Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion

[teuchter]

The problems with implementing assisted evacuations in buildings that were designed on the basis of compartmentation and "stay put" policies are real and difficult ones. Some of the response to the stuff published today seems a bit simplistic and misrepresentative to me.
There are no easy solutions even if you throw money at it. In a building where there are ten residents needing assisted evacuation, even if you employ, say, 20 people full time to be ready at any moment to effect the evacuation, then how exactly are you going to get all of those people, using chair carriers, down a single staircase which all other residents are going to be trying to use too, and which the fire services will imminently need to use to access the building and start fighting the fire.
It seems so expensive and impractical to me that it seems perfectly reasonable to consider other approaches, or to decide that this approach only makes sense in certain buildings, which seems to be what is happening.

 

[agricola]

The problems with implementing assisted evacuations in buildings that were designed on the basis of compartmentation and "stay put" policies are real and difficult ones. Some of the response to the stuff published today seems a bit simplistic and misrepresentative to me.
There are no easy solutions even if you throw money at it. In a building where there are ten residents needing assisted evacuation, even if you employ, say, 20 people full time to be ready at any moment to effect the evacuation, then how exactly are you going to get all of those people, using chair carriers, down a single staircase which all other residents are going to be trying to use too, and which the fire services will imminently need to use to access the building and start fighting the fire.
It seems so expensive and impractical to me that it seems perfectly reasonable to consider other approaches, or to decide that this approach only makes sense in certain buildings, which seems to be what is happening.

A big part of the emboldened bit here can be worked out by reasonably regular (6 months / yearly, ideally) evacuation practices with the local fire brigade, which would cost nowhere near the sums suggested (and what money was spent would go on increasing the number of fire staff so that the practices can be run).

You'll never get PEEPs that are as reliable as workplace ones, but by getting the residents to know who in their own part of the building will need help getting out (and how that help needs to be delivered) it would go a long way towards being effective. It would also help the non-vulnerable residents understand what they needed to do, and the presence of the local brigade at these practices would also mean that they'd know who needed extra help too, potentially allowing the prioritization of calls from that resident in an emergency, and allow them to do the PEEPs (rather than the building owner, who would inevitably do it as cheaply as possible if they did it at all). There obviously might be problems with availability of people but those might not be insurmountable with sufficient thought (eg: a half or full days leave, directed by the state like jury duty, to take part).

I did like though that point in the consultation where it suggested residents might behave differently in an emergency (and presumably abandon the vulnerable), which perhaps underlines what the Home Office actually think of people (though I understand that they do have themselves and their ilk as a frame of reference).

 

[muscovyduck]

I did like though that point in the consultation where it suggested residents might behave differently in an emergency (and presumably abandon the vulnerable), which perhaps underlines what the Home Office actually think of people (though I understand that they do have themselves and their ilk as a frame of reference).

I don't know about how things work in evacuation/fire scenarios but I've got experience with water safety and most people will absolutely drown someone coming to rescue them in desperation to keep themselves above water a couple seconds longer. It's not a moral thing, it's barely even conscious. It's strong enough it can even happen with parents and their own children. Anecdotally though I'm under the impression that doesn't translate over to evacuation situations the same way. Would be interesting to hear what other people who know about this sort of thing have to say

 

[teuchter]

A big part of the emboldened bit here can be worked out by reasonably regular (6 months / yearly, ideally) evacuation practices with the local fire brigade, which would cost nowhere near the sums suggested (and what money was spent would go on increasing the number of fire staff so that the practices can be run).

You'll never get PEEPs that are as reliable as workplace ones, but by getting the residents to know who in their own part of the building will need help getting out (and how that help needs to be delivered) it would go a long way towards being effective. It would also help the non-vulnerable residents understand what they needed to do, and the presence of the local brigade at these practices would also mean that they'd know who needed extra help too, potentially allowing the prioritization of calls from that resident in an emergency, and allow them to do the PEEPs (rather than the building owner, who would inevitably do it as cheaply as possible if they did it at all). There obviously might be problems with availability of people but those might not be insurmountable with sufficient thought (eg: a half or full days leave, directed by the state like jury duty, to take part).

I don't think they are ruling out these kinds of options at this stage though are they?

I did like though that point in the consultation where it suggested residents might behave differently in an emergency (and presumably abandon the vulnerable), which perhaps underlines what the Home Office actually think of people (though I understand that they do have themselves and their ilk as a frame of reference).

Doesn't seem unreasonable to me. Who knows how anyone is going to behave in an emergency until it actually happens. I wouldn't want my evacuation plan to rely on a neighbour putting themselves at risk in order to get me out. That's the point isn't it - what you can rely on.

 

[bluescreen]

I don't think they are ruling out these kinds of options at this stage though are they?



Doesn't seem unreasonable to me. Who knows how anyone is going to behave in an emergency until it actually happens. I wouldn't want my evacuation plan to rely on a neighbour putting themselves at risk in order to get me out. That's the point isn't it - what you can rely on.

This is why there are fire drills, and practice sessions, so that people know what to do and are less likely to panic.
Horrible situation though.

 

[teuchter]

The thing is with Grenfell, loads of stuff was done badly and contributed to the didaster, including evacuation plans and so on.

But in the end it's fairly straightforward what was basically wrong - it was clad in a highly dangerous way. The materials and the system they were used in simply shouldn't have been there. The technical knowledge that they shouldn't have been there existed. The ability to prevent them from being used existed. The occupants were let down by the systems that should have prevented the building being clad in that way. That they were let down is horrendous and shocking and demonstrates that multiple institutions absolutely failed to do what they should have done.

And of course lots of other buildings are also clad in these unsafe systems. The principle of compartmentation and stay-put is reasonably sound, as long as it's not compromised, as it is by these cladding systems. So the basic options are: - change the building and the way it's managed so that an evacuation strategy can work, and you no longer rely on compartmentation
- get rid of the thing that compromises compartmentation - ie replace the cladding.

The way it looks to me, there are some buildings where you simply can't achieve the first of those options. Maybe you can sort-of achieve it at tremendous expense, but even then not in a very convincing way.

In those cases my view is that the solution therefore has to be to replace the cladding (or make some substantial modifications to it that are proven to substantially reduce the risk of external fire spread). This will also be very expensive, but if it actually sorts the problem out, then it's a much better option than the other very expensive option. That's the kind of scenario where it makes sense to talk about proportionality of cost to benefit.

A very bad outcome would be for the govt to announce it's implementing some kind of PEEP scheme, maybe even with lots of funding, but one that just sets up a load of systems that don't work in practice, and gradually get degraded over the years through apathy.

That's why I don't have an issue with this stage of the consultations deciding that that approach is not practical.

Of course, we have to see what happens next.

I think it would be better to shout at govt to get buildings reclad, rather than to implement these PEEP schemes just because it appears they are not following the enquiry's recommendations to the letter.

 

[Lurdan]

Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’

Here are the daily reports.

Spoiler: Daily Reports

Monday - Senior London emergency co-ordinator ‘should have challenged RBKC’s claim it was coping with Grenfell aftermath’

Tuesday - ‘Deficiences’ in Grenfell response continued after control was handed over by RBKC, inquiry hears

Wednesday - No RBKC staff had central government emergency training in 3.5 years before Grenfell fire

Thursday - Senior civil servant warned Grenfell was becoming ‘our New Orleans’ due to failing humanitarian response

Next week: On Monday, David Bellamy, chief of staff to the Mayor of London, and Nick Hurd, who had just been appointed as Home Office minister for policing and the fire service two days before the fire. Then some former DCLG officials. On Tuesday Gill McManus, emergencies management resilience adviser. On Wednesday Jo Farrar, the former director general for local government and public services. And on Thursday Melanie Dawes, the former permanent secretary.

I don't know if the hearings for this Module of the Inquiry will extend beyond next week. The next module, Module 7, is for further evidence from expert witnesses. Over the course of June we should also be hearing closing statements for Module 6 and for the current Module 4. The Inquiry seems to be on schedule to conclude hearings in July.

 

[Miss-Shelf]

A big part of the emboldened bit here can be worked out by reasonably regular (6 months / yearly, ideally) evacuation practices with the local fire brigade, which would cost nowhere near the sums suggested (and what money was spent would go on increasing the number of fire staff so that the practices can be run).

You'll never get PEEPs that are as reliable as workplace ones, but by getting the residents to know who in their own part of the building will need help getting out (and how that help needs to be delivered) it would go a long way towards being effective. It would also help the non-vulnerable residents understand what they needed to do, and the presence of the local brigade at these practices would also mean that they'd know who needed extra help too, potentially allowing the prioritization of calls from that resident in an emergency, and allow them to do the PEEPs (rather than the building owner, who would inevitably do it as cheaply as possible if they did it at all). There obviously might be problems with availability of people but those might not be insurmountable with sufficient thought (eg: a half or full days leave, directed by the state like jury duty, to take part).

I did like though that point in the consultation where it suggested residents might behave differently in an emergency (and presumably abandon the vulnerable), which perhaps underlines what the Home Office actually think of people (though I understand that they do have themselves and their ilk as a frame of reference).

my bf lives on the 19th floor of a block in east London. When I first met him I was asking him what would happen in a fire. Like the if 5 neighbours on his landing knew each other and if they wanted to be in a whatsapp group for emergency reasons. He reached out to them and non of them responded. Having a regular practice drill would help foster a spirit in neighbours of at least knocking on a door to see if someone is in/knows they should evacuate.

If a fire happened now he would likely not get out. He has a serious lung condition and has become reliant on oxygen. AFAIK his housing association doesn't have an accurate record of disabled residents . This must be the case in countless blocks

 

[Pickman's model]

my bf lives on the 19th floor of a block in east London. When I first met him I was asking him what would happen in a fire. Like the if 5 neighbours on his landing knew each other and if they wanted to be in a whatsapp group for emergency reasons. He reached out to them and non of them responded. Having a regular practice drill would help foster a spirit in neighbours of at least knocking on a door to see if someone is in/knows they should evacuate.

If a fire happened now he would likely not get out. He has a serious lung condition and has become reliant on oxygen. AFAIK his housing association doesn't have an accurate record of disabled residents . This must be the case in countless blocks

when i lived in a tower block (14th floor) there was no information on what to do in the event of a fire that i ever saw. i don't recall there ever being a fire inspection in the sixteen or so years i was there. there were no fire alarm panels to break that i ever saw. and there was only one staircase and two lifts, and the lifts broke down on a frequent basis. looking back it was (and for that matter, is) a death trap. if god forbid something happened there even now there'd be lots of dead people. down the way there used to be a fire station, closed by johnson in his wisdom when he was mayor of london. that used to reassure me when i occasionally and briefly considered the possibility of the block burning down. don't know how far fire engines would have to travel now if that block caught fire, it doesn't bear thinking about. council, btw, not ha

 

[Lurdan]

Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 78: ‘The planning hadn’t been done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’

Spoiler: Daily Reports

Monday - Former minister ‘ashamed’ of state's ‘wholly inadequate’ response in Grenfell aftermath

Tuesday - Civil servant denies she was more concerned about building regulations than recovery after Grenfell

Wednesday - Senior civil servant challenged over ‘situational awareness’ of Grenfell fire response

Thursday - Senior civil servant feared ‘panicking’ DCLG would ‘comprehensively mess up’ Grenfell response

As I suspected this was the last week of hearings for Module 4. The Inquiry isn't sitting next week. On Monday June 6th hearings will begin for module 7 - more expert witnesses.

 

[BCBlues]

Imagine rolling out of bed that morning and your first thoughts are omg theres going to be an investigation, I need to give the team a heads up, while watching live news reports of people perishing. How heartless.

 

[Lurdan]

Next Tuesday is the fifth anniversary of the fire.

The anniversary coincides with the Inquiry entering it's last few weeks. This week and next there will be hearings for Module 7, which deals with further expert evidence. (The Inquiry will not be sitting on the 14th). The following week, (w/c 20th June) there will be closing statements for Modules 4 and 6. And at the end of the month the final Module 7 expert evidence.

It's planned that the last Module, Module 8, will begin on July 4th. This is to hear evidence about those who lost their lives in the fire.

 

[chainsawjob]

I saw this image of a 'jubilee street party' done by Grenfell United, a table with 72 empty seats, last weekend. There aren't words are there.

Thanks Lurdan for the continuing updates, appreciated.

Empty table with 72 seats laid out for Jubilee street party nobody will attend

‘I can almost picture them seated at the table today, joining in the celebration.'

metro.co.uk

 

[Lurdan]

A little more detail about the programme of expert evidence in Module 7, which began on Monday, can be found here.

In advance of next weeks anniversary Peter Apps of Inside Housing has posted a long twitter thread about some of the things which have come out of Phase 2 of the Inquiry.

The thread starts here and a version archived as a web page at threadreaderapp.com can be found here.

The thread links to some of Inside Housing's daily and weekly reports. Some of those normally paywalled links work at the moment. But some do not. And on the pages from those links that do work, any subsequent links generally don't work.

Here is a version of it as a web page with images of the tweets, and links to archived versions of the Inside Housing pages, which themselves then have working links. In addition to making it easier to follow the various chains of links it may be of use to people who are twitter phobic, as well as to fans of shit Geocities level web design.

The thread concludes:

 

[Lurdan]

Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’

Spoiler: Daily Reports

Monday - ‘Prevalence of poor practice’ in design of smoke systems, expert tells Grenfell Inquiry

Tuesday - Grenfell Tower smoke system failed to comply with requirements of regulations, expert says

Wednesday - LFB did not follow ‘even basic standards’ in firefighting equipment tests, expert says

Thursday - ‘Essential’ that ‘stay put’ policy for high rises is abandoned, expert tells Grenfell Inquiry

The eagle-eyed may notice that last week's Grenfell Diary was also labelled week 78. This was a cock-up by Inside Housing (they have since corrected it on their site) which I also didn't spot. In terms of their week numbering which I have been following the previous week was week 77.

Interesting week. This Module is about work commissioned by the Inquiry from expert witnesses. That includes some further work that has been commissioned where things have emerged in the course of the Inquiry, or where there has been push back from some corporate core participants against the findings in previous expert witness reports.

There was an example of the latter on Monday and Tuesday. PSB who designed the refurbished smoke control system in Grenfell Tower were unhappy with the conclusions of the Inquiry's expert witnesses and commissioned their own independent report. Simon Lay who produced that gave evidence about it on Monday. The Inquiry's expert witness Barbara Lane has produced a further report in response to this and gave evidence on Tuesday.

There was another example on Wednesday. Ivan Stoianov gave evidence about his report on the water supply available at the time of the fire and how it was used. This was originally due to be presented during Module 5 which looked at the London Fire Brigade but he was asked to do further work to respond to the push back against his conclusions from both the LFB and Thames Water. This is a rare example where I'm really not at all impressed with how Inside Housing has reported things. I'll have a go at explaining why over the weekend.

On Thursday Jose Torero and Luke Bisby both gave presentations about work they were commissioned to carry out. They will both be back next week to answer questions about the reports they have produced.

 

[Lurdan]

Ten page article in the Sunday Times magazine. Web version here (archived)
Corner-cutting, cover-ups and a disregard for human life: why Grenfell really happened - News - The Sunday Times

It includes some statistics about the extent of the building safety issues which came to light after the fire:

The ramifications slowly emerged. First up to 33,000 flats with Grenfell-type cladding had to be stripped; then, as The Sunday Times revealed in 2020, almost 200,000 high-rise homes were found with other flammable materials. Only last month the government quietly confirmed that up to 138,000 further flats in mid-rise blocks also need work. As lenders clamped down, up to 1.5 million homeowners could no longer sell or switch mortgages on their flats. Some flat owners have received fire-risk bills costing more than their homes. The government has pledged £9.1 billion for repairs, but just 21,000 of the 366,000 dangerous flats have been fixed to date.

PDF of the whole article attached.

 

[Lurdan]

Long and interesting Inside Housing article by Peter Apps:
Grenfell five years on: could it happen again?

Putting all of this together, we have a list of basic flaws: dangerous cladding, broken fire doors and the lack of an evacuation plan. What, then, has been done to address these at other buildings?

(...)

Add all of this up, and we go to the fifth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire with the depressing reality that a repeat remains, at least, a possibility.

That is something no one would have accepted when they first saw those horrifying images five years ago.

 

[PTK]

I have just listened to an interview with the first firefighter to enter Grenfell Tower on the World At One on Radio 4, and I was very moved.

It is an absolute disgrace that no-one has been prosecuted, that there are still tower blocks with flammable cladding.

The Grenfell Tower fire is a mark of Cain on the Conservative Party in the London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and on the Conservative government.

 

[friendofdorothy]

dont know if this has already been posted here. its a call for the govt to actually implement the recommendations of the public inquiry -

Sponsor UK Government: UK Government to be legally obligated to implement Public Inquiry recommendations.

www.change.org

 

[GarveyLives]

Lest We Forget Them​

 

[srb7677]

And still no one has been held to account.

 

[teqniq]

Much as I would like it to, that's not going to happen is it? The culpability goes right to the top.

 

[Lurdan]

Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 79: ‘You could argue that the system was created specifically to enable people to circumvent the rules’

(Links to the daily reports at the bottom of that page).

Next week the Inquiry sits on Monday and Wednesday with closing statements for Module 6 (topics 2-4) - Testing and Certification, Fire Risk Assessments and the role of Central Government).

 

[Lurdan]

Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’

(Links to the daily reports at the bottom of that page - they and the other links should all be working).

This week the Inquiry interrupted the current Module, which is hearing further evidence from expert witnesses, in order to hear closing statements for Module 6 (topics 2-4).

Module 6, which ran from October last year to April this year, dealt with four topics, all concerning the regulation of fire safety in the built environment. The first topic related to firefighting, and closing statements for it were heard back in January, together with the closing statements for Module 5, which also dealt with firefighting. This week was about the other three topics:

• testing and certification;
• fire risk assessment;
• and the role of central government in setting the framework of relevant legislation.

That's a lot of ground to cover in making closing arguments, and although the Inquiry only sat for two days there was plenty to say. The Diary gives a very good overview, and I expect the BBC podcast, which should be up shortly, will do so as well.

On Monday Counsel for Bereaved, Survivors and Residents Teams 1 & 2 and the Fire Brigades Union, were followed by the London Fire Brigade and UKAS. On Wednesday Counsel for the Mayor of London was followed by Arconic, Kingspan, Building Research Establishment, LABC, NHBC and perhaps most interestingly the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. The latter made a series of admissions of failings reflecting the change in tone, at least, since Gove was put in charge at the end of last year.

I'll get transcripts of some of the BSR closings up over the weekend.

Next week, on Monday the Inquiry hears further closing statements, this time in respect of Module 4. This ran from April to May and dealt with the aftermath of the fire. Counsel for BSRs Teams 1 & 2 will be followed by RBKC, the LFB, the Mayor, DLUHC and the Met.

On Wednesday and Thursday it's back to Module 7 and the final expert witness, David Purser. He gave evidence during Phase 1 of the Inquiry about the toxic gases produced in fires. His report for phase 2 will deal with the effects of exposure to the toxic products of fire and the causes of the incapacitation and death of those who died at Grenfell Tower.

 

[Lurdan]

The Inquiry has been hearing Module 4 closing statements this morning. Very powerful statements from BSRs Teams 1 & 2. The statement made by Counsel for Kensington and Chelsea included a long list of further admissions of failings. (As one of the few corporate and official core participants which can't wind itself up, reorganise and rebrand itself under a new name or move operations overseas I imagine it has had little choice given the evidence heard).

Changing subject here are transcripts of four of the closing statements made last week in respect of Module 6.

Stephanie Barwise for BSRs Team 1

Sam Stein for BSRs Team 2

Michael Mansfield for BSRs Team 2

Martin Seaward for the Fire Brigades Union

I have added screenshots where they asked for documents to be displayed, and added links to some of the documents and Inquiry transcripts they cited. I omitted two short passages from the transcript of Martin Seaward's where he discussed how much time he had left with the Chair, and I have lightly sub-edited Sam Stein's to correct some punctuation and add back in a couple of missing words in the transcript. I contemplated annotating the uses of surnames and acronyms in Stephanie Barwise's for at least five seconds before giving the idea up.

These statements are very different in form. Those by made Stephanie Barwise have always been high-level, addressed to the panel and make few concessions to a wider audience. Acronyms, surnames and technical terms are used without explanation. This one was no exception. At the opposite extreme Mike Mansfield's was highly discursive (he overran his allotted time, causing an unusual intervention from the Chair) and polemical.

But they also illustrate differences in the criticisms drawn from the evidence the Inquiry has heard. Martin Seaward makes a strong case that:

the fundamental underlying causes of the terrible loss of life at Grenfell Tower were political decisions made by central Government from 1979 onwards in the service of a social and economic system driven by profit and greed.

Stephanie Barwise is scathing about Government's failings but also states:

(...) I turn to the role played by industry. It is ultimately responsible for the events which led to the Grenfell disaster. The Inquiry’s experts consider the external fire spread guidance in ADB, even as it stood, was intelligible to competent designers and, therefore, if Grenfell’s designers had been competent, they would have understood it. (...) To conclude that the failure to clarify or amend ADB led to the lethal fire spread at Grenfell is to overlook the role of the construction sector in deliberate non-compliance, even in areas where ADB left no room for debate, such as insulation and cavity barriers.

Of the other oral closing statements the most shameless came, predictably enough, from Kingspan, which selectively quoted from the expert evidence the Inquiry heard the week before to try to make it's case that banning materials, or prescribing their performance, should be abandoned in favour of a system of large scale fire testing of the kind they were able to game in the past.

Links to the various written closing statements can be found, along with video and transcripts of the oral statements, here and here.

 

[Lurdan]

Here are transcripts of the Module 4 Closing Statements made by BSRs Teams 1 and 2 yesterday.

Allison Monroe on behalf of Team 2

Danny Friedman on behalf of Team 1

Inside Housings daily report yesterday covers aspects of them.
‘Islamophobic’ police document predicted ‘crime and disorder’ after Grenfell fire due to ‘Muslim background’ of victims

It leads on Allison Monroe's citation of an as yet publically undisclosed Met monitoring report. In their own oral closing statement the Met 'strongly refuted' that "Islamophobia affected its response to the tragedy".

However the Inside Housing report doesn't touch on the later part of her statement in which she puts the boot into the TMO in particular, but also the Council and central Government. That part starts here in the transcript.

I've added links to documents quoted and some of those cited (where I can identify them). I've also corrected where at one point Team 1 referred to the wrong person (they also do it in their written statement).

Written statements here: Team 1 and Team 2. [PDF files] Other closing statements linked from here.

 

[BCBlues]

That's powerful stuff from Allison Monroe, one day before the Met is placed in special measures due to many "systematic" failings. If that document isnt included as part of the obvious failings of the Met then it should be, undisclosed or not, they know it's there and its shameful.

Met police placed in special measures due to litany of new ‘systemic’ failings

Exclusive: watchdog’s decision follows nearly 70,000 unrecorded crimes and errors in stop and search

www.theguardian.com

 

[Lurdan]

Here is this weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary (archived):
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia, it is racism, the elephant staring back at us in the room’

After the Closing Statements for Module 4 on Monday (see above), on Wednesday and Thursday the Inquiry heard the final expert witness in Module 7.

David Purser, a toxicologist, gave evidence about the composition of the toxic elements of the smoke produced by the materials in the cladding system, in the windows and window surrounds and, once fire had re-entered the building, flat contents. In one section of his report he gives estimates of the likely times and causes of death of the 70 people who died in, or in three cases falling from, the tower. (Two other people died after they had left it). Much of Thursday was taken up with evidence relating to these individual cases.

The Inside Housing daily reports, together with the Diary cover his findings.

Wednesday - Rapid spread of smoke to lobbies a ‘key event’ in Grenfell deaths, expert witness says

Thursday - Cladding panels and insulation contributed ‘approximately equal’ amounts of toxic smoke at Grenfell Tower, expert says

Purser's view is that those who died were overcome by, and eventually died from, the effects of the toxic fumes. There has been great interest in the fact that the insulation used produces hydrogen cyanide when it burns. Purser's conclusion is that it's contribution to the deaths was far less than the much greater quantities of carbon monoxide produced by all of the burning materials.

He stressed the importance of the speed with which the lobbies filled with toxic levels of smoke - to the extent that at their worst these areas, in contrast to the stairs, were survivable for only three or four minutes. Thus emphasising the importance of the means by which they filled so rapidly with smoke, and the issues of front doors and door closers, the 'refurbished' smoke ventilation system and lifts, and the 'passive' measures to keep the stairs free from smoke, which the Inquiry has spent so much time on.

That concluded the hearings for Module 7 - the Inquiry's provisional timetable says there will be Closing Statements but gives no indication of when or how this will be done.

On Monday the start of the final Module of the Inquiry, Module 8, which consists of "the presentation of evidence concerning the deceased to enable the finding of facts necessary for the purposes of s.5(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009".

There will be expert evidence from three people: On Monday morning Ashley Fegan-Earl, lead forensic pathologist will give evidence about the processes of identifying the cause of death, and Gaille MacKinnon, one of the lead forensic anthropologists working on the identification of those who died in Grenfell Tower, will give evidence about the process of victim identification.
The following Monday morning, 11th, Karl Harrison, one of the lead forensic archeologists working on the recovery of those who died in Grenfell Tower, will give evidence about the process of victim recovery.

However the rest of the hearings until Thursday 21st will deal with each of those who died.

 

[BCBlues]

Next weeks hearing already sounds pretty grim

 

[Lurdan]

Module 8 began this morning with short opening statements by the Inquiry Chair and Lead Counsel outlining what it will be dealing with and how.

A transcript of those statements here.

Aside from evidence from the three people I listed above (the first two of them heard this morning) there will be a presentation in relation to each of the deceased. These will be made by the Counsel for the Bereaved, Survivors and Relatives. They will address the factual questions which the Coroner would be seeking to establish at an inquest, (who the deceased was, and how, when and where they came by their death) and also the facts required by an investigation under Article 2 of the the European Convention on Human Rights, something requested by the BSRs.

To be clear the Inquiry isn't conducting or replacing the inquest but seeking to find answers to the questions an inquest would ask. If the Coroner is satisfied with the Inquiry's findings, and subject to any legal challenge, it would be open to her to adopt them.

The ten questions to be addressed, which the Inquiry has agreed with the BSRs, are listed in Richard Millett's opening statement - link to transcript above. The Phase 2 report will then include individual findings in relation to each of the deceased.

The individual presentations about the people who died begin tomorrow.

Closing Statements for Module 7 which concluded last week will apparently be held in November. I gather that the Inquiry has also asked corporate core participants to prepare updated accounts of what actions they have taken in respect of the issues the Inquiry is looking into, to be produced by November, so presumably these will also be heard then.