Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion

[Teaboy]

Yes, although it looked like it mostly charred and the fire stayed external. Still terrible.

 

[Lurdan]

Looks as if it was a complete design fail as a death trap.

(Coombe is Building Safety Programme Lead for the National Fire Chiefs Council).

 

[teuchter]

That's simply not true though. Other countries do allow single staircase designs.

 

[Teaboy]

I'm also a bit confused about that tweet because its on the Grenfell thread. You can't really add another staircase to an existing tower block. Well, I guess you could but it would have to be external and everything that entails and wouldn't have been much use.

 

[Lurdan]

In retrospect it might have been more sensible if I'd just posted the Nick Coombe tweet without the Phil Murphy tweet responding to it. And also perhaps make it clear that it was talking about the the fire in the block in Sharjah referred to in the posts immediately before mine. And indeed add appropriate caveats.

The point of interest as far as I was concerned was Coombe's understanding of the details of the Sharjah block and how that might - one would wish to stress that word - partly account for the differences in outcome.

Clearly without context such details only go so far. A more recent story at Gulf News includes this

Hassoun said they faced difficulty leaving the building as it was dark and the emergency exits were blocked with discarded furniture.

Obviously one staircase leading to a door you can get out of could be more useful than two which lead to a dead end.

A story today in the Khaleej Times specifically links the fire spread to the presence of ACM cladding
Police say banned cladding caused Sharjah blaze to spread rapidly - Khaleej Times

Aluminum composite cladding - widely used to cover a building's exteriors - has been banned in Sharjah since 2017, after it was found to be a primary factor in massive fires in 2015, 2016, and 2017, Brig Al Serkal said. Such cladding issues were also detected in the fire incidents at The Address Downtown and The Torch in Dubai Marina. Though the Abbco Tower was built before the cladding ban, its owner had already been ordered to remove the aluminum panels from its facade.

(...)

The official said they have conducted a comprehensive survey of existing buildings with aluminum facades across the city. Owners were given a grace period to change the exteriors and replace the material, he added.

If it's true that a 'comprehensive survey' has actually been carried out, then at first glance that might seem to compare favourably with the still incomplete cladding audit here in the UK. This was reported to be in difficulty in January (and serious questions were raised about the accuracy of what had actually been done).
Almost 70% of high rises have not had cladding materials identified, investigation reveals - Inside Housing (links paywalled so archived).
The cladding audit: why the government’s attempts to check high-rise facades is failing - Inside Housing

The end of March deadline for completing the audit was missed. However as the current pandemic illustrates we should be suitably cautious about making hasty and poorly founded comparisons with other and very different countries responses to very complex issues.

 

[teqniq]

Government backs away from pledge to remove Grenfell-style cladding from high-rise buildings by June

 

[Teaboy]

Government backs away from pledge to remove Grenfell-style cladding from high-rise buildings by June

If it was me (and I understand why others would feel differently) I wouldn't be unduly concerned if I lived in a block of flats that had this type of ACM combustible cladding provided it was a relatively new build. Sure, I'd want it changed but I wouldn't be living every day in fear as I would back the internal compartmentalisation to give enough time to escape. Of course if there was Rockwool wall insulation (either external or internal) that would give me a extra level of comfort.

As I say though I can understand why others would feel differently. I would be very worried if I lived in an older block of flats which had limited or no internal fire stopping. I wonder how many blocks there are out there which have been retrofitted with this stuff.

I wouldn't be particularly bothered about HPL cladding. It might not be the best but I doubt it will contribute much to the spread of flames in a real world fire situation.

 

[GarveyLives]

Sadly, Grenfell Massacre survivor, Afwerki Abraha, passed away on 11 May 2020.

 

[Lurdan]

The Grenfell Inquiry has posted an update :

Following a consultation with core participants in May they decided to draw up plans to resume hearings with limited personal attendance. They are now working on those hearings commencing on Monday 6th July.

The Panel's primary concern is the health, safety and wellbeing of all those who would need to attend. The Inquiry team has been working with its contractors to put arrangements in place so that a limited number of attendees can use the Inquiry premises safely and in line with government guidelines. A thorough risk assessment process will be undertaken by the Government Property Agency to ensure compliance with all health and safety requirements.

For these arrangements to be effective, we will need to begin by restricting attendance to the members of the Panel, Counsel to the Inquiry, the witness, their legal representative and any person providing immediate support, and those Inquiry staff and contractors critical to the operation of the hearings. A member of the Press Association will be invited to enable first-hand reporting and assist in making the process as transparent as possible.

Hearings will continue to be streamed online, and Hestia will continue to be available to provide a range of remote wellbeing support services for the bereaved, survivors and residents.

The Inquiry will keep attendance numbers under constant review. The Panel are particularly keen for the bereaved, survivor and resident community to return when possible, but their safety must be our overriding concern and it is too early to suggest when or how that might be possible.

The Inquiry has also published a letter from Boris (pdf here fwliw) which draws attention to Robert Jenrick's June 2nd update on implementing the Phase 1 recommendations (text here - Trigger Warning: there is a deeply unpleasant photograph of Jenrick smirking). Boris also states :

I would like to confirm that the Cabinet Office has engaged the executive search company, Perrett Laver, to identify a shortlist of suitable candidates for the vacant panel member role. This work is progressing well.

Oh good.

Work has continued on phase 2 of the Inquiry during the lockdown. Since April 17th a further 38,635 documents have been disclosed to core participants bringing the total to date to 175,085. That compares with 20,725 for the whole of phase 1.


While hearings were suspended the Inquiry revisited the issue of the undertaking given by the Attorney General that evidence given in the public hearings cannot be used in any subsequent prosecution of the person who gives it. (But can of course be used in the prosecution of others).

The Inquiry had originally asked that this assurance applied to 'legal persons' (ie. companies) as well as 'natural persons' (human beings, or what passes for such in the social housing and building sectors). They had in mind that sole traders, such as some of the independent consultants used during the refurbishment of Grenfell, and directors of some of the larger companies who can afford better quality legal representation, might claim immunity from self-incrimination (ie. refuse to answer questions), if their evidence could be argued to be evidence given 'by' the company they embodied.

The Attorney General initially declined to extend the assurance to 'legal persons'. Lawyers for some 'legal persons' then clarified that their clients did indeed intend to try to avoid answering questions by claiming their right not to self-incriminate. (I suspect that the detailed and fairly intense questioning faced by the first witnesses before hearings were suspended may have focused minds among some of them). The Inquiry asked the Attorney General to reconsider her decision and she agreed.

The correspondence regarding all this can be found on this page, including the correspondence from lawyers on behalf of 'legal persons'. The Attorney General's factsheet on her revised decision is here (PDF file).

 

[GarveyLives]

For information:

 

[baldrick]

Article on Inside Housing: How the government has failed to make buildings with dangerous cladding safe three years after Grenfell

Inside Housing

 

[Badgers]

 

[teqniq]

Scum.

 

[teuchter]

Scum.

Seems a bit kneejerk.

Here is a different perspective on what they are actually saying.

At last, some sense over the cladding crisis from … Rob Perrins, of the Berkeley Group - Leasehold Knowledge Partnership

Rob Perrins, the CEO of the Berkeley Group, tells the Times today that there needs to be a risk-based approach to the remediation of cladding sites rather than a blanket ban on various types of cladding.

www.leaseholdknowledge.com

 

[GarveyLives]

Ahead of the resumption of the public inquiry:

Kensington residents campaign for Grenfell fire inquiry to look at impact of racism

Meanwhile, veteran scholar activist Colin Prescod, who has lived at the same address in West London, a stone’s throw away from the site of the Grenfell massacre since 1958, "gives keys to question what justice for Grenfell could “look like” for the former tenants of the tower, as well as for North Kensington residents, beyond the framework of the state’s judicial system":

Justice4Grenfell: A Political Walk in North Kensington, London. Recorded by Léopold Lambert in London with Colin Prescod on 13 February 2020

 

[Lurdan]

This week the resumed Inquiry heard evidence from two employees of fire safety consultants Exova.

During the first phase of preparation for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, before Rydon was appointed in 2014 as the main contractor, Exova were employed to produce a fire safety strategy for the existing building, which didn't have one, and a fire safety strategy for the refurbishment work.

Neither of these was ever completed, and when Rydon took over they chose not to continue to employ Exova, and not to appoint a replacement. (Exova were subsequently approached for pieces of ad-hoc advice and supplied some). The uncompleted draft fire strategies which were produced by Exova have been criticised, in particular for failing to address the issue of the proposed cladding.

The BBC are continuing to produce a weekly podcast when the Inquiry has public hearings. I listened to much of the hearings this week and the latest podcast episode does a very good job of drawing out the essentials. At the end there is a brief interview with a lecturer in fire engineering about how far the level of communication between architects Studio E and Exova, and the assumptions about their respective roles which have emerged in evidence, represents 'normal industry practice'.

Earlier in the week there was another episode of the BBC podcast which interviewed two residents of blocks still covered in combustible cladding.

For those catching up, Phase 2 of the Grenfell Inquiry is divided into eight modules. It is currently still dealing with module 1. Originally, pre-coronavirus and legal issues, this was due to run from February into April. Presumably it will now be running until September, subject to any further interruptions. The details of what each module covers were set out back in January and can be found in this post.

Video of the evidence sessions is available on YouTube and transcripts and supporting documents on the Inquiry website.

I'd again recommend the BBC podcasts if you want to get up to date with the evidence so far during module 1. If you only have time to listen to one of them I'd suggest episode 118 - the second week of Studio E's evidence. Among other things it covers how non-compliant materials and designs were chosen, provides a large portion of 'explanations' as to how (in their opinion) Studio E were 'not responsible' for this, and eloquently 'paints a picture' of the relationship between the companies involved. It thus lays the foundation for a good deal of the evidence still to be heard.

On Monday the Inquiry is due to hear evidence from another employee of Exova, on Tuesday and Wednesday Bruce Sounes of architects Studio E is due to complete his evidence (twice interrupted back in March by illness), and on Thursday the first of what I imagine will be several days of evidence from Rydon, the main contractor on the refurbishment.

edited to correct spelling

 

[DaveCinzano]

One of the Grenfell Tower architects said they were “miffed” at demands from a building safety officer aimed at preventing fire spreading up the tower and complained it was causing cost increases and delays...The inquiry heard how a fire engineer hoped building regulators would not notice the evacuation arrangements might not be compliant with up-to-date building regulations. One fire engineer wrote to a colleague: “Let’s hope [the building control officer] doesn’t pick up on it.”

Grenfell architect clashed with council over fire prevention

Building control officers insisted on fire barriers in the wall structure, inquiry hears

www.theguardian.com

 

[Lurdan]

Latest BBC Grenfell Inquiry podcast is up
Podcast 122 - Exova, Studio E and Rydon

Inside Housing's Grenfell diary also covers this weeks hearings. It's paywalled so here is an archived version:
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’

Inside Housing are also reporting (paywalled) that :

The government will publish a draft of its Building Safety Bill on Monday – intended to introduce major regulatory changes to resolve the issues that contributed to the Grenfell Tower fire.

Ministers said that the “landmark” piece of legislation will deliver the most comprehensive building safety reforms for nearly 40 years. It will provide the legal framework for a new Building Safety Regulator for blocks taller than 18 metres, which is currently being established in shadow form within the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

Tower block residents will have a “louder voice” under the new regime, the government claimed, with the power to challenge inaction on safety issues from building owners. Leaseholders will also be protected from huge bills to pay for safety work, it added.

A separate consultation on proposals to implement recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s phase one report is also set for publication by the Home Office. The inquiry’s demands included mandatory three-monthly checks of fire doors and personal evacuation plans for all high-rise residents.

The Government's press release about the draft Bill with a little more detail is here
Explained: The Draft Building Safety Bill

 

[two sheds]

Grenfell firm took some of cladding savings for itself, inquiry told

Rydon contract manager admits firm under-reported savings from switch to ACM panels

www.theguardian.com

Rydon looks like it's in a spot of bother.

The main contractor on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment secretly “pocketed” £126,000 while switching the cladding to cheaper, more combustible materials, the inquiry into the deadly fire at the building has heard.

Rydon was bidding for the project in March 2014 when it told the landlord of the council block that it could save £293,368 by switching from the originally specified zinc cladding to plastic-filled aluminium panels, which the inquiry has heard had “significantly worse” fire performance.

At the time, the Kensington and Chelsea Tenants’ Management Organisation (KCTMO) was trying to cut more than £800,000 from the costs and had told Rydon it was “in pole position” to win the contract.

Rydon knew that the actual saving from the switch would be £419,627, but kept this from the client and “took some of the savings for themselves”, possibly as additional profit, Simon Lawrence, Rydon’s contract manager, admitted to the inquiry.
...
Lawrence also admitted he did not investigate the fire performance of the ACM panels and said he did not know they performed significantly worse than zinc in a fire.

...
Earlier on Monday the inquiry was told that Rydon promised five times to appoint fire safety advisers but failed to do so. Instead, it relied on the building control department at Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea council, which owned the block, to advise on whether there were any safety problems.

Lawrence admitted Rydon did not tell the client or the architect it was not hiring a fire expert despite having said it would do so in meetings in April, June, July, September and October 2014 as works were getting under way. The absence of a fire engineer on the team meant the cladding was chosen without consulting a specialist fire safety consultant, Lawrence confirmed.
...
The inquiry heard that when Chris Holt, Rydon’s site manager, asked Lawrence about the need to address fire safety, he was reassured that it was in hand.

In a written statement to the inquiry, Holt said: “I was aware that as the refurbishment was to a residential block of flats, one of the main risk factors would be fire safety. When I started on the project I spoke to Simon Lawrence and asked whether I was required to consider aspects of fire safety in my role. Simon informed me that it was not part of my role and had been dealt with.”

 

[two sheds]

One bit I missed out:

Rydon was also under further pressure to save money on the job because one of its employees, Frank Smith, had underpriced the total works by £212,000. Rydon was looking for ways to “compensate” for the mistake, internal company emails showed.

 

[teuchter]

Grenfell consequences are increasingly becoming significant in the building industry.

Some of this is directly related to the building regs changes for buildings over 18m. These are suddenly a lot more onerous than previously, and really the industry has had to scramble to comply. It's not just that you are more restricted in the type of insulation or cladding that can be used - essentially it now says that you can use virtually nothing combustible in external wall buildups. That includes many of the smaller components, and for many of these, until recently (or still now) there was basically nothing on the market that would comply. Have a look at this website for example - you can get an idea of the speed with which things are having to be developed and certified.

Metz A1 Non-Combustible Cavity Tray / A1 Fire Rated / BBA Approved

The METZ EaZi-Fit A1 Non-Combustible Cavity Tray System is a unique patented all metal, A1 Fire Rated, BBA Approved soft zinc alloy.

www.metzcavitytray.co.uk

In some cases, it seems that the new rules are being applied to buildings where the initial building regs approval was given prior to the changes. Usually, (and building regs get updated all the time) what you have to comply with is whatever was in place at the beginning of the project, because it's not practical to change things once a building is halfway through construction. But now there are projects where substantial and expensive changes are having to be made after things are already half built. As I understand it, this is mainly driven by fire consultants becoming ultra cautious.

Effects are also visible in professional indemnity insurance. There have been reports for a while of building control companies being unable to renew their PI insurance. Many architects, especially if they've ever worked on anything that the insurance company thinks might be vaguely similar to the Grenfell cladding, have seen their PI insurance costs go up massively. In some cases, the increase in the insurance cost completely wipes out any fees earned on the job in their history that has raised the red flag. It also seems to be common for PI renewals to be offered but with an endorsement that basically says you are not covered for anything related to fire safety.

These kinds of effects I think are rather predictable. Unfortunately they don't really address the problems that lead to Grenfell happening. Just becoming ultra cautious and attempting to follow some kind of zero risk strategy doesn't really work... it's not really possible anyway. I've been following quite a lot of the Grenfell evidence and it's clear that while there were lots of minor individual failures that compounded problems, really it's a systematic thing and the way to make it better is through somehow building much more reliable processes for checking and signing stuff off. If you have that in place then it's safe to go with managed risks, which is all you can ever really do anyway.

These kinds of things that result from the insurance market can often have positive effects - but I'm not sure that creating a situation where building essentially just becomes much more expensive does anything to help making the wider changes, and it has lots of negative effects, not just for the people working in the industry.

I wonder if we'll see a trend for buildings that are 17.9m high, for some time.

 

[Lurdan]

This weeks BBC podcast is up
BBC Radio - The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Podcast, 123 The Contractor: Rydon

Two witnesses this week, both former employees of Rydon, the company appointed in 2014 as lead contractor for the Grenfell refurbishment, on a design and build basis, after the first attempt to get the project going had fallen through.

Simon Lawrence, Rydon's contract manager gave evidence for three days, and Simon O'Connor the onsite project manager for one. Although both had worked for Rydon for some years they were both newly promoted to the roles they held for this project, and both left Rydon in 2015, some time before the refurbishment was completed. Indications have begun emerge that the contract was a more troubled one than has been reported so far.

Some more attention grabbing things came out :

the fact, as mentioned in two sheds posts above, that Rydon misrepresented to the TMO the amount of money to be saved by switching from the solid Zinc cladding, which the architects and Council planners had favoured for aesthetic and durability reasons, to ACM panels with a combustible core, which the TMO had asked to be considered on cost grounds;

the fact that behind the talk of 'stakeholder engagement' residents were characterised as vocal and aggressive in raising concerns;

the fact that Rydon in general, and neither of these witnesses in particular, had adequate knowledge of building regulations and fire safety, took no steps to employ or acquire any, failed to see or heed any of the red lights in documentation and correspondence, and were thus, as they stated, dependent on their specialist sub-contractors in these areas, while being unable to effectively monitor what those sub-contractors were doing;

But while these sort of things stood out they don't get to the heart of the larger picture that is emerging of the scale of the failings, and the extent to which they were facilitated by, and in many cases a product of, 'standard industry practise'.

I've recommended the BBC podcast before. I think this one does an exceptional job of setting out and explaining this weeks evidence. I haven't seen anything else which comes close.

Inside Housing's Grenfell Diary for the week covers the headline points :
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’ (paywalled so archived)

More evidence from Rydon employees next week.

 

[teuchter]

The draft "Building Safety Bill"

What is in the government’s Building Safety Bill? Seven key takeaways

Inside Housing takes a look at the government’s draft Building Safety Bill and assesses the biggest changes for the housing sector

www.insidehousing.co.uk

 

[teqniq]

 

[Artaxerxes]

Cunts.

 

[MrSki]

Even the local tory MP Buchan voted against it.

 

[editor]

This government are filth.

 

[MrSki]

Felicity Buchan calls for phase one of the inquiry to be put into law after voting against phase one to be put into law earlier this week.

 

[Chilli.s]

Heartless self serving cunts.

 

[Streathamite]

Felicity Buchan calls for phase one of the inquiry to be put into law after voting against phase one to be put into law earlier this week.

HUH???
She can't be that thick. Can she???