A vulgar marxist theory would say that the US election is going to be won by investors. The funding cartels that
lost their political monopoly in 2016, are going to re-establish their dominance through Biden.
That is the conclusion that a simple version of Thomas Ferguson's 'investment theory of politics' would probably lead us to. Indeed, as he
points out, the more favourable political climate for corporate donors likely had a big impact on the Democratic primaries this year. From that point of view, you could argue that Biden is re-running the 2016 campaign - same funder coalition (FIRE, communications, healthcare, lobbyists), same strategy (wooing suburbanites and elderly swing voters) - and making it work this time round.
However, that analysis looks shaky on close inspection. In 2016, Trump raised far less money than Hillary Clinton (far less than half), and still won. In 2020, he's raised almost as much money as Biden, and the
polls have him losing by double digit margins, and the Senate going Democratic. Not only have his industrial donations broadened this time, with more money from healthcare and FIRE sectors - probably a great deal of that from small firms banking on aggressive opposition to lockdown policies - but he's accumulated more grassroots money. In 2016, he raised $86.7m in small donations. In 2020, that has risen to $251.9m. The single biggest donors toward Trump in both 2016 and 2020 have been
retirees. This cycle, he has raised $134m from pensioners, compared to $37m in 2016. He hasn't had to self-finance his campaign at all, whereas it made up about a fifth of his funding in 2016. He has faced no competition for business funding from any Republican rival, since there was no serious primary challenge.
If this was about big money, there's no reason why Trump shouldn't be doing better than he did in 2016. If it was about the excitement of the core vote, Trump should be doing better. And yet, even on the most pessimistic outlook for Biden (of the kind given by Twitter
sentiment analysis), that simply isn't the case. It hasn't been the case for months. We have to assume that Biden is likely to win, and that the Democrats will control Congress and the executive. This is likely why Trump is reverting to preaching to the hardcore, and why the GOP is emphasising stacking the Supreme Court with reactionaries, skewing
census data to favour right-wing small states, and a surge in voter-suppression court activism. Hence the
constitutional crisis unfolding in the United States. Why? It's possible that the plague is rebuilding the authority of the political centre in the short-run.
Crises don't necessarily favour immediate political polarisation. The 2008 credit crunch saw voters gravitating toward the centre, reaching for the security blanket of traditional authority. Only in later years, through the state's austerian metabolisation of the crisis, did the collapse in political authority polarise the electorate. Moreover, a crisis like the plague - in which the 'bad guy' appears to be a virus rather than banks - is almost the opposite of the credit crunch, in that it tends to reinvigorate the authority of 'experts' rather than diminish it.
It wasn't impossible for right-wing nationalism to take control of the situation. Yet it is notable that the catastrophilic Right has
fumbled its reaction to an actual disaster. Trump, for example, could have imposed a friend/enemy distinction on this virus (the 'China flu' line could have worked), and set himself up as a national protector. It would have required a decisive, early epidemiological intervention and a strong stimulus package that wouldn't run out before November. However, that is contrary to his own instincts, inimical to the radicalised middle-class base, and anathema to the GOP leadership and the donors. Trump's very success in motivating the grassroots, making peace with the Republican establishment and building his donor base made it impossible for him to do what was needed. In the end, aggressive reopening and refusing to renew stimulus was tantamount to throwing the election.
There's another sense in which this crisis rebounds against rightist nationalism, particularly in the United States. Trump-style 'anti-globalism', while it did not offer a coherent alternative to liberal globalisation, did a great deal of political damage to US global dominance. It isn't that he threatened the dominance of Wall Street and the dollar, which continued to be hugely overvalued well into the Covid crisis, and is still used in the overwhelming majority of global transactions. It isn't that he hurt corporate profitability - what was lost with the TPP was a setback for multinational revenues, but the standard Republican tax cut made up for a lot of that. Nor did the jousting with China seriously harm world trade. There was some flattening of trade in recent years, but only in the pandemic did it severely contract. And China, in trying to appease Trump, has offered him some juicy benefits - like, allowing US banks to wholly buy up Chinese financial firms.
However, the
political destabilisation has been obvious. The US Treasury, for example, all but created the G20. It usually runs it, writing its communiques before seeking consensus with other states. Trump didn't care. Under his administration, the G20 was left to other member-states to run. The WTO is, likewise, an enemy of Trump's rather than a major accomplishment of American power. Indeed, insofar as multilateralism represents the
internationalisation of the American state, and its
penetration of allied states, Trump's actions have tended to destabilised, sabotage and impede this dominance (without yet seriously overturning it: see
Panitch & Gindin for the usual insight on this). Rarely has that been more obviously damaging than during the plague.
Traditional Washington would have responded to the plague by treating it as a global security risk. It would have coordinated a standardised global pandemic response, with the WHO, and with the expanded Center for Disease Control and specialised White House agencies leading the nation's "biodefence". It would probably have tried to orchestrate a global economic response through the G20 and the WTO, in order to prevent the collapse of supply chains and the long-term loss of global trade after the pandemic. I can be certain of this because this is more or less what Biden is promising.
Trump has done none of this. As a result, he has faced a global crisis as the head of the most powerful state in the world, and in history, representing a people accustomed to global dominance - without being able to propose a solution that furthers that dominance. Not just he, but the Republican establishment, have been manifestly uninterested in the sources of their power. In that context, the imperialist nationalism of the hard-centre - epitomised in Biden's rhetoric about China, Putin, and so on - is probably more persuasive to a large number of voters than Trump's erratic sabre-rattling.
Finally, while the plague has also unleashed some radical energies - it is difficult to see the Black Lives Matter uprising being as massive and culturally resonant as it has been, without the pandemic - the fact that the Left has been defeated on the terrain of big electoral politics for now, means that these movements are likely to be siphoned into votes for the centre. We can see this, a classic instance of what Gramsci called 'trasformismo', with the alliance between Democratic organisations and Black Lives Matter groups. Hence the reconstitution of the political centre.
We should, of course, be careful with big extrapolations from current trends. The plague is still, to a large extent, an unknown force. We don't know how long Covid-19 will be with us. Some estimates say as late as 2024. We don't know how a vaccine would work, given that people seem to get re-infected: meaning immunity is limited. We don't know about the long-term physical effects of the disease. 'Long Covid' is the name we're giving to some of these effects, but that doesn't mean we understand it. For all we know, the virus is going to destroy human fertility and see the downfall of human civilisation. We just don't know. It certainly doesn't seem unlikely that the coming years, with the severe economic crisis afflicting us, will see major, set-piece social struggles.
Moreover, even if the above prognosis is roughly right, and we can expect the centre to score a few victories in the next few years, it certainly doesn't mean that the violent, fanatical Right of recent years is going away. That is the last thing I would expect to happen.