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Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

Thing is, you actually need to think about what Russia's demands are, and then decide if you can take them seriously, long before you can think about negotiating them.

'look, we need a sphere of influence where things like democracy, rule of law and territorial integrity don't count because otherwise we're not going to be able to maintain our hyper-nationalistic, dictatorial gangster state where we periodically invade our neighbours while poisoning journalists and opposition politicians, and half our population don't have indoor toilets...'.

Thats what Russia's 'legitimate security concerns' are: they aren't about the security of the Russian people, they're about the security of the Russian gangster power structures. 'Russia the construct' firstly the empire, then the Soviet Union, then the Putin-state, simply cannot survive with wealthy, democratic states on it's doorstep - that's the buffer zone it needs, not a military one.
 
Well we can certainly take them seriously in the sense that we take their ability to wage war and death on others seriously. Even when they fuck up a war like this one they still cause plenty of death and destruction.

And we arent going to be able to explore such things without getting into arguments about capitulating to bullies and threats of force. And some people wont like it if we try to discuss such things in isolation, because some will want to compare these phenomenon with how we treat the demands, threats and actions of other bullies who resort to force. But some others never want to accept any equivalence with violent western nations at any point, and understandably certainly not during a period of time where its Russia indulging in war.

Russia wants puppet states around its borders, thats for sure. And this sort of thing is why we struggle to accept peace 'at any cost'. We want to struggle against such things, but we dont get to weigh up these possibilities evenly across all the potential situations where such possibilities arise. There are wild variations in terms of when the required sacrifices are deemed to be worth it, and when we feel we ultimately have little choice but to fall silent, shake our heads and resort to doublethink or double standards. And I suspect that a fair chunk of those who support Ukraine wholeheartedly now still fear the possibility that at some future point the rug may be pulled out from under their feet by powerful players on 'our side' of the equation. If the likes of the US start looking for an exit strategy, then we should have those fears and many in Ukraine will end up feeling used and then abandoned.
 
A brief skim over news articles from February and March suggest that the NATO stuff is exactly what Putin wanted to talk about and make demands about and go on and on about for hours and hours. We'd only have heard about the next stage of that if there had been any appetite to negotiate over such things from our own side. And since there was very little progress, I cannot make any claims about exactly how far those demands would have stretched. We didnt even reach the stage where this would have been spelt out as bluntly in our media as I am doing. Nor am I suggesting that we should have had those negotiations or offered loads on that front.

eg: In Moscow, Macron found a different, tougher Putin

And even Chomsky does not paint those particular talks as something the US etc scuppered. He instead refers to the earlier possibilities based on the Minsk agreement in order to make his usual complaint, and makes it clear that Putin rejected Macrons efforts. This quote is from a very recent interview:



He then moves on to later peace efforts, once the war was already underway, in order to insinuate that the US & UK scuppered those.

Thats from Chomsky: Options for Diplomacy Decline as Russia’s War on Ukraine Escalates

So I'd probably have to go back to the Minsk stuff instead in order to pick at the detail of any viable pre-war negotiations.
Yes, start a war then negotiate. That's what I remember too. Tried and tested I guess.

But no chance to start any negotiations though in eg. 2000, 2001, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 (prior to invading Crimea). Minsk in 2014/15 was the same start a war then negotiate, then nothing more in 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 or 22 - till after yet another invasion begins.

If any other country behaved like this, nobody would be trying to defend it. But because Russia is the rump-USSR (defender of world bolshevism) .. well it's fairly clear why it gets excused.
 
Who is excusing it? People seeking to explore the detail of the factors that lead to war are not all trying to excuse it. Its all down to choice of framing, excuse or explanation etc. And yes, those who are genuine apologists for the actions of Russia get in on that action too, can use it to muddy the waters and build their simplistic versions of reality. All the more reason not to let them dominate the action in that space.
 
Yes, start a war then negotiate. That's what I remember too. Tried and tested I guess.

But no chance to start any negotiations though in eg. 2000, 2001, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 (prior to invading Crimea). Minsk in 2014/15 was the same start a war then negotiate, then nothing more in 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 or 22 - till after yet another invasion begins.

If any other country behaved like this, nobody would be trying to defend it. But because Russia is the rump-USSR (defender of world bolshevism) .. well it's fairly clear why it gets excused.
China's still run by a mighty large communist party
 
You can throw the bolshevism, the communism etc away from the modern picture and will still find people settling on those lines due to the whole 'unipolar vs multipolar' balance of global power stuff. So long as the nation in question isnt overtly fascist, there will be plenty ready to offer some degree of support to any power they think can oppose and negate US power. Hell even if they were a bit fascist then quibbling will be used to downplay that angle.
 
China's still run by a mighty large communist party
In name, sure. But I used bolshevism on purpose. And when China starts on Taiwan in earnest I think we can be sure some people will excuse it. We can even be fairly sure who too, there's likely to be a degree of crossover with today's defenders of Russian concerns isn't there. 20th century hangover.
 
I think the fact is that whatever the causes of the invasion the West and Russia's nervous neighbours see this as a way to degrade/defang Russian military capability to a point where it can't be overtly aggressive for years or decades to come.

Russia belived it would get away with another Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, etc situation and got found out big time. All it's structural corruption is coming home to roost. Ukraine and it's "sponsors" are going to take max advantage to put it to bed if they can.

The worrying thing is what happens in the power vacuum if the Russian Putin state collapses as a result.
 
In name, sure. But I used bolshevism on purpose. And when China starts on Taiwan in earnest I think we can be sure some people will excuse it. We can even be fairly sure who too, there's likely to be a degree of crossover with today's defenders of Russian concerns isn't there. 20th century hangover.
Sure we ran over this 400 or 500 pages ago
 
This is of limited value given how speculative it is, but interesting nonetheless:



Meanwhile... it seems to me there is quite a lot of "continuity USSR" assumptions underpinning these kind of threads. People are wondering why it's just confused teenagers being taken prisoner, why underprepared and isolated forces are taking a kicking, why the latest kit from a Wikipedia list of equipment isn't in play. And it's because this, what you're seeing, is it, the state of the modern Russian military. They've not thrown everything at it but nobody would. But there's not some higher echelon being held in reserve for this. As a nation they've got a few set pieces to retain a foothold in the defence supply game, and then decades of under investment and collapse of the military.

Even in Georgia which was low difficulty they got an absolute kicking, lost most of their armour and shot down a bunch of their own planes. This time on a far tougher job they are taking another one, allegedly really big losses, and being left with little to show for it.

I wouldn't like to predict the long term outcome of this war but Russia is in trouble after all this - this badly planned invasion has revealed a significant truth that was much better left unconfirmed. I'm sure it will be taken advantage of somehow or other.

And in terms of what comes next, let's just say it's not how you would want to fight a war. Even with different doctrines you would want overwhelming initial force, air dominance and clear strongholds and to get it done before resupply made a big difference. None of it seems to have been forthcoming. There's loads of casual talk of ghost-in-the-machine possibilities like thermobaric rockets but they'd have to actually be in a position to deploy the fucking things. I don't know what will happen but I don't think there's any clear linear path towards anything more than what we've seen: an incoherent mess.

In posts like this, continuity ussr
 
In name, sure. But I used bolshevism on purpose. And when China starts on Taiwan in earnest I think we can be sure some people will excuse it. We can even be fairly sure who too, there's likely to be a degree of crossover with today's defenders of Russian concerns isn't there. 20th century hangover.

And the version of this that may yet still end up applying to Ukraine will, if it comes not be before the war, but at some stage during it. There is already the tidy label in the press of 'Ukraine fatigue' waiting in the wings, and things like the energy situation in Europe (which sounds like it will be even worse in the winter of 23-24 than the upcoming winter) will be a factor. If those get stronger and coincide with a stage where the USA and others are looking for an exit strategy, then the tragic realpolitik equations will change and some peoples rhetoric will start to shift in order to accommodate the tragic new realities.

I get bitter in a particular way when I view dramatic, potentially power-shifting events through the spectrum of long running conversations on internet forums, Because I remember how soul destroying it was to see so many people supporting things like the arab spring uprising in Egypt, only for them to evaporate once it had all gone wrong and the potential had been crushed. I'm not blaming them, but the contrast ends up being stark, it can all end up seeing a bit superficial. People that want to avoid looking at things in terms of the realpolitiks, want to override those stale equations and hope for better, are eventually forced to fall silent in its eventual wake.
 
I think the fact is that whatever the causes of the invasion the West and Russia's nervous neighbours see this as a way to degrade/defang Russian military capability to a point where it can't be overtly aggressive for years or decades to come.

Russia belived it would get away with another Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, etc situation and got found out big time. All it's structural corruption is coming home to roost. Ukraine and it's "sponsors" are going to take max advantage to put it to bed if they can.

The worrying thing is what happens in the power vacuum if the Russian Putin state collapses as a result.
The worrying thing is that this war will doom us all
 
Doom isnt a very subtle concept, its more a question of what level of sacrifice people will put up with when the consequences spread so much further than the geographical boundaries of the war.
Doom is not a subtle concept. But when this war is at a time like now, when it prevents cooperation eg the suspension of the Arctic Council, when it leads to more oil and gas and coal use, when it leads to hunger in parts of the world like the me, it's thrusting a chisel into existing cracks and widening them. We were told a few years back we only had to 2030 to prevent disastrous climate change. It doesn't have to be a large push to fuck things irrevocably.
 
Doom is not a subtle concept. But when this war is at a time like now, when it prevents cooperation eg the suspension of the Arctic Council, when it leads to more oil and gas and coal use, when it leads to hunger in parts of the world like the me, it's thrusting a chisel into existing cracks and widening them. We were told a few years back we only had to 2030 to prevent disastrous climate change. It doesn't have to be a large push to fuck things irrevocably.

Its a mixed picture on the energy front. It will make some aspects worse but it will also end up contributing to the transition in various ways, some of which are admittedly pulling in opposite directions. So far the transition has been described in a partial way, the aspects that involve the demand side of the picture have not had their fair share of the spotlight, there has been a dishonest downplaying of that side of the story which will actually be a factor for decades to come. Insecurity of supply and high prices will change the psychology of energy use in Europe, and recession will affect estimates of future demand. I expect there will be numerous other threads where I will continue to waffle about such things in future.
 
I think the fact is that whatever the causes of the invasion the West and Russia's nervous neighbours see this as a way to degrade/defang Russian military capability to a point where it can't be overtly aggressive for years or decades to come.

Russia belived it would get away with another Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, etc situation and got found out big time. All it's structural corruption is coming home to roost. Ukraine and it's "sponsors" are going to take max advantage to put it to bed if they can.

The worrying thing is what happens in the power vacuum if the Russian Putin state collapses as a result.
The US has publicly stated this
 
Its a mixed picture on the energy front. It will make some aspects worse but it will also end up contributing to the transition in various ways, some of which are admittedly pulling in opposite directions. So far the transition has been described in a partial way, the aspects that involve the demand side of the picture have not had their fair share of the spotlight, there has been a dishonest downplaying of that side of the story which will actually be a factor for decades to come. Insecurity of supply and high prices will change the psychology of energy use in Europe, and recession will affect estimates of future demand. I expect there will be numerous other threads where I will continue to waffle about such things in future.
And I look forward to your waffles
 
In name, sure. But I used bolshevism on purpose. And when China starts on Taiwan in earnest I think we can be sure some people will excuse it. We can even be fairly sure who too, there's likely to be a degree of crossover with today's defenders of Russian concerns isn't there. 20th century hangover.

Should China (The People's Republic of China) start on Taiwan (The Republic of China) in earnest it will be much easier to excuse because whilst they might be de facto independent entities, de jure they are not. Diplomatically they are seen as parts of the same country and diplomatically, at least, they claim to be the same country.
 
Should China (The People's Republic of China) start on Taiwan (The Republic of China) in earnest it will be much easier to excuse because whilst they might be de facto independent entities, de jure they are not. Diplomatically they are seen as parts of the same country and diplomatically, at least, they claim to be the same country.
Although it has its own flag, its own currency, its own constitution, its own head of state and its own electoral system. So not quite completely as simple as 'the same country'.
 
Quite sickeningly hilarious all those going on about what a war crime this is/might be it is are the very same people that had no problem with Russia executing a bunch of prisoners without trial not so long ago. Some on here were even pleased about it.
BBC article on this issue

 
Although it has its own flag, its own currency, its own constitution, its own head of state and its own electoral system. So not quite completely as simple as 'the same country'.

Both Taiwan and The People's Republic claim sovereignty over the same territory and that they are the legitimate Chinese government. They have lots of economic links with each other but do not recognise each other as independent states. Taiwan has offices representing its government but no embassies in countries that recognise the PRC and the few countries that still recognise the Taiwanese government as the legitimate rulers of China do not have a PRC embassy.

Countries that do not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state may lament but are unlikely to take action should the PRC invade its renegade province. It will be the same as the reaction to the Chinese Government's actions in Hong Kong.
 
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I referred earlier to the way in which reports don't get made up the chain can affect decision-making. Perun did a video on it, which I'm watching now.

 
I referred earlier to the way in which reports don't get made up the chain can affect decision-making. Perun did a video on it, which I'm watching now.


I prefer his other channel tbh PerunGamingAU

"As humanity first, entrenching ourselves in Washington DC and Moscow let us impose a certain order on the world. The world would be disrupted but the alien invasion, certainly, but the vast militaries and nuclear arsenals of the old powers would ensure things didn't get too out of hand. "

 
The West is starting to get good figures on what works and what doesn't from the stuff they've donated. Apparently half of Germany's PzH2000s are out of service and being cannibalised to keep the rest working. Clearly designed for a NATO-Pact war (expected duration <1mo) and not months of WW1 style artillery battles. Germany has a lot of historical form with technically impressive, but overly delicate weapons systems.

To be fair to the out of commission ones, Germany did give Ukraine some guidelines that basically said they should only use them for 2 hours out of the day or something and they've quite clearly ignored that.
 
Both Taiwan and The People's Republic claim sovereignty over the same territory and that they are the legitimate Chinese government. They have lots of economic links with each other but do not recognise each other as independent states. Taiwan has offices representing its government but no embassies in countries that recognise the PRC and the few countries that still recognise the Taiwanese government as the legitimate rulers of China do not have a PRC embassy.

Countries that do not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state may lament but are unlikely to take action should the PRC invade its renegade province. It will be the same as the reaction to the Chinese Government's actions in Hong Kong.
The bolded bit may well be true, but seeing as China only annexed Taiwan in 1683 (I just checked) then by this logic, Scotland could just as easily be called a 'renegade province' of Great Britain. Which is obviously absurd.

Anyway, there's another thread where this discussion can better be had.
 
The West is starting to get good figures on what works and what doesn't from the stuff they've donated. Apparently half of Germany's PzH2000s are out of service and being cannibalised to keep the rest working. Clearly designed for a NATO-Pact war (expected duration <1mo) and not months of WW1 style artillery battles. Germany has a lot of historical form with technically impressive, but overly delicate weapons systems.

To be fair to the out of commission ones, Germany did give Ukraine some guidelines that basically said they should only use them for 2 hours out of the day or something and they've quite clearly ignored that.
I guess I can understand that. If you're out in the field, and either have a big selection of juicy targets, or are in desperate need of suppressing fire, you're going to take the short term view and just fire the bloody thing, and worry about the longer-term consequences later...
 
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