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WHY IDLIB FIRST?
Although the situations in Deir al-Zour and Idlib are equally urgent, the Syrian army does not have the means to launch two large-scale offensives simultaneously. And while the Euphrates anti-IS option would be better received by Western powers than an Idlib campaign, leaders in Moscow, Damascus, and Tehran do not seem to care much about Western perceptions at this point.
Vladimir Putin seems most concerned about Turkey's calculus, since Ankara could usher in early resolution of the conflict by depriving the rebels of their logistical support. It seems clear now that Putin and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a nonaggression pact when they met in Saint Petersburg on August 9, essentially confirming the partition of Syria into zones of influence. The application of this presumed pact has been gradual. First, pro-Turkish rebels disassociated themselves from JFS, facilitating the encirclement of East Aleppo. Meanwhile, the same rebels conquered territory between Azaz and Jarabulus earlier this year with backing from the Turkish army. Then, once the Syrian army's victory in Aleppo was assured, Turkey launched a direct offensive against al-Bab.
Therefore, if Assad decides to attack Idlib province next, he would benefit from the benevolent neutrality of the Turks, who for their part could try to seize Manbij or even Tal Abyad from the Kurds. By cutting more roads between the Kurdish cantons of Afrin, Kobane, and Qamishli, Turkey would definitely put an end to the Kurdish dream of territorial unity. This would also be a palatable outcome for Assad (who has long refused to grant Syrian Kurds autonomy on the Iraqi model) and Putin (who finds the Kurds too closely aligned with Washington).
Yet a wider Turkish-Kurdish confrontation would have a number of negative consequences for the United States, such as reinforcing the Islamic State's position in Syria, damaging American credibility in the region, and highlighting Washington's perceived unwillingness to protect its allies. These considerations may give U.S. officials further reason to seek understandings with Russia on targeting IS and al-Qaeda while protecting civilian populations and moderate rebels. Renewed consideration of various "safe zone" proposals in northern and southern Syria may also be in order.