I am genuinely happy to have a good faith discussion, but I feel its like talking in a different language.
OK so if I've got this right Alchemix allows you to take a loan out of up to 50% of the collateral that you've deposited. This loan is then paid back by the yield from your collateral. Which begs the obvious question: what happens if the yield isn't of the required level to pay back the loan?
Negative yield you mean?
In practice it is extremely unlikely to occur and even if it did, its unlikely to be so negative for a sufficient period of time that you would end up in "negative equity", although yes, I do suppose its theoretically possible.
Alchemix is also not fully decentralised which poses a security risk, and the transaction fees are relatively high which is a barrier to entry for users who aren't wealthy.
Both of those are true - and a hybrid model is how most DAOs are operating at the moment and yes, fees are high. The industry is literally 3? 4? years old however and the path is made by walking. Enhanced governance is critical and L2 solutions, like Matic, Fantom etc will bring down fees, as will the London hard fork scheduled for July.
In any case don't forget that this whole discussion started because you claimed that defi and cefi platforms were like banks. We're now so far removed from that discussion, talking about risky and complicated investment products for high net worth individuals with exceptional technical expertise, that it's almost surreal.
No, I said Cefi was like a bank.
Defi is not like a bank, which is why I like it.
Again we're at the nexus between regulation and enforcement due to you moving the goalposts. As specific regulations of defi platforms are in the works any ideas regarding enforcement are purely speculative. However, strict liability of coders for any losses caused by their products, combined with safe harbour for defi platforms that work with regulators, would be one idea. In the case of semi-decentralised platforms like Alchemix you could also go after the people who hold governance powers, and their assets.
Well, yeah, you could. But you'd have to find them first, remember that there is no guarantee that any wallet is controlled by one person, or even multiple people (bots are a thing remember!). Then work your way though things like delegated staking, delegated staking to smart contracts, hope that they never used a tumbler or a 2key contract, and that the protocol governance didnt use homographic encryption or zksnarks and thats before you start looking for their assets.
Things are sloppy at the moment certainly, but if this was ever a serious risk there is a whole tool box out there.
I remember reading the Kleros whitepaper and thinking that they don't understand anything about international arbitration, and that many of their use cases would be impossible to implement, and possibly illegal.
Probably illegal, yeah, and....
We're just going round in circles on this point. In some cases the strength of smart contracts is in their immutability. In many other cases, particularly in complex fields, renegotiation is a normal part of contracting. Smart contracts are ill-equipped to deal with this business reality.
But they aren't trying to "deal with this business reality".
Thats the whole point of defi - what you percieve as "reality" is nothing of the kind, its all made up, and it can be made differently. There is no longer any need to "deal with this business reality" and "normal parts of contracting".
I think the rules are shit, and I'm not playing by those rules.
You say I must play by the rules, cos them's the rules
I give you different rules and your response is that it doesnt follow the rules.
Do you see the issue here.
Earlier I gave three examples of cases where traditional contracts allow people to exit painlessly from agreed deals: bankruptcy, court orders, and supervening illegality. You failed to explain how self-executing smart contracts can deal with those scenarios, and side-stepped the issue. So I'll ask again, how is it a strength if a contract is too inflexible to deal with relatively common legal issues?
The equivalent of bankrupcy in defi is liquidations (you get out of a deal by a liquidator taking your collateral). Unsecured lending is not generally a thing as yet.
Court orders - its hard to search cases on Kleros, but it has definitely dealt with incomplete smart contracts, where there was ambiguity. Interestingly there was a case with a dispute with Aragon over a grant that they considered unfulfilled, and they sued through the trad legal system to get their money back, a properly constructed smart contract would have eliminated the need for that.
Supervening illegality - I dont actually know what this is but I;m guessing that its that some law changes in the interim that renders the smart contract illegal. I guess this could happen, say when one SC relies on another which breaks, in which case all dependent SCs are broken. I cant think of any but I'm sure its happened. Will go down that rabbit hole another day.
I'm not sure if this is libertarian magical thinking or not to be honest. In any case, those DAOs that work with regulators will benefit and those that don't will remain niche products.
Well, thats a
live debate right now on Uniswap, initial indications are to commit around $25m for a political defence fund. I cant say I think its a good thing, and I suspect it might get scuppered soon.