Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion
- Thread starter JTG
- Start date
Lurdan
old wave
Grenfell United statement on the Dagenham fire
GRENFELL UNITED STATEMENT
Monday 26th August 2024
FIRE AT FRESHWATER ROAD, DAGENHAM
We wake up to the graphic images of the Dagenham fire, an incident that happened in the middle of the night over a bank holiday weekend when many residents would have been at home, a scenario we have warned about for 7 years.
We anxiously wait for the news that all residents are accounted for, and that they are all being properly cared for by the relevant authorities.
Although we do not have all the details, it seems work was underway to remove non compliant cladding, and the building had a number of fire safety issues. This highlights the painfully slow progress of remediation across the country, and a lack of urgency for building safety as a whole, includingthe implementation of personal evacuation plans for disabled residents which needs urgently addressing.
We are a week away from the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 Report. The fact that when a fire happens, and the best we can hope for at the moment is ‘a near miss’, speaks volumes of the progress made since 14th June 2017.
We expect the Labour government to take action to speed up remediation on unsafe buildings, where their predecessors failed.
x-twitter link
Monday 26th August 2024
FIRE AT FRESHWATER ROAD, DAGENHAM
We wake up to the graphic images of the Dagenham fire, an incident that happened in the middle of the night over a bank holiday weekend when many residents would have been at home, a scenario we have warned about for 7 years.
We anxiously wait for the news that all residents are accounted for, and that they are all being properly cared for by the relevant authorities.
Although we do not have all the details, it seems work was underway to remove non compliant cladding, and the building had a number of fire safety issues. This highlights the painfully slow progress of remediation across the country, and a lack of urgency for building safety as a whole, includingthe implementation of personal evacuation plans for disabled residents which needs urgently addressing.
We are a week away from the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 Report. The fact that when a fire happens, and the best we can hope for at the moment is ‘a near miss’, speaks volumes of the progress made since 14th June 2017.
We expect the Labour government to take action to speed up remediation on unsafe buildings, where their predecessors failed.
x-twitter link
Lurdan
old wave
Ahead of next weeks publication of the Grenfell Inquiry's Phase 2 report, Peter Apps has produced the second of his previews of the multiple issues it will be dealing with. It's on his substack here.
It links to a number of previous stories on the Inside Housing website. Those links all seem to work (at the moment) but the Inside Housing pages link in turn to other pages which are paywalled.
As before here is an archived version of Apps' article. The chains of links from it should all be working if people wish to follow them.
It links to a number of previous stories on the Inside Housing website. Those links all seem to work (at the moment) but the Inside Housing pages link in turn to other pages which are paywalled.
As before here is an archived version of Apps' article. The chains of links from it should all be working if people wish to follow them.
Lurdan
old wave
Peter Apps has produced the third of his previews of the multiple issues the Grenfell Inquiry final report will be dealing with. It's on his substack here.
It links to a number of previous stories on the Inside Housing website. Those links all seem to work (at the moment) but the Inside Housing pages link in turn to other pages which are paywalled.
As with the previous ones here is an archived version of Apps' article. The chains of links from it should all be working if people wish to follow them.
It links to a number of previous stories on the Inside Housing website. Those links all seem to work (at the moment) but the Inside Housing pages link in turn to other pages which are paywalled.
As with the previous ones here is an archived version of Apps' article. The chains of links from it should all be working if people wish to follow them.
PTK
Paul Kegan
I started a new thread on the fire in the Dagenham block.Just heard about this on radio.I wish people would start new threads rather than add to a similar one.
Lurdan
old wave
Grenfell Inquiry Report week and ASTONISHINGLY we suddenly have a whole bunch of Grenfell related stories.
Arguably the most significant are some announcements on Building Safety from Rushanara Ali the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Building Safety and Homelessness.
Her statement is here - Written questions, answers and statements - UK Parliament. Briefly
The proposal about PEEPS is a reversal of the previous Governments refusal to implement the Grenfell Inquiry's Phase 1 recommendation about them.
Peter Apps xtweets about the rather boring looking announcement of the "withdrawal of the outdated National Classes fire testing standards"
Hisam Choucair who lost six family members in the Grenfell fire expresses profound scepticism about the Inquiry and that it's report will change anything.
Grenfell inquiry gave guilty a 'get out of jail free' card, says man who watched six relatives die - Telegraph (archived)
Sky News spoke to a number of the children who survived the fire
'It could have been me': The Grenfell children who survived the blaze - Sky News
The Independent spoke to a number of survivors, relatives and local residents
‘Grenfell is a warning to the world’: The survivors still searching for justice - The Independent
So did the Evening Standard
Bereaved and survivors hope ‘landmark’ Grenfell final report exposes wrongdoing - Evening Standard
Peter Apps had a story in the i with quotes from Eddie Daffarn and Shah Ahmed.
Grenfell residents ‘ignored and belittled’ over safety concerns demand change - inews (archived)
Kate Lamble who presented the BBCs Grenfell podcast and the recent 'Grenfell: Building a Disaster' series has written a long pre-Report story based on the latter
I heard years of Grenfell testimony. Here's why the disaster could have been prevented - BBC News
It's just possible that everybody's favorite combustible insulation manufacturer Kingspan might get the odd mention in the Inquiry's report. Couple of stories about them:
Shane Lowry faces new pressure to end Kingspan deal as Grenfell report due - The Guardian
Latest attempt to shame sports teams and sportspersons into rejecting sponsership money from Kingspan
And on Friday it was reported that Kingspan had settled a compensation case brought by a developer under a provision of the 2022 Building Safety Act which "allows parties suffering injury, damage or loss when dangerous cladding has been installed on a building to claw back money from cladding manufacturers".
Kingspan settles in cladding compensation test case - Construction News (archived)
Rather unlikely to be the last such claim.
The Times REVEAL that Brian Martin who played a major role in the Governments failure to update flawed and misleading Building Regulations guidance in the years before the Grenfell fire has more recently worked as an independent fire safety expert on behalf of freeholders fighting a demand from their leaseholders that they fix dangerous cladding without charging them for all of it. Civil servant who missed chances to prevent Grenfell is now fire safety expert - Times (archived)
Well that's REVEAL if we don't count when Peter Apps wrote about it last September.
Arguably the most significant are some announcements on Building Safety from Rushanara Ali the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Building Safety and Homelessness.
Her statement is here - Written questions, answers and statements - UK Parliament. Briefly
- "The Home Office will bring forward proposals in the Autumn to improve the fire safety and evacuation of disabled/vulnerable residents in high-rise and higher-risk residential buildings in England in response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 1 recommendations that relate to Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans, or PEEPs". Some funding will be provided for Social Housing providers to implement this.
- The plans to end the use of CE marks from June 2025 will no longer apply to construction products
which- they will still be required on products for sale in the UK. Any subsequent changes to the recognition of CE marking would be subject to a minimum 2-year transitional period. - Two updates to the Statutory Guidance accompanying Building Regulations. "First, we are introducing a provision for sprinklers to be installed in new care homes; and second, we are completing the withdrawal of the outdated National Classes fire testing standards, ending a long period of dual specification in favour of the more robust European standard".
The proposal about PEEPS is a reversal of the previous Governments refusal to implement the Grenfell Inquiry's Phase 1 recommendation about them.
Peter Apps xtweets about the rather boring looking announcement of the "withdrawal of the outdated National Classes fire testing standards"
Hisam Choucair who lost six family members in the Grenfell fire expresses profound scepticism about the Inquiry and that it's report will change anything.
Grenfell inquiry gave guilty a 'get out of jail free' card, says man who watched six relatives die - Telegraph (archived)
Sky News spoke to a number of the children who survived the fire
'It could have been me': The Grenfell children who survived the blaze - Sky News
The Independent spoke to a number of survivors, relatives and local residents
‘Grenfell is a warning to the world’: The survivors still searching for justice - The Independent
So did the Evening Standard
Bereaved and survivors hope ‘landmark’ Grenfell final report exposes wrongdoing - Evening Standard
Peter Apps had a story in the i with quotes from Eddie Daffarn and Shah Ahmed.
Grenfell residents ‘ignored and belittled’ over safety concerns demand change - inews (archived)
Kate Lamble who presented the BBCs Grenfell podcast and the recent 'Grenfell: Building a Disaster' series has written a long pre-Report story based on the latter
I heard years of Grenfell testimony. Here's why the disaster could have been prevented - BBC News
It's just possible that everybody's favorite combustible insulation manufacturer Kingspan might get the odd mention in the Inquiry's report. Couple of stories about them:
Shane Lowry faces new pressure to end Kingspan deal as Grenfell report due - The Guardian
Latest attempt to shame sports teams and sportspersons into rejecting sponsership money from Kingspan
And on Friday it was reported that Kingspan had settled a compensation case brought by a developer under a provision of the 2022 Building Safety Act which "allows parties suffering injury, damage or loss when dangerous cladding has been installed on a building to claw back money from cladding manufacturers".
Kingspan settles in cladding compensation test case - Construction News (archived)
Rather unlikely to be the last such claim.
The Times REVEAL that Brian Martin who played a major role in the Governments failure to update flawed and misleading Building Regulations guidance in the years before the Grenfell fire has more recently worked as an independent fire safety expert on behalf of freeholders fighting a demand from their leaseholders that they fix dangerous cladding without charging them for all of it. Civil servant who missed chances to prevent Grenfell is now fire safety expert - Times (archived)
Well that's REVEAL if we don't count when Peter Apps wrote about it last September.
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Lurdan
old wave
Just a couple of interesting links today
Firms criticised by Grenfell inquiry face calls to be banned from public contracts - The Guardian
Grenfell Tower legal powers to fix fire safety crisis are being ignored - Sky News
Peter Apps produced three previews of the issues being dealt with in tomorrow's Inquiry report on his substack. They were full of links leading in turn to other paywalled links so I put up links to archived versions from which it should be possible to follow any chains of links. Modules One to Three -- Modules Four and Five -- Modules Six Seven and Eight
Today he's posted an overview piece. It's on his substack here. And it has very few BLOODY LINKS so doesn't need any paywall busting version (hurrah).
The whole thngs worth reading IMO - but here's the final section of it
Firms criticised by Grenfell inquiry face calls to be banned from public contracts - The Guardian
Grenfell Tower legal powers to fix fire safety crisis are being ignored - Sky News
Peter Apps produced three previews of the issues being dealt with in tomorrow's Inquiry report on his substack. They were full of links leading in turn to other paywalled links so I put up links to archived versions from which it should be possible to follow any chains of links. Modules One to Three -- Modules Four and Five -- Modules Six Seven and Eight
Today he's posted an overview piece. It's on his substack here. And it has very few BLOODY LINKS so doesn't need any paywall busting version (hurrah).
The whole thngs worth reading IMO - but here's the final section of it
And what of change?
The new Labour government took some tentative steps towards this on Monday by promising to implement (and fund) Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) - a move which had previously been rejected by the Home Office under the Conservtives, despite being recommended by the first phase of the inquiry.
The new government has also said it will abolish national fire safety classes for construction products and move to the European ‘Euroclass’ standards. This ends the bizarre position we’ve been in since 2001, when effectively an indefinite transitionary period meant both applied simultaneously. We will also get CE product marking certification for construction materials.
All of these are good steps and things the inquiry would likely have called for - given the evidence. So getting ahead and showing willingness to act is promising.
Nonetheless, there are many further areas of change where the government will probably be called to take more drastic steps.
One clear and obvious one is the creation of some body to oversee the implementation of inquiry recommendations.
This has been loudly called for by INQUEST and others, but not promised by the new government (they have committed to the other half of this campaign - a duty of candour).
But the Grenfell story demands this, not just because the first phase recommendations it made itself were initially rejected, but also because the Grenfell fire is in itself a story about missed recommendations.
If the Lakanal House coroner’s recommendation in 2013 of a review of building regulations guidance with particular regard to the external envelope of a building had been followed, then perhaps we would have had no need for an inquiry at all. If the LFB had been held to account for saying it had implemented the recommendations which were aimed at it, then perhaps we would have had properly trained call handlers and incident commanders when the fire broke out.
Putting a National Audit Office style body in place to ensure this sort of process is no longer ignored and swept under the carpet seems an obvious and immediate change.
And what changes might be recommended that this new body would (potentially) oversee?
In the construction sector, the dire lack of individual responsibility and accountability for safety was a consistent theme of Module One. So was the cost cutting that was driven by price-based procurement.
The Building Safety Act (BSA) implemented in 2022 goes some way to address the former, but has very little to say about the latter. Other safety standards are not addressed by the BSA, despite seeming extremely relevant to Grenfell. So will the inquiry be bold enough to make further recommendations for change in an area the government has already reformed? Or will it hold back?
Similarly, the first phase report stopped short of major criticism of the recladding regime of other buildings, beyond an exaltation to get combustible materials off as quickly as possible. Will Phase Two take any further steps?
Similarly, despite the Phase One report committing to a look into whether or not sprinklers might have stopped the Grenfell Tower fire, we heard almost nothing on this issue during the weeks of evidence. So will it come up in the report recommendations, or be left out?
Substantive recommendations are also likely with regard to housing policy.
There are good lines of evidence which would point to recommendations for more resident involvement. The managing agent at Grenfell Tower had a ‘modular management agreement’ which meant it should have been consulting residents on the major refurbishment of their homes. It didn’t - at least not in a meaningful way - and disaster followed.
If residents had been given a say, would they have accepted the cheapest cladding, or insisted on a fire retardant option? Would they have agreed to removing the fire engineer from the project for cost reasons? Would they have appointed an architects firm with no prior experience of overcladding a high rise?
The list of these goes on, and the answer is almost always the same: of course they wouldn’t have.
The inquiry then has compelling evidence to support a recommendation for meaningful, practical consultation with people who live in a building about the work which is done to it.
This is an area which - despite the major reforms to social housing regulation - remains basically unaddressed in the seven years since the fire. It’s also something the former chair of Grenfell’s leaseholder association is desperate to see.
A huge part of the Grenfell story, which the inquiry has never shied away from acknowledging, is also that many more people could have been saved from the building with a different firefighting strategy.
That is already a finding of fact from Phase One, but Phase Two will go into considerably more depth about why the London Fire Brigade reached a point where it failed in this way.
The conclusion, and the expert evidence which was scathing about the LFB’s operation, should support big conclusions about what a 21st Century fire and rescue service should look like.
In a nutshell, this means moving away from the unreconstructed, macho, heroic, traditional nature of firefighting to something more modern, where evacuation, prevention, preparation and dynamic thinking are as important (if not more) than bashing in doors and getting water on the flames as quickly as possible.
And what of the government operation per se? It is probably too much to ask for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to recommend a complete rethinking of the role of the state in a late capitalist economy, but there are areas in which its recommendations should not be shy about driving change.
If we are going to acknowledge (as we presumably must) that the client-style relationship of the private enforcement, standards and testing bodies under review resulted in industry capture and desperately damaging outcomes for the public, then perhaps we need to see a recommendation that these bodies are renationalised?
If we are going to acknowledge (as we presumably must) that the low priority placed on regulation and its constant dismissal as red tape played a part in the “red alert” warnings of a disaster being missed, then perhaps we need to see a clear statement of how to balance deregulation against public safety?
If we are going to acknowledge (as we presumably must) that the relevant state bodies not only failed to prevent Grenfell, but failed to respond on the night and failed to provide a humanitarian response in the aftermath, then perhaps we need recommendations covering the hollowed out nature of our public services and what that means for their capacity to respond to an unexpected catastrophe?
All of these are big policy questions. But Grenfell was a big event, this has been a big inquiry, and we can only hope now that the final report has the confidence in itself to reflect that and say what it needs to.
The new Labour government took some tentative steps towards this on Monday by promising to implement (and fund) Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) - a move which had previously been rejected by the Home Office under the Conservtives, despite being recommended by the first phase of the inquiry.
The new government has also said it will abolish national fire safety classes for construction products and move to the European ‘Euroclass’ standards. This ends the bizarre position we’ve been in since 2001, when effectively an indefinite transitionary period meant both applied simultaneously. We will also get CE product marking certification for construction materials.
All of these are good steps and things the inquiry would likely have called for - given the evidence. So getting ahead and showing willingness to act is promising.
Nonetheless, there are many further areas of change where the government will probably be called to take more drastic steps.
One clear and obvious one is the creation of some body to oversee the implementation of inquiry recommendations.
This has been loudly called for by INQUEST and others, but not promised by the new government (they have committed to the other half of this campaign - a duty of candour).
But the Grenfell story demands this, not just because the first phase recommendations it made itself were initially rejected, but also because the Grenfell fire is in itself a story about missed recommendations.
If the Lakanal House coroner’s recommendation in 2013 of a review of building regulations guidance with particular regard to the external envelope of a building had been followed, then perhaps we would have had no need for an inquiry at all. If the LFB had been held to account for saying it had implemented the recommendations which were aimed at it, then perhaps we would have had properly trained call handlers and incident commanders when the fire broke out.
Putting a National Audit Office style body in place to ensure this sort of process is no longer ignored and swept under the carpet seems an obvious and immediate change.
And what changes might be recommended that this new body would (potentially) oversee?
In the construction sector, the dire lack of individual responsibility and accountability for safety was a consistent theme of Module One. So was the cost cutting that was driven by price-based procurement.
The Building Safety Act (BSA) implemented in 2022 goes some way to address the former, but has very little to say about the latter. Other safety standards are not addressed by the BSA, despite seeming extremely relevant to Grenfell. So will the inquiry be bold enough to make further recommendations for change in an area the government has already reformed? Or will it hold back?
Similarly, the first phase report stopped short of major criticism of the recladding regime of other buildings, beyond an exaltation to get combustible materials off as quickly as possible. Will Phase Two take any further steps?
Similarly, despite the Phase One report committing to a look into whether or not sprinklers might have stopped the Grenfell Tower fire, we heard almost nothing on this issue during the weeks of evidence. So will it come up in the report recommendations, or be left out?
Substantive recommendations are also likely with regard to housing policy.
There are good lines of evidence which would point to recommendations for more resident involvement. The managing agent at Grenfell Tower had a ‘modular management agreement’ which meant it should have been consulting residents on the major refurbishment of their homes. It didn’t - at least not in a meaningful way - and disaster followed.
If residents had been given a say, would they have accepted the cheapest cladding, or insisted on a fire retardant option? Would they have agreed to removing the fire engineer from the project for cost reasons? Would they have appointed an architects firm with no prior experience of overcladding a high rise?
The list of these goes on, and the answer is almost always the same: of course they wouldn’t have.
The inquiry then has compelling evidence to support a recommendation for meaningful, practical consultation with people who live in a building about the work which is done to it.
This is an area which - despite the major reforms to social housing regulation - remains basically unaddressed in the seven years since the fire. It’s also something the former chair of Grenfell’s leaseholder association is desperate to see.
A huge part of the Grenfell story, which the inquiry has never shied away from acknowledging, is also that many more people could have been saved from the building with a different firefighting strategy.
That is already a finding of fact from Phase One, but Phase Two will go into considerably more depth about why the London Fire Brigade reached a point where it failed in this way.
The conclusion, and the expert evidence which was scathing about the LFB’s operation, should support big conclusions about what a 21st Century fire and rescue service should look like.
In a nutshell, this means moving away from the unreconstructed, macho, heroic, traditional nature of firefighting to something more modern, where evacuation, prevention, preparation and dynamic thinking are as important (if not more) than bashing in doors and getting water on the flames as quickly as possible.
And what of the government operation per se? It is probably too much to ask for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to recommend a complete rethinking of the role of the state in a late capitalist economy, but there are areas in which its recommendations should not be shy about driving change.
If we are going to acknowledge (as we presumably must) that the client-style relationship of the private enforcement, standards and testing bodies under review resulted in industry capture and desperately damaging outcomes for the public, then perhaps we need to see a recommendation that these bodies are renationalised?
If we are going to acknowledge (as we presumably must) that the low priority placed on regulation and its constant dismissal as red tape played a part in the “red alert” warnings of a disaster being missed, then perhaps we need to see a clear statement of how to balance deregulation against public safety?
If we are going to acknowledge (as we presumably must) that the relevant state bodies not only failed to prevent Grenfell, but failed to respond on the night and failed to provide a humanitarian response in the aftermath, then perhaps we need recommendations covering the hollowed out nature of our public services and what that means for their capacity to respond to an unexpected catastrophe?
All of these are big policy questions. But Grenfell was a big event, this has been a big inquiry, and we can only hope now that the final report has the confidence in itself to reflect that and say what it needs to.
A380
How do I change this 'custom title' thing then?
This is a useful primer on today’s report.
www.theguardian.com
Grenfell report blames decades of government failure and ‘systematic dishonesty’ of companies
Verdict of seven-year inquiry into disaster that killed 72 people apportions responsibility widely
taperoo2k
Well-Known Member
It's a tough report to read, I've only just scratched the surface. I can see why the
Tories instituted the inqiury as quickly as they did. If people don't go to prison for
this entirely avoidable disaster I will have lost what little faith I have in the system
as a whole.
Tories instituted the inqiury as quickly as they did. If people don't go to prison for
this entirely avoidable disaster I will have lost what little faith I have in the system
as a whole.
DaveCinzano
WATCH OUT, GEORGE, HE'S GOT A SCREWDRIVER!
Inquiry report download page:
www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk
Phase 2 report | Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Crispy
The following psytrance is baṉned: All
The report is out. All 1700 pages available here: Phase 2 report | Grenfell Tower Inquiry
So much blame in so many directions.
So much blame in so many directions.
eatmorecheese
He's fallen out of the car again
I'm still incensed after all these years. The utter class-based contempt those in authority held for the needs, wishes and voices of the residents.
Lurdan
old wave
The Inquiry Panel's statement is now online. All three panel members spoke - first time we've heard Thouria Istephan and Ali Akbor.
Peter App's initial thoughts here - xtwitter thread archived as a webpage
and a piece he's written for the Guardian
Inside Housing were given embargoed access to the report. Here are archived copies of two of their paywalled stories
KCTMO responsible for ‘chronic and systemic’ safety failings before Grenfell fire, inquiry concludes
Grenfell Inquiry report elects not to make specific recommendations for social housing providers
I have to say I was a little concerned towards the end of the Phase 2 hearings that the so-called 'tenant management organisation' was slipping a little out of sight behind some of the other fuckers responsible for Grenfell. I haven't had a chance to read Volume 3 of the report yet but I'm pleased to see that they seem to be getting a good kicking along with the others.
Peter App's initial thoughts here - xtwitter thread archived as a webpage
and a piece he's written for the Guardian
Inside Housing were given embargoed access to the report. Here are archived copies of two of their paywalled stories
KCTMO responsible for ‘chronic and systemic’ safety failings before Grenfell fire, inquiry concludes
Grenfell Inquiry report elects not to make specific recommendations for social housing providers
I have to say I was a little concerned towards the end of the Phase 2 hearings that the so-called 'tenant management organisation' was slipping a little out of sight behind some of the other fuckers responsible for Grenfell. I haven't had a chance to read Volume 3 of the report yet but I'm pleased to see that they seem to be getting a good kicking along with the others.
PTK
Paul Kegan
The fault lies with parties of different colours, says a Conservative MP on Radio 4, in reaction to the finding that de-regulation that was one of the causes of the deaths of seventy-two people in the Grenfell Tower Fire.
No, the fault lies with neo-liberal Conservatives, neo-liberal Labourites, and neo-Liberal Liberal Democrats, all were all the same political colour beneath their rosettes.
The doctrine of neo-liberalism that has ruled this country for 45 years has dictated that regulations be cut, and thus it was that the homes of hundreds of working class people came to be wrapped in inflammable cladding in order to enrich members of the capitalist class.
No, the fault lies with neo-liberal Conservatives, neo-liberal Labourites, and neo-Liberal Liberal Democrats, all were all the same political colour beneath their rosettes.
The doctrine of neo-liberalism that has ruled this country for 45 years has dictated that regulations be cut, and thus it was that the homes of hundreds of working class people came to be wrapped in inflammable cladding in order to enrich members of the capitalist class.
Lurdan
old wave
ummm - the police investigation has been running since the fire and has been working with the Inquiry, sharing evidence for example. If Mansfield means there should have been some unprecedented joint working arrangement I'm unconvinced. Even setting aside the fact that it would open up a whole new set of time consuming legal challenges from those it was investigating, the police investigation is being run by the Met. I'm not confident about the Met's capacity to organise a doughnut eating and sexual abuse convention which on recent form would seem to be more within it's basic skillset. I can only see their closer involvement in the Inquiry process as meaning that it took even longer than it has done.
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Miss-Shelf
I'll meet you further on up the road
urbanspaceman
Well-Known Member
I was dumbfounded at the design of the panels, when I read about the Grenfell disaster.
I'm familiar with spacecraft engineering, and the Grenfell panels reminded me of the solid fuel booster rockets of the Space Shuttle, in that a thin-skinned aluminium container was wrapped around a solid polymer fuel core, in the case of Grenfell polythene, and the case of the boosters butadiene, a synthetic rubber.
There was a difference, though. For solid fuel boosters, the oxidiser is composed of solid granules, carefully dispersed throughout the fuel mass, and designed to burn at a controlled rate.
But the design of Grenfell was much more dangerous. The oxidiser source was the ambient air, delivered through the air gap behind the panels. As the flames became stronger the air would be convected at increasingly higher speeds up the air gap, thereby accelerating combustion in a ferocious positive feedback process. Aluminium itself is highly inflammable and burns with an exceptionally high temperature flame, so that would have amplified combustion of the polythene and convection of the air.
In summary, the Grenfell's architects wrapped the building in an expendable solid-fuelled runaway ramjet.
I'm familiar with spacecraft engineering, and the Grenfell panels reminded me of the solid fuel booster rockets of the Space Shuttle, in that a thin-skinned aluminium container was wrapped around a solid polymer fuel core, in the case of Grenfell polythene, and the case of the boosters butadiene, a synthetic rubber.
There was a difference, though. For solid fuel boosters, the oxidiser is composed of solid granules, carefully dispersed throughout the fuel mass, and designed to burn at a controlled rate.
But the design of Grenfell was much more dangerous. The oxidiser source was the ambient air, delivered through the air gap behind the panels. As the flames became stronger the air would be convected at increasingly higher speeds up the air gap, thereby accelerating combustion in a ferocious positive feedback process. Aluminium itself is highly inflammable and burns with an exceptionally high temperature flame, so that would have amplified combustion of the polythene and convection of the air.
In summary, the Grenfell's architects wrapped the building in an expendable solid-fuelled runaway ramjet.
Lurdan
old wave
As I mentioned above Inside Housing had embargoed early access to the report. I posted links to archived versions of two of their paywalled stories. Here are the other two.
‘Complacent’ government ‘well aware’ of cladding risks before Grenfell fire but ‘failed to act’
‘Systematic dishonesty’ by product manufacturers ‘very significant reason’ for Grenfell’s deadly cladding, inquiry concludes
‘Complacent’ government ‘well aware’ of cladding risks before Grenfell fire but ‘failed to act’
‘Systematic dishonesty’ by product manufacturers ‘very significant reason’ for Grenfell’s deadly cladding, inquiry concludes
And the manufacturers knew. And they made a decision to keep the concerns secret so they could carry on selling their product. This is surely heading towards corporate manslaughter charges.
taperoo2k
Well-Known Member
It's the same thing with Boeing, they cut corners to save cash and increase profits. Which has led to entirely
avoidable deaths due to Boeing throwing safety out the nearest door. Unregulated Capitalism becomes a law unto itself.
Looking at the evidence in the inquiry report, there is ample evidence for a range of charges.
One would hope the Met has done a proper job on the investigations it's carried out.
Lurdan
old wave
Grenfell United statement:
GRENFELL UNITED RESPONSE ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE GRENFELL PHASE 2 INQUIRY REPORT
Today marks the conclusion of a painful six years listening to the evidence of the deaths of 54 adults and 18 children, our loved ones, neighbours and friends. It is a significant chapter in the journey to truth, justice and change. But justice has not been delivered.
The inquiry report reveals that whenever there's a clash between corporate interest and public safety, governments have done everything they can to avoid their responsibilities to keep people safe. The system isn't broken, it was built this way.
It speaks to a lack of competence, understanding and a fundamental failure to perform the most basic of duties of care.
The recommendations published today are basic safety principles that should already exist, highlighting how the government’s roles, duties and obligations have been hollowed out by privatisation.
Where voids were created as the government outsourced their duties, Kingspan, Celotex and Arconic filled the gaps with substandard and combustible materials. They were allowed to manipulate the testing regimes, fraudulently and knowingly marketing their products as safe.
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has laid bare his mistrust in the building industry - no single publication like approved document B should subsequently be used as a means to regulate fire safety and to keep the public safe.
The government knew this was no way to regulate. It was there to be exploited.
Our lawyers told the Inquiry that the corporate core participants - Arconic, Kingspan and Celotex - were "little better than crooks and killers". The report makes clear that this statement is entirely true. We were failed in most cases by incompetence and in many cases by calculated dishonesty and greed.
The duty of government should be to safeguard life, whilst protecting us from corporate greed. But for too long, they have aided corporations, facilitating them to profit and dictate regulation.
It is a damning indictment of this country that amateurs (like Carl Stokes and Brian Martin) can pose to be experts, putting countless lives at risk and taking the lives of our loved ones.
There's a reading of the inquiry hiding in plain sight that speaks to both the damage done to Grenfell Tower and the wider damage done to Britain.
It's a serious problem for the whole country when governments invite corporations to write their own rules.
The government must now exert control over the sector to prevent further dismantling of public safety, which used to be understood as their primary job, not aiding and abetting crooks and killers.
To prevent a future Grenfell, the government needs to create something that doesn’t exist: a government with the power and ability to separate itself from the construction industry and corporate lobbying, putting people before profit.
Over and above all, the judge concludes what we already knew, that every single loss of life was avoidable.
We expect this government to break old habits and implement all of the recommendations made by Sir Martin Moore Bick from the Inquiry report without further delay, because the time to address this is already three decades too late.
We are calling on the government to ban Arconic, Kingspan, Celotex and Rydon from central or local government procurement processes. And finally start acting in the British public’s interest.
We have an expectation that the Met Police and the CPS ensure that those who are truly responsible are held to account and brought to justice.
We must never forget that at the heart of this Inquiry report is the fact that 72 people lost their lives.
xtwitter link
Today marks the conclusion of a painful six years listening to the evidence of the deaths of 54 adults and 18 children, our loved ones, neighbours and friends. It is a significant chapter in the journey to truth, justice and change. But justice has not been delivered.
The inquiry report reveals that whenever there's a clash between corporate interest and public safety, governments have done everything they can to avoid their responsibilities to keep people safe. The system isn't broken, it was built this way.
It speaks to a lack of competence, understanding and a fundamental failure to perform the most basic of duties of care.
The recommendations published today are basic safety principles that should already exist, highlighting how the government’s roles, duties and obligations have been hollowed out by privatisation.
Where voids were created as the government outsourced their duties, Kingspan, Celotex and Arconic filled the gaps with substandard and combustible materials. They were allowed to manipulate the testing regimes, fraudulently and knowingly marketing their products as safe.
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has laid bare his mistrust in the building industry - no single publication like approved document B should subsequently be used as a means to regulate fire safety and to keep the public safe.
The government knew this was no way to regulate. It was there to be exploited.
Our lawyers told the Inquiry that the corporate core participants - Arconic, Kingspan and Celotex - were "little better than crooks and killers". The report makes clear that this statement is entirely true. We were failed in most cases by incompetence and in many cases by calculated dishonesty and greed.
The duty of government should be to safeguard life, whilst protecting us from corporate greed. But for too long, they have aided corporations, facilitating them to profit and dictate regulation.
It is a damning indictment of this country that amateurs (like Carl Stokes and Brian Martin) can pose to be experts, putting countless lives at risk and taking the lives of our loved ones.
There's a reading of the inquiry hiding in plain sight that speaks to both the damage done to Grenfell Tower and the wider damage done to Britain.
It's a serious problem for the whole country when governments invite corporations to write their own rules.
The government must now exert control over the sector to prevent further dismantling of public safety, which used to be understood as their primary job, not aiding and abetting crooks and killers.
To prevent a future Grenfell, the government needs to create something that doesn’t exist: a government with the power and ability to separate itself from the construction industry and corporate lobbying, putting people before profit.
Over and above all, the judge concludes what we already knew, that every single loss of life was avoidable.
We expect this government to break old habits and implement all of the recommendations made by Sir Martin Moore Bick from the Inquiry report without further delay, because the time to address this is already three decades too late.
We are calling on the government to ban Arconic, Kingspan, Celotex and Rydon from central or local government procurement processes. And finally start acting in the British public’s interest.
We have an expectation that the Met Police and the CPS ensure that those who are truly responsible are held to account and brought to justice.
We must never forget that at the heart of this Inquiry report is the fact that 72 people lost their lives.
xtwitter link
taperoo2k
Well-Known Member
I'm reading the report into the deaths of the residents. The number of times I've read this in relation to residents with vulnerabilities
"based on information held on the TMO’s Capita Insight system did not identify as having
any vulnerability" is grim. The report lists what vulnerabilities the residents had before and if the TMO
were aware of it. Capita gets everywhere.
The care taken to identify the remains of residents was so much more than the council or TMO showed
the residents in life.
"based on information held on the TMO’s Capita Insight system did not identify as having
any vulnerability" is grim. The report lists what vulnerabilities the residents had before and if the TMO
were aware of it. Capita gets everywhere.
The care taken to identify the remains of residents was so much more than the council or TMO showed
the residents in life.
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