Ukraine and the Russian invasion, 2022-24

[gosub]

No chance. Russia can keep this going for a few months at most, and perhaps only weeks. Vietnam and Afghanistan (twice) involved superpowers with the resources to sustain a war indefinitely. That's not the case here.

They all still ended in an away loss

 

[Aladdin]

They are not separate though. Any chance an anti-war moment in Russia has of stopping the war is dependent and the Ukraine army holding its grounds.

And let's be honest it will not be stopped by any kind of street moment. The pressures form withing the Russian state will stop it before it gets to that point.

And I remain far from convinced that ended the conflict as quick as possible is the best war to avoid bloodshed. If Ukraine surrendered it would end the conflict. But a prolonged invasion could be far more bloody than the current war and create far more missery for Ukrainian civilians than the current war.

Calling for workes to rise up and end the war is fine rhetoric but it is just that, it does not seem to reflect what is happening on the ground.

All this is true.

But Russia does need another Revolution

 

[kabbes]

They all still ended in an away loss

Not really. A “loss” normally implies the other side “wins”. The invaded countries lost so much that it’s fair to say nobody won, even if the invasions were ultimately repelled. And it’s not like the US or USSR ever ended up fighting on their own soil, let alone had to make any concessions that saw them lose anything from their own territory. If they “lost”, it was only an inability to take from others, never anything they originally started with.

It’s been said before, but Ukraine lost the moment they were invaded and continue to lose every day this continues. The only question right now is what will the final tally of loss look like?

 

[JimW]

Not really. A “loss” normally implies the other side “wins”. The invaded countries lost so much that it’s fair to say nobody won, even if the invasions were ultimately repelled. And it’s not like the US or USSR ever ended up fighting on their own soil, let alone had to make any concessions that saw them lose anything from their own territory. If they “lost”, it was only an inability to take from others, never anything they originally started with.

It’s been said before, but Ukraine lost the moment they were invaded and continue to lose every day this continues. The only question right now is what will the final tally of loss look like?

I was reading a decent analysis in Chinese from Lu Gang, who heads a national Central Asia research body here which ended on the same point when interviewer was asking him if the US was going to be the big winner as the swivel-eyed commentary here often has it.
His current position (think interview was a couple of days ago) is first attack has clearly failed as no major cities fallen but he expects a second round in April and thinks at best there might be compromise deal come May. As has been said on here IIRC, the state of play in the field sets the parameters for what can be demanded round the peace talks table and he doesn't think Russia's put itself in a position to enforce too strong demands.

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www.163.com

Was interesting to read a sensible take from someone with the ear of central government here.

 

[bimble]

Interesting that France's Foreign Minister has been speaking publically saying that Russia is only "pretending to negotiate" and that it is important not to be fooled.

 

[existentialist]

I've had about enough of these attempts to narrow down what is considered acceptable to discuss on this thread to an absurd degree. I can appreciate why that happened with a poster that has now been banned from this thread, and that was not a safe example for me to build this complaint upon without getting associated with their shit. But I'm quite keen not to see the phenomenon and the accusations that accompany it repeated more broadly, especially since in times of war there is a tendency for more people than normal to fully leap on board a narrower than normal stance and to more actively police posters who stray from that line. Wars raise uncomfortable questions and things are easily polarised. I dont want uncomfortable, challenging aspects to be brushed under the carpet, including ones I dont actually happen to agree with myself.

This is in no way a demand that you agree with posters, stances and angles that you dont really agree with, or that you should not challenge them. But it is an appeal for you not to characterise these posters and their points in quite the way you have been tending to on this thread so far. Its unsettling to me because you arent coming across on this thread in the way I'm used to thinking of you in other threads at all. Maybe that says more about me than you, and I do not intend to keep going on about this, but I thought I'd just raise this now with the hope that I can then move on.

I suppose I'm especially unsettled because I think I'm seeing more dogma than pragmatism at work here, in contrast to what we were talking about earlier.

edit - let me put it this way. There is a fake, hollow version of pragmatism that focusses mostly on smearing all inconvenient angles and possibilities as being naive, immature dogma based stuff entirely void of any possible merit, not worthy of serious discussion. I am not entirely allergic to such lines of attack, but I certainly dont like it when such attacks become the default, made using rather broad brush strokes. Too much risk that the resulting 'pragmatism' is built on a rigged game, since too many of the legitimate ingredients that should go into a fair evaluation have been unfairly discarded at the earliest opportunity.

I'm not trying to narrow down discussion. My comment referred only to my unwillingness to continue discussing this subject with this poster, no more than that.

 

[strung out]

I'm not trying to narrow down discussion. My comment referred only to my unwillingness to continue discussing this subject with this poster, no more than that.

You've been an unpleasant bully on multiple times recently, particularly your disgusting post about RD2003 just prior to his banning from the thread.

I happen to disagree with those criticising the supply of military aid from the west in favour of a more working class centred approach, but your 'nice guy' persona elsewhere belies what is an increasingly obvious nasty streak.

 

[bimble]

These 'deepfake' videos, a perfect weapon for our time.
This article says that yesterday, in retaliation for the Russian video (where on hacked Ukrainian tv a fake Zelensky tells everyone to surrender) there was a deepfake of Putin released yesterday too:

"A deepfake video of Russian President Vladimir Putin also appeared online on Wednesday..In the video, the Russian president appears to announce the surrender of Russia and calls on soldiers to "go home while you're alive".

Deepfake video shows Zelenskyy's false call for Ukraine to surrender

The manipulated video appears to show Ukraine's President calling on citizens to lay down arms. #TheCube

www.euronews.com

 

[Spymaster]

Well, if we've got cynical hats on, I understand your desire for somebody to do something to save Ukrainians from this invasion. Really, I do. I'm just not convinced it's going to happen.

The same powers that are supplying weaponry are refusing to sanction Gazprombank because they want to keep buying gas from Russia, which is presumably helping to finance the invasion, in case that hasn't been mentioned. Gazprombank: The Big Russian Lender That Dodged Western Sanctions

I just can't see how real help is coming from that direction, honestly.

When you say 'help from that direction' do you mean you see no value in supplying the weaponry because "the west" is also still giving Russia money for gas? Hopefully not because that would be senseless.

Obviously with any sanctions package, the value must be weighed in relation to the deleterious effect it has on your own (in this case mainly EU) economies. That's simple pragmatism. That said, I'm pretty sure you will see sanctions on Russian gas very soon. It's not as easy as just turning off the tap. Obviously alternative supplies need to be found but there's also the fact that a fair bit of the gas supply infrastructure in European countries is owned by Russian firms. Gazprom, for example, owns UK based Pennine Natural Gas and has a fair sized UK network supplying heavy industry from a variety of sources (not just Russian gas). They own the metering stations and delivery hardware that supply those firms. If Gazprom were sanctioned now, all of that would stop because anyone else who supplied gas across their equipment, without specific permission, would be sanctions-busting. There needs to be code and regulatory change to prevent that from happening. Same with the rest of Europe, but up to 50 times more in some cases, especially Germany. All that takes time.

There will have been a lot of work going on in the past weeks to get to a position where sanctions can be imposed on Russia's gas economy but it isn't a question of just flicking a switch.

 

[cupid_stunt]

I will concede this is true - more weapons for Ukraine mean the fighting lasts longer, the longer the fighting goes on, the more anger within Russia grows, particularly as the Russian body count increases. So if we're saying that the aim of sending weapons is to prolong the fighting which will wear out Russia and increase opposition to Putin, then I accept the logic of that. But it means a lot more deaths, of Ukrainian civilians as well as Russian soldiers.

But, that is something no ones knows, if the Ukrainians don't fight back now, and hopefully bring about a more favourable agreement with Russia in the coming weeks, resulting in the withdrawal of Russian troops, that could actually save more lives in the long-term than letting Russia occupy the country resulting in a guerrilla war that could run for years and years, with an ever growing number of deaths and all the associated misery such a long drawn out war would ensure.

It's for the Ukrainians to decide what they think is the better option for them, and if that means more weapons to damage the invading army, we should supply them, it would be immoral not too.

 

[bimble]

Interesting talk

One bit i don't get. He says as a fact that Putin has had a moment of truth, sometime between the start of the invasion and now, where its dawned on him that everything he thought about Ukraine was wrong and what he intended to achieve (regime change) is therefore going to be impossible.
But why is he so sure about that, Where's the evidence that Putin has had this moment of realisation sometime in the last 3 weeks ?

 

[teqniq]

Very informative thread on Russia's prospects of taking Kyiv:

 

[dilute micro]

One bit i don't get. He says as a fact that Putin has had a moment of truth, sometime between the start of the invasion and now, where its dawned on him that everything he thought about Ukraine was wrong and what he intended to achieve (regime change) is therefore going to be impossible.
But why is he so sure about that, Where's the evidence that Putin has had this moment of realisation sometime in the last 3 weeks ?

idk, but I'd be careful in deluding ourselves that we have the same info or are even capable of interpreting info the same as government officials or military commanders. These people are well plugged in with connections we don't hear about. They're not on message boards. The ex-general from the other day was in Ukraine a couple weeks before the invasion. This whole Ukraine thing was going down behind the scenes long before it happened.

 

[Aladdin]

One bit i don't get. He says as a fact that Putin has had a moment of truth, sometime between the start of the invasion and now, where its dawned on him that everything he thought about Ukraine was wrong and what he intended to achieve (regime change) is therefore going to be impossible.
But why is he so sure about that, Where's the evidence that Putin has had this moment of realisation sometime in the last 3 weeks ?

I think he is right to say that Putin's loss of support within Russia is what might be impacting on Putin's thoughts and possible actions now.

 

[andysays]

...It's for the Ukrainians to decide what they think is the better option for them, and if that means more weapons to damage the invading army, we should supply them, it would be immoral not to.

Yes, it's up to "the Ukrainians" to decide what they think is the better option for them, but that doesn't mean "we" should supply them with whatever they demand, regardless of the potential consequences of escalating the conflict beyond its current level.

The Ukrainian government is continuing to ask for aircraft, and for the imposition of a NFZ; that doesn't mean they should be given them.

(I've put both "the Ukrainians" and "we" because you appear to be conflating people and the governments which supposedly represent them. The reality is that, for example, the Ukrainian government has denied men of "military age" of the option choosing what they think is the better option for them, by preventing them from leaving the country. Similarly, no one posting here has been or will be consulted about the level of eg NATO response.)

 

[JimW]

Very informative thread on Russia's prospects of taking Kyiv:

That Chinese researcher I quoted said by their doctrine you'd expect to need ten times the number of troops Russia has available - 500,000 as opposed to the actual 50,000.

 

[cupid_stunt]

Yes, it's up to "the Ukrainians" to decide what they think is the better option for them, but that doesn't mean "we" should supply them with whatever they demand, regardless of the potential consequences of escalating the conflict beyond its current level.

The Ukrainian government is continuing to ask for aircraft, and for the imposition of a NFZ; that doesn't mean they should be given them.

I specifically said weapons, because that is what was under discussion, there's no chance of a NFZ, and most likely not the supply of jets, that has been made very clear by NATO.

(I've put both "the Ukrainians" and "we" because you appear to be conflating people and the governments which supposedly represent them. The reality is that, for example, the Ukrainian government has denied men of "military age" of the option choosing what they think is the better option for them, by preventing them from leaving the country. Similarly, no one posting here has been or will be consulted about the level of eg NATO response.)

This is just silly, of course I am referring to the various governments, when using the terms "the Ukrainians" and "we", to think otherwise would be a bit bonkers.

 

[The39thStep]

Never knew this . Only a short series of tweets worth a read .

 

[elbows]

Very informative thread on Russia's prospects of taking Kyiv:

Although I'm allowing myself more room to consider Russian failures, my basic problem with the sort of analysis that features in that twitter thread hasnt really changed. We arent being given any sort of proper indication about the size, capabilities and location of Ukrainian troops. Russia getting bogged down in certain ways, generalised descriptions about the perils of urban warfare, and vague claims about willingness to fight in Kyiv still does not properly compensate for that. Without that sort of detail it is very hard for me to see such analysis of Russias prospects in regards Kyiv as anything other than a contribution to the continuation of a very clear propaganda narrative that has been pretty consistent since the early days of this war. Propaganda often works best when there is a healthy dose of truth in it, or when people can find reason to think it plausible. The failure of Russia to achieve its central goal within a few weeks has significantly helped the credibility of this sort of analysis, but I reckon I will fuck up if I now start taking it at face value rather than paying attention to the details that are consistently omitted.

 

[existentialist]

Although I'm allowing myself more room to consider Russian failures, my basic problem with the sort of analysis that features in that twitter thread hasnt really changed. We arent being given any sort of proper indication about the size, capabilities and location of Ukrainian troops. Russia getting bogged down in certain ways, generalised descriptions about the perils of urban warfare, and vague claims about willingness to fight in Kyiv still does not properly compensate for that. Without that sort of detail it is very hard for me to see such analysis of Russias prospects in regards Kyiv as anything other than a contribution to the continuation of a very clear propaganda narrative that has been pretty consistent since the early days of this war. Propaganda often works best when there is a healthy dose of truth in it, or when people can find reason to think it plausible. The failure of Russia to achieve its central goal within a few weeks has significantly helped the credibility of this sort of analysis, but I reckon I will fuck up if I now start taking it at face value rather than paying attention to the details that are consistently omitted.

The Youtube video I posted a bit upthread addresses some of this, and illustrates some of what you're saying - there is definitely a bias towards triumphal footage of Russian vehicles being destroyed, and Ukrainian "wins", but very little from the other point of view.

I can see why, propaganda-wise, Ukraine may well not want to show equivalent footage of battles where they come off worse, and my guess is that Russia's more centralised media machine simply isn't good enough to get within-one-day footage of their version of events all over Twitter/Youtube in the same way as Ukraine's more embedded/grassroots media seem to be doing.

Mark Cappy, in that video, mentions an incident in which Russians captured a large number of Javelin anti-tank missiles, and have been using them against the Ukrainian army, for example - something which doesn't seem to have appeared on the general social media radar. So I do think we need to be cautious about forming too many judgements about exactly how it's going, although even so the big picture stuff does seem to show that, overall, Russia isn't doing particularly well at the moment. What will happen if/when they decide to reinforce, and particularly when they start really going for the cities is anyone's guess, though. I want to think that the Ukrainians can prevail, or at least push Russia into a "winning to death" scenario (a term I believe was used to describe the German attempts to capture Ukraine and particularly Kyiv in 1943), but that inevitably biases me to put more weight on the stories that tell me what I want to hear.

 

[andysays]

I specifically said weapons, because that is what was under discussion, there's no chance of a NFZ, and most likely not the supply of jets, that has been made very clear by NATO.



This is just silly, of course I am referring to the various governments, when using the terms "the Ukrainians" and "we", to think otherwise would be a bit bonkers.

So your position is basically that if Ukraine asks for it and NATO is prepared to give it then it should happen without question, and anyone with a different opinion is to be dismissed as a bit bonkers.

 

[Spymaster]

So your position is basically that if Ukraine asks for it and NATO is prepared to give it then it should happen without question, and anyone with a different opinion is to be dismissed as a bit bonkers.

That’s a particularly strange interpretation of his posts.

 

[cupid_stunt]

So your position is basically that if Ukraine asks for it and NATO is prepared to give it then it should happen without question, and anyone with a different opinion is to be dismissed as a bit bonkers.

Where have I said that?

 

[Pickman's model]

Although I'm allowing myself more room to consider Russian failures, my basic problem with the sort of analysis that features in that twitter thread hasnt really changed. We arent being given any sort of proper indication about the size, capabilities and location of Ukrainian troops. Russia getting bogged down in certain ways, generalised descriptions about the perils of urban warfare, and vague claims about willingness to fight in Kyiv still does not properly compensate for that. Without that sort of detail it is very hard for me to see such analysis of Russias prospects in regards Kyiv as anything other than a contribution to the continuation of a very clear propaganda narrative that has been pretty consistent since the early days of this war. Propaganda often works best when there is a healthy dose of truth in it, or when people can find reason to think it plausible. The failure of Russia to achieve its central goal within a few weeks has significantly helped the credibility of this sort of analysis, but I reckon I will fuck up if I now start taking it at face value rather than paying attention to the details that are consistently omitted

given the poor performance of the russian armed forces thus far, and their having used firepower to compensate for lack of other proficiences, i suspect the people they send in will not be greatly skilled in the abilities urban warfare demands. the syrians may prove more proficient than their russian colleagues. but there's a ton of stuff online about urban warfare, about battles in cities like stalingrad, hue, grozny, fallujah. and there's a great load of information about the how to's, the ways in which urban warfare is a 3d battlefield rather than the more usual 2d one elsewhere - where battles for buildings are battles for each room. and subterranean operations or tunnel warfare is also key to success as there is that unseen dimension to the conflict. (all links bar the stalingrad and subterranean ops ones are to pdfs)

 

[Pickman's model]

modern warfare institute podcast about the battle for kyiv at What Will the Battle of Kyiv Look Like? - Modern War Institute

 

[elbows]

The Youtube video I posted a bit upthread addresses some of this, and illustrates some of what you're saying - there is definitely a bias towards triumphal footage of Russian vehicles being destroyed, and Ukrainian "wins", but very little from the other point of view.

I can see why, propaganda-wise, Ukraine may well not want to show equivalent footage of battles where they come off worse, and my guess is that Russia's more centralised media machine simply isn't good enough to get within-one-day footage of their version of events all over Twitter/Youtube in the same way as Ukraine's more embedded/grassroots media seem to be doing.

It may be that Russia doesnt feel the need to do much of that propaganda, because they intend to demonstrate their gains once key objectives are met, rather than feel the need to bolster the impression of individual battles being won.

I suppose one technique I use is to see how much of the positive, 'Ukraine isnt losing' message makes it through to the main narrative from the likes of the BBC. Not much really does from what I've seen so far. The BBC live feed page will still report on the latest claims from the likes of UK and USA defence department status updates, but I'm not sure they really place much weight on those things when it comes to the overall narrative. eg It didnt stop the BBC from starting a 'battle for Kyiv looms' in their main tv news bulletin last week.

Mark Cappy, in that video, mentions an incident in which Russians captured a large number of Javelin anti-tank missiles, and have been using them against the Ukrainian army, for example - something which doesn't seem to have appeared on the general social media radar. So I do think we need to be cautious about forming too many judgements about exactly how it's going, although even so the big picture stuff does seem to show that, overall, Russia isn't doing particularly well at the moment. What will happen if/when they decide to reinforce, and particularly when they start really going for the cities is anyone's guess, though. I want to think that the Ukrainians can prevail, or at least push Russia into a "winning to death" scenario (a term I believe was used to describe the German attempts to capture Ukraine and particularly Kyiv in 1943), but that inevitably biases me to put more weight on the stories that tell me what I want to hear.

Yeah the Javelin stuff is a good example. I actually stumbled on something from a different retired US military figure which discussed that and other things, but that I would not want to post in this thread because various statements in it can easily come across as pro-Putin and will make peoples blood boil and will probably cause an argument I dont want to have here. And that will rather detract from aspects of his analysis that might well be closer to the truth than the stuff we keep hearing. And I havent really studied the track record of the person in question. I suppose I will go as far as to name him so people can look into it if they want, but please dont shoot me when you find him saying things that arent well received, and certainly dont assume I agree with everything he is saying, only that a few bits and bobs make some sense or at least cover some of the most obvious omissions from other sources. Col. Douglas Macgregor.

 

[cupid_stunt]

This Col. Douglas Macgregor may have somethings right, but Jesus, he's a bit of an oddball.

Fox News' Invasion Expert Is a Trump-Appointed Putin Propagandist Who Thinks Russia Is Being 'Too Gentle'

Douglas Macgregor has said there’s no point in sanctioning Russia and that America should “absolutely” let Putin take over as much of Ukraine as it wants

www.rollingstone.com

 

[BCBlues]

modern warfare institute podcast about the battle for kyiv at What Will the Battle of Kyiv Look Like? - Modern War Institute

Theres some other interesting podcasts listed in there too, bookmarked for later.
Cheers Pickman's model

 

[elbows]

given the poor performance of the russian armed forces thus far, and their having used firepower to compensate for lack of other proficiences, i suspect the people they send in will not be greatly skilled in the abilities urban warfare demands. the syrians may prove more proficient than their russian colleagues. but there's a ton of stuff online about urban warfare, about battles in cities like stalingrad, hue, grozny, fallujah. and there's a great load of information about the how to's, the ways in which urban warfare is a 3d battlefield rather than the more usual 2d one elsewhere - where battles for buildings are battles for each room. and subterranean operations or tunnel warfare is also key to success as there is that unseen dimension to the conflict. (all links bar the stalingrad and subterranean ops ones are to pdfs)

I'm not really looking into that sort of detail in regards that sort of urban warfare, because I'm not convinced that will be what a battle for Kyiv actually looks like, given that the 'politics' of the situation may change if Russia breaches the outer defences and neutralises any major Ukrainian forces in the area. And if it does still come down to that sort of battle, I dont really anticipate having near-realtime access to the detail of any fighting conducted on a street by street, building by building basis.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

It's for the Ukrainians to decide what they think is the better option for them, and if that means more weapons to damage the invading army, we should supply them, it would be immoral not too.

Dangerous to talk about morality when it comes to state actors and what it is you think they should do. Some kind of messy, dirty compromise is probably the best chance of a way out of this, very possibly one mediated by a leader of a country that knows a thing or two about starting wars of acquisition. But if ending the killing is the priority, moral purity can't come into it.