Today's opening addresses mark the start of module 5, during which we will investigate the remaining matters, concerning the London Fire Brigade's response to the Grenfell Tower fire on the 14th of June 2017, that could not be addressed in Phase 1.
We will also investigate three other specific topics that arise from the Chairman's findings in the Phase 1 report. Those specific topics are as follows:
First, the adequacy and effectiveness of visits carried out by the LFB, under section 7.2d of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, to obtain information which is necessary to discharge the LFB's statutory function to extinguish fires.
Secondly training, and with particular focus on the training provided by the LFB to incident commanders, and in relation in particular there, to evacuation.
And thirdly, alternative fire fighting strategies in high rise buildings.
As to the structure of module 5, we're going to start with opening statements by certain of the core participants today.
Starting from tomorrow, we will hear evidence from past and present senior LFB officers on the topics that I've mentioned.
You will recall that at Phase 1 the Inquiry called evidence from some 88 LFB employees, and the statements of a further 262 LFB witnesses were read into the record.
In this module 5 the Inquiry will not therefore be calling any further factual evidence about the events on the night of the fire on the 14th of June 2017. Those events have been the subject of detailed analysis and findings in the Phase 1 report.
The Inquiry currently expects the factual evidence of this module 5 to take 14 or so sitting days.
Following the factual evidence we will then hear from three of the four experts retained by the Inquiry for the purposes of this module. Those experts are as follows:
1. Professor Chris Johnson, who has examined the effectiveness of the LFB's communication systems;
2. Mr Steve McGuirk, who will deal in broad terms with fire fighting on the night; and
3. Professor Jose Torero, who will consider general issues arising from the fire fighting response.
We expect that that evidence, the evidence of each expert, will take one day apiece.
Doctor Ivan Stoianov has addressed certain issues relating to water on the night of the fire. In the light of some of the points made by Thames Water and the LFB, very recently in their opening submissions, the Inquiry team has decided to call Doctor Stoianov's evidence later, in Module 7, to allow him to consider the points that have been raised.
Finally, I should make it clear that the first part of Module 6 will be concerned with further questions for the LFB and others, such as the sufficiency of the LFB's policy arrangements for the management of fire survival guidance calls; MHCLG's policy document GRA 3.2 and evacuation; the translation of knowledge within the LFB, of risks presented by cladding fires in high rise buildings, into operational policy and practise; and the lessons learned and arising from the Lakanal House fire, and other relevant fires in this country and abroad. We intend to examine those matters in module 6 but also to some extent in this Module 5.
I should also make it clear that in module 6 the Inquiry will hear evidence from the present London Fire Commissioner and his two immediate predecessors.