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Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

I saw some wild speculation about who may have been eating in there as an attempt to justify it but for me even if it’s true the civilian collateral is just too high . Ghastly .
I'm sure many of us remember the Americans doing something similar 20 years ago CNN.com - Airstrike targets senior Iraqi officials - Apr. 8, 2003 US forces launch two-pronged assault on Baghdad clearly no war crimes trial resulted from that, despite the killing of 14 or more civilians. I suspect that should there be any moves towards convening an international war crimes tribunal the legitimacy of such a body would be attacked in the court of public opinion by contrasting those cases where the United States did something in Iraq or Afghanistan without legal consequences even when as in the case of the restaurant it was authorised from the top, with war crimes prosecution in the case of Russia. While such a move would be criticised as whataboutery here I wonder how effective it would be elsewhere
 
I'm sure many of us remember the Americans doing something similar 20 years ago CNN.com - Airstrike targets senior Iraqi officials - Apr. 8, 2003 US forces launch two-pronged assault on Baghdad clearly no war crimes trial resulted from that, despite the killing of 14 or more civilians. I suspect that should there be any moves towards convening an international war crimes tribunal the legitimacy of such a body would be attacked in the court of public opinion by contrasting those cases where the United States did something in Iraq or Afghanistan without legal consequences even when as in the case of the restaurant it was authorised from the top, with war crimes prosecution in the case of Russia. While such a move would be criticised as whataboutery here I wonder how effective it would be elsewhere

And in any case, since neither the Russian Federation nor the United States of America are party to the ICC, it seems unlikely for war crimes prosecutions to be pursued over any of these events in the foreseeable future.
 
I think that woman's mother was making herself heard outside saying her daughter was in there and her daughter, the woman in the photo, was then found and rescued uninjured.
 
And in any case, since neither the Russian Federation nor the United States of America are party to the ICC, it seems unlikely for war crimes prosecutions to be pursued over any of these events in the foreseeable future.
But isn't Ukraine a member of the ICC, in which case it can investigate and indite for crimes committed on Ukrainian territory?
 
However...

"Ukraine is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, but it has twice exercised its prerogatives to accept the Court's jurisdiction over alleged crimes under the Rome Statute occurring on its territory, pursuant to article 12(3) of the Statute. The first declaration lodged by the Government of Ukraine accepted ICC jurisdiction with respect to alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014. The second declaration extended this time period on an open-ended basis to encompass ongoing alleged crimes committed throughout the territory of Ukraine from 20 February 2014 onwards."
 
A dirty bomb would have very little long term effect, and the radiation dose from the initial blast would be so low, that wouldn't have an effect, either.

The whole concept of a dirty bomb is a bit silly, and sounds much worse than it actually is, purely becaus it involves radioactivity, which people have been conditioned to fear.
I would expand on this point by saying that pretty much every mention of radiation and nuclear weapons in this conflict so far has been an unhelpful injection of fear-based propaganda.

I mean its not surprising that people want to factor nuclear weapons into their thinking, but in most circumstances it actually offers us no useful information about what will happen next or what options Putin actually has on his table. Nuclear weapons remain a threat that is hard to convert into action, a stalemate, with the longstanding logic of mutually assured destruction rendering the actual use of the weapons impotent in most scenarios.

There are some limits to this stance, and so I do retain a never say never approach to my thinking on this, but I refuse to promote the fear unless there are really obvious signs that things have spiralled to the extent that such threats become live and actually plausible. We've not come anywhere remotely close to that in this conflict so far.
 
i think you've missed what's been said over the past 18 months about russian nuclear doctrine see eg Russian military doctrine calls a limited nuclear strike "de-escalation." Here's why.
Not really. Thats not a brand new doctrine for Russia, and it borrowed from US thinking from the 1960s, as that article points out. So I dont really think its a real game-changer, its just an explicit attempt this century to formulate and then later revise a doctrine that achieves a sort of parity with longstanding US thinking on such matters.

It is true that such options are perhaps not covered so well by my use of the term Mutually Assured Destruction and the global nuclear armageddon scenario envisaged. But a MAD type escalation is still what ultimately gives this smaller scale threat its teeth, MAD still lurking in the background, still setting off chains of thought that under most scenarios would cause both parties to avoid triggering this sort of smaller scale use of nuclear weapons in the first place.

The Ukraine war is testing the concept of how far support can be extended before being seen as a proxy war that would step over red lines and lead to far more explicit threats of nuclear retaliation. But broadly speaking this is still business as usual in the atomic age, with the nuclear weapons having an effect on how far a side will go with conventional warfare and proxy support, rather than the actual use of nuclear weapons being a serious and imminent prospect.

A few articles in the last week suggest that the recent mutiny triggered backchannel and even more formal, direct discussions between Russia and the USA, with the USA feeling the need to reassure the Russian regime that they are not seeking to exploit that situation to achieve regime change. Nuclear risk does sponsor the urgency with which such things happen at a time like that. I know the reassurances I just described may seem to be at odds with some of Bidens subsequent public rhetoric, but much of the public-facing stuff is just for show, its theatre.
 
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Talk of a six brigade Ukrainian assault in the direction of Lysychansk. It's got tactical benefits (which it would need anyway to be credible), but could this be a feint pending a sucker punch further south?
 
Not really. Thats not a brand new doctrine for Russia, and it borrowed from US thinking from the 1960s, as that article points out. So I dont really think its a real game-changer, its just an explicit attempt this century to formulate and then later revise a doctrine that achieves a sort of parity with longstanding US thinking on such matters.

It is true that such options are perhaps not covered so well by my use of the term Mutually Assured Destruction and the global nuclear armageddon scenario envisaged. But a MAD type escalation is still what ultimately gives this smaller scale threat its teeth, MAD still lurking in the background, still setting off chains of thought that under most scenarios would cause both parties to avoid triggering this sort of smaller scale use of nuclear weapons in the first place.

The Ukraine war is testing the concept of how far support can be extended before being seen as a proxy war that would step over red lines and lead to far more explicit threats of nuclear retaliation. But broadly speaking this is still business as usual in the atomic age, with the nuclear weapons having an effect on how far a side will go with conventional warfare and proxy support, rather than the actual use of nuclear weapons being a serious and imminent prospect.

A few articles in the last week suggest that the recent mutiny triggered backchannel and even more formal, direct discussions between Russia and the USA, with the USA feeling the need to reassure the Russian regime that they are not seeking to exploit that situation to achieve regime change. Nuclear risk does sponsor the urgency with which such things happen at a time like that. I know the reassurances I just described may seem to be at odds with some of Bidens subsequent public rhetoric, but much of the public-facing stuff is just for show, its theatre.
I love the strawman in your first paragraph. It doesn't matter where the doctrine is from or what relationship it had to former us policies. It's that mad is from the period of icbm nuclear warfare and you don't seem to have got that things have changed a bit since then.
 
I love the strawman in your first paragraph. It doesn't matter where the doctrine is from or what relationship it had to former us policies. It's that mad is from the period of icbm nuclear warfare and you don't seem to have got that things have changed a bit since then.
When it comes to what matters, nothing has changed until we actually reach a scenario where a country looks like it is actually going to use a nuclear weapon rather than simply using the fear of them to block other actions/give substance to red lines.

They remain a powerful threat, same as it ever was. People run with that concept into stupid territory where they talk about the possible imminent use of a nuke, or whether Putin will use one in imagined scenario x,y or z. I will continue to speak out against people spending emotional energy on such fears unless we actually end up in a situation where the actual use of a nuclear weapon seems plausible. That has not happened in this conflict so far. Mostly because the mere possibility of one being used in scenario x,y or z makes it unlikely that we will actually see us spiral towards those very scenarios. Thats what impact nuclear weapons have, they are a blocker against certain forms of escalation. If you think otherwise, please put some flesh on the bones of your argument.
 
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Ukrainian writer Victoria Amelina has died from injuries she sustained from the Russian missile attack on a restaurant in Kramatorsk last Tuesday (27/06/23).

Ms Amelina, 37, was a researcher who started documenting war crimes after Russia's full-scale invasion last year. She also started working with children near the frontline.

She died on Saturday (01/07/23), the 13th person to have been killed in the attack. About 60 others were injured.

Last year she unearthed the diary of children's writer Volodymyr Vakulenko, who was abducted and killed by Russian troops in the city of Izyum soon after the invasion.

Her first non-fiction book in English, War and Justice Diary: Looking at Women Looking at War, is due to be published.

In an earlier statement confirming that Amelina had been injured in the attack, PEN Ukraine and war crimes watchdog Truth Hounds said that members of both groups had travelled to the frontlines with Amelina.

"Now, Victoria has become a victim of a war crime herself," they said.

A post pinned to her Twitter profile shows Amelina taking a photo of a bombed building in Ukraine.

"It's me in this picture," the post reads.

"I'm a Ukrainian writer. I have portraits of great Ukrainian poets on my bag. I look like I should be taking pictures of books, art, and my little son. But I document Russia's war crimes and listen to the sound of shelling, not poems. Why?"

Victoria Amelina: Ukrainian writer dies after Kramatorsk strike
 
When it comes to what matters, nothing has changed until we actually reach a scenario where a country looks like it is actually going to use a nuclear weapon rather than simply using the fear of them to block other actions/give substance to red lines.

They remain a powerful threat, same as it ever was. People run with that concept into stupid territory where they talk about the possible imminent use of a nuke, or whether Putin will use one in imagined scenario x,y or z. I will continue to speak out against people spending emotional energy on such fears unless we actually end up in a situation where the actual use of a nuclear weapon seems plausible. That has not happened in this conflict so far. Mostly because the mere possibility of one being used in scenario x,y or z makes it unlikely that we will actually see us spiral towards those very scenarios. Thats what impact nuclear weapons have, they are a blocker against certain forms of escalation. If you think otherwise, please put some flesh on the bones of your argument.
I agree with you by and large. The area where all this line of argument can break down is where mental instability combine with misinformation, poor judgement and a hierarchical command structure. This has always been true, but the pressures of war can make it all much worse, particularly if the war is going badly from your own point of view. I don't know enough about the checks and balances in the Russian military. Are they sufficient to prevent a deranged autocrat from doing the unthinkable?
 
Interesting little article about the counteroffensive

Mmm. Not convinced by it at all.
 
Interesting little article about the counteroffensive


How terrifying must to be for the small initial force? Yeah we just here so the Russians offload all their ammo at us...
 
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