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Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

Could really do with a revised scenario now.

I disagree - he's got the same problem: that there's a solid (35-50%?) Chance that in 18 months he's going lose 50%+ of his supply line. He either needs to have the Russians out (or as near as is possible), or have established a supply line that isn't subject to the vagaries of US politics by then, or knows he's going to have a potentially catastrophic problem in his hands.
 
I disagree - he's got the same problem: that there's a solid (35-50%?) Chance that in 18 months he's going lose 50%+ of his supply line. He either needs to have the Russians out (or as near as is possible), or have established a supply line that isn't subject to the vagaries of US politics by then, or knows he's going to have a potentially catastrophic problem in his hands.
You can of course have a revised scenario, about the same problem, with longer ( as in this case ) or shorter deadlines. Risk factors may be revised accordingly
 
I disagree - he's got the same problem: that there's a solid (35-50%?) Chance that in 18 months he's going lose 50%+ of his supply line. He either needs to have the Russians out (or as near as is possible), or have established a supply line that isn't subject to the vagaries of US politics by then, or knows he's going to have a potentially catastrophic problem in his hands.
tbh i'd say there's an 80-90% chance of him losing his supply lines in 18 months. everything i can see says 2025 is on. and then we all have a catastrophic problem on our hands.
 
Looking at what is going in in Ukraine around this counter-offensive, I keep coming back to the idea that - regardless of the counter-offensive itself - Ukraine is doing quite a comprehensive job of weaponising the possibility of it. We are seeing a lot of disruption on the Russian side that seems to be disproportionate to the effort Ukraine is actually putting in.

Case in point: the shooting down of two ECM helicopters and two fast jets, where there seem to be two possibilities. Either Ukraine shot them down using Buk missiles from near the border, but probably using radar capabilities beyond those of the standard Buk radar control systems (supposition seems to be that they've linked more powerful Western radar systems to the Buk setup, to enable them to do detection and targeting from further back inside Ukraine at less risk to them. The second possibility, which appears to be the official Ukrainian line, is that trigger-happy Russian air defence crews shot down their own aircraft - given the depletion of trained and competent personnel on the Russian side, and the climate of heightened panic and fear arising from the arrival of Storm Shadow, and the many UAV strikes Ukraine has launched in the border regions, this seems conceivable, though I imagine it would suit Ukraine well to maintain this story and thus keep their enhanced anti-air capablilities in the shadows for as long as possible.

Either way, it is going to have made quite a big dent in Russia's sense of invulnerability in the air: whatever happened, 4 state of the art Russian assets fell out of the sky over Russia itself.

Another case in point - the collapse of the lines around Bakhmut. Again, despite the Russian forces holding the flanks around Bachmut being notionally elite units, it appears that the attrition that the Russians have experienced throughout this war means that most of the composition of those units is anything but elite, being made up mostly of mobiks. I'd hazard a guess that quite a lot of the officer level staff are also inexperienced or otherwise of poor quality. So all it has taken has been small, localised attacks at various points along that line (along with a nice bit of decapitation further into Luhansk), and it's been possible to sow sufficient fear and confusion to cause those lines to break up, and start an escalating process of panic and fleeing.

Dr Mike Martin (book out now) talks of the role of psychology in war, and I think it's easy, as we focus on things that go bang, to forget that, to a large extent, it's not the actual bangs that make the difference, but the psychological consequences that result from them. Russia knows this - that's why they have been attacking civilian infrastructure, and why their preferred method of dealing with cities is to bomb them flat with huge amounts of explosive, in a distinctly unsubtle way. Ukraine is, necessarily, because it doesn't have those resources, going for a more subtle approach, presumably on the basis that if you can sow fear in a small way, you can rely on that fear rippling out through the enemy and causing a cascade of failure - hence the Russian outfits holding the flanks collapsing and fleeing, no doubt taking that fear with them back through the lines, and spreading it across a broader front.

Furthermore, I think we will not realise just how effective Ukraine's trolling of the Russians has been until long afterwards, but I think that this might be the first war where the power of social media has been leveraged beyond simply using it as a propaganda medium (vide the Russian approach to Twitter, with set-piece statements from the Usual Suspects). Stuff like NAFO - which the Ukrainian high command appear to be supporting and endorsing - and the various comments, often sarcastic and subtle (remember the commander who silently produced a watermelon during speculation about the location of last year's counteroffensive? :) ) that the Ukrainian establishment has gone in for. It might easily be written off as trivial or silly, but I strongly suspect that such of it as reaches Russian ears might well be provoking equal measures of angry outrage and disconcertion. After all, Ukraine was supposed to crumble, not sit there laughing at their invaders.
 
Looking at what is going in in Ukraine around this counter-offensive, I keep coming back to the idea that - regardless of the counter-offensive itself - Ukraine is doing quite a comprehensive job of weaponising the possibility of it. We are seeing a lot of disruption on the Russian side that seems to be disproportionate to the effort Ukraine is actually putting in.

Case in point: the shooting down of two ECM helicopters and two fast jets, where there seem to be two possibilities. Either Ukraine shot them down using Buk missiles from near the border, but probably using radar capabilities beyond those of the standard Buk radar control systems (supposition seems to be that they've linked more powerful Western radar systems to the Buk setup, to enable them to do detection and targeting from further back inside Ukraine at less risk to them. The second possibility, which appears to be the official Ukrainian line, is that trigger-happy Russian air defence crews shot down their own aircraft - given the depletion of trained and competent personnel on the Russian side, and the climate of heightened panic and fear arising from the arrival of Storm Shadow, and the many UAV strikes Ukraine has launched in the border regions, this seems conceivable, though I imagine it would suit Ukraine well to maintain this story and thus keep their enhanced anti-air capablilities in the shadows for as long as possible.

Either way, it is going to have made quite a big dent in Russia's sense of invulnerability in the air: whatever happened, 4 state of the art Russian assets fell out of the sky over Russia itself.

Another case in point - the collapse of the lines around Bakhmut. Again, despite the Russian forces holding the flanks around Bachmut being notionally elite units, it appears that the attrition that the Russians have experienced throughout this war means that most of the composition of those units is anything but elite, being made up mostly of mobiks. I'd hazard a guess that quite a lot of the officer level staff are also inexperienced or otherwise of poor quality. So all it has taken has been small, localised attacks at various points along that line (along with a nice bit of decapitation further into Luhansk), and it's been possible to sow sufficient fear and confusion to cause those lines to break up, and start an escalating process of panic and fleeing.

Dr Mike Martin (book out now) talks of the role of psychology in war, and I think it's easy, as we focus on things that go bang, to forget that, to a large extent, it's not the actual bangs that make the difference, but the psychological consequences that result from them. Russia knows this - that's why they have been attacking civilian infrastructure, and why their preferred method of dealing with cities is to bomb them flat with huge amounts of explosive, in a distinctly unsubtle way. Ukraine is, necessarily, because it doesn't have those resources, going for a more subtle approach, presumably on the basis that if you can sow fear in a small way, you can rely on that fear rippling out through the enemy and causing a cascade of failure - hence the Russian outfits holding the flanks collapsing and fleeing, no doubt taking that fear with them back through the lines, and spreading it across a broader front.

Furthermore, I think we will not realise just how effective Ukraine's trolling of the Russians has been until long afterwards, but I think that this might be the first war where the power of social media has been leveraged beyond simply using it as a propaganda medium (vide the Russian approach to Twitter, with set-piece statements from the Usual Suspects). Stuff like NAFO - which the Ukrainian high command appear to be supporting and endorsing - and the various comments, often sarcastic and subtle (remember the commander who silently produced a watermelon during speculation about the location of last year's counteroffensive? :) ) that the Ukrainian establishment has gone in for. It might easily be written off as trivial or silly, but I strongly suspect that such of it as reaches Russian ears might well be provoking equal measures of angry outrage and disconcertion. After all, Ukraine was supposed to crumble, not sit there laughing at their invaders.

All the pronouncements coming out from Prigozhin the last week or so are quite wild and seem to play into this version of events as well that from what we see here there does seem to be some unravelling of things on the Russian side.
 
All the pronouncements coming out from Prigozhin the last week or so are quite wild and seem to play into this version of events as well that from what we see here there does seem to be some unravelling of things on the Russian side.
I really don't know what to make of the Prigozhin stuff - it could be a) just him kicking off for his own purposes, b) a nice bit of Russian maskirovka, or c) him making some kind of power bid for the post-Putin scenario. Or something completely different that nobody's thought of. I guess it doesn't really matter beyond the effect it appears to be having on the ground, which I imagine is to make the Russian soldiery feel even more exposed and insecure - that at least appears to be an Actual Thing, if the retreat of the 74th and, I think, 200th is anything to go by.
 
I disagree - he's got the same problem: that there's a solid (35-50%?) Chance that in 18 months he's going lose 50%+ of his supply line. He either needs to have the Russians out (or as near as is possible), or have established a supply line that isn't subject to the vagaries of US politics by then, or knows he's going to have a potentially catastrophic problem in his hands.
I do wonder about Putin's decision to go in when he did. It seems a really bad strategic choice, and wanting until closer ot even after the next US election would have made more sense.

We're the factors pushing him to invade now? Or was it just a really bad decision?
 
Does anyone remember the US's New Earth Army programme

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I do wonder about Putin's decision to go in when he did. It seems a really bad strategic choice, and wanting until closer ot even after the next US election would have made more sense.

We're the factors pushing him to invade now? Or was it just a really bad decision?
I think he was believing his own propaganda, and the reports from his subordinates. The Perun channel on Youtube has a nice piece on the effects of corruption in the Russian military, and Trent Telenko, who has made some pretty bad calls, has some solid stuff on the interaction between corruption and logistics - cheap rotting truck tyres, skipped maintenance, and so on.

Not to mention the effects of the bezdorizhzhia season, which Russia seems unaccountably to have twice ignored, but then again, that's another classic Russian vulnerability: the failure to apply the lessons learned previously. Also see the Vuhledar catastrophe, where successive supposedly elite Russian units walked into a classic Ukrainian trap, costing them huge amounts of personnel and hardware.
 
Talking about the role of psychology in war, this attack on an airbase some 150km inside Russia must have caused concern, it was on the 3rd May, but seems to have only now been confirmed.

 
Talking about the role of psychology in war, this attack on an airbase some 150km inside Russia must have caused concern, it was on the 3rd May, but seems to have only now been confirmed.


Yeah. These attacks are going to have far more psychological impact than the direct damage they do. On two fronts: the military will have to reposition to take account of the potential vulnerabilities of forward air bases, but also because it makes the, ahem, "special military operation" a far less zero-risk option for the Russian people. If you know that missiles/drones have overflown YOUR town (or could) in order to hit an airbase, it becomes a lot harder for the propagandists to paint this as some kind of operation against a bunch of idiot knuckledragging khokhols.
 
Yeah. These attacks are going to have far more psychological impact than the direct damage they do. On two fronts: the military will have to reposition to take account of the potential vulnerabilities of forward air bases, but also because it makes the, ahem, "special military operation" a far less zero-risk option for the Russian people. If you know that missiles/drones have overflown YOUR town (or could) in order to hit an airbase, it becomes a lot harder for the propagandists to paint this as some kind of operation against a bunch of idiot knuckledragging khokhols.

They're fighting all of NATO remember?
 
They're fighting all of NATO remember?
There is that, yes :). But I'm not sure whether that is really going to fly with enough of the Russian population to make a huge difference. It may even count against them, especially if they can't actually show any Big Wins. They were supposed to just roll over NATO, too, after all...
 
I really don't know what to make of the Prigozhin stuff - it could be a) just him kicking off for his own purposes, b) a nice bit of Russian maskirovka, or c) him making some kind of power bid for the post-Putin scenario. Or something completely different that nobody's thought of. I guess it doesn't really matter beyond the effect it appears to be having on the ground, which I imagine is to make the Russian soldiery feel even more exposed and insecure - that at least appears to be an Actual Thing, if the retreat of the 74th and, I think, 200th is anything to go by.

I mean he's an oligargh, never been in the military before, close to Putin, probably surrounded by yes men, and near the front line of a war where he's likely seeing all sorts of military and political problems having real world impacts on the people around him; think it's entirely possible it's a genuine war weary anger and frustration at everything going on?
 
I saw him speak in Manchester in the early 1990s I think . There were quite a few people there 250 or so I would guess and at the end the audience was asked to vote on his thesis which of course very few agreed with and he said something like “I guess history hasn’t finished in Manchester “ .
Which was nice .
 
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Yeah this is the problem, it's not just the "anti-imperialist" side that is full of whackos and vermin.
I read one of Fukayama's books (The Origins of Political Order) and he is actually a much more nuanced thinker than his association with the 90s "End of History" triumphalism would suggest.

I actually found his historical teleology to be surprisingly similar to Marxism, recognising early slave societies as the origins of class society, and viewing some form of tribal democracy (analagous to "primitive communism" in Marxism) as the "natural" human order which class society has alienated us from. His "end of history" conclusion, at least from the book I've read, doesn't actually mention capitalism - he concludes that a triumvirate of political accountability, rule of law, and a strong state are the "final" form of political order, balancing the naturally democratic tendencies of human nature against the demands of large scale and complex economic organisation. In principle, this isn't incompatible with Democratic Socialism, it is only incompatible with Marxist-Leninist "Democratic Centralism" which in practise lacks accountability and rule of law (i.e. executive state power is subject to no serious legal constraints).

But anyway I think the western left could do with reverting to a recognition of "bourgeois revolution" to bring basic rule of law and Parliamentary democracy as something progressive instead of dismissing global south demands for basic democratic accountability as imperialist plots. Liberals (in the political sense) are not the biggest enemy in the world today - if the spread of authoritarian capitalism isn't beaten back then there we won't even have the space to organise a working class movement, and authoritarian capitalism (especially China) also hinders the necessary emergence of an international workers movement as it is impossible to communicate and organise safely with Chinese workers who play an integral role in the world economy, and without whom an international workers movement could never succeed.

I view the Ukraine war as something like a bourgeois-democratic revolution against whatever you call Russia's system (there isn't really a name for it, but it seems defined by dictatorial power operating in the interests of a small number of oligarchs competing for influence and favour with the leader) and support it on that basis. I don't think we can take basic democratic rights for granted these days, and reestablishing the old link between socialist politics and democratic politics is key to reviving socialism as a global force, because it is the only way for Western leftists to make common cause with global south (including Ukraine here, maybe) struggles for basic democratic rights.
 
I read one of Fukayama's books (The Origins of Political Order) and he is actually a much more nuanced thinker than his association with the 90s "End of History" triumphalism would suggest.
I know other people have said similar.
But for all that Fuckyama has injected more nuance and rowed back a little from neoconservatism it would mad to suggest that he is the opponent of anyone fighting for socialism, his politics remain the expansion and extension of capitalism.
I don't think we can take basic democratic rights for granted these days, and reestablishing the old link between socialist politics and democratic politics is key to reviving socialism as a global force, because it is the only way for Western leftists to make common cause with global south (including Ukraine here, maybe) struggles for basic democratic rights.
You are assuming a link between democratic and socialist politics that many would contest did/does not exist. Socialism has had to, and will continue to have to, oppose liberal democracy to achieve its aims.
 
I know other people have said similar.
But for all that Fuckyama has injected more nuance and rowed back a little from neoconservatism it would mad to suggest that he is the opponent of anyone fighting for socialism, his politics remain the expansion and extension of capitalism.

You are assuming a link between democratic and socialist politics that many would contest did/does not exist. Socialism has had to, and will continue to have to, oppose liberal democracy to achieve its aims.

There is a link between democratic and socialist politics. If you don't have the right to freedom of assembly and speech then you can hardly organise a labour movement, can you?
 
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