...
The dispute significantly complicates efforts by the Trump administration to assemble a broad and cohesive regional coalition to
counter Iran’s regional influence. The Saudi-led isolation of Qatar came just two weeks after the visit by President Trump to Saudi Arabia in which countering Iran—and terrorism more broadly—was a pronounced theme. It is possible that the Trump visit’s highlighting of the Iran threat appeared to tilt the U.S. so far in the Saudi/UAE/Bahrain direction that the three were emboldened to wring major concessions from Qatar. Yet, the U.S. effort to contain Iran, and to operate throughout the region, depends on an access to an inter-connected web of Gulf military facilities, perhaps most prominent of which is Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base where 10,000 U.S. Air Force personnel serve. A prolonged intra-GCC dispute is certain to interfere with the seamlessness of U.S. operations in the Gulf, whether or not U.S. access to Al Udeid is affected (which it has not to date)—and thus impinge on U.S. efforts to keep Iran militarily contained. Even if day-to-day U.S. operations are unaffected, the U.S. effort to construct an integrated ballistic missile defense system in the Gulf—intended to neutralize Iran’s increasingly large and sophisticated ballistic missile force—is sure to be hampered. These strategic considerations for Iran policy largely explain why U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stepped in as a mediator to try to repair the rift as quickly as possible.
The Gulf rift’s effect on Iran’s regional position is likely to be mixed. In the near term, Iran’s allies, the
Zaydi Shi’a Houthi rebels in Yemen are likely to benefit at least somewhat because Qatar is exiting the Saudi-led coalition and seeking to restore the Sunni-led government there. While Qatar’s ground contingent in Yemen is small, its air force is well trained and its air strikes have helped the Saudi-led effort. Iran’s position in Syria is likely to benefit marginally from the Gulf dispute. Qatar has been aiding groups such as Ahrar al-Sham against
the Assad regime; this and other pro-Qatar groups have been effective against pro-Assad forces, particularly around Damascus. If, in an effort to resolve the rift, Qatar agrees to cease supporting its protégé groups in Syria, the overall opposition effort against Assad could weaken pro-Iranian forces in Syria, which might gain more room to advance. Conversely, Iran’s regional position could be set back if resolving the rift requires Qatar to cease its support for Hamas and end its humanitarian support for the Gaza Strip, which Hamas runs. Hamas has been a key instrument through which Iran puts pressure on Israel, and any weakening of Hamas weakens Iran’s regional strategy, particularly against Israel. However, these outcomes pale by comparison to the benefits Iran receives from watching the GCC, the its primary regional adversary, devolve into acrimony.
..but all the main protagonists resigned from their jobs with in a week of 'victory' after driving around in a huge red bus with a lie written on the side of it which they shortly after said they didn't really mean).
