In a recent article published in
The National Interest, George asserts that Russian and American leaders profoundly misunderstand each other, mutually interpreting fundamentally defensive military preparations as evidence of aggressive military intent. For instance, while U.S. policymakers believe they expanded NATO up to Russia’s borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a purely defensive measure to consolidate democracy and deter Soviet-era-style
aggression, Kremlin leaders interpret those same moves as evidence that the U.S. and its NATO allies are intent on crippling, if not overthrowing, the Russian regime.
Although George’s recent article never uses the phrase, these mutual perceptions of
mistrust could be a textbook example of “
fundamental attribution error," a term coined by social psychologist Lee Ross to describe mistakes that we make in attributing motives to other people’s behavior. An example of attribution error in the current context is that we believe our own behaviors (such as placing NATO troops on or near Russia’s borders in countries like Latvia and Poland) are forced upon us by external factors (Russian military rebuilding in the Putin era) while attributing Russia’s military moves to fundamental internal
personality traits (Putin and other Kremlin leaders are by nature, aggressors).