Glad to hear that people seem to have got out OK. Looks a pretty bad fire from the pictures in that article. Some pictures from the MEN.
You can see the cladding in this picture, but it doesn't seem to have affected the entire facade. It will be interesting to know if the cladding was dubious - although the building is only six stories, so might not have fallen into the checking regime for high-rise blocks (not sure what the cut off point was). Like like it has burnt right through the external wall by the roofline though.
I feel this story should be much more front page news than it is. We've just had confirmation of the breakdown of the building control system (for those who needed confirmation) and that hundreds more towers are potentially lethal, and the government is doing fuck all.
It seems HPL panels have different fire ratings. Some may be okay, but who could you trust to make the judgement at this point?
What I'm also amazed by is the banning of ACM panels only on high rise buildings over 18m. I find the idea of cladding a four storey building in flammable material being okay to be very strange. It feels like there's a lot of lobbying by manufacturers and developers going on to slow down any bans on their products.
I feel this story should be much more front page news than it is. We've just had confirmation of the breakdown of the building control system (for those who needed confirmation) and that hundreds more towers are potentially lethal, and the government is doing fuck all.
It seems HPL panels have different fire ratings. Some may be okay, but who could you trust to make the judgement at this point?
What I'm also amazed by is the banning of ACM panels only on high rise buildings over 18m. I find the idea of cladding a four storey building in flammable material being okay to be very strange. It feels like there's a lot of lobbying by manufacturers and developers going on to slow down any bans on their products.
The logic of the 18m is to do with the reach of fire engines. In other words, over 18m you can't really fight the fire from the outside. Fire regs have never been about reducing the risk of fire to zero, it's about reducing the risk to an "acceptable" level and having the means to fight the fire if one does happen.
Banning combustible materials outright would probably mean doing away with any kind of timber cladding. Some might say that's what we should do. Then all facade materials kind of have to be masonry or cement based. At the same time as everyone is looking at fire risk, there are a lot of people calling for the construction industry to reduce its use of cement, and increase the use of timber, on environmental grounds.
It seems HPL panels have different fire ratings. Some may be okay, but who could you trust to make the judgement at this point?
What I'm also amazed by is the banning of ACM panels only on high rise buildings over 18m. I find the idea of cladding a four storey building in flammable material being okay to be very strange. It feels like there's a lot of lobbying by manufacturers and developers going on to slow down any bans on their products.
Not "slow down" so much as "remove any possibility of". For years, but especially since 2010, government has done a very good job of looking like it does not want to even acknowledge obvious risks when new things come onto the market.
The logic of the 18m is to do with the reach of fire engines. In other words, over 18m you can't really fight the fire from the outside. Fire regs have never been about reducing the risk of fire to zero, it's about reducing the risk to an "acceptable" level and having the means to fight the fire if one does happen.
Banning combustible materials outright would probably mean doing away with any kind of timber cladding. Some might say that's what we should do. Then all facade materials kind of have to be masonry or cement based. At the same time as everyone is looking at fire risk, there are a lot of people calling for the construction industry to reduce its use of cement, and increase the use of timber, on environmental grounds.
Timber-framed, timber-clad tower blocks are predictably rare however. This does illustrate why it's sensible to have different standards for different types of building.
E2a: A large, 'sustainable' timber clad building did go up in flames at Nottingham university not that long ago.
The logic of the 18m is to do with the reach of fire engines. In other words, over 18m you can't really fight the fire from the outside. Fire regs have never been about reducing the risk of fire to zero, it's about reducing the risk to an "acceptable" level and having the means to fight the fire if one does happen.
Banning combustible materials outright would probably mean doing away with any kind of timber cladding. Some might say that's what we should do. Then all facade materials kind of have to be masonry or cement based. At the same time as everyone is looking at fire risk, there are a lot of people calling for the construction industry to reduce its use of cement, and increase the use of timber, on environmental grounds.
But it's beginning to look like firefighters are unable to put out these cladding fires even on lower buildings. If that's the case then the fact that they can reach them may not be relevant (though important they can reach people with ladders obv). Perhaps the temperature at which they burn is different, and that needs to be factored in? I'm pretty sure plastic burns hotter than wood and would be harder to extinguish.
I'm aware I'm making suggestions while not being an expert here, but I guess that's because we appear to have a building control system that has had enough of experts, so I'm left making guesses...
Timber-framed, timber-clad tower blocks are predictably rare however. This does illustrate why it's sensible to have different standards for different types of building.
E2a: A large, 'sustainable' timber clad building did go up in flames at Nottingham university not that long ago.
That was still under construction though, and buildings are always systems in terms of how they actually perform. So if your internal spaces aren't divided as they will be when finished, and if parts of it are open, they might be far more vulnerable to the rapid spread of fire than they would be when finished... they seem to have had the confidence to rebuild it to essentially the same design.
Timber structure is a whole different thing to cladding anyway. In many ways a timber frame is more resistant to fire than a steel one. Timber chars through at a steady rate and usually structures will be designed so that the timbers can still function even after having lost some of their thickness. On the other hand steel at a certain temperature simply fails completely.
Don't know if anyone else is listening to Flat 142 on R4. I didn't intend to but I appear to be. I've taken, listened into and dealt with many horrible 999 calls in the past and even so this is grim listening.
No, that one is new. The one I listened to was lower down, the firefighters actually reached their flat but told them to wait but didn’t come back. Heavy going.
I fear that there is a lot more "shuddering" to come:
"Grenfell should have been central to this election, the government’s deficient response to the dozens of lives lost reflects their attitude to many areas of social care ...
That was published the day before the election and spoke warmly of Emma Dent Coad, the Labour MP for Kensington. The author of the article said she was the only local politician to offer meaningful support after the fire. The rest of Kensington showed how much they care by voting Tory and removing Dent Coad the next day.
The author of the article said she was the only local politician to offer meaningful support after the fire. The rest of Kensington showed how much they care by voting Tory and removing Dent Coad the next day.
The following update on developments was prepared shortly before the General Election:
Further local responses appear here:
"This result is a disaster for my neighbours, who have suffered immeasurably before, during and since the Grenfell Tower atrocity, former Labour MP Emma Dent Coad writes ..."
"Kensington is a microcosm for the wider havoc the Conservatives have wreaked, and it has highlighted the deceitful tactics the Lib Dems are willing to use. Their views on minority communities are not so different to the Tories, as they would like us to believe. Whilst hundreds of people in London and Glasgow attended anti-Boris protests over the weekend, Kensington residents held yet another local walk for Grenfell, but both messages remain unheard ..."
Phase 2 of the Inquiry is divided into 8 modules. In his opening statement yesterday, Richard Millett, the Counsel to the Inquiry, set out what would be covered in each module and the provisional timetable.
Transcripts are in the standard, rather annoying, two column format with line numbers. Here is a more readable pdf of that opening statement.
Millett also went into some detail about who would be called to give evidence during module 1, and the relation of the different companies involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower to one another.
Core participants were asked to give written statements (these are all up on the website), which they all then got to see. As Richard Millett indicated, with only one exception - the Council - none of these statements admitted any liability. This week there will be opening statements from Counsel for the various core participants. Tomorrow morning (Wednesday) there will be submissions on behalf of the TMO and the Council.
Below are the details he gave about each module of the Inquiry.
Module 1 - planned to conclude in April
Module 1 will examine the role, acts and omissions of the professionals and other persons involved in the refurbishment of the tower from 2012 to its sign- off in July 2016. We will be hearing from a significant number of witnesses, including witnesses for the architect, Studio E; the design and build contractor, Rydon; the cladding subcontractor, Harley; the fire safety engineer, Exova; the fabricator of the aluminium composite, or ACM, panels, who was CEP; as well as the employer's agent, quantity surveyor and CDM 1 co-ordinator, Artelia; and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea's Building Control department.
We will also hear from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, or TMO, about their role in procuring the project and what they did as client.
As I will explain in due course, Mr Chairman, there will be particular focus on the materials selected for incorporation into the external wall as the project progressed, and their compliance or otherwise with the building regulations and relevant associated statutory guidance, and in particular Approved Document B on fire safety, or ADB, as well as relevant industry guidance.
(...)
The issues that we will be examining with the Module 1 witnesses broadly encompass the following:
First, the initial decision to undergo refurbishment at Grenfell, the reasons for the decision and the budget.
Second, the appointment of the professionals by the TMO, criteria, roles, interface between professionals.
Third, procurement of the design and build contractor, looking at the process adopted and compliance.
Fourth, planning.
Fifth, the cladding, particularly the design and selection decisions, compliance with ADB and industry guidance, consideration given to fire safety or fire risk, with a particular focus on the ACM panels, the rainscreen insulation, the window infill panels, the windows and window surrounds, cavity barriers, and the crown.
Sixthly, fire strategy, pre- and post-refurbishment, development and adequacy, including consideration of cladding.
Seventh, Building Control, with the principal focus on the facade.
Module 2 - planned to run from 4th May to mid-June
Module 2 will then examine closely the testing, classification, certification, and marketing of key products used in the external wall, and specifically the ACM panels used in the rainscreen system, made and sold by Arconic; the polyisocyanurate, or PIR, and phenolic insulation used behind those ACM panels in the external wall construction, principally RS5000, made and sold by Celotex, which was PIR; the K15 Kooltherm product, made and sold by Kingspan, which was phenolic; the cavity barriers made and sold by Siderise; and the Aluglaze window infill panels.
We will be particularly interested in : first, the key tests that these products underwent, particularly the Arconic ACM panels with the polyethylene core and the Celotex and Kingspan insulation; second, their resultant fire classifications; third, how those tests and classifications were represented by the manufacturers to their markets and to the two certification bodies, the LABC and the BBA; fourth, the relevant certificates issued by the BBA in the case of the ACM panels and Kingspan's K15 Kooltherm product, and the LABC in the case of both K15 Kooltherm and the RS5000 insulation; and last, how those certificates were represented by the manufacturers to their markets, their buyers.
Module 3 - planned to run from the end of June to early October
Module 3 will be divided into three broad topics. The first topic will investigate the complaints made by residents of the tower before 14 June 2017, which particularly relate to fire safety and concerns that were raised about doors and the quality of workmanship during the refurbishment. We will then examine the responses of the TMO and RBKC to those complaints and the degree of engagement by the TMO in the refurbishment works.
Module 3 will then consider a second topic, namely compliance by the TMO, RBKC and the London Fire Brigade with their obligations under law, namely the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety ) Order 2005, otherwise known often as the RRO. A particular focus of our investigation at this module will be the fire risk assessments carried out by Carl Stokes and their adequacy.
The final topic of Module 3 will contain the active and passive fire safety systems inside the tower — so lifts, fire doors, smoke extraction system — together with the gas supply system.
There will then be closing statements for the first three modules.
Module 4 - provisionally mid-October to mid-November
In Module 4, we will examine the performance of local and central government in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
Module 5 - provisionally from the end of November to mid-February 2021.
Module 5 will consider the adequacy of the firefighting response on the night of the fire. Important elements of that assessment were addressed by you already, Mr Chairman, in the Phase 1 report, including the fundamental question whether stay-put advice could and should have been withdrawn before 2.47 am.
There are, however, matters that require further investigation. These include: the purpose and adequacy of section 7.2(d) visits; the training of firefighters, including but not limited to incident command training, as well as alternative tactics for fighting fires in high-rise buildings; and communications and equipment, including the adequacy of water supply and pressure.
Module 6 - provisionally from February to May 2021
Module 6 will involve a close study of central and local government's role in the disaster, and it will study in particular the responses by central government and other public bodies to previous incidents and reports, coroners' recommendations and things of that nature, including in respect of the building regulations and associated guidance and fires and firefighting.
In addition, and following on from the evidence which you will hear in Module 2, we will examine in further detail a number of aspects of the existing regime for testing, certification and classification of materials for use in external cladding systems, both in general terms and in relation to specific products. That examination will, we anticipate, encompass four things at least :
First, the route to compliance with the requirements for external cladding systems under the building regulations and associated guidance, as well as the basis for each such route, including the practice of desktop assessments.
Second, guidance produced by industry associations and standard-setting organisations as to fire safety for the external cladding systems of high-rise buildings, and as to the compliance with the functional requirements of the building regulations for individual components of such systems and as a whole.
Third, understanding across industry and amongst standard-setting and certification bodies of the meaning and application of key test results and classifications.
Fourth, the regulation and supervision of testing, certification and classification of construction products in relation to fire safety and performance in fire, including, again, the role of central government.
Module 7 - provisionally May 2021
Module 7 will be devoted to the remaining expert evidence and will run for a week, one week, until mid-May next year. The experts will examine the results from testing of cladding components and their final conclusions on the relative contributions of the cladding design and materials to the fire spread at Grenfell Tower; the adequacy of the testing regime investigated in earlier modules; and the conclusions to be drawn about the Grenfell Tower fire, including the lessons to be learned when comparing the Grenfell Tower fire with other fires, both domestically and internationally.
Module 8
Module 8 is to be for any remaining evidence and all submissions relating to the circumstances in which each deceased met their death, so far as not covered in the earlier modules and Phase 1.
There was a brief introductory BBC podcast last Friday. During phase 2 they will be producing podcasts weekly rather than daily.
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