Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion

I'm sorry teqniq, the dancing up and down I'm about to perform isn't aimed at you, but the headline, and the similar claim made in that article, are complete and utter bollocks :mad:. The bereaved families are not "finally hearing" harrowing details.

Firstly, the details being presented for each of the deceased been have all been discussed - often in more far more potentially distressing depth - at different times during the Inquiry. The BSRs are themselves core participants. Not only will they have had the chance to see all the evidence that has been presented and published publicly, they will have had the chance to see a great deal more that hasn't been. And they will have seen it all well before it has been dealt with in the hearings.

But more importantly these presentations are not being made by Counsel to the Inquiry, but by the legal representatives for the bereaved themselves. In addition to going over the details of the identity of each deceased person, and what is known of how, when and where they died, drawing together the evidence the Inquiry has heard, they are also giving short presentations of who they were as people. These latter have been written with the bereaved and reflect their wishes, for example about whether or not to show photographs of them. These presentations are being made on behalf of the bereaved not to them, or at them.

I don't generally bother with the issue of how bad the Guardian is (IMO they're all cunts) but that is an amazingly crass piece of misreporting.

I'd add that the presentations are obviously dealing with difficult things but they have been respectful and IMO are not nearly as grim as, for example, the evidence last week from the toxicologist which dealt not just with the estimated times and cause of death, but touched on the nature of those deaths.

If anyone does want to watch the video of these Module 8 presentations I'd recommend doing so on catch up rather than live. There are long breaks between each presentation, which are very often extended to ensure that family members of the deceased who wish to be present in the hearing room, some of whom have come to London to be there, can take their places.
 
Last edited:
Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’
Lots of links from it all of which should be working.

Inside Housing are only providing weekly accounts during this part of the Inquiry. (A note from Inside Housing on our Grenfell Tower Inquiry coverage).

This one gives a good account of what the module is about and illustrates this with material from the presentations given about the deaths related to Flat 205 on the top floor: four people who died in the flat after taking refuge in it and one person who fell from it. (In total twenty four people died in the flats or the lobby on the top floor and two people fell from it).
 
Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’
Links from it should be working

This was the second week of presentations about the people who died in the fire. The Diary gives accounts of some of them: the four people who died in Flat 202 on the top floor, the eleven people who died in Flat 193 and one person who died in Flat 181.

Next week is the final week of these presentations.
 
Twitter thread by Peter Apps of Inside Housing (twitter link)

It might be worth pointing out a couple of the things that are coming up in this part of the inquiry (which is focusing on the circumstances of each victim's deaths) as some of the slightly more overlooked aspects of the inquiry have been held up as quite significant...

1. Lifts. There has been a lot of discussion about how disabled and vulnerable residents were unable to get out. In many of the presentations the issue of lifts has also been raised. Grenfell did not have 'firefighting' lifts, which could have been used in rescues.
Firefighters had also been unable to take control of the lift via an override switch on the ground floor. We covered this evidence last year, but it appears stigmatising views relating to fears of ASB (Anti-Social Behaviour) contributed. Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 44.​

2. Smoke vents. A key reason for residents trapped on Floor 23 not fleeing was the speed with which the lobby filled with smoke. Witness evidence suggests this smoke came (at least partly) through the smoke vents – so the system was pulling it up from lower floors and leaking.
There was lengthy evidence about the smoke vents (and the dampers which should prevent smoke leakage) also last year: Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 42.​

3. What caused 15 residents to go up to the top floor at around 1.30am? At this point the stairs were (relatively) passable, and more than 70 people evacuated unaided. But instead of going down 15 people from upper floors went up. 14 of them died.
This issue was addressed at length in Phase One and the report, but remains unsettled. It has come up in several presentations. Evidence has focused in particular on one witness who recalls hearing a male voice “shouting in a clear English accent, ‘go back, go back’”.​

We don't know precisely who this voice belonged to. We do know that other residents (who survived) were told to go back to their flats by firefighters as they descended. They ignored this advice.​
We also know that at around the time as the group who went up were entering the stairwell, a rescue attempt a few floors below saw a stairwell door held open and smoke suddenly enter the stairs. This may have increased the sense of danger.​
Some also believed there was a possibility of rescue by helicopter, and those with vulnerabilities would have struggled to make it all the way down the stairs.​

4. Evacuation plans and vulnerabilities. This has been talked about a lot, but it is coming up in so many presentations. We know that the fire disproportionately killed disabled residents who could not escape.
The presentations are illustrating that these vulnerabilities were known to the TMO. They are also illustrating (tragically) the way in which relatives who might have been able to escape stayed and died because they could not leave vulnerable residents.​
We've written on this issue a lot, but in short it was systemic – and continues. Residents of high rise buildings still don't have evacuation plans, with the Home Office recently branding providing them "not proportionate".​

5. 999 calls and promise of rescue. This was obviously covered in detail in Phase One, but we're going back through it – how for example, whole families reported being trapped from as early as 1.40am, but no crews were dispatched to reach them until 3am.
In the meantime, they were given false reassurances that firefighters were coming which made them less likely to attempt an escape during the window when it might have been possible.​

It's often said that the Grenfell Tower fire was about more than cladding and that's true - these presentations are a heartbreaking illustration of the scale of the multiple failures that led to the deaths.
 
Today was the last day of Module 8 and the last day of hearings until Monday November 7th when it will hear final overarching submissions by core participants.

In the meantime the Inquiry will start writing its Phase 2 report. No target date for completion has been set. It could well be the autumn of next year. For comparison Phase 1 of the Inquiry sat for 85 days and disclosed 20,752 documents. It took eleven months to produce the Phase 1 report. Phase 2 has sat for 308 days and disclosed 299,056 documents. And as Peter Apps pointed out on twitter today

3d9evfu.png


Given that after the Phase 2 report is released there will not only be decisions about any criminal prosecutions, but also a small tsunami of legal action between and against the corporate core participants based on its findings, I would think 'complex' is putting it mildly.

Here is the Inside Housing report of today's hearing which heard difficult presentations about the deaths of five family members in Flat 182 and about the deaths of three people who died in Flat 113 and one person who fell from it. (Flat 113 was the subject of a special episode of the BBC podcast).

Grenfell Tower Inquiry oral evidence completes with final presentations relating to trapped victims

At the end of the day after a minutes silence for those who died their names were read out:

View attachment Module 8 - Presentations Relating to the Deceased-output3.mp4
 
Grenfell United tweet

twitter link

Mr Chairman, members of the panel, we have now come to the end of Module 8, the final module in this Inquiry.

During the last three weeks, in addition to the evidence of the professionals who worked on recovery, identification and cause of death of the deceased we have heard many accounts of the facts bearing on how those who lost their lives in the tower in the early hours of 14 June 2017 came to meet their end.

The Inquiry team and I are grateful to all counsel for the bereaved, for their presentations, and for the mostly neutral way in which the relevant facts were presented. That cannot have been easy. We are also grateful that this advanced point in our work for the sensitive and dignified recalling of who each of the individuals who died were, what they were like in life, and what they went through in their final hours and minutes. There can be nobody whoever had a heart who hearing those presentations could remain unmoved and unthinking.

I offer two reflections on what we've heard. First, there may have been times in the last three weeks when you were struck by the vast distances between the final terrible experiences of those who died, what they saw, smelt, heard, felt, feared and said in those last hours and the matters that we have investigated over the last two and a half years in this phase.

How great is the Gulf between, for example, what Jessica Urbano Ramirez experienced in her final hour and the filler debate. What did Hamid Kani's end have to do with the NBS specification? Raymond Bernard's final moments with the evolution of GRA 3.2, the Choucair's deaths with class 0, Hesham Rahman's with the Lakanal case study, what did architect's test 5B have to do with Mehdi El-Wahabi's last moments?

At times in these weeks you might have wondered whether we were sitting in a completely different room listening to something wholly unrelated to all the other threads making up the fabric of this disaster, and it is this perception of distance in itself which is an important discovery in our work. It tells us how so many actions and omissions of so many people working in offices and on their smartphones, in meeting rooms, on sites, in testing houses, discharging endless strings of emails, have consequences perhaps far remote from their consciousness but which were always objectively present in the perpetually contingent.

Each presentation that we have heard has built a bridge across that Gulf. Each presentation not only reminds us again of who we do this work for and why we do it, but it also tells us that every decision, every act, omission, interpretation, understanding, practice, policy, protocol, affects someone somewhere. Someone who is unknown and unseen but who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother.

Secondly, I must add one further observation from counsel's chair. Sitting here, my team and I can only admire the dignified bearing of those left behind. The grieving families who still travel a hard road. They have endured many months of detailed and often dry evidence with patience, and they have now come here to sit and hear these graphic and unsparing accounts in modest and silent reflection. Their dignity and their courage in the face of the ineffable horror is its own attribute, a light shining out in the darkness.

Mr Chairman, I would now ask those who are able to stand for a 72 second period of silent reflection after which we will read the names of each of the names and the faces of those who perished at Grenfell.
 
Twitter link to Grenfell United statement

twitter link

Responding to the closing statements of Module 8 from the Public Inquiry. Grenfell United, the bereaved families and survivors said:

Yesterday marked the end of the Inquest function which examined the most horrific details of how our loved ones passed and the painful accounts of how they spent their final moments.

Reliving the details in such a public way made it even more difficult. But knowing that they died needlessly is the hardest part to accept.

For the last four years we have listened to how we were failed by those who were responsible for our safety. And with the truth now exposed, everyone has heard just how bad things were and remain.

We experienced first hand the mistreatment of our local authority and landlord the Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO). But to hear the evidence and watch those who bullied us for years lie in an attempt to evade the consequences of their actions, serves a different kind of pain.

This process has uncovered what we have always known. That Grenfell was totally avoidable. Had our landlord listened to our warnings, had our Government valued our safety instead of feasting on corporate money with a sole focus to deregulate the system, had those in power not turned a blind eye to corruption and bribery, had the London Fire Brigade removed stay put as soon as it was clear the fire was not containable, had politicians not built a system that only serves them and their friends and not the people.

72 people would still be with us today and 18 children would still have their futures ahead of them.

But 72 people died, forced to pay the ultimate price. And we will forever suffer the consequences of other peoples' negligence, greed and corruption.

We thank the inquiry team and our lawyers for uncovering the truth about what caused the Grenfell fire and the failings during and after on the 14th of June 2017. However, with that said, the Inquiry's findings mean nothing if no one is held accountable and the process is meaningless if the recommendations are not implemented and left to gather dust.

It's a sobering thought that this much evidence can be made public yet the companies responsible continue to profit. That our Government continues to reject vital recommendations and little to nothing has changed for the better.

We hope Sir Martin Moore-Bick will be thorough and rigorous in his findings and that the Phase Two report will be rigid and impactful in bringing about real change.

We now await the Metropolitan Police and the Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) to bring about the necessary criminal charges and to prove to us that there is not a two tier justice system.

We have been patient, we have given this process all the rope we have. But we have not healed and we are no closer to justice.

We ask all those who have stood with us until now to keep going. This phase might be over, but the battle for justice is not, and we will continue to fight until those culpable are prosecuted.
 
Next Monday 7th November the Inquiry reopens to hear final submissions from core participants.

As part of their submissions, corporate and government core participants have been asked to give an account of what changes they have made since the fire. At the start of the Inquiry in 2018 they were asked to provide initial position statements, and these were put up on the Inquiry website over the summer. It will be interesting to compare them with what they have to say now. Other core participants will be giving overarching final submissions.

The Inquiry has not announced how next week's hearings will be structured. No closing statements were heard for Module 7, which heard final expert evidence, and we don't yet know whether there will be separate submissions in respect of this module.

Peter Apps of Inside Housing has begun a series of recaps of the evidence heard during phase two of the Inquiry. Here is the first. Links from it should be working.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry recap: module one – the refurbishment (archived)
 
Inside Housing report on today's closing statements for Phase 2 of the Inquiry.

Lawyers for Grenfell community set out ‘rogues gallery’ of organisations ‘most accountable’ for fire (archived)

I'll transcribe the oral closing submissions made on behalf of the BSRs.
Here's the first by Stephanie Barwise for BSR Team 1

(I should point out that I've added back in part of a sentence missing from the official transcript, inserted some commas and added a couple of words in square brackets to hopefully make the meaning clearer).

I'll add the others here as I do them.

Danny Friedman also for BSR Team 1.
Michael Mansfield for BSR Team 2.
Adrian Williamson also for BSR Team 2.
Imran Khan for the BSR represented by Imran Khan & Partners.
 
Last edited:
Today's Inside Housing report:

Grenfell cladding manufacturer calls failure to release devastating fire tests on material used on tower a ‘non-issue’ (archived)

The Inquiry heard final submissions from Arconic, Kingspan, Harley Facades (cladding subcontractor on the refurbishment) and PSB (who designed the refurbished smoke extraction system). The 'merry-go-round of buck passing', generously lubricated with weasel words, came out for another spin.

It's back again tomorrow with Celotex, the BBE, RBKC and the former "TMO".
 
Today's Inside Housing report:

Social housing staff under investigation for ‘serious criminal offences’ relating to Grenfell fire (archived)

Before the headline gets your hopes up it is worth reading the actual quote from James Ageros representing the former "TMO":

Counsel for the Inquiry urged core participants not to engage in a merry-go-round of buck passing and it was remarked on that none of the core participants, save for RBKC, and now possibly DLUHC and the BBA has made any admissions before the Inquiry. This is not lost on the TMO. However, as the Inquiry knows, the TMO exists now only as an organisation whose function is to respond to any civil or criminal proceedings brought against it. The handful of staff presently in post were not in post before the fire and had no dealings with the refurbishment. Sir, for these reasons it is not appropriate for those now employed to express critical judgements about the organisation as it previously was, or its employees. This is especially so when a number of the individuals in question continue to be investigated by the police for serious criminal offences.

If it wasn't for those pesky police officers they could tell all.

However, he was able to state:

As it has throughout the TMO expresses its sincere sympathy and condolences to those who lost loved ones during the terrible fire which occurred on the 14th of June 2017. And it hopes that those who grieve may find some comfort in the years to come including through the findings of this Public Inquiry.

So that's all right then.

Other core participants felt far less inhibited in blaming former employees, or admitting "non-causative" errors, including Celotex, the manufacturer of one of the combustible insulation products used on the tower. The Inside Housing report gives a good account of what their counsel said.

Their position was demolished by Stephanie Barwise for BSR Team 1

Turning to Celotex. Unlike the other core participants, Celotex does admit to wrongdoing, albeit it denies that these actions had any causative effect. The two aspects of wrongdoing Celotex admits to are, first, discrepancies in the BS 8414 test carried out by BRE on RS5000 insulation in May 2014, and the way that test was described in Celotex marketing literature. It was that test which led Celotex to be able to market its RS5000 product as suitable for use above 18 metres.

The second aspect of admitted wrongdoing is the understatement of lambda values by the selective use and omission of data. Lambda values represent the heat conductivity of a material such as insulation, and are therefore part of the thermal calculations done to ascertain the ability of every layer of the external walls to resist heat loss. Those calculations are known as U-values. The lower the lambda values and overall U-values the better.

Both these aspects of Celotex’s wrongdoing — the misstatement of the test and the understatement of the lambda values — feature in the reasons why the designers and contractors at Grenfell were influenced to use Celotex. Both these behaviours evidence a culture within Celotex at the time which will require careful examination in this Inquiry. It is not the case that the test on RS5000 and the misdescription of that test and the understatement of the lambda values had no causative effect.

As Celotex was well aware, there was a lack of knowledge in some building inspectors about the use of combustible insulation. Celotex exploited this lack of knowledge, but in a way which carefully avoided expressing a view on the requirements of ADB.

A good example of this was that in April 2015, a distributor of RS5000, SIG, told Celotex that the NHBC was refusing to approve RS5000 unless there was no difference between the proposed cladding system on site and that described in Celotex’s RS5000May 2014 test.

If we may turn to {CEL00001406}, at the bottom of page 1 we see Celotex’s head of technical’s reply to SIG.

He says:

The official Celotex view.

Celotex are open about the test we have performed and we always include the (…) Rainscreen Cladding Guide (…) The key line being:

‘Any changes to the components (…) will need to be considered by the building designer’.

At the foot of page 1 he says:

Here is my view.

If we scroll down, he says:

(…) ultimately the specification of this product will depend on the (…) requirements of (…) [ADB]. Celotex do not try to second guess what may, or may not be, deemed suitable and if RS5000 is rejected as an option (…) we take it on the chin (…) We have (…) had conversations with the NHBC and are aware that generally we will struggle to [get RS5000] accepted (…) at this time.

He went on:

We have heard of one (…) job where the inspector said that it was OK to use any insulation upto 18m and only above 18m did it have to be non-combustible or in line with the requirements of BR 135. Clearly wrong. The fire hasn’t got a tape measure and if it starts at the ground floor it will love to race up the first 18m. Just shows you the smoke of confusion out there.

If we can scroll back up to the top of page 1 (CEL00001406/1), Celotex’s distributor’s reply to this was:

Thanks for that.

Never has the expression ‘smoke and mirrors’ been more appropriate.

I think I’ll adopt a version of ‘caveat emptor’ and if specifically challenged use the rock fibre options. If I’m not challenged it’ll be RS5000.

This, as Celotex well knows, is how its marketing strategy worked. Contractors and designers would use the fact that the sales literature indicated the product was fit for use over 18 metres to get it onto buildings if they could get it past the building control inspector.

Celotex also omits to mention just how aggressive its marketing strategy was. It used the subcontractors and specifiers effectively as pushers to ensure that its products were specified and used on buildings. This was part of Celotex’s so-called push/pull marketing strategy, namely using potential contractors on a project to push the product onto architects, who would then specify it, thereby pulling it onto the building.

Nowhere was that more apparent than in an internal Celotex document in early June 2017 in which Celotex acknowledged that architects and main contractors push RS5000 particularly vehemently, but noted that to sell RS5000, Celotex needed to engage with the key decision-makers, namely the building owner, client warranty provider and fire engineer. The document records that one of the main reasons why RS5000 was continuing to achieve success was because of Celotex’s growing relationships with these warranty providers and fire engineers.

In these circumstances, it does not lie in Celotex’s mouth to assert that the misleading description of the May 2014 test for RS5000 had no causative effect and that the designers at Grenfell cannot have relied upon it.

As Celotex accepts, it was dealing directly with Harley in relation to the use of RS5000 at Grenfell, and indeed it is clear that Celotex went out of its way to win the Grenfell project. The so-called must-win projects list sent by Celotex to its parent company, Saint Gobain, on 7 November 2014, included at item 2 Grenfell Tower. Celotex saw Grenfell as being a flagship for the RS5000 product, hence in July 2015 it drafted a Celotex case study regarding the use of Celotex at Grenfell, boasting super-low lambda values, delivering better U-values and thinner solutions, precisely the qualities it knew the designers of Grenfell wanted.

Whilst it was heartening that Celotex’s counsel corrected Harley’s incorrect submission that there was no evidence that Harley knew the cladding was dangerous, it is nevertheless disappointing that Celotex itself also fails to recognise the evidence which demonstrates the fallacy of its position.

She didn't say that this week. This was in the Team 1 opening submission back in January 2020. (Worth reading again IMO)

RBKC reiterated the admissions of serious failings it had previously made. Counsel for the BBA went through the changes it has made to its organisation and procedures. And counsel for the Mayor of London made the same point as some of the BSR submissions, that the Inquiry should consider how to try to ensure that its recommendations are acted on.

Tomorrow Exova, DLUHC and a closing statement by Counsel to the Inquiry.
 
Last edited:
Grenfell United Statement


Twitter link

Responding to the closing statements from the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry. Grenfell United, the bereaved families and survivors said:

Five and a half years ago, we might have seen today as a significant milestone, marking the formal end of the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry. A process we have endured for over five years.

But in reality, today is no different to any other. Only another reminder that we've been saying the same thing for five years. That we continue to live our lives knowing the evidence has been uncovered. And yet, there's no change. No accountability. No charges.

In the half a decade since the fire, we've had four Prime Ministers, seven Secretaries of State. And no progress.

What we've had instead is Government Ministers who continue to advocate for deregulation. Today of all days, Jacob Rees-Mogg, the same Minister who blamed residents for not using their common sense has chosen to speak out on this matter.

Whilst we wait for further recommendations, the Government has yet to implement a single recommendation from the Phase 1 report. They've been allowed to continue their circus for far too long. And we sound like a broken record.

The Government was warned countless times of the danger to human life through deregulation. But they turned a blind eye, let corporates game the system and Government pocketed the profits.

The Lakanal House fire in 2009 should have been the wake up call. It killed six people and opened up questions on building safety but they did nothing.

The Lakanal House Inquiry issued the London Fire Brigade with critical recommendations left incomplete by the time Grenfell Tower was alight. Had they lifted the stay put policy when it was clear the fire was uncontrollable, that night might have been very different.

The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea treated us like second class citizens. They refused to invest in Grenfell Tower for 30 years, and when they did they wrapped it in petrol.

Our local council colluded with our landlord the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management to ensure we were silenced. The KCTMO bullied us, ignored our fire safety concerns and treated our lives like a game of monopoly.

Kingspan's tests in 2006 and 2007 showed a "raging inferno" and the product "burning on its own steam" but they concealed it and sold it anyway.

Arconic managers speculated about a fire killing 60 or 70 people.

Celotex staff were made to "lie for commercial gain" and described the company as a "fraud on the market".

All of this, and yet no consequences.

We now have to put our faith into a justice system that protects the powerful. A system that prevents justice. Whilst this system exists, we face the same unachievable battle as the many before us. From Aberfan, to Hillsborough, justice has been denied and Grenfell is no different.

We hope Sir Martin Moore-Bick will be thorough and rigorous in his findings and that the Phase Two report will bring real change; a legacy for the 72 people who lost their lives that night.

We thank the Inquiry team for all their work in uncovering the evidence. It's now up to the Metropolitan Police and the Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) to bring about the necessary criminal charges and to prove to us that there is not a two tier justice system.

We ask all those who have stood with us until now to keep going. This phase might be over, but the battle for justice is not, and we will continue until those culpable are prosecuted.
 
Today's Inside Housing report:

Grenfell Inquiry ‘able to conclude every death was avoidable’ as its lawyer slams ongoing ‘merry-go-round’ of buck-passing (archived)

This was the last day of hearings and finished with a closing statement from Richard Millett in which he made concrete the 'merry-go-round of buck passing'. Taking each of the main corporate and official bodies in turn he listed all of those they had pointed the finger at, each illustrated with a graphic. At the end he drew the graphics together into a 'web of blame'.

Map of who blames who for Grenfell fire


Earlier the DLUHC and Exova had given closing statements.

The written closing submissions for those bodies who haven't made oral statements: the Cabinet Office, NHBC, JS Wright, BRE, Thames Water, Max Fordham, Siderise and Rydon are linked from here on the Inquiry website. Noticeably missing are architects Studio E.


Each and every one of the deaths that occurred at Grenfell was avoidable.


twitter link
 
Among the recommendations in the Grenfell Inquiry's Phase 1 report were a series dealing with evacuation in high rise buildings. They included
  • The development of national guidelines for carrying out partial or total evacuations of high-rise buildings – including protecting fire access routes and procedures for evacuating people who require assistance
  • Fire services develop policies for partial or total evacuation of high rises
  • Owner and manager be required to draw up and keep under review evacuation plans, with copies provided to local fire and rescue services and placed in an information box on the premises
  • All high-rise buildings be equipped with facilities to enable the sending of an evacuation signal to the whole or a selected part of the building
  • Owners and managers be required by law to prepare personal evacuation plans for residents who may struggle to do so personally, with information about them stored in the premise’s information box
  • All fire services be equipped with smoke hoods to help evacuate residents down smoke-filled stairs
The Inquiry's recommendations were based on the idea that buildings should have Plan B: a workable plan that can be activated if stay put unexpectedly becomes untenable for some or all of the residents due to the building failing.

In May this year the Government launched a consultation into a system which rejected this approach, and in particular the need to plan for partial or total evacuation in most circumstances, and the requirement to provide Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) for disabled residents. The system they consulted on instead is a five-step plan for “emergency evacuation information sharing” (EEIS).

  1. Defining the building’s evacuation strategy: deciding whether the building should have general advice to stay put, or leave immediately in the event of a fire
  2. Identification of those who need support to evacuate: asking residents to “make themselves known… if they consider they would need support to evacuate”
  3. A person-centred fire risk assessment checklist: an assessment of in-flat risks of the resident who would struggle to evacuate, which the building owner would “review… and consider what might be reasonable for them to implement to mitigate against the risks identified”. However, it added: “Responsible persons currently have no statutory duties to implement in-flat prevention or suppression measures. We do not propose to change this. In-flat measures should remain largely for the resident to implement and finance.”
  4. Sharing information with local fire authority: to share the information about residents with disabilities either digitally or via a premises information box with local fire services
  5. The fire and rescue service to access and use this information in the event of a fire

However, the consultation said “it would not be proportionate to mandate the measures laid out in steps two to five in stay put buildings”, meaning that for the vast majority of buildings no process of identification will be put into effect.

The proposals therefore mark an effective abandonment of the core philosophy of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s phase one report: a plan B is required because it is not possible to place total reliance on stay put.
Quoted from this Inside Housing story.

Under this proposal buildings would be divided into one of two categories: "stay put" or "simultaneous evacuation". The latter would be those defined as dangerous and requiring a waking watch. For the rest - the majority:

Stay put buildings would have no plans made for evacuation, with total reliance placed on the building’s compartmentation to keep residents safe.

In September two members of Claddag, a campaigning group representing disabled residents of buildings with dangerous cladding, were given permission to seek a judicial review over the decision not to implement PEEPs. The judicial review hearing began yesterday. The Inside Housing report of the proceedings is here (archived)

Government privately ruled out implementing Grenfell Inquiry recommendation before completing consultation, court hears

The Government will be presenting its case today.

On the issue of the need for a Plan B, an evacuation plan if stay put becomes untenable, in March the Home Office appointed the National Centre for Social Research to conduct a research project on the issue of evacuating high-rise buildings. Last week they published its report which entirely contrary to the Government's current approach concluded

the body of evidence suggests that no single strategy is universally appropriate for the evacuation of high-rise residential buildings. Instead, every high-rise residential building should have a bespoke fire evacuation plan, developed in full consideration of the building design, the composition of occupants and crucially, the presence, or indeed absence, of effective compartmentation.

Residential high-rise buildings ‘should have individual evacuation plans’, says government-funded review - Inside Housing (archived)
 
Inside Housing report on yesterday's judicial review hearing over the Government's decision not to implement PEEPs.

Government says ‘no decision’ made on personal evacuation plans for disabled people (archived)

Despite going out to consultation on entirely different proposals than those recommended by the Grenfell Inquiry, and stating that "we are currently unable to mandate PEEPs in high-rise residential buildings", the Governments Counsel argued that no decision had in fact been made about PEEPs. and it would be “premature for the court to be invited to second-guess as to how that decision will be taken and what it will be”.

The High Court's ruling is expected next year.
 
Inside Housing report on yesterday's judicial review hearing over the Government's decision not to implement PEEPs.

Government says ‘no decision’ made on personal evacuation plans for disabled people (archived)

Despite going out to consultation on entirely different proposals than those recommended by the Grenfell Inquiry, and stating that "we are currently unable to mandate PEEPs in high-rise residential buildings", the Governments Counsel argued that no decision had in fact been made about PEEPs. and it would be “premature for the court to be invited to second-guess as to how that decision will be taken and what it will be”.

The High Court's ruling is expected next year.

Kicking the can down the road at it slimiest. The minute you see Johnsons name alongside "unelected peers" you should not be surprised at the arrogance on show here.
 
Yesterday the Sunday Times published an interview with Gove in which he went further than the Government has previously in accepting responsibility for the seriously flawed system of Building Regulations.

Michael Gove: We are to blame on Grenfell - The Sunday Times (archived)

Evidence to the Grenfell inquiry has shown that official guidance was widely seen to allow highly flammable cladding on tall buildings. Does Gove now accept that the rules were wrong? “Yes,” he answers. “There was a system of regulation that was faulty. The government did not think hard enough, or police effectively enough, the whole system of building safety. Undoubtedly.”
Five minders sit around the table. One shoots him a look, but he ploughs on: “I believe that [the guidance] was so faulty and ambiguous that it allowed unscrupulous people to exploit a broken system in a way that led to tragedy.”

Inside Housing gives some background:

Gove accepts ‘faulty’ government guidance contributed to Grenfell fire - Inside Housing (archived)

Previous statements, including those given to the inquiry by government lawyers, had seen them accept a failure to oversee the enforcement work of local authority inspectors, but never that central government guidance was itself flawed.

In a twitter thread - archived here - Inside Housing's Peter Apps points out some of the consequences of the Government's previous stance

Among many other things, a much quicker admission that govt guidance was flawed would have resulted in a totally different approach to the cladding crisis. They would have known from the start that lots of buildings would need work. They certainly wouldn't have published a critical advice note in autumn 2018, which said all buildings with combustible materials breached the guidance unless justified by a large-scale test. This is the root of people being unable to mortgage their homes, which continues today. Should be some very serious questions asked about why a group of civil servants and senior advisors put out the claim that the cladding was subject to an outright ban. And why the govt stuck to this claim in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary

Grenfell United's response:

Grenfell United response to Gove's admission of Government responsibility for flawed building regulations


twitter link

Of course as Peter Apps points out:
Peter Apps points out non compliance as important as the flawed guidance


twitter link
 
The Inquiry has put more documents on it's website. They include this:

2015 Government email discussing removing all official building standards


Twitter link -- The document itself is here. Missing from Pete Apps' screencap is the last two lines of it.

Last line: 'The Building Controls system consists of .... blah de blah'


There are also documents relating to Celotex, and to Saint Gobain, the company which bought them in order to sell combustible insulation in the UK.

Celotex's parent company knew in 2010 it's product could cause toxic smoke.

Twitter link

Inside Housing story about this:

Grenfell insulation firm had document warning its product could cause ‘dense, acrid smoke’ leading to ‘incapacitation and death’ - (Archived)

and a longer background piece with links to the documents, and a discussion of the contribution the cladding materials made to the toxic smoke produced by the fire.

The toxic smoke files: new Grenfell inquiry evidence reveals knowledge of risks before deadly blaze - (archived)

Smoke plays an important, tragic role in the Grenfell Tower story. It was the inhalation of smoke that killed almost all of the victims of the blaze. It was also smoke that trapped them. Thick smoke in the lobbies, which appeared early in the fire, is why many people shut their doors, phoned 999 and followed the advice to stay put instead of fleeing the building. (...)

Where did all this smoke come from? Some of it was from the furniture, appliances, bedding, carpets and other possessions inside flats which were being consumed by the blaze. In most residential fires, this is what ignites first and is where all of the smoke comes from. But Grenfell was different. Here, the first things to burn, besides the kitchen where the blaze started, were the materials that made up the cladding system on the external walls of the tower.
 
Back
Top Bottom