And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

In FP Assad Will Talk, But He Won’t Negotiate

...
The Assad regime’s accomplishments in governance during the civil war have mainly been defensive, but they should not be underestimated. It has maintained monopoly control over the Syrian state’s still-functioning institutions, and it has also managed to keep for itself a Syrian national identity that is cross-confessional, multiethnic, and inclusive. The regime has a core of active supporters, but it has also enlisted the passive or active support of many Syrians who want to preserve what’s left of the state, who are exhausted by the war, or who fear what they see as an opposition overtaken by extremism and anarchic warlordism.

Ilya Samman, a businessman and member of the tolerated opposition Syrian Social Nationalist Party, has helped organize “local reconciliations” in towns near Damascus that have entailed rebel surrenders and the restoration of government control. Samman, who told me he had been detained and tortured before the war for his membership in an illegal political party, acknowledged that he was serving the interests of the Assad government. “We thought, fine, if they want to use us,” he said. “So long as it’s useful to resolve the crisis.” His work might complement the government’s brutal military campaign, he told me, but it also allowed civilians to return to their homes and saved lives. “To me, it’s worth it,” he said.

The capital city’s exhausted public, meanwhile, seems uninterested in holding its own government to account. An apparently unreformed Syrian regime has offered to restore the old, predictable political order, albeit in substantially worse material circumstances. Many Syrians seem willing to accept that bargain.

And maybe the rest of the world will, too. Throughout the conference, speakers floated the possibility of renewed ties with Europe, but normalization with the United States seems to have been considered a bridge too far.
...

Another reflection by Heller on his recent visit to Damascus. An ugly, repressive regime in a thicket of obvious but useful fictions. A well known Devil.

There's an article up thread from the Summer where Heller looks at Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki rather critically and concludes the Syrian revolt requires the unfussy embrace of such people even if they do post up the odd beheading on YouTube. They've since grown rather close to AQ and rounded on FSA flagged groups. Who can know what is in mens hearts you can only judge actions. Heller's never without nuance. This is not a simple conflict that you come away from with clean hands.

It occurs to me we often presented the first Iraqi rising often as conspiracy of foreign actors just as the regime would identifies its troubles. In fact it was mostly made up of sacked Baath party members and soldiers who sometimes turned to Salafi ideas for a fighting ideology. CENTCOM still puts about the idea that IS emerged out of Syria rather from its own troubled reconstruction of Iraq. The Whitehouse wore blinkers during IS's recovery in 2013 being fed happy stories. We are still in denial that IS has signifiant popular support in places. CENTCOM analysts accused their leaders of distorting the facts they presented in a positive light. Our MSM painted a picture of the Syrian revolt that was largely blind to its rather narrow provincial popularity and extremist elements. Our leaders saw a government that had lost all legitimacy because it savagely bombed its own people (true) while ignoring Assad having lots of support in Syria's big urban centres to do just that. Our much trumpeted humanitarian interests in Syria often looked more like talking peace while stoking a conflict just as we do in Yemen while being blind to "barbarous" war fighting and an impending famine. Damascus sees the world it wishes to see but we choose our own self serving bubble.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War IS Boring Syrian Regime Bombs Eastern Aleppo While Russia Focuses Its Bloody Strikes Elsewhere

...
Cross-examining hundreds of public reports of air strikes in northwestern Syria from mid-October to mid-November 2016 makes one thing clear. The majority of air strikes flown by the Russian air force and, since Nov. 11, 2016, Russian naval aviation targeted insurgents from the Free Syrian Army in the area between Jishr Ash Shughour, Ma’arat An Nauman, Lataminah and Khan Sheikhoun in western Idlib governorate.
...

Points out the tech in use just isn't very accurate. That civilian deaths in East Aleppo lately may be more down to regime air I do find plausible.

 

[Idris2002]

From The Washington Institute Status of the Syrian Rebellion: Numbers, Ideologies, and Prospects

Balanche qualifies "Secularist" as being mostly not set on secular government but favouring a large role for Sharia in the state; "Other" in other words. The lower pies show that these groups make up the largest category of a revolt that's hard to size accurately. These are mostly the groups we are happy to back while our allies often have other preferences. Unfortunately this is by far the most fragmented category.

The Syrian Salafi-Jihadists simply have a national rather that international focus in the manner of AQ or IS, Ahar al Sham for example. Political Islamist is of the representative political but very broad Muslim Brother tradition that Ankara is most sympathetic with.

The top pie is ISW identified "power brokers" rebel groups is probably most interesting. Groups big and cohesive enough to work beyond the purely defensive like Ahar.

Balanche struggles a bit to offer a way of avoiding large parts of Syria turning into an AQ tolerating Emirate as Idlib has. Suggests we back the "Secularists" more strongly. But he points out this won't work if our allies pour in support behind other factions.

I'd add the rather obvious problem that the larger more revolutionary groups will eventually have them for breakfast as has been the growing tendency. Who has the most TOWs, Grads or MANPADs is one factor but the revolt has to consolidate to fight the R+6 effectively. It must become a revolution like the PKK not diverse risings and the political energy is with the radical shades. It's far to late to reengineer the Syrian opposition.

"Secularists" who aren't really secular. What an innovation in social progress. Given that the author's whole idea hinges on persuading Saudi and the gulf states to quit their bullshit (and bullshit is, like, their thing, man, so good luck with that that), his whole thing is utterly forlorn.

 

[Idris2002]

In FP Assad Will Talk, But He Won’t Negotiate
Another reflection by Heller on his recent visit to Damascus. An ugly, repressive regime in a thicket of obvious but useful fictions. A well known Devil.

There's an article up thread from the Summer where Heller looks at Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki rather critically and concludes the Syrian revolt requires the unfussy embrace of such people even if they do post up the odd beheading on YouTube. They've since grown rather close to AQ and rounded on FSA flagged groups. Who can know what is in mens hearts you can only judge actions. Heller's never without nuance. This is not a simple conflict that you come away from with clean hands.

It occurs to me we often presented the first Iraqi rising often as conspiracy of foreign actors just as the regime would identifies its troubles. In fact it was mostly made up of sacked Baath party members and soldiers who sometimes turned to Salafi ideas for a fighting ideology. CENTCOM still puts about the idea that IS emerged out of Syria rather from its own troubled reconstruction of Iraq. The Whitehouse wore blinkers during IS's recovery in 2013 being fed happy stories. We are still in denial that IS has signifiant popular support in places. CENTCOM analysts accused their leaders of distorting the facts they presented in a positive light. Our MSM painted a picture of the Syrian revolt that was largely blind to its rather narrow provincial popularity and extremist elements. Our leaders saw a government that had lost all legitimacy because it savagely bombed its own people (true) while ignoring Assad having lots of support in Syria's big urban centres to do just that. Our much trumpeted humanitarian interests in Syria often looked more like talking peace while stoking a conflict just as we do in Yemen while being blind to "barbarous" war fighting and an impending famine. Damascus sees the world it wishes to see but we choose our own self serving bubble.

What's this "we", paleface?

 

[CrabbedOne]

Long paper on FSA flagged groups. Blames FSA disunity on the lack of early more full throated US support. Contends that these moderate elements are more in tune with the Syrian population than radicals which may well be true. But I doubt that boat has sailed.

 

[CrabbedOne]

The joys of Free Idlib University.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Such a cynic, as if the PKK ever tells expedient porkies.

 

[CrabbedOne]

SW of Homs.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE Egypt's Sisi backs Syria's Assad as opposition talks planned for Paris

...
"The priority is that we support the national armies to impose control over the territory, deal with the extremists, and impose the necessary stability in Libya, Syria and Iraq," he said.

"When you refer to the National Army in Syria, do you mean the Syrian army?" the presenter asked, to which Sisi replied: "Yes."

The admission of support for Assad's forces is likely to further raise already heightened tensions between Egypt and its allies in the US and Saudi Arabia.

Regional support for the Assad government has been mixed, with the Gulf states and Turkey generally opposed Meanwhile Iraq, Iran and, to an extent, Algeria, are supportive.

Sisi restored diplomatic relations with Syria following the 2013 military coup which overthrew the government of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed President Mohamed Morsi. Under Morsi, relations with Riyadh had been severed due to the Brotherhood's support for the Saudi opposition.

Egypt also angered its allies last month when it backed a Russian-backed motion calling for a ceasefire in Syria but ignoring Russia's bombing of besieged eastern Aleppo.
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Where Sisi's sympathy lay has been evident for some time.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 26 - November 20, 2016

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The U.S. faces increasing constraints on its available courses of action as Russia takes continued steps to limit future options for engagement in the Syrian Civil War. Russia aims to force the surrender of Eastern Aleppo City and thereby impose a major defeat on the remaining acceptable opposition in Northern Syria. This outcome will hasten the transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-Jihadist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, eliminating potential partners for the U.S. in Syria and legitimizing the counter-terrorism narrative of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, Russia also consolidated its control over regional airspace with the deployment of seven additional S-300V4 air defense systems to Syria on November 15, reinforcing the effective no-fly zone created by its integrated air defense systems in the country. These measures aim to raise the cost of any military intervention against the regime and steer the U.S. into accepting military cooperation against ‘terrorism’ with Russia and Syria as the path of least resistance. Any partnership along these terms would only exacerbate the long-term grievances that fuel Salafi-Jihadist groups in Syria while allowing Russia to consolidate its regional influence and advance its strategic objective to expel the U.S. from the Middle East.
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ISW judges the Russian naval contribution to be mainly for show especially aimed at a domestic audience. They have a lot of Russian air strikes hitting Aleppo.

This is necessarily a bit one dimensional as it misses what Russia's allies are up to. I don't get the impression the Russians are fully masters of the situation any more than the US.

Upthread there's a WiB post suggesting the main focus of Russian attacks isn't Aleppo but SW Idlib. You might read that as preparation for moves on Idlib or as the Russian military still seeing threats to Russian basing in Latakia as a priority. The gas pump on the Med in Latakia may not seem like much but if you are thinking of Syria in the way the USSR did as the hub of their ME policy it grows in significance. Rather twins with building basing on the Black Sea where the Russian Line Of Supply to Syria starts. Runs right through that other old Russian strategic obsession the Dardanelles guarded by an even older enemy Turkey. And Aleppo has a great deal to with Turkish strategic depth viewed from Ankara.

It's more accurate to say the Iranians want the Great Satan out of the ME than the opportunist Russians do. That's what they've been at in Iraq since 06. Actually the Iranians probably distrust what the neo-imperial Russians are up to in Syria. Iranian interests lie in Southern Syria and their GLOC to HA. That's all about Israel; HA is the Persians deterrent threat to Israeli aggression and at some distant point the key to taking back Jerusalem. Not something that suits the Russians who have no desire to tangle with the IDF while they dig themselves in at Tartus etc.

When Latakia was threatened by Jaish al Fateh's advance in Idlib the head of IRGC-QF went to Moscow and invited Russian air power into the picture. The Iranians first preference seemed to be for Assad to abandon his strategy of defending in all corners aimed at reconquering Syria and shrink his lines of defence to a viable rump state. The addition of Russian muscle made taking back Aleppo practical. The IRGC has blamed insufficient Russian CAS for reverses in Aleppo. Russia stop start approach to crushing the pocket while jawing with Kerry seems a source of Iranian frustration. While the IRGC has thrown resources at Aleppo thousands of Iraqi militiamen left Aleppo to join the battle for Mosul and Tal Afar. A wider body of Iraqi Hashd figures have signalled pursuing the Jihad against IS into Syria is next. This tells us something about Iranian strategic priorities.

WiB had the regime as being responsible for most of the bombing in Aleppo. It's Assad who really has the imperatives to reclaim all of Syria's commercial capital. That's key to his legitimacy as a strongman with his base. It's not enough to secure Latakia. He must establish a monopoly of force in Useful Syria. Aleppo is the hope for prosperity under the Baath yolk. This war looks shaped more by the Assad clan's interests than their allies.

 

[Jeremiah18.17]

Looks like Syrian Air Force have attacked Turkish positions near Al Bab killing three Turkish soldiers.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From CMEC Syria’s Path From Civic Uprising to Civil War

...
A DISPERSED POWER STRUCTURE

On the surface, the omnipresence and brutality of the security state, the absurd personality cult around the Assads, and the state’s ideological posturing and militarism made the Baath Party appear similar to totalitarian parties in North Korea and earlier in former communist Romania.34 However, as will be discussed in this section, Syrian Baathism in fact relied on a dispersed, localized power structure that allowed the regime to integrate, promote, or marginalize groups belonging to different sects according to their loyalty and their usefulness for the purpose of power maintenance.35

This power structure was based on the management of informal networks of power and patronage structured by subnational identities and categories—sect, region, ethnicity, and tribe. At the grassroots level, a combination of official regime representatives, intelligence officers, and prominent members of local society would cooperate in running a specific locality as a fief, sometimes with considerable autonomy. These officials would provide their loyalty and material proceeds to the leadership in return for franchises of authoritarian power. Thus, the main currency in this system of dispersed rule, and the key to accessing privilege and resources, was not so much sectarian affiliation but rather loyalty to the regime and usefulness for its maintenance of power.
...

More like the way the far right regimes of 70s South America operate. Power negotiated through corrupting patronage and so limiting the need for coercion. This of course fits nicely with complex Syrian patchworks of identity based on clan, sect, class and ethnicity. The divisive Saleh dancing on the heads of snakes in Yemen has parallels but this is more systemic. The Divisionsal structure of the SAA is at the heart of it.

Political groups like the MB in opposition to this traditionally sought to generate a sense of solidarity based around the Sunni Mosque. The regime's decision facing the appearance of something similar during the Arab Spring to tolerate the PKK is explained in terms of seeing them as divisive local power brokers. And the Sunni Arab risings that do emerge aren't sufficiently unified by sectarian identity in the way most Saudis are. In fact the Syrian rebels are often at odds on how this is constituted. They generally agree on is Sharia as basis of law but little more.

This is a more complex picture than the regime simply playing on ethno-sectarian tensions. As in Iraq that emerged from a background where these markers were less important than they now seem. The author seems to have missed late Iraqi Baathist methods of rule had similarities and left a fragmented Sunni Arab population that fractured under ham fisted attempts at reconstruction. Struggles resulted that now are often more intra-sect than sectarian.

It gets to the very problematic nature of the rotten Syrian Baathist state in any attempt to make a peace in Syria. Which is perhaps the big problem the Russians will face in trying to do a Chechnya in Syria. It foresees what is likely to be a series of authoritarian warlord ruled fiefdoms. Some sensible enough suggestions are made for resolving that but they do assume a international focus on Syria that I suspect will be absent.

It reaches the logical conclusion that essential reforms would be needed to the regime to stabilise the country but I doubt that beast can changes its spots without collapsing.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The National Grozny and Aleppo: a look at the historical parallels

The way its sold to the Russian domestic audience as an anti-terror campaign against scary IS is perhaps the most interesting aspect. It's very clearly not that. The Russian Federation has more reason to worry about Islamic terrorism than us. One in five of its citizens are Muslim but easily conjured rampant Islamophobia might be a better explanation.

That the FSB is widely suspected by Russians to have been behind the apartment bombing that led to the flattening of Grozny and this really does not outrage much of the cynical Russian public is typical.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
The Lebanese daily said that the gathering “came at the request of the Russians” who were impressed by Hezbollah’s military performance during the “Battle of Martyr Abu Omar Saraqeb,” a failed rebel offensive launched in late October against regime positions in western Aleppo.

After observing the results of the rebel campaign, which was turned back thanks in part to Hezbollah’s large military presence on the frontlines, Russia last week called for a meeting with the Lebanese organization, according to Al-Akhbar.

“The meeting was attended by high-ranking Russian officers, who paid tribute to [Hezbollah’s] capabilities,” the report claimed, explaining that previous communication between Moscow and Hezbollah was handled by both sides’ representatives in the joint operations room in Baghdad and Damascus that include Syrian and Iraqi military officials.
...

Another sign of HA's large role in Aleppo.

Somebody should tell Putin there are Russian officers working directly with the A-Team of Jihadist terror he'd be so shocked.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
In the case of the Euphrates Shield forces around al-Bab, Turkish soldiers have been in the vanguard, say Western military officials. Elsewhere, they have held back and the spearhead role has been taken by Syrian rebels. Why the switch is unclear, but some Western diplomats suggested this week that it was a signal to Damascus that it would be Turkish soldiers occupying the town when seized and not Syrian insurgents — a move they suspected aimed at mollifying Damascus. If that is the reason, judging by Wednesday’s airstrike, it would appear to have failed.

Reaction to that Syrian air strike mentioned above.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE The UK's role in cleaning dirty money from the Middle East

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Assad's millions in London

To take but one example, Bashar al-Assad’s estimated personal wealth in 2012 was close to £1bn, that of the Assad family nearly £5bn. Most of that wealth is now out of Syria and a lot of it has come to the UK. And while the government has frozen some £100m of assets belonging to leading figures of the Syrian regime, nothing has been seized as the proceeds of criminal activity.

Unsurprisingly London is the overwhelming favourite choice for making dirty money clean. Properties with prestigious addresses that hold and usually exceed their purchase value are a very good way to conceal looted wealth.

The report cites the case of Soulieman Marouf, one of Bashar al-Assad’s associates. Marouf was placed on the EU sanctions list in October 2012. The man described by the Guardian newspaper as the Assad family fixer has been investigated for money laundering by the Swiss authorities. Those investigations showed that despite limited business activity his accounts held $31m in cash.

Yet with all that happening, Marouf was still able to purchase a flat in London’s upmarket St John’s Wood in November 2014. It added to an already impressive portfolio that, according to the report, has “at least six luxury properties in London including flats totalling £6 million and a house in St John’s Wood worth £1.3 million”.
...

Well you wouldn't want to deter dodgy oligarchs from hiding their loot in London think of the effect on luxury property values.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor After Mosul battle, is Syria next for PMU?

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Then came Assad's call, marking the third phase of the Iraqi intervention in Syria, dubbed as a comprehensive intervention by the PMU and a strengthening of the strategic Shiite alliance. This way, the presence of the armed Shiite groups would directly be under the umbrella of the Syrian regime, rather than under the management of Hezbollah or Iran.

However, should such an action take place, it would result in additional conflicts in the region and have major repercussions on Iraq, while the raging war will continue even if the Iraqi forces succeeded in liberating all territories from IS. It is also likely for this to weaken the PMU instead of strengthening it, by making its fighters intervene in battles outside of Iraq and compromise its unity since many Sistani-affiliated factions would object to the PMU’s intervention in Syria.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In DW UN Syria envoy: Eastern Aleppo could be 'gone by Christmas'

Following a visit to Damascus, UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura was "very worried" about the future of east Aleppo. In an interview published in Friday's "Süddeutsche Zeitung" newspaper, de Mistura said if the bombing continued as it had up until now, "then by Christmas there would be no east Aleppo anymore."

He had the impression that the government was seeking to accelerate its military activity in the embattled city, control of which is split between the regime and various rebel forces.

He said it was possible that Assad's forces would succeed in taking over the eastern rebel-occupied part of the city when it was almost destroyed. In such a case, he said tens of thousands of refugees would make their way to Turkey.
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Probably is what they are aiming at.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In TDS Regime aims to bisect east Aleppo: rebel

...
In the latest fighting, the pro-government forces, identified by the rebels mainly as Shiite militias, have sought to advance into an area of northeastern Aleppo, Nour said. Heavy bombardment of civilian areas has also resumed.

“The regime is using heavy, systematic bombardment in the areas where it is trying to advance. This is causing many injuries in the ranks of the revolutionaries,” he said late Wednesday via Skype from Aleppo.

“For roughly five days the intensity of the attack and clashes in the northeast area has increased, and this threatens the entire eastern region.”

The aim is “to besiege Aleppo twice, and split it into two areas, and this will be a catastrophe if it happens,” Nour said, explaining that the pro-government forces would then be able to open new fronts in the battle for Aleppo. This would further stretch the outgunned rebel fighters after what Nour called “one of the hardest periods” Aleppo had faced.

Parts of the city have been largely reduced to rubble and residents are short of food, medicine and fuel. Nour said flour was being mixed with other foods such as rice and cracked wheat to eke out remaining supplies.

Despite this, Nour said rebel morale was high. “God willing it will not be easy for the regime. We have excellent capabilities and are defending well,” he said.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
In the time of President Hafez al-Assad in the 1980s, these people were given a painful blow. It was almost lethal, particularly in Hama. I was a young first lieutenant. The decision at that time was a wise one. This time, we did not settle the matter from the beginning, which is why we have ended up where we are. But it was the decision of the leadership. As for me, my view was different. Take, for example, the students at the [Tiananmen] square in China, which changed China. If the Chinese state had not settled the student chaos, China would have been lost and the West would have destroyed it.
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Which is a commonly held view with regime supporters. Bashar was just too nice a guy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC Beirut 1982, Aleppo 2016

...
The PLO faced a broadly similar dilemma in Beirut in 1982. It realized from the outset of the Israeli siege that it would have to evacuate the Lebanese capital, but decided to hold out for the best political terms it could obtain. However, the Arab states proved unwilling to sustain diplomacy on its behalf in the face of U.S. refusal to discuss anything other than the modalities of a PLO evacuation. Syria, the only Arab state to take part in the war, prioritized its own concerns: it quickly agreed a ceasefire with the IDF and subsequently blocked the transit of volunteers and arms to the PLO through its territory. And when France tabled a draft resolution at the UN Security Council calling for mutual PLO and Israeli withdrawals (as it did recently for Aleppo), the U.S. vetoed it (as did Russia recently). The U.S. later approved a joint French-Egyptian proposal linking the siege of Beirut to resolution of the Palestine problem, but almost immediately aborted it by proposing a competing diplomatic initiative of its own, which it then failed to pursue anyway.

Faced with diminishing diplomatic returns and escalating Israeli bombardment—including extensive use of air-burst and white phosphorous artillery shells, cluster munitions, and bunker-busting bombs against civilian apartment blocks suspected of harboring PLO leaders—and rapidly mounting civilian casualties—which formed 84 percent of the final death toll of the war—the PLO finally agreed to leave Beirut.

Despite enjoying significant material and diplomatic support from the U.S., leading members of the European Union, and key Gulf states over several years, the Syrian opposition is now in a position much closer to that of the PLO. Clearly, there are important differences. The opposition is fighting entirely on home ground, whereas the PLO faced calls from most of its own Lebanese allies to leave as soon as the IDF closed in on Beirut in 1982. Furthermore, while all PLO forces had left Lebanon by the end of 1983, opposition fighters pulling out of Aleppo would be able to regroup in adjacent parts of Syria, in the Aleppo countryside and in Idlib province.

But the consequences of evacuating Aleppo are likely to be far graver for the Syrian opposition than the departure from Lebanon ultimately was for the PLO. The latter redirected its effort into building the extensive grassroots movement that provided the backbone for the first intifada that erupted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987 and brought the PLO into direct dialogue with the U.S. administration the following year. But for the Syrian opposition, the loss of Aleppo would prompt external backers to curtail further support, while freeing regime troops and providing them with a springboard for operations against remaining opposition areas. Some rebels might abandon the struggle and go into exile, but others might join the jihadist camp or go underground to conduct a bombing campaign in regime areas, further eroding the opposition's domestic and international appeal.
...

A useful parallel between two sieges.

Points out that the arrival of Trump may change rebel calculous over holding the East Aleppo pocket as the low probability of being rescued by the US has receded even further. That might cause them to cut their (and civilian) losses and abandon it.

The PLO was widely regarded as an unpopular invader in Lebanon I recall. As a result the similarly arrogant IDF was often welcomed initially but that wore off as well and produced HA. Reagan called the IAF bombing of West Beirut not merely "barbarous" but a "holocaust". It was a smaller affair but it made a big impact at the time. Bin Laden would cite the siege as a motivation for 9-11.

Overall in Aleppo City there appears also to be a good deal of hostility to the rebels. A fair portion really are not locals to the East Aleppo pocket. The revolt came in from the burbs and countryside in 2012. The recently arrived AQ contingent for instance appears to be mainly commanded by Idlib beards. They were not well received by other rebels when they arrived in the Summer.

The rebels do have civilian support in the pocket but it's clearly not unanimous. A lot of civilians are simply trapped. Fearful of regime retribution but the mood does seem to be shifting towards risking flight. It's nothing like what IS are up to in Mosul but there are credible reports of coercion of civilians attempting to flee for example by Ahar al Sham. In starvation sieges even populations that have been supportive can turn nasty with the defenders. There's already been rioting.

Another risk is defender solidarity collapsing. The article mentions splits within the famously fractious PLO but the fighters in the pocket are even more diverse. They're mostly Beards but it would be inaccurate to call them all Salafi-Jihadis, those are a minority, many are MB types, some just Accidental Guerillas. The groups that have been there longest probably relate more closely to the civilian population. AQ already turned one signifiant FSA flagged group in the pocket and dismantled it. East Aleppo is a big PR success for AQ at the moment. Despite the failures to break the siege it is an heroic moment and is facilitating their rise within the revolt. It's not unknown for an AQ affiliate to withdraw advertising that as a move being made to spare civilians. There are signs of tensions in the Syrian AQ arm about the rebranding despite this success which will be a complication. I think the likes of AQ will be less pragmatic than the PLO which was far more politically mature even in 82 and could see a diplomatic path.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War Is Boring Syrian Rebels Brought a Homemade Cannon to the Battlefield

A truck mounted muzzle loader that fires cannonballs; almost Steampunk.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment Kata’ib Humat al-Diyar: A Prominent Loyalist Militia in Suwayda’

...
Even so, Kata’ib Humat al-Diyar is accused of being one of the leading groups relied on by the regional al-Amn al-Askari head Wafiq Nasir for kidnapping operations in Suwayda’ province, a lucrative business said to be worth more than 850,000,000 Syrian pounds in the province in terms of ransoms paid. Also, despite the anti-smuggling image of the group, allegations also exist of certain members’ involvement in profiteering through setting up checkpoints to allow smugglers to pass (e.g. here) or similar involvement in smuggling operations deemed detrimental to the security of the province (cf. here).

In any case, this overview of Kata’ib Humat al-Diyar illustrates that the influence and size of the loyalist factions in Suwayda’ province should not be underestimated, despite the growth of Rijal al-Karama. Indeed, third-way leaning groups cannot afford full-blown open confrontation with the loyalist groups as it would simply prove too costly, and ultimately the priority must be to defend Suwayda’ province from external attack. As the media director for Rijal al-Karama put it, “In the event of an external attack on the Jabal, all factions unite.”

A regime supporting but "reformist" Druze group that's got to pick a pocket or two.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Reuters Qatar will help Syrian rebels even if Trump ends U.S. role

...
Qatar was determined to carry on, Sheikh Mohammed said, sipping tea in his spacious office on the ministry's top floor overlooking the Gulf.

"This support is going to continue, we are not going to stop it. It doesn't mean that if Aleppo falls we will give up on the demands of the Syrian people," he said.

HISTORIC ALLY

"Even if the regime captures it (Aleppo), I am sure they will have the ability to capture it back from the regime ... We need more military support, yes, but even more important we need to stop the bombardment and create safe zones for the civilians."

He said Assad was "the fuel of Daesh" - an acronym for Islamic State - because his forces' killing of Syrians helped the hardline group motivate young Syrian recruits. "We never see any effort for him fighting Daesh," he said.

But Trump has signaled opposition to U.S. support for the rebels, indicating he could abandon them to focus on fighting Islamic State which controls land in eastern and central Syria.
...

My bold, pots and kettles innit. Qatar has certainly backed some very dodgy people at times in Syria.

Country Of 80 People determined to fight till the last Syrian.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On AMN Turkish-backed rebels, Syrian Army and Kurdish forces all advance in race to al-Bab

...
Thus, the FSA - heavily supported by the Turkish Armed Forces - were able to capture Umm Shukyaf, Umm Adasah and Anifiyah, east of al-Bab in Aleppo province.

Meanwhile, the FSA also launched fresh assaults against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at Sab Wiran and Sheikh Nassir. However, these attacks were repelled while another Turkish tank was destroyed by the SDF on the outskirts of the villages.

On the other hand, the SDF finally captured the villages of Tall al-Jijan and Tall Unayb, west of Al-Bab, after prolonged clashes with the Islamic State.

The pro-government 'Kafr as Saghir Martyrs' Kurdish militia also advanced alongside the Syrian Arab Army's (SAA) Republican Guard east of Aleppo city, thus capturing the villages of Khirbat Duwayr, Amad Taltinah, Shaalah, and Tal Al-Khashkhashat. During the SAA offensive, the SDF provided fire support against ISIS.

Notably, the latter advance puts Syrian government forces just 8 kilometers west of al-Bab, a prize which all warring parties hope to obtain.
...

So the Eastern thrust of the TSK/rebels continues to encircle al Bab.