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Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

We're not getting info about Ukrainian losses so it's impossible to gauge how the battle for Donbas is going but everything does seem to be a bit quiet besides the kharkiv retreat and the azovstal surrender. Ukraine clearly does not, despite all the Internet hype, (yet?) have the offensive capacity to retake lost territory in the south and may not ever. A horrendous settlement and partitioning of Ukraine still feels more likely than Ukraine fully winning and kicking the Russian army out back to 2014 borders. The real losers are the Ukrainians under occupation in such a scenario - the west/North of Ukraine will receive a lot of aid for reconstruction. Mariupol will not.
 
The thing about the Kharkiv advances to me is that a simple glance at Stary Saltiv area on google maps tells you a lot about Russia's (recent) intentions there. The Sivertskiy Donets river is just very large, with marshes, forests etc. It absolutely makes sense from a Russian pov (assuming Donbas focus) to withdraw beyond it, and gradually retreat from Kharkiv. I mean yeah, fucking armchair general shit, but I more mention it because it's easy to get lost in the mix of optimistic/propagandistic talk of 'pushing back to the Russian border' when that may be broadly intentional.
 
The thing about the Kharkiv advances to me is that a simple glance at Stary Saltiv area on google maps tells you a lot about Russia's (recent) intentions there. The Sivertskiy Donets river is just very large, with marshes, forests etc. It absolutely makes sense from a Russian pov (assuming Donbas focus) to withdraw beyond it, and gradually retreat from Kharkiv. I mean yeah, fucking armchair general shit, but I more mention it because it's easy to get lost in the mix of optimistic/propagandistic talk of 'pushing back to the Russian border' when that may be broadly intentional.

See I don't think that is armchair general shit. This sort of thing is just us trying to work out what is going on and what might happen. Which is natural enough surely?

For me Armchair Generals are the ones sitting there going, "Well if I was in charge I'd be doing X, Y and Z.", "What the Ukrainians should do is, blah blah blah."

So that's my tuppence worth on the subject. Armchair analysis perhaps but nothing wrong with that in my book.

eta: A general point, not aimed at Cid in any way. :)
 
We're not getting info about Ukrainian losses so it's impossible to gauge how the battle for Donbas is going but everything does seem to be a bit quiet besides the kharkiv retreat and the azovstal surrender. Ukraine clearly does not, despite all the Internet hype, (yet?) have the offensive capacity to retake lost territory in the south and may not ever. A horrendous settlement and partitioning of Ukraine still feels more likely than Ukraine fully winning and kicking the Russian army out back to 2014 borders. The real losers are the Ukrainians under occupation in such a scenario - the west/North of Ukraine will receive a lot of aid for reconstruction. Mariupol will not.
True, but there are things that people elsewhere in Ukraine can never get back, like in Bucha and Borodianka.
 
We're not getting info about Ukrainian losses so it's impossible to gauge how the battle for Donbas is going but everything does seem to be a bit quiet besides the kharkiv retreat and the azovstal surrender. Ukraine clearly does not, despite all the Internet hype, (yet?) have the offensive capacity to retake lost territory in the south and may not ever. A horrendous settlement and partitioning of Ukraine still feels more likely than Ukraine fully winning and kicking the Russian army out back to 2014 borders. The real losers are the Ukrainians under occupation in such a scenario - the west/North of Ukraine will receive a lot of aid for reconstruction. Mariupol will not.
The real losers are the people who aren't actually party to the war but will starve because food that would have been exported from Russia and Ukraine wasn't. As for Mariupol who knows who'll be in charge there at the end of the war
 
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We're not getting info about Ukrainian losses so it's impossible to gauge how the battle for Donbas is going but everything does seem to be a bit quiet besides the kharkiv retreat and the azovstal surrender. Ukraine clearly does not, despite all the Internet hype, (yet?) have the offensive capacity to retake lost territory in the south and may not ever. A horrendous settlement and partitioning of Ukraine still feels more likely than Ukraine fully winning and kicking the Russian army out back to 2014 borders. The real losers are the Ukrainians under occupation in such a scenario - the west/North of Ukraine will receive a lot of aid for reconstruction. Mariupol will not.

Russia is getting their act together a bit more now, they’ve even developed their own drone-dropped munitions like Ukraine, also using drones to assist with artillery targeting etc (I’ve seen footage and they have very good resolution cameras).

They’re also doing night raids in Donbas with special forces/Wagner types and night vision equipment to target Ukrainian positions and equipment, just sneaking into camps etc - exactly the techniques Ukraine was using earlier in the war when the Russians thought they could just march in and everything would fall over. Catching up.

Still lots of reported issues with Russian morale, and Ukraine having some success with attacks on arms depots etc. to degrade supply lines. Ukraine also having a lot more aircraft up in the sky following supply of spare parts from overseas to get more planes in a flyable state. We are seeing the effect of the big guns supplied by USA etc, stuff like loitering munitions a bit less, I’ve only seen footage of one attack with a Switchblade and it wasn’t that impressive. I don’t know what else they have coming that will help. Cruise missiles still a big problem but the hope is Russia will run out at some point.
 
a big part of this battle of perspectives rests on the notion of whether Ukraine is winning or not.
If it is "winning" and can push back Russian forces all the way out from its borders then the position of the author of that piece adds up. But what if Ukraine isn't winning. What if Russia increasingly succeeds? It already occupies substantial territory, they are utterly ruthless, and there are signs of new advances.

The importance of the narrative of which side is winning makes the information war so important. The most recent example of Ukrainian soldiers from the Azovstal steelworks being described as "evacuated" as opposed to captured and interned in Russian POW camps is just one of many examples of that.

Like many i didnt expect the Russian military machine to be as bad is it appears to be, but I still remain deeply sceptical of the 'Ukraine can repel the Russians completely' line. Even Zelensky at one point said explicitly this was impossible.

If Ukraine isnt winning then the counter-argument of "Is the USA (Nato) really helping or not" kicks in, because at that point it drags out the point at which the conflict will come to some kind of end.

The author says, rightly IMO:
"Ukraine, quite simply, is fighting for its continued existence and the United States is helping it. That it is doing so not out of charity but for its own reasons is so mundane a point to make that it is barely worth mentioning, and yet the idea that the United States may have ulterior motives in helping Ukraine fight against Russia is presented as some sort of uncomfortable truth."

Mundane it may be, but it musn't be forgotten, especially so if Ukraine is found to be "losing". At what point does a peace deal with a loss of territory become the right thing to do. That some argue that it already is so isn't so outlandish if Ukraine is "losing" already. As I say it all comes down to that key perception of who is winning or not.
 
At what point does a peace deal with a loss of territory become the right thing to do.
I don't know. Neither do you or any of the American leftists who want to hand over half of Ukraine to Putin because they think it'll buy 'peace in our time'. What I do know is that as long as the people of Ukraine are willing to fight I'm willing to support them! Are you?
 
I don't know. Neither do you or any of the American leftists who want to hand over half of Ukraine to Putin because they think it'll buy 'peace in our time'. What I do know is that as long as the people of Ukraine are willing to fight I'm willing to support them! Are you?
of course i support the people of ukraine .
 
a big part of this battle of perspectives rests on the notion of whether Ukraine is winning or not.
If it is "winning" and can push back Russian forces all the way out from its borders then the position of the author of that piece adds up. But what if Ukraine isn't winning. What if Russia increasingly succeeds? It already occupies substantial territory, they are utterly ruthless, and there are signs of new advances.

The importance of the narrative of which side is winning makes the information war so important. The most recent example of Ukrainian soldiers from the Azovstal steelworks being described as "evacuated" as opposed to captured and interned in Russian POW camps is just one of many examples of that.

Like many i didnt expect the Russian military machine to be as bad is it appears to be, but I still remain deeply sceptical of the 'Ukraine can repel the Russians completely' line. Even Zelensky at one point said explicitly this was impossible.

If Ukraine isnt winning then the counter-argument of "Is the USA (Nato) really helping or not" kicks in, because at that point it drags out the point at which the conflict will come to some kind of end.

The author says, rightly IMO:
"Ukraine, quite simply, is fighting for its continued existence and the United States is helping it. That it is doing so not out of charity but for its own reasons is so mundane a point to make that it is barely worth mentioning, and yet the idea that the United States may have ulterior motives in helping Ukraine fight against Russia is presented as some sort of uncomfortable truth."

Mundane it may be, but it musn't be forgotten, especially so if Ukraine is found to be "losing". At what point does a peace deal with a loss of territory become the right thing to do. That some argue that it already is so isn't so outlandish if Ukraine is "losing" already. As I say it all comes down to that key perception of who is winning or not.
Not sure why you think Ukraine is unlikely to push Russia back. They've done it near Kharkiv. And it seems logical that Russia's performance will get progressively worse, because they will use up more and more of their best weapons and troops and be unable to replace them in quantity, and their morale will continue to plummet. Whereas Ukraine keeps getting more and better weapons, and their morale is probably improving. If Ukraine takes too many casualties they'll fall back, but that doesn't seem to be happening.
 
a big part of this battle of perspectives rests on the notion of whether Ukraine is winning or not.
If it is "winning" and can push back Russian forces all the way out from its borders then the position of the author of that piece adds up. But what if Ukraine isn't winning. What if Russia increasingly succeeds? It already occupies substantial territory, they are utterly ruthless, and there are signs of new advances.

The importance of the narrative of which side is winning makes the information war so important. The most recent example of Ukrainian soldiers from the Azovstal steelworks being described as "evacuated" as opposed to captured and interned in Russian POW camps is just one of many examples of that.

Like many i didnt expect the Russian military machine to be as bad is it appears to be, but I still remain deeply sceptical of the 'Ukraine can repel the Russians completely' line. Even Zelensky at one point said explicitly this was impossible.

If Ukraine isnt winning then the counter-argument of "Is the USA (Nato) really helping or not" kicks in, because at that point it drags out the point at which the conflict will come to some kind of end.

The author says, rightly IMO:
"Ukraine, quite simply, is fighting for its continued existence and the United States is helping it. That it is doing so not out of charity but for its own reasons is so mundane a point to make that it is barely worth mentioning, and yet the idea that the United States may have ulterior motives in helping Ukraine fight against Russia is presented as some sort of uncomfortable truth."

Mundane it may be, but it musn't be forgotten, especially so if Ukraine is found to be "losing". At what point does a peace deal with a loss of territory become the right thing to do. That some argue that it already is so isn't so outlandish if Ukraine is "losing" already. As I say it all comes down to that key perception of who is winning or not.

You've made this point before. And again, if you're arguing Nato and the West should stop supporting Ukraine's defence efforts in some hope that this will lead to a shorter less bloody war is at best frankly naive. It may well lead to a shorter war but a bloody victory by Russia, likely more of the horrors we've heard about inflicted on the population and a bleak future for the Ukrainians under a Russian regime.

Again, Nato and the West aren't insisting they continue to fight. They're defending their very lives, way of life. Abandoning them to Russia because hey, it will be better in the long run, probably, sorry about that. Stinks.

Also Putin getting the mesage that he can do what he wants to his non Nato neighbours and well maybe one day have a go at testing Nato's resolve. As oft said of him, he respects power and strength. It's all bad but abandoning the Ukrainians now would be immoral and dangerous IMO.

none of which for obvious reasons, means maximum effort and attention should not be put into avoiding a direct war with Russia.
 
The Graun has an edited version, still pretty hardcore.

The work of the medics is impressive, especially considering they're in a steelworks. Looks like one guy has had surgery fixing breaks to his upper arm involving lots of pinning and an external structure, sort of medical scaffolding.

I don't know much about army medical practices, but I should have thought a procedure like that would be more in the remit/realms of an army (or civilian) hospital, rather than frontline first aid and patching up?

And I couldn't help noticing the leg amputees and thinking Hang on, they're under siege in a steelworks, where did they get not one, but two sets of crutches from? And then wondering is that standard kit for medical corps to be carrying round with them, supplies of crutches for the soldiers, some of whom will inevitably get bits of their legs blown off?
 
Actually not 'officially listed' but their defence secretary tweeted he was looking forward to diving it. :thumbs:

Wouldn't it be officially classed as a war grave and therefore off limits for diving?

The jokes at the time of its sinking, about the ship, the Moskva, being reclassified as a submarine were funny, but wouldn't diving the wreck be counted as desecration of a war grave?

Not sure how it works, but I had a vague recollection that navy ships sunk in battle with loss of life were considered sensitive?
 
The thing about the Kharkiv advances to me is that a simple glance at Stary Saltiv area on google maps tells you a lot about Russia's (recent) intentions there. The Sivertskiy Donets river is just very large, with marshes, forests etc. It absolutely makes sense from a Russian pov (assuming Donbas focus) to withdraw beyond it, and gradually retreat from Kharkiv. I mean yeah, fucking armchair general shit, but I more mention it because it's easy to get lost in the mix of optimistic/propagandistic talk of 'pushing back to the Russian border' when that may be broadly intentional.

I can see the sense in withdrawing beyond that area now, but the important bit is why, and that seems simply down to them failing to take Kharkiv, after trying for over two months, and that's because of the Ukrainians' resistance, then the Ukrainians started a serious counteroffensive earlier this month.

So, whilst their withdrawal 'may be broadly intentional' now, it's only because they failed miserably in their mission, and full credit to the Ukrainians for that.

It's still going to be bloody hard to force them to withdraw in the Donbass region and south of the country, if indeed they can, so there's long haul ahead.
 
Wouldn't it be officially classed as a war grave and therefore off limits for diving?

The jokes at the time of its sinking, about the ship, the Moskva, being reclassified as a submarine were funny, but wouldn't diving the wreck be counted as desecration of a war grave?

Not sure how it works, but I had a vague recollection that navy ships sunk in battle with loss of life were considered sensitive?

I wouldn't take it seriously, it just seems like a bit of trolling from the Ukraine Defence Minister.
 
Wouldn't it be officially classed as a war grave and therefore off limits for diving?

The jokes at the time of its sinking, about the ship, the Moskva, being reclassified as a submarine were funny, but wouldn't diving the wreck be counted as desecration of a war grave?

Not sure how it works, but I had a vague recollection that navy ships sunk in battle with loss of life were considered sensitive?

A few War graves - like Royal Oak - are off limits for diving but others can be dived. Some of them have their entrances concreted shut to keep drivers out.

Moskva is in 300ft of water, which is deep for scuba diving, so only high tech divers will be getting close.
 
Mundane it may be, but it musn't be forgotten, especially so if Ukraine is found to be "losing". At what point does a peace deal with a loss of territory become the right thing to do. That some argue that it already is so isn't so outlandish if Ukraine is "losing" already. As I say it all comes down to that key perception of who is winning or not.

Much would depend on what kind of deal it was. For a start, the kidnapped Ukrainian citizens would have to be returned. For that to happen, Russia would have to first admit that they'd taken them in the first place, secondly they'd need to have kept records of who they'd taken and where they'd ended up, which I doubt they've bothered to do. Also anything resembling 'peace' would have to involve war criminals facing justice. Again, this requires Russia admitting to these crimes and agreeing to give up senior officers, hand over records etc. That is inconceivable tbh.

Without those two things as a minimum, never mind actual withdrawal from occupied land, there cannot be 'peace' IMO. The guns might stop firing but the lived reality of Ukrainian people would not be a peaceful one. And as even this would still be a humiliation for Russia, there could be no guarantee they wouldn't just regroup and have another crack at it later on. The demented bullshit about Ukraine being a natural part of Russia; and Ukrainians themselves subhumans, nazis, satanists or whatever will still pervade Russian propaganda and thought.

Anyone who claims there's a simple way to negotiate a way out of this has not been paying attention. It's disappointing that so many 'big name' lefties seem to be in that camp.
 
Not sure how it works, but I had a vague recollection that navy ships sunk in battle with loss of life were considered sensitive?

This is true. The German fleet scuttled at Scapa Flow in 1919 was able to be used as a source of low-background steel because the ships were sunk without loss of life.

But for some reason civillian ships don't seem to get the same reverence. I guess you only get to rest in peace if you were on your way to kill someone else when you died.
 
I can see the sense in withdrawing beyond that area now, but the important bit is why, and that seems simply down to them failing to take Kharkiv, after trying for over two months, and that's because of the Ukrainians' resistance, then the Ukrainians started a serious counteroffensive earlier this month.

So, whilst their withdrawal 'may be broadly intentional' now, it's only because they failed miserably in their mission, and full credit to the Ukrainians for that.

It's still going to be bloody hard to force them to withdraw in the Donbass region and south of the country, if indeed they can, so there's long haul ahead.

That may be important if you're looking at the broader narrative of whether Ukraine has mounted a heroic resistance against an occupier, it may be important if you want to talk about Russia's titanic overestimation of its capabilities in the early stages of the invasion, but that's just not my point. I want to try and get some kind of grasp on what is happening now and, most importantly, how that will pan out both in terms of the people currently under occupation and in terms of the effects on UA more broadly, and consequently global food supply etc. What I was saying with that post is essentially what you put in your last sentence. Kharkiv doesn't tell us that much, if anything, about UA ability to mount offensives against Russia's new strategic aims.

Don't get me wrong here, clearly we're still seeing huge fuckups on Russia's side. I have not one clue what is going on around Severodonetsk, save the rumours that float about on twitter, the stuff on UA maps and occasional confirmed actions. But it's important to remember that UA morale is not some fixed thing, particularly with Donbas potentially turning into something of an attritional conflict.
 
On the Kharkiv situation, the MoD has claimed that the Lieutenant General in charge has been suspended because of the mission's failure.

The UK’s ministry of defence has issued its daily public intelligence briefing on the situation with Russia and Ukraine, and this morning it is concentrating on the situation within Russia’s military.

The ministry claims that Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel has been suspended for failing to capture Kharkiv and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov has been suspended from commanding the Black Sea Fleet.

It says: "A culture of cover-ups and scapegoating is probably prevalent within the Russian military and security system. Many officials involved in the invasion of Ukraine will likely be increasingly distracted by efforts to avoid personal culpability for Russia’s operational set-backs." LINK
 
That may be important if you're looking at the broader narrative of whether Ukraine has mounted a heroic resistance against an occupier, it may be important if you want to talk about Russia's titanic overestimation of its capabilities in the early stages of the invasion, but that's just not my point. I want to try and get some kind of grasp on what is happening now and, most importantly, how that will pan out both in terms of the people currently under occupation and in terms of the effects on UA more broadly, and consequently global food supply etc. What I was saying with that post is essentially what you put in your last sentence. Kharkiv doesn't tell us that much, if anything, about UA ability to mount offensives against Russia's new strategic aims.

Don't get me wrong here, clearly we're still seeing huge fuckups on Russia's side. I have not one clue what is going on around Severodonetsk, save the rumours that float about on twitter, the stuff on UA maps and occasional confirmed actions. But it's important to remember that UA morale is not some fixed thing, particularly with Donbas potentially turning into something of an attritional conflict.

We seem to be in agreement, from what little information we are getting it seems that things, away from Kharkiv, are basically stalled ATM, and it could go either way, depending of the morale on both sides and possibly who starts running out of weapons first, it could well drag on for many months, or even years, :(
 
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