisans are a variation on light infantry, so if the ukrainians can do that there i see no basic reason why the russians couldn't employ light infantry in a similar way against ukrainian forces
 
Last edited:
don't talk such rot. american advantages mainly come from their vastly superior firepower. not their infantry tactics. i've named an author, you clearly haven't spent one moment looking at his works, be that the last hundred yards, phantom soldier, super squad... he writes about eg the german storm troopers of the first world war, the sort of light infantry tactics that the russians used in ww2, things the americans have forgotten. i've been banging on about the american pivot some years back to prepare for war with peer- and near-peer opponents, you're still farting on about insurgents like that's who the americans will face in the next big war.

Sorry? What has this got to do with the 'next big war' and who the 'American's will be facing next'? get your head out of 2025.
 
don't talk such rot. american advantages mainly come from their vastly superior firepower. not their infantry tactics. i've named an author, you clearly haven't spent one moment looking at his works, be that the last hundred yards, phantom soldier, super squad... he writes about eg the german storm troopers of the first world war, the sort of light infantry tactics that the russians used in ww2, the north vietnamese, things the americans have forgotten. i've been banging on about the american pivot some years back to prepare for war with peer- and near-peer opponents, you're still farting on about insurgents like that's who the americans will face in the next big war.

e2a: turning to the land, if you look upthread a bit there's a map showing the ukrainians are engaging in partisan warfare around melitopol. seems to me that partisans are a variation on light infantry, so if the ukrainians can do that there i see no basic reason why the russians couldn't employ light infantry in a similar way against ukrainian forces

The latest ISW report does suggest Russian partizan units are operating on the west side of the river.
 
Back
Top Bottom