I'm sorry teqniq, the dancing up and down I'm about to perform isn't aimed at you, but the headline, and the similar claim made in that article, are complete and utter bollocks . The bereaved families are not "finally hearing" harrowing details.
It might be worth pointing out a couple of the things that are coming up in this part of the inquiry (which is focusing on the circumstances of each victim's deaths) as some of the slightly more overlooked aspects of the inquiry have been held up as quite significant...
1. Lifts. There has been a lot of discussion about how disabled and vulnerable residents were unable to get out. In many of the presentations the issue of lifts has also been raised. Grenfell did not have 'firefighting' lifts, which could have been used in rescues.
Firefighters had also been unable to take control of the lift via an override switch on the ground floor. We covered this evidence last year, but it appears stigmatising views relating to fears of ASB (Anti-Social Behaviour) contributed. Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 44.
2. Smoke vents. A key reason for residents trapped on Floor 23 not fleeing was the speed with which the lobby filled with smoke. Witness evidence suggests this smoke came (at least partly) through the smoke vents – so the system was pulling it up from lower floors and leaking.
There was lengthy evidence about the smoke vents (and the dampers which should prevent smoke leakage) also last year: Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 42.
3. What caused 15 residents to go up to the top floor at around 1.30am? At this point the stairs were (relatively) passable, and more than 70 people evacuated unaided. But instead of going down 15 people from upper floors went up. 14 of them died.
This issue was addressed at length in Phase One and the report, but remains unsettled. It has come up in several presentations. Evidence has focused in particular on one witness who recalls hearing a male voice “shouting in a clear English accent, ‘go back, go back’”.
We don't know precisely who this voice belonged to. We do know that other residents (who survived) were told to go back to their flats by firefighters as they descended. They ignored this advice.We also know that at around the time as the group who went up were entering the stairwell, a rescue attempt a few floors below saw a stairwell door held open and smoke suddenly enter the stairs. This may have increased the sense of danger.Some also believed there was a possibility of rescue by helicopter, and those with vulnerabilities would have struggled to make it all the way down the stairs.
4. Evacuation plans and vulnerabilities. This has been talked about a lot, but it is coming up in so many presentations. We know that the fire disproportionately killed disabled residents who could not escape.
The presentations are illustrating that these vulnerabilities were known to the TMO. They are also illustrating (tragically) the way in which relatives who might have been able to escape stayed and died because they could not leave vulnerable residents.We've written on this issue a lot, but in short it was systemic – and continues. Residents of high rise buildings still don't have evacuation plans, with the Home Office recently branding providing them "not proportionate".
5. 999 calls and promise of rescue. This was obviously covered in detail in Phase One, but we're going back through it – how for example, whole families reported being trapped from as early as 1.40am, but no crews were dispatched to reach them until 3am.
In the meantime, they were given false reassurances that firefighters were coming which made them less likely to attempt an escape during the window when it might have been possible.
It's often said that the Grenfell Tower fire was about more than cladding and that's true - these presentations are a heartbreaking illustration of the scale of the multiple failures that led to the deaths.
Counsel for the Inquiry urged core participants not to engage in a merry-go-round of buck passing and it was remarked on that none of the core participants, save for RBKC, and now possibly DLUHC and the BBA has made any admissions before the Inquiry. This is not lost on the TMO. However, as the Inquiry knows, the TMO exists now only as an organisation whose function is to respond to any civil or criminal proceedings brought against it. The handful of staff presently in post were not in post before the fire and had no dealings with the refurbishment. Sir, for these reasons it is not appropriate for those now employed to express critical judgements about the organisation as it previously was, or its employees. This is especially so when a number of the individuals in question continue to be investigated by the police for serious criminal offences.
As it has throughout the TMO expresses its sincere sympathy and condolences to those who lost loved ones during the terrible fire which occurred on the 14th of June 2017. And it hopes that those who grieve may find some comfort in the years to come including through the findings of this Public Inquiry.
The official Celotex view.
Celotex are open about the test we have performed and we always include the (…) Rainscreen Cladding Guide (…) The key line being:
‘Any changes to the components (…) will need to be considered by the building designer’.
Here is my view.
(…) ultimately the specification of this product will depend on the (…) requirements of (…) [ADB]. Celotex do not try to second guess what may, or may not be, deemed suitable and if RS5000 is rejected as an option (…) we take it on the chin (…) We have (…) had conversations with the NHBC and are aware that generally we will struggle to [get RS5000] accepted (…) at this time.
We have heard of one (…) job where the inspector said that it was OK to use any insulation upto 18m and only above 18m did it have to be non-combustible or in line with the requirements of BR 135. Clearly wrong. The fire hasn’t got a tape measure and if it starts at the ground floor it will love to race up the first 18m. Just shows you the smoke of confusion out there.
Thanks for that.
Never has the expression ‘smoke and mirrors’ been more appropriate.
I think I’ll adopt a version of ‘caveat emptor’ and if specifically challenged use the rock fibre options. If I’m not challenged it’ll be RS5000.
The Inquiry's recommendations were based on the idea that buildings should have Plan B: a workable plan that can be activated if stay put unexpectedly becomes untenable for some or all of the residents due to the building failing.
- Defining the building’s evacuation strategy: deciding whether the building should have general advice to stay put, or leave immediately in the event of a fire
- Identification of those who need support to evacuate: asking residents to “make themselves known… if they consider they would need support to evacuate”
- A person-centred fire risk assessment checklist: an assessment of in-flat risks of the resident who would struggle to evacuate, which the building owner would “review… and consider what might be reasonable for them to implement to mitigate against the risks identified”. However, it added: “Responsible persons currently have no statutory duties to implement in-flat prevention or suppression measures. We do not propose to change this. In-flat measures should remain largely for the resident to implement and finance.”
- Sharing information with local fire authority: to share the information about residents with disabilities either digitally or via a premises information box with local fire services
- The fire and rescue service to access and use this information in the event of a fire
Quoted from this Inside Housing story.However, the consultation said “it would not be proportionate to mandate the measures laid out in steps two to five in stay put buildings”, meaning that for the vast majority of buildings no process of identification will be put into effect.
The proposals therefore mark an effective abandonment of the core philosophy of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s phase one report: a plan B is required because it is not possible to place total reliance on stay put.
Stay put buildings would have no plans made for evacuation, with total reliance placed on the building’s compartmentation to keep residents safe.
the body of evidence suggests that no single strategy is universally appropriate for the evacuation of high-rise residential buildings. Instead, every high-rise residential building should have a bespoke fire evacuation plan, developed in full consideration of the building design, the composition of occupants and crucially, the presence, or indeed absence, of effective compartmentation.
Inside Housing report on yesterday's judicial review hearing over the Government's decision not to implement PEEPs.
Government says ‘no decision’ made on personal evacuation plans for disabled people (archived)
Despite going out to consultation on entirely different proposals than those recommended by the Grenfell Inquiry, and stating that "we are currently unable to mandate PEEPs in high-rise residential buildings", the Governments Counsel argued that no decision had in fact been made about PEEPs. and it would be “premature for the court to be invited to second-guess as to how that decision will be taken and what it will be”.
The High Court's ruling is expected next year.
[Celotex] The company that sold the combustible insulation used on Grenfell Tower had research which demonstrated that it produced acidic, toxic smoke when burned 18 months before the blaze, a document leaked to Inside Housing reveals.
Evidence to the Grenfell inquiry has shown that official guidance was widely seen to allow highly flammable cladding on tall buildings. Does Gove now accept that the rules were wrong? “Yes,” he answers. “There was a system of regulation that was faulty. The government did not think hard enough, or police effectively enough, the whole system of building safety. Undoubtedly.”
Five minders sit around the table. One shoots him a look, but he ploughs on: “I believe that [the guidance] was so faulty and ambiguous that it allowed unscrupulous people to exploit a broken system in a way that led to tragedy.”
Previous statements, including those given to the inquiry by government lawyers, had seen them accept a failure to oversee the enforcement work of local authority inspectors, but never that central government guidance was itself flawed.
Among many other things, a much quicker admission that govt guidance was flawed would have resulted in a totally different approach to the cladding crisis. They would have known from the start that lots of buildings would need work. They certainly wouldn't have published a critical advice note in autumn 2018, which said all buildings with combustible materials breached the guidance unless justified by a large-scale test. This is the root of people being unable to mortgage their homes, which continues today. Should be some very serious questions asked about why a group of civil servants and senior advisors put out the claim that the cladding was subject to an outright ban. And why the govt stuck to this claim in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary
Smoke plays an important, tragic role in the Grenfell Tower story. It was the inhalation of smoke that killed almost all of the victims of the blaze. It was also smoke that trapped them. Thick smoke in the lobbies, which appeared early in the fire, is why many people shut their doors, phoned 999 and followed the advice to stay put instead of fleeing the building. (...)
Where did all this smoke come from? Some of it was from the furniture, appliances, bedding, carpets and other possessions inside flats which were being consumed by the blaze. In most residential fires, this is what ignites first and is where all of the smoke comes from. But Grenfell was different. Here, the first things to burn, besides the kitchen where the blaze started, were the materials that made up the cladding system on the external walls of the tower.