Saudis / UAE / Egypt / Bahrain vs Qatar

[CrabbedOne]

I think that's rather obvious,

e2a



What? Seriously? The calls were for 'Bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity'. doesn't sound much like failures of succession to me.

That's rather confusing symptoms with causes. It does not take much of an analytical leap to connect young reformers like Bashar and Gamal implementing neoliberal policies that corruptly feathered the urban elite's nests while ignoring their security establishments with subsequent unrest. There are other causes but this is a neglected one. How does a clan based dictatorship deal with transitions of power? Even Yemen was to some extent about Saleh's dynastic succession. It's not how the MSM described these events but it's pretty evident they tended to misread them as did our politicians. The "Arab Spring" was widely misinterpreted. It didn't come out of nowhere like a Messianic tide of history. Poor leadership decisions and ill judged attempts at reform helped destabilise old authoritarian regimes.

And now we have MbS freed from domestic checks and balances and set on reforming the KSA's economy while prosecuting what looks like a very belligerent foreign policy. His jingoistic war in Yemen has made him popular but that can sour quickly. As Kirk Sowell said recently the risks in the KSA come not from terrorism but from the top.

 

[teqniq]

I seem to recall it started with a street vendor immolating himself due to continued persecution by the authorities and his subsequent failure to make a living in Tunisia and snowballed from there.

 

[CrabbedOne]

I seem to recall it started with a street vendor immolating himself due to continued persecution by the authorities and his subsequent failure to make a living in Tunisia and snowballed from there.

Completely unrooted in the complex domestic political conditions in a variety of MENA states then. Well I guess such grand theory sells newspapers.

 

[teqniq]

It was a broad-based social movement from the bottom-up after years of being shat on from on high. One of the reasons it didn't succeed, particularly in Egypt is that whilst the energy for social change was there, there was no plan for what came immediately after quite possibly because a lot of the protests were led by youth movements/young activists with little experience. Then what became known as the 'deep state' staged a brutal comeback after the Muslim Brotherhood who essentially jumped on the social change bandwagon foolishly thought they could do business with them. The situation as I'm sure you are aware in Egypt is worse now than it was under Mubarak. I did not arrive at these conclusions solely through buying and reading newspapers but by following activists on Twitter who were and in many cases still are, there. Most of them have fallen silent now, certainly on political issues through fear of arrest. It is not a grand theory, it is what actually happened. So go ahead and attempt to graft failures of succession onto the situation but from here it doesn't look like it fits.

 

[teqniq]

Lots of pot calling the kettle black going on here

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan claims ultimatum issued to Qatar is 'against international law'

 

[elbows]

Completely unrooted in the complex domestic political conditions in a variety of MENA states then. Well I guess such grand theory sells newspapers.

There were many factors at work. Arab spring threads were a lot more interesting because people could dwell on what was happening at a grassroots level, and the ways that power was expressed at a street level. Not just endless analysis of 'palace coups', the whimsies of the ruling classes, regional geopolitics etc. That shit is a factor and so a degree of cynicism is necessary, in some countries more than others, but there isnt enough hope or everyman reality in it to inspire people. So by all means carry on talking to yourself about the games of the powerful ad nauseam but please dont sneer when people dare to mention the great unwashed and their role in proceedings.

 

[CrabbedOne]

It was a broad-based social movement from the bottom-up after years of being shat on from on high. One of the reasons it didn't succeed, particularly in Egypt is that whilst the energy for social change was there, there was no plan for what came immediately after quite possibly because a lot of the protests were led by youth movements/young activists with little experience. Then what became known as the 'deep state' staged a brutal comeback after the Muslim Brotherhood who essentially jumped on the social change bandwagon foolishly thought they could do business with them. The situation as I'm sure you are aware in Egypt is worse now than it was under Mubarak. I did not arrive at these conclusions solely through buying and reading newspapers but by following activists on Twitter who were and in many cases still are, there. Most of them have fallen silent now, certainly on political issues through fear of arrest. It is not a grand theory, it is what actually happened. So go ahead and attempt to graft failures of succession onto the situation but from here it doesn't look like it fits.

Actually this isn't a bad summary of some of what happened. It what was reported because the sources were the same. It's a bit naive about some Egyptian political realities. Our media only really noticed twittering activists and then often only in English. Most Egyptians weren't hanging off Twitter but watching cable TV during the protests. Most Egyptians didn't participate. Coverage was very focused on Cairo. They largely ignored the labour movement which was often at the centre of things. They ignored the army like it was a political bystander as the US military might be. In retrospect this created a distorted picture of a potentially liberalising society when most Egyptians remained conservative often revering the army and/or The Mosque. Protesters I recall frequently praised the army with an almost religious fervour. This was a very bad sign.

It's a bit unfair to the MB as I recall they basically won a landslide with the Salafists in second place. They did not jump on any progressive bandwagon. That was a bit of an illusion as all those folk on Twitter didn't have anything like their base or a coherent political program. The reactionary MB only ever an opposition party proceeded to not even live up to the expectations of their supporters. Islam provided no rapid solution. Their support cratered. They always had substantial opposition. Morsi overreached in a variety of ways. The military then confidently hit the kill switch with some popular support.

I arrived at these conclusions by reading a lot of policy papers by people who speak Arabic and do actually understand the place in depth. For example read What was the Egyptian military thinking after the revolution?

...
The conventional narrative of a civil uprising followed by a shaky democratic transition and ending in a military coup fundamentally misunderstands Egypt’s politics. Egypt’s military has been deeply invested in politics for the last half-century. The military, not street protesters, ultimately removed President Hosni Mubarak on Feb. 11. The military, not civilians, governed Egypt between Mubarak’s removal and the inauguration of Morsi on June 30, 2012. And the military, not civilians, removed Morsi on July 3, 2013. Overthrowing a government and governing through the collective leadership of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are as much political acts as winning elections or stitching together a legislative coalition.

The military’s political role in the republican regime descended from the 1952 coup merits closer inspection. Its power does not only flow from the barrel of a gun, and it is not based upon a supposed economic empire. Over the past five years, the Egyptian armed forces benefited from the two distinct kinds of control over information to retain institutional power. Information asymmetry and narrative control are key to the army’s recent success: Only generals understand the army’s politics, and generals are key to the way Egyptians have been taught to understand their own history. These advantages have allowed the army to fend off challenges to subject their institution to legislative control and transform it into one more government agency rather than the embodiment of the nation.
...

So the military is really the pivotal political actor at every stage of the Arab Spring in Egypt.

They could have crushed the protests just as they, savagely, did the post coup riots. The army chose not to. The Generals even let the MB, finally the second most important political actor here, have a shot at governing. I'm not suggesting this was a plan. The military reacted to events and had some respect for the will of the people if with limited patience. They just end up being the decisive political actor.

Why the military reacted the way it did in Egypt is very particular to Egypt. Their own growing dissatisfaction with the Mubarak clan was certainly a factor. One of many reports from The NYT in 2010 Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt

...
But many in the military chafe at the idea of a Gamal Mubarak presidency, especially as he ascends to the office through the kind of heavily manipulated ballots to which Egypt has grown accustomed. If he wants to succeed his father, said Mohamed Kadry Said, a retired general, he must win in “clean elections.”

Much of the military’s distrust of Gamal Mubarak stems from his ties to a younger generation of ruling party cadres who have made fortunes in the business world. The military is tied to the National Democratic Party’s “old guard,” a substantially less wealthy elite who made their careers as ministers, officers and apparatchiks. Military officers said they feared that Gamal Mubarak might erode the military’s institutional powers.

“Of course the military has become jealous they are not the only big bosses now,” said General Said. “They feel threatened by the business community.”

General Said, the military adviser to the government’s Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, still works closely with the defense establishment. He says that he believes a military coup is “not an option,” but that he thinks that President Mubarak’s successor, whether Gamal Mubarak or someone else, will have to convince the military that its position in the Egyptian power structure will remain secure.
...

Finally even the possible ascendence of the MB was a preferable outcome.

 

[teqniq]

I am a lazy bastard who doesn't actually type too much but, anyway...

Actually this isn't a bad summary of some of what happened. It what was reported because the sources were the same. It's a bit naive about some Egyptian political realities.

Why thank you so much.

Our media only really noticed twittering activists and then often only in English. Most Egyptians weren't hanging off Twitter but watching cable TV during the protests. Most Egyptians didn't participate. Coverage was very focused on Cairo. They largely ignored the labour movement which was often at the centre of things. They ignored the army like it was a political bystander as the US military might be.In retrospect this created a distorted picture of a potentially liberalising society when most Egyptians remained conservative often revering the army and/or The Mosque. Protesters I recall frequently praised the army with an almost religious fervour.

but I did not ignore any of these things and started to read around which is when I discovered from a Time article that the Egyptian army is indeed revered by large swathes of the poplulace, but since the conflict with Israel has pretty much run large sections of the economy, anything from petrol stations to pasta manufacturers.

It's a bit unfair to the MB as I recall they basically won a landslide with the Salafists in second place. They did not jump on any progressive bandwagon.

This is essentially a lie. The MB are a very conservative organisation, they saw an opportunity and they grasped it eagerly. Furthermore they had the organisation and power structure to make it happen, but they couldn't have done it without the acquiescence of the army.

That was a bit of an illusion as all those folk on Twitter didn't have anything like their base or a coherent political program.

Which harks back to what i said earlier about youth movements.

The reactionary MB only ever an opposition party proceeded to not even live up to the expectations of their supporters. Islam provided no rapid solution. Their support cratered. They always had substantial opposition. Morsi overreached in a variety of ways. The military then confidently hit the kill switch with some popular support.

Morsi was/is a fool and thought he could advance a conservative Islamist agenda without blowback, though although it may seem strange I know of people on Twitter who voted for them in the hope that it might lead to a better way forward rather than the sad state of affairs before and that which ensued.

I arrived at these conclusions by reading a lot of policy papers by people who speak Arabic and do actually understand the place in depth. For example read What was the Egyptian military thinking after the revolution?..

I suggest you actually read some stuff from people who were/are actually there, people who are also Arabs but who do people like me who don't speak or read Arabic the courtesy of posting in english, rather than 'policy papers'.

They could have crushed the protests just as they, savagely, did the post coup riots. The army chose not to. The Generals even let the MB, finally the second most important political actor here, have a shot at governing. I'm not suggesting this was a plan. The military reacted to events and had some respect for the will of the people if with limited patience.

How nice of them.

Why the military reacted the way it did in Egypt is very particular to Egypt. Their own growing dissatisfaction with the Mubarak clan was certainly a factor. One of many reports from The NYT in 2010 Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt

I know about Mubarak's intended succession of his son, thanks, it does not entirerely explain away a popular social movement from the bottom up however. It may well have been the straw that broke the camel's back in some respects but it also it does not explain away years of brutality. People saw what happened in Tunisia and dared to believe it might be possible in Egypt. This I think was the main impetus.

Finally even the possible ascendence of the MB was a preferable outcome.

Oh rly?

 

[teqniq]

A somewhat rose-tinted perspective of Qatar, but some interesting stuff nevertheless.

Qatar is giving Saudi and the UAE a masterclass in international diplomacy

 

[elbows]

A somewhat rose-tinted perspective of Qatar, but some interesting stuff nevertheless.

Qatar is giving Saudi and the UAE a masterclass in international diplomacy

Some dodgy distortions in that article for sure.

It also took a lead role in the Arab Spring. Qatar was the only state in the Middle East to support the Egyptian people in their uprising before joining in military action against Gaddafi’s Libya, providing funding for the rebels and even military aircraft for the NATO-led bombing campaign. The UAE and Saudi backed Al-Sisi and support the remnants of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya.

Bollocks regarding Libya. The UAE was well up for Gaddafi's downfall, and the side they support in post-Gaddafi Libya cannot be described as Gaddafi remnants. Qatar and the UAE are fighting a proxy war in Libya for sure, but even a basic description of the situation deserves more than this article provided. In this and other ways the article demonstrates just how closely aligned it is with the Qatari line. Only the propaganda from that side in Libya would dare to describe a parliament that was once elected (though its mandate since expired) and Hafter who spent decades living near CIA headquarters in Virginia as being Gaddafi remnants.

In fact some events in Libya could be used as example of just how much Qatar 'cares about democracy' when people in a country like Libya dont vote for their favoured Islamists, quite a good counter to the premise of that article. I've not got time to attempt this properly right now but stuff I've posted about Libya before covers it. eg I dont think Belhadj's party got a single seat in the elections it stood in, and later a combination of some Islamist, tribal & city groups took Tripoli and forced the winners of that election to flee east. Hafter is a dodgy spoiler who appears to have since taken hold of this 'Tobruk government/House of Representatives' and as I mentioned their mandate expired so I am not trying to heap legitimacy on this eastern government who are UAE/Egypt etc backed, just seeking to indicate one of the more glaring omissions from that article since it dared to mentioned Libya in the context of Qatari benevolence.

 

[J Ed]

Summary of the competing claims and interests here. The Qatar Crisis

 

[not-bono-ever]

the list of Saudi demands is quite eye watering- this isnt about Qatar, this is about cleaning the regional house and crushing the saboteurs

 

[teqniq]

They are fine ones to talk with the funding extremism shit, and a whole raft of other stuff tbh. But there again we already know this.

 

[gosub]

the list of Saudi demands is quite eye watering- this isnt about Qatar, this is about cleaning the regional house and crushing the saboteurs

It's leveraged on World Cup construction and face

 

[not-bono-ever]

Summary of the competing claims and interests here. The Qatar Crisis

That is a nice succinct piece

 

[teqniq]

Yes I know it's 'The American Conservative' but it would seem to be fairly well informed on the mess that is the current US administration and has in part led to the current state of affairs.

Tillerson and Mattis Cleaning Up Kushner’s Middle East Mess

 

[teqniq]

Saudi Arabia, allies give Qatar two more days to accept demands

Meanwhile at al-Jazeera



So that's probably a 'no' then.

 

[teqniq]

Egypt blocked UN sanctions against Saudi branch of Islamic State

from

 

[teqniq]

Newly disclosed documents help explain the Qatar crisis - CNNPolitics.com

 

[teqniq]

Not come across AEI before here is their about page. Make of it what you will. Interesting article nevertheless

Information warfare in the Gulf • AEI

 

[elbows]

Leaky oops!

Not that the plan sounded credible, bank run by man with interesting reputation and Tory links sells UAE an unrealistic plan to wage financial war on Qatar shocker

Leaked Documents Expose Stunning Plan to Wage Financial War on Qatar — and Steal the World Cup

A PLAN FOR the United Arab Emirates to wage financial war against its Gulf rival Qatar was found in the task folder of an email account belonging to UAE Ambassador to the United States Yousef al-Otaiba and subsequently obtained by The Intercept.

The economic warfare involved an attack on Qatar’s currency using bond and derivatives manipulation. The plan, laid out in a slide deck provided to The Intercept through the group Global Leaks, was aimed at tanking Qatar’s economy, according to documents drawn up by a bank outlining the strategy.

The outline, prepared by Banque Havilland, a private Luxembourg-based bank owned by the family of controversial British financier David Rowland, laid out a scheme to drive down the value of Qatar’s bonds and increase the cost of insuring them, with the ultimate goal of creating a currency crisis that would drain the country’s cash reserves.

 

[elbows]

Largely out of sight, this stuff rumbles slowly on. Latest is that plans to build a canal the entire length of the Saudi-Qatar border have being given to the press.

Saudi Arabia to build canal cutting off Qatar: reports

 

[agricola]

Largely out of sight, this stuff rumbles slowly on. Latest is that plans to build a canal the entire length of the Saudi-Qatar border have being given to the press.

Saudi Arabia to build canal cutting off Qatar: reports

The infantilization of modern politics continues apace, I see. "We'll build a canal! With marinas! And a nuclear waste dump on ur side!!!1one"

 

[tim]

The Qatari ambassador to Somalia has been caught chatting about Qatari involvment in a car bomb attack on Emirati interests in the country:

In an audio recording obtained by The New York Times of a cellphone call with the Qatari ambassador to Somalia, a businessman close to the emir of Qatar said that the militants had carried out the bombing in Bosaso to advance Qatar’s interests by driving out its rival, the United Arab Emirates.

“The bombings and killings, we know who are behind them,” the businessman, Khalifa Kayed al-Muhanadi, said in the call on May 18, about a week after the bombing.

The violence was “intended to make Dubai people run away from there,” he said, referring to the Emirates’ financial capital. “Let them kick out the Emiratis, so they don’t renew the contracts with them and I will bring the contract here to Doha,” the capital of Qatar



With Guns, Cash and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia