Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

[dilute micro]

This is what you said yesterday:



And that's what I was responding to. The specific claim that the Ukrainians are currently "advancing". Based on the evidence we have, yes they are making small advances here and there. But Russia is making small advances here and there too. And in both cases the advances are very very small, in relation to the area of the occupied territory. The NYT article I posted, with the red and blue areas, seems to support my general impression with some actual numbers.

To say "the Russians are not holding the current position" is, I think, misleading. For all intents and purposes, that is what they are managing to do, at the moment.

It may further confound you but for both Ukraine and Russia taking ground isn't always for the purpose taking and holding it. Sometimes it's done to force the other side to expend resources and with no intention of keeping that ground due to any number of reasons - topography, distance from artillery support and so forth.

But at Robotyne there is a real effort to take ground. Russia is trying to stop Ukraine but can't. Not only that, they've tried to retake areas there, but have failed.

 

[dilute micro]

you don't have a fucking clue. you link to something where some of the terms are explicitly described as maneuvers, and there's no way on god's green earth that a maneuver is a strategy. tell you what, have a look at something like an annotated guide to tactics or b.a. friedman's 'on tactics' and find out about the things which currently confuse you. sure, there will be different plans for different sections of the front but they will be coordinated by the ukrainian general staff, it's not like general a goes off to one section and general b goes to another and they work without any communication or general plan guiding them.

....described.....as....maneuvers... And? You don't have a clue. There are several strategies from that list that are being employed in Ukraine, more than several. You were trying to simplify with "the strategy". No, there's many.

 

[teuchter]

It may further confound you but for both Ukraine and Russia taking ground isn't always for the purpose taking and holding it. Sometimes it's done to force the other side to expend resources and with no intention of keeping that ground due to any number of reasons - topography, distance from artillery support and so forth.

Not sure why you think this would confound me, seeing as a few posts ago I quoted some ISW commentary that described Russia doing exactly this.

 

[DownwardDog]

There will be a time to make that final judgement, but it isn't now.

When will it be time to make that judgement?

 

[Pickman's model]

....described.....as....maneuvers... And? You don't have a clue. There are several strategies from that list that are being employed in Ukraine, more than several. You were trying to simplify with "the strategy". No, there's many.

if there were then one might expect informed sources to make reference to them. but they don't, eg this from yesterday

Seizing the Initiative in Ukraine: Waging War in a Defense Dominant World

Ukraine retains the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day, based on new CSIS analysis of the summer offensive and a comparative review of cases since World War I.

www.csis.org

for my money you're ignorant of the levels of warfare and this is leading you into confusion

The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis

The author explains the concept of the levels of war and positions them as levels of analysis. Taught in the Command and General Staff Officers’ Course, the levels of analysis clarify thinking and are used as an approach to research and analysis

www.armyupress.army.mil

 

[dilute micro]

When will it be time to make that judgement?

I guess that will be when key capabilities are exhausted to the point that Ukraine can't work around it. That time isn't now, though.

 

[dilute micro]

if there were then one might expect informed sources to make reference to them. but they don't, eg this from yesterday

Seizing the Initiative in Ukraine: Waging War in a Defense Dominant World

Ukraine retains the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day, based on new CSIS analysis of the summer offensive and a comparative review of cases since World War I.

www.csis.org

for my money you're ignorant of the levels of warfare and this is leading you into confusion

The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis

The author explains the concept of the levels of war and positions them as levels of analysis. Taught in the Command and General Staff Officers’ Course, the levels of analysis clarify thinking and are used as an approach to research and analysis

www.armyupress.army.mil

Only you would be this persnikety. This isn't a war college, so there's no need to subscribe to using levels of war as levels of analysis. It's perfectly fine to call defence in depth, fabian strategy, air supremacy, and so on as strategies.

 

[Pickman's model]

Only you would be this persnikety. This isn't a war college, so there's no need to subscribe to using levels of war as levels of analysis. It's perfectly fine to call defence in depth, fabian strategy, air supremacy, and so on as strategies.

to take but one example from your post, air supremacy isn't a strategy, you either have it or you don't. it's perhaps an aspiration or a pre-condition for other things but it isn't a strategy. it's like you want words to mean what you want them to mean instead of their common or garden meaning.

 

[dilute micro]

Interesting bit here. Everyone saw this coming a while ago. Russia has fallen below Ukraine in number of daily artillery shots fired. Inbound North Korean aid will put Russia above again for a little longer.


Silicon Curtain link

 

[manji]

Interesting bit here. Everyone saw this coming a while ago. Russia has fallen below Ukraine in number of daily artillery shots fired. Inbound North Korean aid will put Russia above again for a little longer.

View attachment 395479Ian
Silicon Curtain link

Even if that were true which I doubt it’s about accuracy. The Russian multiple missile launchers have a system where each rocket has a different destination.

 

[a_chap]

...each rocket has a different destination.

Their quality control has always been shocking.

 

[teuchter]

Interesting bit here. Everyone saw this coming a while ago. Russia has fallen below Ukraine in number of daily artillery shots fired. Inbound North Korean aid will put Russia above again for a little longer.

View attachment 395479
Silicon Curtain link

It doesn't seem you are looking at the chart and its sources very closely. You'll notice that the final pair of numbers are for "IV qtr 2023" and as today is only the 14th of October, so the numbers for the average number of daily shots for the 4th quarter of 2023 can only be projections.

So, even if all of this data were accurate and reliable, we couldn't say that "Russia has fallen below Ukraine".

Where does the chart com from? It comes from somewhere on twitter - here:



and where has Roman Sheremata got the numbers from? He got them from here, another twitter user, @HerrDr8 :



Here is @HerrDr8's analysis:



And he does give sources for his estimates, some of which aren't just other twitter handles. But he doesn't give any sources for the Russian estimate for Q3 2023. And he doesn't give any sources for the Q4 estimates for either side... presumably because Q4 hasn't actually happened yet.

 

[Pickman's model]

It doesn't seem you are looking at the chart and its sources very closely. You'll notice that the final pair of numbers are for "IV qtr 2023" and as today is only the 14th of October, so the numbers for the average number of daily shots for the 4th quarter of 2023 can only be projections.

So, even if all of this data were accurate and reliable, we couldn't say that "Russia has fallen below Ukraine".

Where does the chart com from? It comes from somewhere on twitter - here:



and where has Roman Sheremata got the numbers from? He got them from here, another twitter user, @HerrDr8 :



Here is @HerrDr8's analysis:

View attachment 395503

And he does give sources for his estimates, some of which aren't just other twitter handles. But he doesn't give any sources for the Russian estimate for Q3 2023. And he doesn't give any sources for the Q4 estimates for either side... presumably because Q4 hasn't actually happened yet.

For me that's your best post on urban

 

[kabbes]

Just one thing to point out there: you don’t need to project Q4 to have a daily average for it — I would guess it just means the daily average to date.

 

[teuchter]

That's not the same thing as the daily average for Q4 though. It's the daily average for the first week or two of October. Just like the daily average for Q1 2022 is not the same thing as the daily average for 2022.

Of course, if the "estimates" for the first two weeks of October are accurate then you can indeed say that Ukraine has overtaken Russia at this moment in time. But we have no idea what the sources are or how those estimates were made.

The more I look at that spreadsheet the more questions I have. For example, where does the 28k number for Russia in 1Q23 come from? Is this guy someone I can trust to be careful with numbers?

 

[kabbes]

It’s pretty standard to label the figures for the quarter you’re currently in as being that quarter’s figures. I don’t think there’s any shenanigans there. It’s not like we don’t all know what the date is. And it is interesting to note that the daily rate for this quarter so far is lower than the daily rates of earlier quarters

 

[dilute micro]

That's not the same thing as the daily average for Q4 though. It's the daily average for the first week or two of October. Just like the daily average for Q1 2022 is not the same thing as the daily average for 2022.

Of course, if the "estimates" for the first two weeks of October are accurate then you can indeed say that Ukraine has overtaken Russia at this moment in time. But we have no idea what the sources are or how those estimates were made.

The more I look at that spreadsheet the more questions I have. For example, where does the 28k number for Russia in 1Q23 come from? Is this guy someone I can trust to be careful with numbers?

Did you really think Russia was incapable of running out of artillery shells? It's been well written about in the news since last year, so has been the need for assistance from other countries. It's not a surprise.

 

[teuchter]

Did you really think Russia was incapable of running out of artillery shells?

No. Where did I say that?

 

[teuchter]

It’s pretty standard to label the figures for the quarter you’re currently in as being that quarter’s figures. I don’t think there’s any shenanigans there. It’s not like we don’t all know what the date is. And it is interesting to note that the daily rate for this quarter so far is lower than the daily rates of earlier quarters

How interesting it is, depends on what the information is based on though doesn't it? And we aren't told this.

If we look at the numbers given for Russia for 1Q23, there is a spread of estimates between 15K and 25K (which somehow ends up as 28K on the chart).

So if the 7K for 4Q23 is based on one estimate, provided by someone-or-the-other in the first week or two of that quarter, it would be quite reasonable to expect that other estimates could be going on for half of that or twice that. Who knows.

We're looking at a chart made by some twitter account which doesn't give any sources for the relevant bits of info, and it's being suggested that we can conclude that Russia has now fallen below Ukraine. Maybe they have, but it seems premature to me. The chart just seems to be a projection of what people are expecting to happen, and as such doesn't seem to bring any new info to light.

 

[cupid_stunt]

Oh, do shut up, man.

 

[kabbes]

How interesting it is, depends on what the information is based on though doesn't it? And we aren't told this.

If we look at the numbers given for Russia for 1Q23, there is a spread of estimates between 15K and 25K (which somehow ends up as 28K on the chart).

So if the 7K for 4Q23 is based on one estimate, provided by someone-or-the-other in the first week or two of that quarter, it would be quite reasonable to expect that other estimates could be going on for half of that or twice that. Who knows.

We're looking at a chart made by some twitter account which doesn't give any sources for the relevant bits of info, and it's being suggested that we can conclude that Russia has now fallen below Ukraine. Maybe they have, but it seems premature to me. The chart just seems to be a projection of what people are expecting to happen, and as such doesn't seem to bring any new info to light.

Oh, I have no idea if the numbers are accurate or just made up or somewhere in between. Any problem it has in that regard is nothing to do with labelling the current Q4 figure as Q4, though. Either the numbers are accurate, and that makes the pattern as a whole (including Q4) interesting and pertinent. Or the numbers are not accurate and the whole thing is irrelevant.

 

[JimW]

Even if it only broadly reflects reality it is pretty striking, so to speak.

 

[Artaxerxes]

Oh, do shut up, man.

We’ve had quite enough of experts round these parts (just as well really considering their rarity)

 

[teuchter]

The infographic by @HerrDr8 is actually dated "30 sept 2023" if you look at the top.

So, the numbers beyond that date are clearly just his projections, not even estimates based on limited real info. It's been taken by that other twitterer and made into a chart that presents it as fact. Then this gets flung around the internet, including on here, and read uncritically.

 

[The39thStep]

Even if it only broadly reflects reality it is pretty striking, so to speak.

This thread or the whole boards on Urban ?

 

[kabbes]

The infographic by @HerrDr8 is actually dated "30 sept 2023" if you look at the top.

So, the numbers beyond that date are clearly just his projections, not even estimates based on limited real info. It's been taken by that other twitterer and made into a chart that presents it as fact. Then this gets flung around the internet, including on here, and read uncritically.

Your eyes are better than mine! I can’t read that.

As a projection, it remains interesting or not only based on the accuracy of the numbers, of course. If the numbers are right, the trend is meaningful with or without inclusion of the first few weeks of October. It provides a testable theory, which we can see if it plays out. If the numbers are wrong, the whole lot is meaningless anyway.

 

[dilute micro]

The infographic by @HerrDr8 is actually dated "30 sept 2023" if you look at the top.

So, the numbers beyond that date are clearly just his projections, not even estimates based on limited real info. It's been taken by that other twitterer and made into a chart that presents it as fact. Then this gets flung around the internet, including on here, and read uncritically.

No, not at all. At the end of December Russia's numbers, at least, will have changed with that line moving upward again - which I mentioned in the initial post. There's very little chance they're just going to sit on the new supplies and wait until 2024 to start up again. But after having used up what North Korea can supply, Russia's numbers will again drop based partly on why they're burning through so much artillery shells, which has also been written about because this is a thing that matters.

Russia Has More Artillery Than Ukraine. But Russian Gunners Have A Bad Habit Of Shelling ... Nothing.

 

[teuchter]

No, not at all. At the end of December Russia's numbers, at least, will have changed with that line moving upward again - which I mentioned in the initial post. There's very little chance they're just going to sit on the new supplies and wait until 2024 to start up again. But after having used up what North Korea can supply, Russia's numbers will again drop based partly on why they're burning through so much artillery shells, which has also been written about because this is a thing that matters.

Russia Has More Artillery Than Ukraine. But Russian Gunners Have A Bad Habit Of Shelling ... Nothing.

Ok. Yes we should be trying to understand why Russia's numbers are dropping, if they are continuing to do so.

It's also important to have an eye out for inaccurate information, and false or misleading statements like:

Russia has fallen below Ukraine in number of daily artillery shots fired.

And try and understand why such statements get made, which of course is to do with motivated reasoning and confirmation bias.

 

[dilute micro]

Ok. Yes we should be trying to understand why Russia's numbers are dropping, if they are continuing to do so.

It's also important to have an eye out for inaccurate information, and false or misleading statements like:



And try and understand why such statements get made, which of course is to do with motivated reasoning and confirmation bias.

If they're continuing to do so? Why only then? Why not all along since the war started? You're incredibly naive to think that a graph that includes Q4 on the chart is trying to fool anyone or that in a matter of hours Russia will unleash a barrage that would dramatically change the numbers. Those statements get made probably because they're true and significant on predicting what to expect in the future. This intersect on the graph is no surprise. In other words, the trend has been noticed for a long time. It wouldn't even matter if the graph was indeed wrong, and Russia and Ukraine are actually even at this point, which is hardly possible because they can detect artillery. The important thing is an artillery-based army is disarming itself for no good reason. It points to what is seen in other parts of their army - terrible command, and in this case, terrible battlefield command.


As Milley said:

“The Russians have run into a lot of problems. They've got command-and-control issues, logistics issues. They've got morale issues, leadership issues and a wide variety of other issues.”

And this too from the link above:

There’s a “near-absence of reversionary courses of action” in the Russian fire-control system, analysts Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds explained in a study for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

What that means is, in Russian doctrine, brigades, battalions and batteries tend to freeze up in the absence of detailed instructions from higher command. While awaiting fresh orders, lower units just keep doing what they already were doing. Even when it doesn’t make sense. Even when the current course of action is killing friendly troops.

“This approach has probably had the greatest impact in creating a gap between potential and actual capability as regards Russian fires,” Zabrodskyi, Watling, Danylyuk and Reynolds wrote.

Russian gunners simply don’t think for themselves. “All reported contacts are treated as true. All fire missions appear to be given equal priority and are prosecuted in the order in which they are received unless an order to prioritize a specific mission comes from higher authority.”

“It seems that those directing fire missions either do not have access to contextual information or are indifferent to it,” the analysts added.

If this is the reason why Russia is burning through shells at such a rate, it's not something that is going to be fixed by new supplies of shells. It won't be fixed any time soon, if at all.

 

[DownwardDog]

In conclusion, nobody has a fucking clue what's going on.