you say that and indeed it seems difficult for ukraine to counter the russians without getting bigger and better guns. but i'd have thought (and i'm sure
kebabking could comment usefully on this) that it's the sort of thing light infantry or special forces might be able to deal with, something - say - the parachute regiment from the british army or the rangers from the american might be tasked with (or the sas or delta force, i don't know). every time you see images of artillery in this war you don't see a guarding force, and i wonder how easy it would be to flank them, to hold them in place with something like a drone strike, while units of infantry either debus and assault or having worked their way round the back take out the gun crews and destroy at least some of the guns.
Apologies for the lack of a timeous response...
Attacking enemy artillery is a classic cavalry Manoeuvre, and has been practiced since Crecy. However, it requires a force which is highly mobile, and a gap to move through.
The Ukrainians have done some small scale raiding of this nature, but it has a limited effect, and uses a huge amount of precious resource - but it's long been established (American civil war, and certainly WWI) that the best way to kill artillery is with more artillery. The profusion of airborne ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance) assets means that tracking artillery, and the
vast logistics train that is required to keep the guns firing, is relatively easy - so the Ukrainians have taken a three pronged approach based on their ISTAR and weapons capabilities:
Self-Propelled Guns with unguided, but still pretty accurate, 155mm fires to disrupt Ru gunlines, and SPG 155mm guided fires to attack specific targets within the Ru gunlines - Bty/Regt HQ's, & ammunition stockpiles. Usually in the same attack - western guns are more accurate, and have longer range than Ru guns, and with guided ammunition they might only have to use half a dozen guided shells to disable a whole Battery (4 - 10 guns) by destroying it's C2 and available ammunition.
The arrival of GMLRS has allowed them to attack Ru Operational level ammunition dumps - the munitions arrive by train, from Russia, are unloaded, stored, and them moved by truck to the gunlines. They can be 40-70km behind the front lines, and are
huge - easily a mile across, one I saw was 12 miles long, with hundreds of thousands (millions) of artillery shells and other ammunition. Helpfully they tend to put their big fuel dumps next to them...
Marrying ISTAR and deep fires has allowed the Ukr to cripple Ru artillery in some areas, and for limited periods of time - a HIMARS strike on a forward logistics hub kept 30+ miles of Ru guns silent for 3 days by destroying it's entire ammunition stock.
The problem Ukr has is one of scale: the Ru are an army that has long believed that artillery wins wars, and it spends it's budget accordingly. It's artillery forces are vast, and it's war stocks of ammunition are beyond measure.
However, Ukr has definitely hit the right policy - stop the ammunition getting to the guns: one is worthless without the other, and the logistics of keeping the guns supplied are easy to see, vulnerable, and don't move. Just as Russia has moved to a doctrine of grinding out a relentless trickle of results by the use of vast firepower, Ukr has settled on a doctrine of grinding out a result by interdiction of fuel and ammunition. It will take several months, and will require a huge surge in ammunition and modern guns from the west, but it will probably work in (eventually) massively degrading the Ru Armys main combat arm.
Less dashing perhaps, but methodical.
