Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

[Pickman's model]

Well putins words and actions are pretty good indicator of what he wants - hes obsessed about restoring his version of Russia - which means assimilating nations like urkraine and others back into the fold. The military strategy is there for all to see - they were clearly unprepared for any sort of serious resistance and are now in serious trouble.
Unlike the US/uk and Iraq - I doubt anyone outside Putin's echo chamber thought invading Ukraine would be a good idea - whereas the the Iraq war was fiercely argued for by both the US and Uk governments and their media cheerleaders (a pre war propaganda campaign notably absent from Russia's build up to invasion) . And - militarily - they were correct in that Saddam's forces would crumble very quickly. What they got disastrously wrong was their belief that they could easily install a stable pro western regime and that the invaders would be welcomed as liberators (and that everyone would forget about the WMD nonsense).
I dont remember bush or Blair making long paranoid rants threatening nuclear Armageddon and "purifying" the country of traitors in pursuit of national glory.
Was there hubris, and self delusion and ego involved? - yes for sure - but Putin's is another level - just listen to the rabid shit he spews - or look at the fucking table. This is on scale of the US deciding to invade and install a pro western regime in Iran and expecting them not to fight. An idea that was occasionally mooted but very quickly shot down. I think Trump (also a delusional megalomaniac) toyed with that one as well - but the pentagon were very strongly against it cos it nonsense on stilts.
But Putin's regime seems immune to any voices opposed to the caprice of their leader - so yes it does make sense to try and understand what the fuck he is doing and why - and I would argue that his actions are driven far more by (self fulfilling) paranoia and deluded, obsessive romantic nationalism rather than cold geo-political calculation. Which is NOT generally how most states behave - other than ones that are in the grip of your hitlers, saddam's, pol pots, idi amins and vladimir putins.
Every outcome is bad for Russia - even if they manage to conquer ukraine (now a very big if) they will face an unending well supported, well armed insurgency that will require a huge commitment of resources to contain. Their have been exposed as militarily far weaker than what was believed. Their economy is in the toilet thanks to sanctions. They have united all their neighbors in opposition. They are an international pariah. They have revitalized the unity and resolve of both NATO and the EU. Nobody will be clamoring to join up to some greater Russia -its the exact opposite.

yeh but you're wrong. what's happened is there's been a cackhanded plan which has obvs fallen apart: but better plans are available. you're like 'the russian army aren't all that' in the june and july of 1941. but once they get into gear i suspect we'll see a different side to them (as the ft article Supine links to above suggests). it might be too little too late. but if there's one experience no one connected to the russian government in any capacity wants to repeat, it's something like their experience in afghanistan. so chances are they'll declare victory and return triumphant to the independent republics of donetsk and lugansk instead of try to subdue all ukraine against an insurgency.

e2a: don't you remember bush saying you're either with us or against us after 9/11 and when the french refused to take part in the invasion of iraq french fries were renamed freedom fries in the us, and there was all that cheese-eating surrender monkeys bit?

 

[Raheem]

Well putins words and actions are pretty good indicator of what he wants - hes obsessed about restoring his version of Russia - which means assimilating nations like urkraine and others back into the fold. The military strategy is there for all to see - they were clearly unprepared for any sort of serious resistance and are now in serious trouble.
Unlike the US/uk and Iraq - I doubt anyone outside Putin's echo chamber thought invading Ukraine would be a good idea - whereas the the Iraq war was fiercely argued for by both the US and Uk governments and their media cheerleaders (a pre war propaganda campaign notably absent from Russia's build up to invasion) . And - militarily - they were correct in that Saddam's forces would crumble very quickly. What they got disastrously wrong was their belief that they could easily install a stable pro western regime and that the invaders would be welcomed as liberators (and that everyone would forget about the WMD nonsense).
I dont remember bush or Blair making long paranoid rants threatening nuclear Armageddon and "purifying" the country of traitors in pursuit of national glory.
Was there hubris, and self delusion and ego involved? - yes for sure - but Putin's is another level - just listen to the rabid shit he spews - or look at the fucking table. This is on scale of the US deciding to invade and install a pro western regime in Iran and expecting them not to fight. An idea that was occasionally mooted but very quickly shot down. I think Trump (also a delusional megalomaniac) toyed with that one as well - but the pentagon were very strongly against it cos it nonsense on stilts.
But Putin's regime seems immune to any voices opposed to the caprice of their leader - so yes it does make sense to try and understand what the fuck he is doing and why - and I would argue that his actions are driven far more by (self fulfilling) paranoia and deluded, obsessive romantic nationalism rather than cold geo-political calculation. Which is NOT generally how most states behave - other than ones that are in the grip of your hitlers, saddam's, pol pots, idi amins and vladimir putins.
Every outcome is bad for Russia - even if they manage to conquer ukraine (now a very big if) they will face an unending well supported, well armed insurgency that will require a huge commitment of resources to contain. Their have been exposed as militarily far weaker than what was believed. Their economy is in the toilet thanks to sanctions. They have united all their neighbors in opposition. They are an international pariah. They have revitalized the unity and resolve of both NATO and the EU. Nobody will be clamoring to join up to some greater Russia -its the exact opposite.

Mostly agree. But Putin's decisions haven't just been driven by weird ideology and megalomania. What he originally planned was something slightly bolder than 2014 or Georgia before that. Sweep into Kyiv, replace the government and point laughing at the stunned faces of western politicians. Not so irrational. It would have been massively popular at home and would have brought a sizable economy into the Russian fold. The main reason everything's a mess now is that Russia made a complete pig's ear of it, rather than because Putin is guided by an irrational sense of mission.

 

[Kaka Tim]

yeh but you're wrong. what's happened is there's been a cackhanded plan which has obvs fallen apart: but better plans are available. you're like 'the russian army aren't all that' in the june and july of 1941. but once they get into gear i suspect we'll see a different side to them (as the ft article Supine links to above suggests). it might be too little too late. but if there's one experience no one connected to the russian government in any capacity wants to repeat, it's something like their experience in afghanistan. so chances are they'll declare victory and return triumphant to the independent republics of donetsk and lugansk instead of try to subdue all ukraine against an insurgency.

hard to get into gear when the you your economy is in the toilet and nobody wants to fight. in WW2 they had massive economic and military aid and the whole population was mobilized to fight a brutal invader (a bit like Urkaine right now). Doing the "sensible" thing - i.e. negotiating an extra chunk of Ukraine and declaring victory - still leaves them in shit street economically and diplomatically and their mliitary embaressed - they will be weaker and worse off in every way than before the war.

 

[Dogsauce]

A new Russian revolution won't come until VP dies (which could be sooner than we think), and if the rival successors are unable to fully overcome each other. That's what might provide an opening for the broad masses to overthrow oligarchy. With the emphasis on "might", "possibly", "perhaps".

Yeah, but if there’s the slightest whiff of taking on the oligarchs or even anything to the left of Macron-style liberalism they’ll be on their own and get no back-up from the ‘West’. You’re only allowed a certain type of revolution these days.

 

[elbows]

What they got disastrously wrong was their belief that they could easily install a stable pro western regime and that the invaders would be welcomed as liberators (and that everyone would forget about the WMD nonsense).

But with that conflict as with this current one, I can question whether they really believed that stuff and whether they actually cared, so long as their main aims were achieved. Claims about being welcomed with open arms may be a part of crude propaganda and justifications for war, and trying to sell the war by setting false expectations about how easy it will be before it actually starts. Including being able to pretend we didnt foresee the consequences of war and the downsides, as opposed to calculating that actually we were prepared to live with those consequences and found them a price worth paying, but simply didnt want to admit so publicly.

And whether you believe its fair for me to point this out depends in part on what people end up believing the true motivations and aims were and are again this time.

The question of what the main purposes of the war actually were is apparently not as easy to answer truthfully in either case, and so we can go round in circles about this stuff and related issues, our perceptions can go flying off in all sorts of directions, some of which arent actually consistent.

 

[elbows]

I mean really, if this war ends with Russia having made some very clear gains, but with some people insisting otherwise, its really going to do my head in. And that still remains true even when they will also have clearly lost some things as a result of the war. Because again judging that stuff involves a recognition of whether those losses were actually a price they considered worth paying, and judgements about that will be severely faulty if we cant even bring ourselves to acknowledge the gains they've made via violence.

We've jumped the gun with this conversation because things arent over yet, we cant reach conclusions about gains, and can only judge some of the losses so far. But I take recent posts as a sign of things to come in almost every conceivable scenario that could emerge, and I'm already groaning as a result.

 

[Pickman's model]

hard to get into gear when the you your economy is in the toilet and nobody wants to fight. in WW2 they had massive economic and military aid and the whole population was mobilized to fight a brutal invader (a bit like Urkaine right now). Doing the "sensible" thing - i.e. negotiating an extra chunk of Ukraine and declaring victory - still leaves them in shit street economically and diplomatically and their mliitary embaressed - they will be weaker and worse off in every way than before the war.

so you say. i think that things aren't going well for russia but - like a football match - the result should be judged at the end of the game. this could go a variety of ways and while you're quite possibly right on many things you say in this post you're quite possibly wrong, too.

 

[JimW]

I do think you have to work hard not to be affected by the Western framework on things. Without wanting to go all STWC, and maybe I've been here too long, but reading the preamble to the Biden - Xi phone conversation that's scheduled, China is miffed about the US telling them to step up and I think with some justification. They've called for ceasefire and sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, why should they play your world cop sidekick too?
I mean, clearly they're better placed to have a quiet word and I hope they are, but when your whole schtick is non-interference I don't expect that'll be dropped overnight.

 

[Chz]

The most likely "gain" would, I think, be fairly neutral. Assuming Russia swallows the Donetsk and neighbouring region, what they've done is take away a region of Ukraine with a large hostile minority and turned it into a Russian area with a large, hostile minority (or even majority in some areas). It will give them trouble for decades unless they pull an Uncle Joe and deport every ethnic Ukrainian in the area.

 

[bimble]

The most likely "gain" would, I think, be fairly neutral. Assuming Russia swallows the Donetsk and neighbouring region, what they've done is take away a region of Ukraine with a large hostile minority and turned it into a Russian area with a large, hostile minority (or even majority in some areas). It will give them trouble for decades unless they pull an Uncle Joe and deport every ethnic Ukrainian in the area.

Yep I don’t understand what the advantage is to recognising or ‘owning’ just that bit, thought it was a pretext.

 

[Yossarian]

Russian TV cut out for some reason while Captain Botox was addressing a pro-war rally in Moscow.

 

[elbows]

The most likely "gain" would, I think, be fairly neutral. Assuming Russia swallows the Donetsk and neighbouring region, what they've done is take away a region of Ukraine with a large hostile minority and turned it into a Russian area with a large, hostile minority (or even majority in some areas). It will give them trouble for decades unless they pull an Uncle Joe and deport every ethnic Ukrainian in the area.

For me the most obvious primary aim and potential gain for Russia really is the grand chessboard/sphere of influence/NATO/neutrality/security buffer stuff. With a side serving of 'take our threats more seriously in future', although that bit could go wrong if the war is such a disaster that it makes Russian military capabilities seem crappy and thus Russia a less daunting adversary.

One way or another I'm bound to end up going on about that stuff a lot more in future, but am trying to wait till the outcome of this war is far more settled than is currently the case.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

But with that conflict as with this current one, I can question whether they really believed that stuff and whether they actually cared, so long as their main aims were achieved. Claims about being welcomed with open arms may be a part of crude propaganda and justifications for war, and trying to sell the war by setting false expectations about how easy it will be before it actually starts. Including being able to pretend we didnt foresee the consequences of war and the downsides, as opposed to calculating that actually we were prepared to live with those consequences and found them a price worth paying, but simply didnt want to admit so publicly.

And whether you believe its fair for me to point this out depends in part on what people end up believing the true motivations and aims were and are again this time.

The question of what the main purposes of the war actually were is apparently not as easy to answer truthfully in either case, and so we can go round in circles about this stuff and related issues, our perceptions can go flying off in all sorts of directions, some of which arent actually consistent.

I agree largely, however, as with Afghanistan, there was clearly an intention to install a stable pro-'West' regime in Iraq, and that intention was not realised. Again as with Afghanistan, they were pretty clueless when it came to working out who they should actually deal with after the invasion, siding with rural warlords over 'leftist' urban intellectual types. And in both cases, the result was utterly catastrophic. Whatever the degree to which they swallowed their own propaganda initially, they failed by those important measures.

wrt Russia, it does appear that the initial intention was to install a pro-Russia regime in Ukraine and that this is going to fail. Whether securing assurances over Donbass might count as gains is debatable, imo. It's arguable that one of the motivations for the invasion was the way that the Donbass impasse was showing signs of becoming unblocked. It's been Russia's clear intention to maintain these 'frozen conflicts' in Donbass, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc.

 

[bimble]

If “denazification” is going to be defined as being only ever about the azov people that would be great. But Russian tv is still tying Zelensky to the whole drug addicted nazis run the country story which doesn’t bode well.

 

[JimW]

The most likely "gain" would, I think, be fairly neutral. Assuming Russia swallows the Donetsk and neighbouring region, what they've done is take away a region of Ukraine with a large hostile minority and turned it into a Russian area with a large, hostile minority (or even majority in some areas). It will give them trouble for decades unless they pull an Uncle Joe and deport every ethnic Ukrainian in the area.

Apparently a land bridge to Crimea would have some significant advantages, or so I read. If they carve that out too, suppose that's a gain.

 

[Supine]

If “denazification” is going to be defined as being only ever about the azov people that would be great. But Russian tv is still tying Zelensky to the whole drug addicted nazis run the country story which doesn’t bode well.

Bimble, when putin talks about denazification he isnt talking about nazis. He’s talking about people he doesnt like. Like elected politicians.

 

[Pickman's model]

For me the most obvious primary aim and potential gain for Russia really is the grand chessboard/sphere of influence/NATO/neutrality/security buffer stuff. With a side serving of 'take our threats more seriously in future', although that bit could go wrong if the war is such a disaster that it makes Russian military capabilities seem crappy and thus Russia a less daunting adversary.

One way or another I'm bound to end up going on about that stuff a lot more in future, but am trying to wait till the outcome of this war is far more settled than is currently the case.

going on what's happened so far the major changes i'd make to the russian army if i was shoigu or gerasmilov would be a) to upgrade the communications, so they're encrypted; b) institute a 'lessons learned' programme to capture innovation and advances on best practice; c) re-examine conscription - see whether some of the body of knowledge conveyed in the 12 month period of conscription now could be covered in schools; d) raise the wages of soldiers (volunteers) and eliminate hazing; e) institute an inquiry into the intelligence failures around the invasion re-examine the way in which plans are drawn up: perhaps the plans were too optimistic - but perhaps the plans were the best available under some of the limitations of the russian army, eg the travelling along roads rather than across country might have been because of the known rural conditions or to prevent getting lost (a potential navigation training issue). i suspect the planners were harried by shoigu and gerasmilov to hurry up with those plans, and this is part of what undermined the russians. oh and f) insert red teams within the planning process to test it at all stages Red team - Wikipedia

i think that no matter how the war ends, there will be a period of self-examination in russia, in the government and the armed forces, which may end in their forces becoming more effective (or could go entirely the other way, with the malaise in the russian army lasting years).

 

[SpackleFrog]

That at least would be one small positive to come out of this horror.

Except of course it might serve to massively increase their support in Ukraine

 

[SpackleFrog]

Well putins words and actions are pretty good indicator of what he wants - hes obsessed about restoring his version of Russia - which means assimilating nations like urkraine and others back into the fold. The military strategy is there for all to see - they were clearly unprepared for any sort of serious resistance and are now in serious trouble.
Unlike the US/uk and Iraq - I doubt anyone outside Putin's echo chamber thought invading Ukraine would be a good idea - whereas the the Iraq war was fiercely argued for by both the US and Uk governments and their media cheerleaders (a pre war propaganda campaign notably absent from Russia's build up to invasion) . And - militarily - they were correct in that Saddam's forces would crumble very quickly. What they got disastrously wrong was their belief that they could easily install a stable pro western regime and that the invaders would be welcomed as liberators (and that everyone would forget about the WMD nonsense).
I dont remember bush or Blair making long paranoid rants threatening nuclear Armageddon and "purifying" the country of traitors in pursuit of national glory.
Was there hubris, and self delusion and ego involved? - yes for sure - but Putin's is another level - just listen to the rabid shit he spews - or look at the fucking table. This is on scale of the US deciding to invade and install a pro western regime in Iran and expecting them not to fight. An idea that was occasionally mooted but very quickly shot down. I think Trump (also a delusional megalomaniac) toyed with that one as well - but the pentagon were very strongly against it cos it nonsense on stilts.
But Putin's regime seems immune to any voices opposed to the caprice of their leader - so yes it does make sense to try and understand what the fuck he is doing and why - and I would argue that his actions are driven far more by (self fulfilling) paranoia and deluded, obsessive romantic nationalism rather than cold geo-political calculation. Which is NOT generally how most states behave - other than ones that are in the grip of your hitlers, saddam's, pol pots, idi amins and vladimir putins.
Every outcome is bad for Russia - even if they manage to conquer ukraine (now a very big if) they will face an unending well supported, well armed insurgency that will require a huge commitment of resources to contain. Their have been exposed as militarily far weaker than what was believed. Their economy is in the toilet thanks to sanctions. They have united all their neighbors in opposition. They are an international pariah. They have revitalized the unity and resolve of both NATO and the EU. Nobody will be clamoring to join up to some greater Russia -its the exact opposite.

I mean, smokedout said it better than me already but really you do need to acknowledge when you post that stuff that it's just "I reckon", none of us know that much about Putin's motivations.

By the way, if you don't remember Blair and Bush's evangelical rants, fair enough, but they did happen.

 

[Pickman's model]

hard to get into gear when the you your economy is in the toilet and nobody wants to fight. in WW2 they had massive economic and military aid and the whole population was mobilized to fight a brutal invader (a bit like Urkaine right now). Doing the "sensible" thing - i.e. negotiating an extra chunk of Ukraine and declaring victory - still leaves them in shit street economically and diplomatically and their mliitary embaressed - they will be weaker and worse off in every way than before the war.

further to previous replies, they will be richer in experience.

 

[strung out]

For those feeling utterly depressed by the pessimistic posts above, this is a really good article from Lawrence Freedman (an actual expert, rather than an internet expert, on strategy, Russia, and failed military operations - he was a member of the Iraq Inquiry) about the cost to Russia, and how virtually any gain they might realise from here will have come at a terrible and high cost to them: The Bankrupt Colonialist

Have copied the opening paragraph and conclusions for those who'd rather read it here.

The Bankrupt Colonialist​

The Russo-Ukrainian War has settled into a pattern of Russian failure to achieve core military objectives, combined with a readiness to inflict death and destruction on the Ukrainian people. While some attacks, such as those on the training base near Lviv over the weekend, have a discernible strategic purpose, most are indiscriminate and, other than vengefulness, their purpose is less clear. They have evidently not made it easier for Russian troops to enter cities. They might be intended to coerce Kyiv into making concessions in the negotiations but President Zelensky has not wavered on securing his country’s freedom and sovereignty. It may be that the damage is an end in itself, so that even a free Ukraine is incapacitated. Whatever the purpose, making causing hurt the military priority has left Russian war aims even more confused than they were three weeks ago.

Implications

The strains on the Russian war effort are already evident, from the army’s hesitation about trying to fight their way into cities and the recruitment of mercenaries, to the reported appeal to China for help with supplies of military equipment and Putin’s fury with his intelligence agencies for misleading assessments and wasting roubles on Ukrainian agents who turned out to be useless. He is now having to choose between a range of poor outcomes, which the US suggests may include escalation to chemical use (which would be both militarily pointless and test further Western determination not to get directly involved).

We are now beyond the point where Putin has much ‘face’ to be saved, even if it were a priority for the other major powers to save it. In launching this disastrous war he has revealed himself to be not only a vicious bully but also a deluded fool.

War is rarely a good investment. Putin has acted for reasons of political and not economic opportunism. The prospects for any territory “liberated” by Russia is bleak. They will not prosper and will remain cut off from the international economy. To the extent that people stay they will have to be subsidised for all their needs while there will be little economic activity.

Because of the destruction the short-term prospects will be bleak even if these territories are fully returned to Ukraine. But over the longer-term they will be much better off because of the amount of economic assistance Ukraine will receive and its integration into the international economy.

This support will be even more vital should Putin be inclined to follow a scorched earth policy, attempting to demolish Ukraine’s defence and industrial capacity, diminishing it as a modern economic power for the foreseeable future. This would be not so much a strategy and more of a temper tantrum, punishing the Ukrainians for refusing to be colonised.

Yet as Germany and Japan showed after 1945 even shattered economies can be rebuilt to even greater levels of efficiency with sufficient resilience and resources. That is another reason why Western financial assistance and investment will be especially vital - Ukraine’s full recovery will serve as a testament to Putin’s failure.

As part of this, and with his standing boosted by his war leadership, President Zelensky will need to tackle some of the chronic problems of corruption that have plagued his country.

We have been caught out already by Putin’s capacity to act on the basis of his warped world-view, whatever objective calculations might suggest. Nonetheless, it is worth keeping this analysis in mind when considering prospective peace deals. The Russians may have underestimated the costs of conquest from the start but their approach to war has raised those costs considerably, especially in those parts of Ukraine close to Russia. If they are realistic about future costs (big if) then they might prefer to revert to the old formula from the 2015 Minsk agreement that would have given these areas more of a say in some new constitutional arrangement. On the other hand these areas will now, if allowed to express themselves, likely be as anti-Russian as the rest of Ukraine.

The other implication is that while economic sanctions have not yet given the West much leverage over Putin’s war strategy they do offer it leverage over his peace strategy. While he may have convinced himself that Russia – with Belarus – has a self-sufficient autarchic option this is another self-serving fantasy. The question of the future of sanctions and how they might be unwound is not one to be discussed separately from any peace talks. They are a vital part of the negotiations. As there can be no Western-led peace talks without Ukraine, it should be made clear to Moscow that for now this is a card for Zelensky to play. The future of the Russian economy can then be in his hands. Should a moment come to start to ease sanctions, some leverage will be required to ensure that any agreement is being honoured. There could be a link to reparations for the terrible damage caused.

“Fanaticism”, according to George Santayana, “consists of redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim.” As his original war plans failed Putin has insisted his forces follow a disruptive and cruel strategy that has put his original aims even more out of reach and Ukraine with a say over the future of the Russian economy.

 

[Yossarian]

If “denazification” is going to be defined as being only ever about the azov people that would be great. But Russian tv is still tying Zelensky to the whole drug addicted nazis run the country story which doesn’t bode well.

Yep, while Russian media does amplify anything connected to far-right groups in Ukraine, the "Nazi" stuff seems to have a lot more to do with how Putin has been playing on Russian sentiment about WWII.

Sergei Markov, a pro-Kremlin analyst who appears frequently on state television, claims that Ukraine’s modern-day Nazis are not anti-Jewish but anti-Russian — because that is the agenda that he claims Western intelligence agencies set for them.

Mr. Markov says the Kremlin started using the “Nazi” terminology to “get through to Western politicians and media” about the necessity of invading Ukraine. But the use of the word also appears geared toward Russians, for whom remembrance of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany remains perhaps the single most powerful element of a unifying national identity.

Now, the narrative goes, Mr. Putin is finally carrying out the Soviet Union’s unfinished business.

Why Vladimir Putin Invokes Nazis to Justify His Invasion of Ukraine (Published 2022)

The language of Russia’s invasion has been dominated by the word “Nazi” — a puzzling assertion about a country whose leader is Jewish.

www.nytimes.com

 

[elbows]

I agree largely, however, as with Afghanistan, there was clearly an intention to install a stable pro-'West' regime in Iraq, and that intention was not realised. Again as with Afghanistan, they were pretty clueless when it came to working out who they should actually deal with after the invasion, siding with rural warlords over 'leftist' urban intellectual types. And in both cases, the result was utterly catastrophic. Whatever the degree to which they swallowed their own propaganda initially, they failed by those important measures.

I cant respond fully to this stuff without derailing the thread, so I'll just give it one paragraph and say that as soon as we get beyond the 'regime change' goal in Iraq, peoples beliefs about what the rest of the aims were start to diverge. There was a long list of potential motivations that people argued over for years in regards Iraq, with far too little consensus and plenty of generalisations. Just to give one example, we can debate the extent to which they cared about subsequent regime stability and development, and people could claim that a weak, divided regime became the preference. Especially given that one of the reasons the Saddam regime probably wasnt removed many years sooner involved difficulties arising from the traditional Western preference involving a Sunni strongman, to counter Iranian influence, but thats what Saddam was and an easy like-for-like replacement looked to be a tricky proposition. Likewise there were loads of different oil angles people could choose from, including keeping domestic development and consumption lower than it would evolve to be in a stable, progressing, developing regime. Anyway I dont want to go on about this more, lets just say that for all the thousands of hours of debate about that war in this country, detail about the actual aims beyond the obvious regime change one were kept pretty damn narrow and superficial. And that has quite the knock on effect on how people end up thinking about the war and whether those who indulged in it ultimately considered it worthwhile.

wrt Russia, it does appear that the initial intention was to install a pro-Russia regime in Ukraine and that this is going to fail. Whether securing assurances over Donbass might count as gains is debatable, imo. It's arguable that one of the motivations for the invasion was the way that the Donbass impasse was showing signs of becoming unblocked. It's been Russia's clear intention to maintain these 'frozen conflicts' in Donbass, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc.

Regime change and the installation of a new puppet is certainly the easiest and most obvious version of 'sphere of influence' stuff to understand and for Russia to have aimed for. But there is more than one way to achieve those sorts of results, and thats where some of the biggest unknowns remain in my mind. Russia looks likely to accept alternatives to this crude approach if they think it will achieve the same sort of results with one or two less major headaches in terms of long term occupation etc. I might end up droning on about these aspects for years to come, and as the years go by we'll not really be left in any doubt as to what affect this war had on the trajectory of Ukraine and its relations with other nations and blocks.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I cant respond fully to this stuff without derailing the thread, so I'll just give it one paragraph and say that as soon as we get beyond the 'regime change' goal in Iraq, peoples beliefs about what the rest of the aims were start to diverge. There was a long list of potential motivations that people argued over for years in regards Iraq, with far too little consensus and plenty of generalisations. Just to give one example, we can debate the extent to which they cared about subsequent regime stability and development, and people could claim that a weak, divided regime became the preference. Especially given that one of the reasons the Saddam regime probably wasnt removed many years sooner involved difficulties arising from the traditional Western preference involving a Sunni strongman, to counter Iranian influence, but thats what Saddam was and an easy like-for-like replacement looked to be a tricky proposition. Likewise there were loads of different oil angles people could choose from, including keeping domestic development and consumption lower than it could evolve to be in a stable, progressing, developing regime. Anyway I dont want to go on about this more, lets just say that for all the thousands of hours of debate about that war in this country, detail about the actual aims beyond the obvious regime change one were kept pretty damn narrow and superficial. And that has quite the knock on effect on how people end up thinking about the war and whether those who indulged in it ultimately considered it worthwhile.



Regime change and the installation of a new puppet is certainly the easiest and most obvious version of 'sphere of influence' stuff to understand and for Russia to have aimed for. But there is more than one way to achieve those sorts of results, and thats where some of the biggest unknowns remain in my mind, Russia looks likely to accept alternatives to this crude approach if they think it will achieve the same sort of results with one or two less major headaches in terms of long term occupation etc. I might end up droning on about these aspects for years to come, and as the years go by we'll not really be left in any doubt as to what affect this war had on the trajectory of Ukraine and its relations with other nations and blocks.

Fair enough that this is a derail. But just to say that it's an interesting idea that they might have ended up wanting a divided and fractured country. I'm not sure I buy it. From what I've read about the way they misunderstood the situation they found themselves in (and the motivations of those they were dealing with), general haplessness is a better explanation for what ended up happening. And I think general haplessness is a pretty strong player in Ukraine as well. He crops up a lot.

 

[Raheem]

And I think general haplessness is a pretty strong player in Ukraine as well. He crops up a lot.

I've heard he's not even a real general.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I've heard he's not even a real general.

Backed up by commander clueless and major mistake. It's amazing the positions you can get given if you act like you know what you're doing.

 

[Raheem]

Backed up by commander clueless and major mistake. It's amazing the positions you can get given if you act like you know what you're doing.

I don't move in those circles, but I have encountered Private Misgivings.

 

[existentialist]

Backed up by commander clueless and major mistake. It's amazing the positions you can get given if you act like you know what you're doing.

I knew a Captain Hassall, who got promoted to Major

 

[Pickman's model]

I don't move in those circles, but I have encountered Private Misgivings.

the military are undermined by Major Cock-Ups

 

[elbows]

I think general haplessness is a pretty strong player in Ukraine as well. He crops up a lot.

I seek to build a case that he is real, but is also multi-purpose and very useful to those who set the agenda and make the big decisions.

We are familiar with the frequency of mistakes and the absurdities of the human condition and human behaviour. But we are also familiar with dodgy priorities, cold calculations, indifference and layers of deliberately misguiding bullshit.

I suggest that in almost any area of life, and in the application of concentrated power, all of the above are present and some failings are used to disguise the priorities and cold calculations. I could say that about the pandemic, I could say that about most wars that spring to mind.