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Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

People shouldn't read too much into early losses especially considering most of the info is coming from the Russian side, Russia has had chance to create several defensive lines, and we don't know the bigger picture yet.
I'm fairly happy to go with ISW's mapping & reporting - although they are based in the States they do try very hard to verify details, although only using information in the public domain. When they can't confirm something, then they say "reporting suggests" or similar. Otherwise it is omitted.
 
Worth noting that there are two very different objectives here in the information warfare domain (wanky workspeak) - Russia is absolutely desperate to highlight/make up Ukrainian failures for very obvious reasons, Ukraine however is absolutely desperate to avoid highlighting Ukrainian successes, because those are the areas it's going to pour it's finite resources into, not places where it's probing attacks are being repelled, and it could really do with not telegraphing where they are thinking about concentrating their mass to the Russians.

So while we will see video of Ukrainian armoured groups rolling across the Steppe while the remains of Russian tanks smoke gently in the background - because Ukraine does still have a domestic political requirement for that - we are, imv, going to see far more of the triamphalist stuff from the Russians that the Ukrainians, regardless of what's actually happening on the ground.

My personal suspicion is that what goes into - and out of - the media is that Ukraine's summer offensive is going to look like the opposite of Blitzkrieg. Heavier losses than planned, all a bit more crap than hoped, Russians far more able than advertised, and then in September/October someone is going to look at a map and discover that Ukraine has reduced Russian held territory by 50%+.

It's not going to be how it feels that matters, it's going to be what it looks like in October/November.

Obviously there's a tension here - from a military perspective the least said about successes the better, but from an information warfare perspective you could argue that what you want is wild, unconstrained panic in Moscow. I think the first will win, but I won't discount the second - having your enemy dissolve into chaotic interfactional warfare in its capital city is a lot easier on your casualty rate than fighting tooled-up armoured Divisions.
 
Worth noting that there are two very different objectives here in the information warfare domain (wanky workspeak) - Russia is absolutely desperate to highlight/make up Ukrainian failures for very obvious reasons, Ukraine however is absolutely desperate to avoid highlighting Ukrainian successes, because those are the areas it's going to pour it's finite resources into, not places where it's probing attacks are being repelled, and it could really do with not telegraphing where they are thinking about concentrating their mass to the Russians.

So while we will see video of Ukrainian armoured groups rolling across the Steppe while the remains of Russian tanks smoke gently in the background - because Ukraine does still have a domestic political requirement for that - we are, imv, going to see far more of the triamphalist stuff from the Russians that the Ukrainians, regardless of what's actually happening on the ground.

My personal suspicion is that what goes into - and out of - the media is that Ukraine's summer offensive is going to look like the opposite of Blitzkrieg. Heavier losses than planned, all a bit more crap than hoped, Russians far more able than advertised, and then in September/October someone is going to look at a map and discover that Ukraine has reduced Russian held territory by 50%+.

It's not going to be how it feels that matters, it's going to be what it looks like in October/November.

Obviously there's a tension here - from a military perspective the least said about successes the better, but from an information warfare perspective you could argue that what you want is wild, unconstrained panic in Moscow. I think the first will win, but I won't discount the second - having your enemy dissolve into chaotic interfactional warfare in its capital city is a lot easier on your casualty rate than fighting tooled-up armoured Divisions.
Cheers - intersting stuff.
Im thinking also that early part of the offensive is going to be the hardest - attacking well defended static defences that have been in place for many months is going to be a costly, bloody grind (think El Alamein was weeks of relentless artillary, stalemate and slogging before the german lines broke - ditto normandy) . The key is if/when UKR breaks through how quickly they can exploit it vs how effectively Russia can plug any gaps. Its here that UKR advantage in inteliigence, mobility and abiltiy to improvise on the ground could prove decisive. Fairly easy to order unmotivated, undertrained grunts to hold static postions where they just shoot back from behind concrete - bit different if you have to quickly move forces into a rapidly changing, chaotic situation where units on the ground have to think on their feet.
 
Cheers - intersting stuff.
Im thinking also that early part of the offensive is going to be the hardest - attacking well defended static defences that have been in place for many months is going to be a costly, bloody grind (think El Alamein was weeks of relentless artillary, stalemate and slogging before the german lines broke - ditto normandy) . The key is if/when UKR breaks through how quickly they can exploit it vs how effectively Russia can plug any gaps. Its here that UKR advantage in inteliigence, mobility and abiltiy to improvise on the ground could prove decisive. Fairly easy to order unmotivated, undertrained grunts to hold static postions where they just shoot back from behind concrete - bit different if you have to quickly move forces into a rapidly changing, chaotic situation where units on the ground have to think on their feet.
I think one advantage this time around is the availability to Ukraine of precision munitions to take out C&C / observation posts and dug in artillery / ammunition / field kitchens.
Don't laugh at the last - nothing more demoralising for troops expecting food etc is to find that it's all gone up in smoke & little bits. There's only so long that grunts will last on cold field rat-packs, even in summer.
 
I suppose the ideal is something like what happened with the eastern counteroffensive last year - Ukraine manages to break Russian lines to the point where they cut and run. And, let's face it, Russia knows that's a risk - that's what having "blocking forces" is all about.

The difficulty is getting to that point. They managed it last year via large-scale misdirection - lots of hints that Kherson was going to be the main target, which the Russian leadership swallowed. I'd be surprised if they'd get away with anything quite so straightforward again (although, with Russia, you just never know - they haven't proven themselves to be adept at learning from their mistakes). So the new Ukrainian approach seems to be "is this the counteroffensive, or just a probing attack?". The difficulty with that is that, in the short term, if Russia responds to every probing attack as if it's the counteroffensive, then the Ukrainian attacks are going to be subject to overwhelming force in the short term. But in the process, they are going to be running the Russian reserve ragged (alliteration FTW), and thinning them out. If they can keep that up for long enough, given that they'll experience a fair amount of attrition of their own in the process, they can reach a point where all reserves are committed, and weak points stay weak. At which point they can start going for a breakthrough at one or more of those weak points.

The old 3:1 defender advantage thing gets mentioned a lot, but I that assumes some degree of equality of personnel and materiel, not least a high level of commitment to the defence, and guns/machines that aren't worn out from being used for 18 months. Not to mention the rather better initial quality of a fair chunk of Ukraine's kit. It seems likely that Ukraine is in a position to attack the Russian rear from in front, using accurate longer-range guns, which - as StoneRoad just pointed out - isn't good for logistics or morale. If there are blocking forces, and Ukraine knows where they are, they can also be targeted, giving the front line Russian troops more of an opportunity to cut and run. And there's quite a lot of Western aerial stuff like Rivet Joint hanging around over the Black Sea, so they probably have a better idea what's going on in the Russian lines than Russia does about Ukraine.
 
People shouldn't read too much into early losses especially considering most of the info is coming from the Russian side, Russia has had chance to create several defensive lines, and we don't know the bigger picture yet.
I don't see much point into reading anything into any random image, or indeed trusting uncoroborated statements of any of the belligerents.
 
I don't see much point into reading anything into any random image, or indeed trusting uncoroborated statements of any of the belligerents.
TBF, that's a bit "they're all as bad as each other".

Of course Ukraine is going to lie and misdirect, and anyone accepting everything they say at face value would be a fool.

But there are countless situations where Russia has made statements which are patently false on their face, and to no particularly good end.
 
Give the media blackout, how do you know it's a minor setback?
It's not a media blackout though. The Russians are posting every positive thing that happens to them. It's only a blackout for the Ukrainian side, so we're not going to see anything positive until it's done and dusted. The best we can do is try to estimate how it's going by what Russian media is posting.
 
It's not a media blackout though. The Russians are posting every positive thing that happens to them. It's only a blackout for the Ukrainian side, so we're not going to see anything positive until it's done and dusted. The best we can do is try to estimate how it's going by what Russian media is posting.

And, no doubt posting every positive thing that they have just made up, and which hasn't actually happened.
 
It's not a media blackout though. The Russians are posting every positive thing that happens to them. It's only a blackout for the Ukrainian side, so we're not going to see anything positive until it's done and dusted. The best we can do is try to estimate how it's going by what Russian media is posting.

What's the point of doing that? Why not accept that it's not possible to make a credible "estimate" from such a source.
 
Why do you think that?
The Wagner leader has been constantly having a go at the Russian leaders for not providing proper equipment for them. Now the Russians have decided that for Wagner to continue working for them they have to sign contracts.

Wagner man says he isn't going to sign them.

These guys are pretty much guns for hire. They won't do contracts etc.

But they might go where the money is. And where the proper equipment and supply lines are. That's 50k highly volatile and paid for people that not only know the Russians plans, but could switch sides in a heartbeat if they aren't getting what they want.

Obvs, I could be wrong.

You could have always read the link though.
 
The Wagner leader has been constantly having a go at the Russian leaders for not providing proper equipment for them. Now the Russians have decided that for Wagner to continue working for them they have to sign contracts.

Wagner man says he isn't going to sign them.

These guys are pretty much guns for hire. They won't do contracts etc.

But they might go where the money is. And where the proper equipment and supply lines are. That's 50k highly volatile and paid for people that not only know the Russians plans, but could switch sides in a heartbeat if they aren't getting what they want.

Obvs, I could be wrong.

You could have always read the link though.
Thanks but that doesn’t really add up. Why do you think the Wagner bloke wants to be the next Putin?
 
I think it's easy to overestimate Wagner et al as playahs...

Wagner has X or Y men/material, but what it doesn't have is any logistics. It is entirely dependant on the Russian military moving it and supplying it with everything - so, for example it can't go from fighting in Ukraine to fisticuffs with the 2nd Taman (Guards) Motor Rifle Division and the FSB in Red Square without buying 10,000 off peak returns to Moscow, which the FSB will notice, and be unhappy about.

Progozin is, like Kadyrov, is not really a playah in his own right - neither are Aethlings, those on the pool to succeed the Glorious Prince Vlad of St Petersburg who will tragically, unforeseeably and accidentally, fall out of a 20th story window while sleeping - but they are more minor characters who have to be bought off by the competing Aethlings, more in order to avoid them being bought by another Aethling than because they are needed per se - both will adjust to the new leader in short order. Kadyrov because it's federal money he doles out to keep him the jefe, and Progozin because whatever Wagner is, what it isn't is a match for the Russian Army.
 
The Wagner leader has been constantly having a go at the Russian leaders for not providing proper equipment for them. Now the Russians have decided that for Wagner to continue working for them they have to sign contracts.

Wagner man says he isn't going to sign them.

These guys are pretty much guns for hire. They won't do contracts etc.

But they might go where the money is. And where the proper equipment and supply lines are. That's 50k highly volatile and paid for people that not only know the Russians plans, but could switch sides in a heartbeat if they aren't getting what they want.

Obvs, I could be wrong.

You could have always read the link though.
I think that switching sides might not be that easily achieved, don't suppose the Ukrainians will be so receptive to that sort of walk-in
 
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