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Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion

People seek outrage at the actions or inactions of individuals and newspapers want headlines but anyone actually following the enquiry can see that the problems are totally systematic and affected the way every single person who worked on the project behaved. Unless you work out how to change how building projects are procured, the ways in which responsibility is assigned and regulations are monitored all the same things will continue to happen.
 
People seek outrage at the actions or inactions of individuals and newspapers want headlines but anyone actually following the enquiry can see that the problems are totally systematic and affected the way every single person who worked on the project behaved. Unless you work out how to change how building projects are procured, the ways in which responsibility is assigned and regulations are monitored all the same things will continue to happen.

no, sending a badly paid project manager to jail will fix it
 
Very few organisations have a thought out records retention policy other than the NHS and the police. I have worked mainly in R&D and even there whilst I've kept most of my personal notebooks going back 12 years or so, I doubt my colleagues have.
 
Very few organisations have a thought out records retention policy other than the NHS and the police. I have worked mainly in R&D and even there whilst I've kept most of my personal notebooks going back 12 years or so, I doubt my colleagues have.
from my reading of met police's records retention policy they want to keep shit they can use on other people forever and destroy or conceal as soon as possible anything that might possibly be used to hold them accountable.
 
from my reading of met police's records retention policy they want to keep shit they can use on other people forever and destroy or conceal as soon as possible anything that might possibly be used to hold them accountable.
An accurate observation, Police Scotland moved to special notebooks with numbered pages so they couldn't be removed. The policeman I spoke to said there were severe penalties for removing the pages.
 
there was the bloke who sounded hugely overworked and stressed into making a decision because they'd let all the other inspectors go - as I recall.
 
Last week further evidence from former staff of Kensington and Chelsea TMO :
  • Claire Williams the TMO's project manager on the Grenfell refurbishment from September 2013.
  • Peter Maddison the TMO's director of assets and regeneration from January 2013.
BBC podcast here. Unofficial transcript of the podcast here. (Previous weeks transcripts here).

Inside Housing's Grenfell diary for this week (paywalled so archived):
Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’
(Previous weeks diaries here)

(There is a link in this weeks diary to a June 2019 Inside Housing story about how the TMO responded to the recommendation to fit sprinklers after the Lakanal House fire. That link is broken - here is an archived version.
Grenfell management company ignored Lakanal recommendations after government said they would ‘not be mandatory’

On Monday Peter Maddison is due to continue. Once his evidence is concluded the Inquiry's expert witnesses will begin giving evidence. Currently Beryl Menzies is scheduled for Tuesday and Barbara Lane for Wednesday and Thursday.
 
Very few organisations have a thought out records retention policy other than the NHS and the police. I have worked mainly in R&D and even there whilst I've kept most of my personal notebooks going back 12 years or so, I doubt my colleagues have.

I must be thinking of a different police then. You know, the ones that misplace every piece of evidence that could make them look bad with never a soul held accountable.
 
This week saw the final day of witness evidence for Phase 1 of the Inquiry, and the start of evidence from the Inquiry's expert witnesses.
  • Peter Maddison the TMO's director of assets and regeneration from January 2013 gave a final day of evidence.
  • Beryl Menzies gave evidence about the Council's Building Control.
  • Barbara Lane gave evidence about the fire strategies produced by Exova, and the various pieces of health and safety information which should have been produced during and at the end of the reburbishment.
BBC podcast here. Unofficial transcript of the podcast here. (Previous weeks transcripts here).

Inside Housing's Grenfell diary for this week (paywalled so archived):
Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’
(Previous weeks diaries here)

Next week, from Monday afternoon to Wednesday morning, the last expert witness, architect Paul Hyett, is due to give evidence. There are no closing statements for Module 1 - they will be heard at the end of Module 3. So on Thursday it is intended to start Module 2 with opening statements from the Inquiry team and various core participants. - What do all these modules cover ?

There was an additional BBC podcast this week covering the response to the recommendations made by Phase 1 of the Inquiry one year later. A transcript of it should be up later this weekend.
 
An accurate observation, Police Scotland moved to special notebooks with numbered pages so they couldn't be removed. The policeman I spoke to said there were severe penalties for removing the pages.

There is in the Met as well; they used to regularly kick people out at Hendon who tried to do it (there were even people who tried to do it with the old IRB, which had numbered pages).
 
After 65 days of hearings Module 1 of this phase of the Inquiry concluded on Wednesday, at the end of two days of evidence from the final expert witness, architect Paul Hyett.

Yesterday Module 2 started with opening statements. The third Inquiry panel member, Ali Akbor, took part for the first time via video link.

Richard Millett, the Inquiry's Lead Counsel, revealed that some former employees of Arconic were still attempting to avoid giving evidence in person, citing French law. They have however given written statements, and Millett indicated that if ongoing discussions didn't resolve this issue they could be 'empty chaired'. Part of the six days scheduled in January for their testimony could be devoted to a presentation of the evidence the Inquiry already has, and the questions the Inquiry would have invited them to respond to.

More interestingly still, Millett revealed that just last Thursday solicitors for Kingspan, the manufacturers of the combustible insulation that was substituted on parts the outside of Grenfell Tower had written to the Inquiry :

(...) attaching a letter directly from Kingspan to the BRE saying that they were now withdrawing a number of their BS 8414 test reports and associated BR 135 reports. Kingspan’s letter to the BRE said in terms that the very first test carried out on Kooltherm K15 in 2005 was not representative of the K15 product which had been sold by them from 2006 onwards. That is to say the K15 tested in 2005 was essentially a different product to what was being sold after 2006.

It was also confirmed that the K15 product used in two further BS 8414 tests in 2014 was not representative of the K15 product then on the market. The letter says that this was prompted by discoveries of irregularities relating to the testing systems, the systems tested, which had in turn been prompted by requests from this Inquiry.

This is actually a big deal. Kingspan are market leaders in the supply of insulation products and these now withdrawn test certificates were a significant part of the basis on which these products have been sold and used on thousands of buildings in the UK. Peter Apps for Inside Housing (archived):
Kingspan withdraws insulation fire test admitting it is 'not representative' of product on market for 15 years

The Inquiry then heard an opening statement from BSRs (Bereaved Survivors and Residents) Team 1. Although written down this comes across as rather technical and dry (here is a transcript of it), it was a pretty brutal takedown of the way materials manufacturers influenced changes in the regulatory regime which permitted new 'routes to compliance', gamed and rigged fire test results to obtain fire ratings and certificates, and then misrepresented those ratings and test results to sell their combustible products.

Peter Apps on this opening statement here, and specifically about Arconic here. Inside Housing story about it archived here
Grenfell cladding and insulation firms engaged in 'sinister' attempts to undermine regulations, inquiry hears

Later, amongst others, there were opening statements from manufacturers Arconic, Celotex, and Kingspan. In addition to weasel words from all three, the first two continued the circular firing squad strategy by vigorously denouncing other corporate core participants.

Full transcript of the days proceedings here (pdf in usual annoying two column fomat).
 
If these things about the various manufacturers are true then it is indeed a big deal.

I've watched a fair bit of the enquiry and with most of the people involved in the project itself, I feel that although some of them failed to check things sufficiently, or were doing stuff that wasn't entirely within their competency, or were wrongly assuming that things were other people's responsibility, in many cases I can to some extent imagine myself in the same position and I don't see them as willfully doing things that they know to be dangerous.

This stuff with the manufacturers is a bit different - it appears that they are deliberately cheating test results. Also, they can't point to some other organisation misleading them. The buck stops with them. When someone on the Grenfell construction or design team says that they looked at a BBA certifcate or product literature, and trusted that the information there was basically sound, even if they failed to read the caveats properly, or didn't have the technical knowledge to interpret things correctly, in the end they are trusting that these companies would not present something in a way that makes it appear fine when actually it's not. But if those companies knew internally that they were producing misleading information, and were doing it deliberately, that's a whole different thing, a kind of active rather than passive negligence.
 
This week's Inside Housing Grenfell Diary is up a bit earlier than usual - archived here :
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’

Understandably it focuses on what came out at the first day of of module 2 yesterday. If you only have time to read one of the inordinate number of links I've posted today I would recommend this one.

As a result the expert evidence from earlier in the week is only dealt with in the form of paywalled links to it's previous stories. Here are archived versions of them :
1. - Government guidance ‘endorsed’ use of deadly ACM cladding panels before Grenfell, expert says
2. - Specification of combustible insulation was ‘major failure’ by Grenfell architect, says expert
3. - Construction industry ‘culture’ places cost ahead of safety, says Grenfell Inquiry expert
 
This weeks BBC podcast is up. Here's an unofficial transcript of it. The first half is understandably devoted to the claims about the materials manufacturers made on Thursday. It usefully adds to the other accounts I've linked to.

As an example, one thing I haven't seen picked up elsewhere is that after reporting the BSR Team 1 opening statement about how Celotex had
procured the carrying out of the BS 8414-2 test in May 2014 in a wholly improper manner by using magnesium oxide board, which is used in furnaces, to fortify the cavity barriers
the podcast then adds:
In her written submissions Stephanie Barwise referenced a witness statement which has not yet been publicly released, to suggest that it’s overwhelmingly likely that staff in the Building Research Establishment advised Celotex on how to pass this large scale fire test. This is an extraordinary claim. It would mean one of the organisations responsible for testing, certifying and setting standards in the construction industry also helped companies think their way around those tests.

The second half of the podcast also gives a rather better account of the expert evidence given by Paul Hyett earlier in the week. This was highly critical of the architects Studio E and rejected a number of the arguments they made in their evidence. In the unofficial transcript of the podcast that starts here.
 
I suspect that "the rest of Kensington" probably had the same view of the Grenfell Tower massacre as many of the politicians seeking their votes:

ELo8r40XkAAEGmX.jpg

The following update on developments was prepared shortly before the General Election:



Further local responses appear here:



My Electoral Defeat In Kensington Shows Lies Pay


And:


Kensington and the Grenfell victims deserve better than lying Lib Dems and a Tory MP



article-1263212-08F7B0FB000005DC-566_233x339.jpg

Former Conservative Party leadership candidate, Sam Gyimah, who contested the parliamentary seat concerned for ... the Liberal Democrats.



An update on someone who no longer appears to have very much to say about the people of Kensington, particularly those impacted by the Grenfell Tower massacre:

Tory-turned-Lib Dem Sam Gyimah lands directorship role at Goldman Sachs

article-1263212-08F7B0FB000005DC-566_233x339.jpg


The joke's on who?
 
There were more Module 2 opening statements this week, a presentation on fire testing by expert witness Barbara Lane and the first two days of evidence from former employees of insulation manufacturer Celotex.

BBC podcast up as usual. Unofficial transcript of it here. (Older transcripts here)

There has been no Grenfell Diary so far this week from Inside Housing. Thus the only full account of this weeks hearings is the BBC podcast and the unofficial transcript of it.

Here's an archived version of one Inside Housing story which covers Barbara Lane's presentation.
Inquiry expert questions testing regime used for Grenfell cladding system products

Next week more evidence from Celotex and (presumably subject to how long those take) from Simco a subcontractor Celotex employed to construct their large-scale fire test mock-up.

ETA: Among the opening statements on Monday there were two given on behalf of Bereaved Survivors and Residents Team 2. The most interesting of them IMO was the first which went over the actions of the manufacturers, illustrating this with reference to documents, including some which haven't yet been released. Here is a transcript including images (this includes a couple of screenshots where items aren't yet on the Inquiry website). BSRteam2Opening

The other Team 2 statement did contain some of the best lines :
Sam Stein (for BSR Team 2): (…) you and the panel may well come to the conclusion that the manufacturers, Arconic, Kingspan and Celotex, are little more than crooks and killers. These companies knew their materials were dangerous to life. They knew their materials would burn with lethal speed. And yet they marketed their products into an uncaring and underregulated building industry, which spread them around residential buildings like a disease.
 
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Good on him for speaking up.

Absolutely - but I think we know how the company is going to play it:

"...a young, junior member of staff...not conversant with full facts or overall picture...left under something of a cloud...spotty performance...we had high hopes for him which sadly were not realised...seems to be suffering from a misplaced sense of guilt..."
 
I've been listening to some of the testimony of the less junior celotex staff. They can't put it on one guy - everyone knew what was being done. And very similar story over at the main competitors, Kingspan.
 
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