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And next, Syria?

On Syria Direct ‘Absolute chaos’ as regime advances to within 1km of cutting east Aleppo in two
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Syrian government forces and their allies have spread opposition forces thin in recent days, rebels told Syria Direct, by opening more than a half dozen battlefronts across east Aleppo city.

“The regime certainly didn’t make their advances easily,” Mohammad Adeeb, a spokesman for rebel faction Nour e-Din a-Zinki, told Syria Direct on Sunday. “But, ultimately, they’re putting pressure on all of our fronts, and we’re kept busy with all of the clashes.”

“In my five years of fighting, I’ve never seen such intense bombing as what’s gone on these past five days in Aleppo,” Adeeb added.

The Assad regime’s weekend gains mark the deepest that regime forces have advanced into the opposition stronghold since rebels initially established control over the eastern half of the city in 2012.
As much about a concentration of manpower as airpower.
 
On AlJaz Syria government forces split rebel-held Aleppo in two
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The army renewed an operation to retake eastern Aleppo nearly two weeks ago, hoping to deal the opposition a potentially devastating blow.

"Yesterday was the worst day we've witnessed since the war started. More than 1,500 families have fled to the regime-controlled west of the city. The bombing is horrific," Ibrahim Abu Leith, Aleppo-based spokesman for the Civil Defence, told Al Jazeera.

The city, which was Syria's biggest before the start of a civil war that has killed hundreds of thousands of people, is divided between the government-held west and rebel-held east, where UN officials say at least 250,000 people remain under siege.

Rebels in Aleppo have lost at least 30 percent of the besieged east since Saturday, as frontlines continued to cave in after nearly five months of siege.

Syria's Al-Watan daily, which is close to the government, said the army was advancing quickly.

It said the next stage of the operation would be "to divide the remaining area into security districts that will be easily controlled and to capture them successively".

The advance would then "push the gunmen to turn themselves [in] ... or accept national reconciliation under the terms of the Syrian state".

East Aleppo-based journalist Zouhir al-Shimale told Al Jazeera that there was a "constant collapse" as rebel-held neighbourhoods continue to fall to government forces.

Civilians besieged for months in the east have faced serious food and fuel shortages.

The Observatory, which relies on a network of informants in the country to monitor the war, said that nearly 10,000 civilians had fled east Aleppo overnight on Saturday - at least 6,000 to the Kurdish-controlled northern district of Sheikh Maksoud, with the rest fleeing to government-held areas.

"It is the first exodus of this kind from east Aleppo since 2012," Abdel Rahman said, calling it the "biggest defeat" for the rebels in Aleppo since then.
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A rather sudden collapse but it's been under pressure for a long time. Those IDP numbers are still pretty low.

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On AlJaz How much longer can east Aleppo hold out?
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The United Nations estimates that there are nearly 8,000 rebel fighters in besieged east Aleppo, 900 of whom are members of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham - the al-Qaeda-affiliated group formerly known as al-Nusra Front.

"Nothing like this has happened in an area of the size and complexity of east Aleppo, and, with multiple major armed factions inside, it seems unlikely any deal will be coordinated easily or smoothly."

By the time the Daraya deal took place in August, the suburb's population - once nearly a quarter of a million - was down to 8,000 people. There were only 800 rebel fighters.

Both the Syrian government and its Russian and Iranian backers understand that waging an assault on an urban area the size of east Aleppo will be a long and bloody battle, according to Yezid Sayigh, a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center. "It took them years to take Daraya," says Sayigh. "East Aleppo is far bigger and far more difficult an area to take."

"They're going to focus on siege tactics to basically engineer a political deal in which the opposition agrees to surrender some of its heavy weapons, while certain categories of fighters are allowed safe passage to other rebel-controlled areas."

With two months to go before US President Barack Obama hands over the reins to President-elect Donald trump - and even then, there is a high likelihood that Trump's Syria policy will play even more into the hands of Assad and Putin than Obama's - Russia and the Assad "aren't pressed for time".

"Why would they take high risks or risk high casualties?" asks Sayigh, if starve-or-surrender policies have already proved successful in places such as Daraya and Moadamiya.
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On Al Monitor Putin not waiting for Trump to press advantage in Syria
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Maxim Suchkov writes that while there is cautious optimism about Trump’s position on Syria, Putin is also aware that the US Congress may seek to box in Trump, as Julian Pecquet has reported, so Russia will not be squandering the remaining weeks of the Obama administration.

“Moscow believes it now has the opportunity and time to make critical gains in Syria,” Suchkov writes. “Russian airstrikes in Idlib and Homs provinces as well as the Syrian army offensive in Aleppo seem to be building in this line of reasoning. At the same time, this shouldn’t contradict other Russian moves described previously — with an overall decrease in anti-American rhetoric, more attacks on the Islamic State and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and prospects for the deterrent built by the Russians in Syria to be a potential bargaining chip with the new administration.

“At the same time,” Suchkov adds, “the military offensives are set to bring more rebel groups to direct talks with the Russian military. According to the Bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic on Nov. 19, within the previous 24 hours 'truce agreements were signed with representatives of three inhabited areas of Hama province and two in Latakia province.' Thus, the total number of inhabited areas whose leaders had signed the so-called reconciliation agreements now amounts to 956, while the number of cease-fire application forms signed with leaders of armed groups has reached 69. Finally, another track Moscow is pursuing is consultations with Iran and Turkey on strategic aspects of Syrian statehood, such as the country’s integrity. Both Tehran and Ankara favor the idea of a united Syria — though each for their own interests and with specific visions for it. Nevertheless, it is important for Russia to find itself on the same page with the regional stakeholders on the critical issues before the situation in Syria is transformed into a postwar diplomatic mode.”

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Well who would rely on the unpredictable Trump?

The Russians in fact have been rather slow to press the advantage in Syria this year with the Iranians often making impatient noises while Lavrov and Kerry flap gums. Regardless of the big powers airpower based posturing Assad has persistently said he intends a reconquista while the rebels have edged closer to irreconcilable Salafists. Neither the Russians nor Americans appear to gained have much leverage in Syria. The US can't even control the Syrian PKK pursuing their own strategic objectives despite lavish air support and Turkey is decidedly off reservation. In fact the Iranians and Turks are far closer to the main actors on the ground and it might be better if they and the Syrians were at the centre of any peace talks rather than Syria being a plaything of superpowers sorting out status issues. With Obama coming to the end of his Lame Duck there is even less point in the peace making kabuki. The R+6 will press the remaining pockets in East Aleppo into starvation and try to force surrenders. It'll start again with the inadequacy filled Trump as eager to show boat as Putin. Likely with a new set of facts on the ground, somewhat narrower US objectives and a more aggressive attitude to Iranian influence at least in rhetoric.
 

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Jennifer Cafarella, the Syrian analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, says the challenge for Washington will be establishing limits on both Ankara and the YPG’s ambitions – and more broadly, developing a plan for the future of northern Syria that extends beyond defeating the Islamic State

“Right now, Turkey is imposing the limits on what is possible in northern Syria. The US is trying to acquiesce to Turkish demands without losing the Kurds as an ally, and we’re getting outplayed by both,” she said. “Rather than simply trying to keep pace with the Turks and Kurds as they compete, we need to recognize the influence we do have over both sides and start using it to force them to consider an outcome that is acceptable for all rather than continuing to pursue maximalist goals. We need to lose our ISIS tunnel vision in order for that to be possible, though.”

Trump has spoken positively about both Erdogan and Kurdish forces, but how he plans to reach an accommodation between the rival forces in the region remains a mystery. Without such an agreement, the Syrian war could drag on – and the ensuing political vacuum could give the Islamic State an opportunity to rise again. Bombing the hell out of ISIS, in other words, is the easy part.
Well Obama's approach is basically one of denial that there is a problem. Engineering some sort of MV between the PKK and Ankara in Syria might well be a test of Trump's much vaunted negotiation skills or just his well worn track record of screwing over collaborators.
 
In The Times Of Israel First IDF-Islamic State clash sends Israeli message: Don’t mess with us
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On Sunday morning, at approximately 8:30 a.m., soldiers from the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit crossed the security fence with Syria to conduct an “ambush operation.” While remaining inside Israeli territory, the soldiers came under attack from Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, formerly known as the Yarmouk Martyr’s Brigade, an army spokesperson said.

The soldiers returned small arms fire, but soon came under attack from mortar shells as well. The incident concluded when the Israel Air Force targeted a truck “that had some sort of machine gun on top of it” and killed the four terrorists who were riding in it.

“It was a short exchange, but it was productive,” IDF spokesperson Lt. Col. Peter Lerner concluded.
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Well it's an IS aligned group that has worried both the Jordanians and Israelis for a while.

How little Israel as been involved in Syria is perhaps surprising. Finally a self mowing lawn. The IDF haven't even seen it as opportunity to catch a rather busy HA with their trousers down.
 
In The Times Of Israel Israel Air Force officer: ‘Syria’s the global stage, everybody’s playing there’
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According to the senior air force official, since their arrival in Syria some 14 months ago, the Russians have turned the “momentum” of the fighting in favor of Assad and against the Islamic State.

Barring “dramatic changes,” that trajectory will continue, arriving at some sort of equilibrium — “but not a solution” — within the next few months, the senior officer said.

For Israel, which once enjoyed nearly unchallenged air superiority in the region, the arrival of the Russian military and its S-400 missile defense system — one of the most advanced in the world — made the situation in Syria “a challenge,” he said.
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Interesting that here reporting the views of an IAF officer TTOI essentially reuses bogus Russian rhetoric on them being in Syria to fight IS. Something that the rebellion focused Russians have done very little of while the war on IS is the main US preoccupation in both Syria and the larger Iraqi theatre. I suspect that's not ignorance but agreed talking points. He's careful to say the IAF isn't collaborating with the Russians but de-conflicting.
 
On War On The Rocks KILL THE IRAN DEAL OR ACCOMMODATE RUSSIA? TRUMP WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE
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In a recent interview he gave to The Wall Street Journal, Trump indicated he would accommodate Putin by cutting off aid to the armed Syrian opposition paving the way for Russia, its Syrian client, and Iran to finish off the Syrian opposition in Aleppo and the rest of northwest Syria. According to Trump, in exchange for this change in policy, the United States would receive greater cooperation from Russia and the Assad regime to destroy ISIL in eastern Syria and western Iraq.

Iranian cooperation would be a critical component of such an approach. Iranian supported Shia militias in Syria and Iraq represent a significant portion of the ground forces that are and would be doing the fighting. Iran will have to play a constructive role in restraining these militias from committing sectarian violence. And it will have to acquiesce to a government in Baghdad that is inclusive enough to avoid wholesale Sunni alienation that leads to an ISIL rebirth under another name. It is unclear if Iran is willing to take either of those steps.

It is highly questionable whether Trump’s proposed approach could lead to stability in Syria and Iraq. Instead it would likely cement the dangerous trends that are already occurring in Syria. The armed opposition is increasingly cooperating with extremist organizations in the face of intense attacks on Aleppo, and with the withdrawal of American support, any motivation to moderate would disappear. The combination of Assad, Russia, and Iran have not, until now, had the manpower to take and hold northwest Syria and there is no indication that will change. The end result would be Assad in power in most of the country with an Al-Qaeda affiliated safe haven in northwest Syria that is much more firmly entrenched than it is today.

This decision would also be morally reprehensible giving the Assad regime and its allies carte blanche to continue and expand on the atrocities of the past five years, which have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocents. But for all its faults, this approach, at a minimum, represents a coherent strategy. But if the Trump administration chooses to combine this Syria strategy with efforts to unilaterally dismantle the Iran nuclear agreement – the situation goes completely haywire. Our European partners, as well as the Saudis and Israelis, have already signaled that they would prefer the United States did not walk away from the deal. The international consensus that was so critical to economically isolating Iran prior to the nuclear agreement would collapse.
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I've pointed out this before.

Russian strategy in Syria hinges on having the IRGC providing ground forces to make up for the growing inadequacies of the SAA. If Russians were dying as quickly as Iranian assets are in Syria the Russian public might well question a distant venture that's so far been fairly painless show boating.

The Israelis may see it differently but strategically Russia restarting the USSR's ME policy in Syria may actually be a bigger problem for the US than more clusters IRGC beards lurking on the Golan. It's not like the IDF is going to have much difficulty thinning those out if it comes to trouble.

There are useful things about the Russians. Like the Syrian PKK with a bit of PR lipstick on a pig they are one of the less repellant partners. If we are seeking to final deescalate in Syria the Russians also can offer a credible deterrent to US allies who disagree with that. The Russian are likely not going anywhere and they've installed air defence systems that could hamper the GWOT so they have to be involved. However Russia's claim to offer leverage over Assad looks rather bogus to me. In Damascus it's the Iranians who have traction and like the Russians they appear much more willing to compromise than Assad. Let's not fool ourselves; neither will ever usher Assad out of power. All you can hope is they'll yank his lead occasionally.

The R+6 alliance also looks too weak to pacify all of Syria by brute force as Assad repeatedly states he wishes to. The Syrian state is bankrupt, rotten and increasingly fragmented but its not such a stretch to see Useful Syria returning to the relative stability of heavily repressed Damascus. It appears to be what we are stuck with no matter how badly it works. The question is more how to deal with an ungoverned warlord haunted hinterland rather useful to terrorists. Well in Afghanistan Langley bribed the appropriate warlords or staged the odd butcher and bolt drone raid not unlike the way the Political Officers of the Raj worked. Which isn't far off what the Jordanians are doing to secure their Syrian border.

It's easy to be distracted by their awakened superpower status but it is probably a mistake to view Russia as anything other than a recent interloper in Syria. The USSR never gained deep influence there either. The Iranians have been part of the status quo in Syria for decades. In terms of the GWOT the Russians are just 2nd rate airpower muscle that the US could easily replicate if allowed to operate in Syria's skies. They are not providing holding forces the thing that the US as a polity is also adverse to. A realist view in Syria might well be leerily working alongside Iran in principle much as the US has had to in Iraq. Our dumb proxy war against them has just strengthened their hand in Damascus. The Iranians are simply another ugly fact of life in Syria.
 
On Al Monitor Syria rejects Russian proposal for Kurdish federation

Another indication of Moscow's lack of leverage in Damascus. On the face of it some version of federalism isn't necessarily a bad idea in Syria. Moscow probably sees such moves as avoiding a costly countrywide war and deescalating the situation. But that isn't about to fly with Assad.

Here it's not just a matter of Bashar's stiff neck or rather it is. A federal Syria is rejected by most Syrians. It's not even universally popular amongst Syrian Kurds. Assad's supporters would probably lynch him if he agreed to the PKK ideas for a federal Syria. It's one thing accepting pragmatically PKK autonomy when facing a far more dangerous Sunni Arab revolt. That stretches as far as collaborating with the PKK against the rebels and Turks. Making the hudna permanent and ending Syria's Arab identity is quite another thing.
 
On TCF Keeping the Lights On in Rebel Idlib
In Syria’s rebel-held Idlib province, residents have established local governance bodies that provide needed services and simultaneously pose a political challenge to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. No overarching authority has replaced the state after it was forced from Idlib. Islamist and jihadist armed groups hold power at the local level, and have developed relatively sophisticated service coordination bodies. Yet ultimate decision-making power has typically sat with donor organizations outside the country. Localism and wartime conditions have also frustrated attempts to unify and rationalize service and governance in Idlib. Syrian rebels wanted Idlib to demonstrate an alternative to Assad’s rule, but their efforts have been stymied by internal rivalries and problematic relationships between local rebel administrators inside Syria and international sponsors abroad. Idlib’s trajectory mirrors the wider dynamics of Syria’s war and fragmented opposition.
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Another nuanced article from Heller. Rather sympathetic amongst a pretty chaotic picture of disparate rebel factions and divisive external donors.

One key point is folk in Idlib have often stopped paying taxes and what governance apparatus there is dependent of foreign sources. I'm reminded of the 1776 inversion: "No representation without taxation."
 
On War On The Rocks THE STAGE IS SET FOR AN ESCALATION: THE MEANING OF SYRIA’S ATTACK ON TURKISH FORCES\
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Under the Tiger Forces’ Ominous Shadow

As Turkey’s cross-border efforts progressed deeper into Syria territory, the Baathist regime has become more aggressive. On October 21, 2016, the regime threatened Turkey that it would shoot down Turkish aircrafts when Ankara extended its air campaign to target Kurdish YPG militants. A few weeks later, on November 14th, Assad`s forces dropped leaflets over al-Bab warning the locals that the regime would soon initiate an operation to recapture the town.

Notably, as recently as November 17th, Iran’s “semi-official” Fars News Agency reported that Assad’s forces had troop concentrations at the Kuweires Airbase for shifting military operations into al-Bab and adjacent areas. Furthermore, pro-regime outlets also stressed that units from the Tiger Forces equipped with heavy arms were deployed to Aleppo in late October. Furthermore, according to the same sources, al-Hassan was with his troops for operations in northern Aleppo in November 2016. Most probably, these detachments were sent as reinforcements to the initial deployments of the Tiger Forces from Hama to the Kuweires Airbase in late September.

In other words, Assad might have tasked Baathist military elements to reach al-Bab before the Turkey-backed campaign can. In this respect, the regime already hinted its intentions by concentrating the Tiger Forces near the town. Even more importantly, there is a non-negligible possibility that the Kuweires Airbase, and its operations, were under the Tiger Forces’ de facto control when the Albatros aircraft(s) attacked Turkish positions.

Though we don’t know further details about the incident, we might be sure about one thing: The underlying reason of the regime’s insidious aggression revolves around al-Bab.
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And that's all going on while East Aleppo is still being rolled up which is part of the reason why the Tiger Forces are up there.

The R+6 are now dealing with a pocket with greatly reduced perimeter in Aleppo which may free up forces. Regime media has repeatedly said the SAA will move on Al Bab. They are only about 8km away to the South. With the SDF approaching on the Eastern and Western flanks. Certainly in a position to greatly complicate any TSK move to take al Bab. And there's no credible threat to Raqqa to trigger an IS withdrawal. This is exactly the sort of situation that worried retired TSK Generals eye Euphrates Shield with some concern.

Al Bab is another area where Damascus isn't quite singing off the same hymn sheet as Moscow. Damascus does not want Ankara owning "The Door" to Aleppo. This article notes that Russian interests in Syria are probably a lower priority than those in a wider geopolitical game in which Turkey is a very important player. Al Bab is just a bauble to dangle for Moscow.
 
On War On The Rocks POLITICAL AIRPOWER, PART II: THE SEDUCTIVE ALLURE OF PRECISION WEAPONS
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The quest for enviable levels of precision has stretched over more than half a century, arriving at the point where we can accurately place weapons within feet of our intended aimpoint, even in bad weather. We have increased standoff distances, allowing accurate weapons delivery to be accomplished without closing to point-blank range. In the process, we have constructed our own straitjacket, insisting in a level of precision effects that we cannot reliably deliver. The political airpower aspect of precision is paradoxical: While it was intended to minimize risk to U.S forces and quickly achieve objectives to end conflict, instead it is neutering our fielded forces, prolonging conflict, and increasing both the political risk and the risk to warfighters who go in harm’s way and yet cannot accomplish the mission. The goal of minimizing unintended effects is both moral and necessary, but the expectation that we can eliminate them is unrealistic. Combat is a nasty, dirty business — a violent manifestation of policy options that cannot be made clean, predictable or nice. If the desired policy is to avoid unnecessary destruction, then avoid the military option as a policy choice. Precision will not allow policymakers to avoid the ruin inherent in war — destruction is the handmaiden of war, the second horseman. No one should long for war, but if a war is to be had, there is a responsibility to act swiftly and decisively to bring about its end and to accept the consequences of that choice rather than trying to avoid them. Airpower is not an easy way out.
As relevant to Syria as anywhere.

What's very dangerous about precision airpower is since Desert Storm there's been a great deal of BS about it's "surgical" capability. That almost bloodless wars can be waged. The reality is no matter how well targeted 2,000lbs of explosive with a very large blast radius is inherently liable to kill as indiscriminately as a barrel bomb. Even a precise system like Brimstone is only as good as the targeting intelligence available. CENTCOM's habit of fibbing about unintended civilian casualties supports this mythos. This all leads politicians to assume they have God like powers at their disposal and the option of war with very few political costs. Trouble is the resulting high altitude meddling can result in chaos of the Libyan kind. Air power has limited utility in wars amongst the people.
 
On Iran Tracker
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  • Abdollahian: Pro-regime forces will “completely liberate Aleppo” soon. Hossein Amir Abdollahian, the international affairs advisor to Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, congratulated Syrian pro-regime forces on their recent advances in Aleppo city’s eastern neighborhoods. Abdollahian claimed that pro-Assad forces are “about to completely liberate Aleppo.” A news source linked to the Syrian government reported that Iranian-backed forces are also readying for operations along the outskirts of southwestern Aleppo city to recapture the strategically important town of Khan Tuman. Iran suffered over 35 casualties during a rebel offensive on the town of Khan Tuman in May. For the latest on the regime’s operations around the city of Aleppo, please see the Institute for the Study of War’s latest Aleppo Campaign Update. (Fars News Agency) (E)
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On ISW ALEPPO CAMPAIGN UPDATE: PRO-REGIME FORCES ADVANCE IN EASTERN ALEPPO CITY
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The looming fall of Eastern Aleppo City to the regime and its allies poses a major threat to the long-term interests of the U.S. in Syria. Eastern Aleppo City serves as one of the last remaining major hubs of acceptable opposition groups in Northern Syria. The surrender of Eastern Aleppo City will likely drive these groups into deeper partnership with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and other Salafi-Jihadist Groups in order to preserve their military effectiveness on the battlefield. An ongoing humanitarian crisis also appears poised to further exacerbate as pro-regime forces methodically tighten their siege on the thousands of opposition fighters and tens of thousands of civilians remaining in Eastern Aleppo City, generating grievances that will further bolster the appeal of Salafi-Jihadist Groups. At the same time, the fall of Aleppo City will not mark the end of the Syrian Civil War. Opposition groups will likely wage an increasingly-radicalized insurgency across Northern Syria with continued support from regional backers such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The success of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City thus stands only to open a new phase of the conflict that bolsters the long-term staying power of Salafi-Jihadist Groups in Syria.
Which seems to be a commonly shared opinion.

The less radical groups defending the pocket have not even been able to capitalise on that. AQ, Ahar and Zinki were rather prominent in the later part of the siege. Idlib will still stand but it's more predominantly radical Salafist.

The fall of Mosul isn't likely to end problems in Iraq either. That's predicted to transition into an 06 style insurgency.
 

Not much new here but it's a bit of an obvious drawback using the Russkis as an intermediary with a Syrian when bombing right next to SAA positions with dodgy intell. They may have been knocking back a few well chilled bottles of aftershave after all. It should not be beyond the wit of CENTCOM to arrange more direct channels rather than killing several dozen people they did not intend to right in the middle of peace talks.
 
On NOW. What would the fall of Aleppo mean?
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Morale-crushing as that moment would undoubtedly be for the rebels, it’s unclear how much it would change militarily at the countrywide level. To see why, first recall that Syria’s rebels number around 150,000, according to the analyst Charles Lister’s book, The Syrian Jihad. To put that in context, the total number of fighters in eastern Aleppo was estimated by the UN last month at 8,000, or about 5% of the total. A quick glance at a map shows that the other 142,000 fighters are geographically spread throughout the country, holding almost all of Idlib Province as well as sizeable chunks of the provinces of Aleppo, Quneitra, and Daraa, with smaller enclaves in the environs of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Latakia. Indeed, as Lister documented in a recent 40-page report on Syria’s rebels, as of September 2016 there were more than 80 CIA-vetted rebel brigades still actively fighting the regime, in coordination with Turkey- and Jordan-based command centers, across Aleppo, Damascus, Deraa, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Qalamoun, and Quneitra Provinces. Of the 80, only 13 (or 16%) operated exclusively in Aleppo Province.
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It's always been a largely rural and provincial rebellion. This sort of analysis tends to miss that the big urban centres of Useful Syria are what matters. After East Aleppo and the Damascus countryside is cleared Assad is in position to hold most of that. That will be no small task given his manpower shortage.

The revolt is large but it has very limited ability to concentrate forces on an objective. While softening up Idlib Assad can start pick away at the diverse ecology of the revolt. The authoritarian Baathist system is not so inflexible that it will incorporate opportunist rebel turncoats. The main risks to Assad barring foreign intervention are overreach, state fragmentation and economic collapse.

As in Iraq there will be an insurgency. Mass casualty terror tactics in Syrian have mainly been employed by the Baathist state and to a far lesser extent IS. On the opposition side they may be sectarian but it's never really had the savage civilian slaughtering character of post-Saddam Iraq's Sunni insurgency driven mostly by cold eyed former Baathists used to genocidal campaigns. Massacre prone IS brought something of that into Syria but it hasn't caught on as a tactic despite the routine savagery of the regime. When AQ started off in a similar fashion rebels tended to reject them. Damascus for some time now has not been plagued with attacks in the way Baghdad is and will probably continue to be. Given the presence of Salafi-Jihadis of some sophistication it may not be the ineffectual intifadas of the Pals against the Israelis but the result may be the same: preventing the victor from enjoying the spoils.

If Trump and his pack of Islamophobes follows his current line and sides with Russia in Syria it probably will play into AQ's hands. Wider Syrian rebel resentment at such treachery by the "Far Enemy" after they pinned so much hope on US intervention would be understandable.
 
On MEE ANALYSIS: The Kurdish 'frenemies' aiding Assad in Aleppo
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In an article published by the Washington Institute in July, he wrote: “From Sheikh Maqsoud, the YPG fired on the rebels defending the Castello Road. The YPG also attacked the Bani Zaid district, to the west of Sheikh Maqsoud, forcing the rebels to retreat to avoid being caught between the Syrian army and the Kurdish forces.”

“Whereas the YPG might have remained neutral in this battle, the group clearly indicated its preference through its actions, contributing to its overall strategy of co-operating with Russia in order to connect the Kurdish enclaves of Afrin and Kobane.”

But according to Alexander Clarkson, a lecturer in international studies at King's College London, any co-operation may be more through convenience than shared goals.

"The regime-YPG relationship is not stable. There isn't any particular sentiment tying the two together," he told MEE.

Sheikh Maqsoud journalist Mousa believed the apparent co-operation was unlikely to last. “Even if they are friends, they are enemies at the same time.”
What we have between the PKK and the regime is a fragile non-aggression pact that has frayed at times. You might call it a hudna. Traditionally an agreement made between enemies who have not actually buried the hatchet. It's how the Crusader Kingdom survived for best part of a century. Here the rebels represent a common enemy dangerous both to the Baath and the revolutionary PKK. We can see it in mutually beneficial action in both East Aleppo and al Bab at the moment.
 
On ISW Putin Sets the Stage for the Incoming U.S. Administration
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Putin’s establishment of A2/AD zones across Europe and the Middle East make U.S. engagement with Russian forces more difficult and expensive, but far from impossible. The S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are mobile, have been deployed in numbers so as to create redundancies in Russia’s air defense network, and are supported by a number of short-range air defense systems to cover close engagements.[32] U.S. forces are nevertheless capable of penetrating the exclusion zones created by these systems. A successful defeat of a Russian air defense unit would require first jamming and partially disabling the system, followed by a ‘hard kill’ strike from a stealth aircraft once the system has been damaged.[33] The deployment and use of these U.S. capabilities would be expensive and time-consuming. It would require extensive planning and sufficient political will to oversee these and follow-on operations. It is well within the capacity of the American military to accomplish these tasks, however. Putin is counting on the deterrent capabilities of Russia’s air defense systems to preclude U.S. action and trusting that Washington will acquiesce to his policies rather than undertake these complicated strikes.
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ISW itching for a crack at the Russkis expensive toys.
 
On TNI The Day after Aleppo Falls
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Taking over Aleppo would represent an important step for the Syrian regime, virtually ending the international community’s attempts to engage Assad in real negotiations. But it would not bring an end to the fighting; rather, it would mark the start of the next phase in the conflict. In this new phase, the fragile understanding that has avoided open confrontation between the Syrian regime and Turkey would be challenged by Turkish activism and by a regime emboldened by its victory in Aleppo. This might bring the regime to cooperate more closely with the Kurdish forces (with whom it already has strong links) and with neighbouring Iraq, which, like Syria, is threatened by Turkish adventurism. A quick fall of Aleppo would allow the regime to free some resources that could be used to exploit any potential opportunity arising from the Syrian Democratic Forces’ advance towards Raqqa. As the regime is still struggling with severe manpower shortage, any chance to “free-ride” on other parties’ efforts would surely be appreciated.
Assad being Assad getting into a scrap with Ankara no matter what arrangements the Russians have made is not unlikely.
 
Syrian rebels in secret talks with Moscow to end Aleppo fighting

Syrian rebels in secret talks with Moscow to end Aleppo fighting
Turkey-facilitated negotiations without US show how Washington could become sidelined

Syrian rebel leaders are in secret talks with Russia to end the fighting in Aleppo, according to opposition figures, a development that shows how the US could become sidelined in some of the Middle East’s most pivotal conflicts.

Four opposition members from rebel-held northern Syria told the Financial Times that Turkey has been brokering talks in Ankara with Moscow, whose military intervention last year on the side of President Bashar al-Assad helped turn the five-year civil war in the regime’s favour.

The talks, they say, have focused on negotiating a deal to end the conflict in Aleppo, the country’s besieged second city.

“The Russians and Turks are talking without the US now. It [Washington] is completely shut out of these talks, and doesn’t even know what’s going on in Ankara,” said one opposition figure who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the negotiations.

While this is not the first time a rebel representative has met with the Russians, those familiar with the talks said it is the first time such a large number of opposition groups were involved — a sign of where they think they will have to turn to reach a deal.

Talks appear to have made little progress, but the fact they are taking place — without US involvement — underlines the shifting political dynamics in the Middle East.

President-elect Donald Trump has repeatedly signalled his willingness to back Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to shore up the Assad regime in the five-year civil war, arguing the Kremlin is acting to stamp out Islamic extremists. The outgoing Obama administration has provided training and weaponry for the rebels and has called for Mr Assad’s departure.

Regional actors now seem more willing to bypass Washington to seek out pacts with Russia, which is keen to develop the image of a rising power that can help broker such deals.

Ali Sheikh Omar, an Aleppo council leader, said politicians in rebel-held eastern districts have agreed a team they want to join negotiations with Russia over ending the fierce aerial assault that has flattened the city. Regime forces have made a significant breakthrough in the past week, captured more than a third of the rebel’s territory in the city.

“Negotiations are being done directly with the Russians because we all know at this point that Bashar al-Assad is nothing more than a provincial governor carrying out the orders of Putin,” he said.

One rebel leaders denied such negotiations, while others declined to comment saying the issue was too sensitive. A western regional diplomat said he had no confirmation but had been seeking information about potential talks. He also had reports of a Russian military flight from the Syrian port city of Latakia, the site of one of Moscow’s military bases, to Ankara on November 24.

None of those who spoke about the negotiations would clarify if the rebels met the Russians face-to-face or indirectly, with Turkish officials mediating.

Asked about the talks, Maria Zakharova, a Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman, said: “Washington isolated itself. We’ve been negotiating with the [Syrian] opposition in Turkey for years — it’s not news.” A Turkish official did not respond to a request for comment.

For Washington, any such negotiations have ramifications far beyond Syria. Emile Hokayem, a fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the marginalisation of the US in the civil war has already begun under President Barack Obama, who has shown a reluctance to entangle Washington in regional rivalries — leading Middle East leaders to turn to Moscow instead.

“The American approach to this conflict guaranteed the US less and less relevance not just in the Syrian conflict but also the broader regional dynamics. There has been a loss of face and a loss of leverage,” Mr Hokayem said. “The politics of the region are being transformed and this happened under Obama, whether by design or by failure.”

Libyan general Khalifa Haftar, who holds an eastern portion of the war-torn country, recently went to Moscow seeking military support. Turkey, having resolved its dispute with Moscow over the downing of a Russian jet, is believed to have reached an understanding with Russia that allows Ankara to deploy its forces in parts of northern Syria. Egypt and several Gulf countries have also increased communications with Russia, Mr Hokayem said.

Charles Lister, a Syria expert at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said the first meeting between Russia, Turkey and the rebels took place on Monday in Ankara and another meeting was likely on Saturday.

“Russia is hedging its bets. It would prefer to make a deal with the opposition,” he said. “If Aleppo were to fall, the Syrian regime would need so many troops to hold the city that its forces would be left thin elsewhere in the country — or dependent on Iranian help, which Moscow would prefer to avoid.”

However, he said it would be difficult for the opposition to meet Russian demands about removing their heavy weapons from the city, or disentangling themselves on the front lines from Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, a group linked to al-Qaeda with whom they often fight alongside against Assad.

Tensions also remain high between Ankara and Moscow, especially after Turkey accused regime officials of striking their forces in Syria. Rebels say Ankara believes Assad forces received a green light from Moscow, which shows how fragile relations still are.

In parallel to the talks in Turkey, the US has been quietly pursuing negotiations to restore the ceasefire and aid deliveries to Aleppo, including talks with Russia through the Geneva process and regular phone conversations between secretary of state John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov.

John Kirby, state department spokesman, said on Tuesday there had been no “tangible progress” in the talks about Aleppo. However, he added: “We wouldn’t still be at the table in this multilateral format if we didn’t think it was worth it.”

One opposition figure, when asked why he thought Russia would seek a deal with the rebels just as Mr Assad appeared to be winning the war, said he thought the objective is to raise its role in negotiations beyond the Middle East. The Russians, he said “are essentially saying: ‘screw you Americans’.”
 
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