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And next, Syria?


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Regime forces fought their way into East Aleppo with support from the Russian air force and, more– important, an intense artillery barrage that overwhelmed rebel defense lines. Assad now seems to have a sufficient number of ground forces in the area to launch assaults in urban districts where the army had previously eschewed offensives for lack of troops. Although there is no reliable estimate of regime forces in Aleppo, opposition sources cited in an August 30 Daily Mail article claimed that Iran has overseen the deployment of up to 60,000 Shiite militiamen to Syria. Whatever their true numbers, many fighters have no doubt made their way to Aleppo and furthered Assad's campaign there.

For their part, the number of rebels in Aleppo is estimated at only 10,000, according to a November 29 report in Le Figaro. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham has 1,500-2,000 men, and Ahrar al-Sham, its main partner in the Jaish al-Fatah coalition, has around 2,000. The remaining 6,000 are from the Fatah Halab coalition, which is linked to the Free Syrian Army but has proven incapable of coordinating operations among its members.

Jabhat Fatah al-Sham reinforced its presence in Aleppo this spring, allowing it to dominate Fatah Halab and prevent any rebel surrender. The former group's desire for hegemony led to fighting with other rebels in recent weeks, especially in the north, facilitating the regime's progress. From a military point of view, it likely would have been impossible for the encircled rebels to hold their frontline perimeter anyway, since it extended more than fifty kilometers and was under attack from all directions.

The next regime offensive in Aleppo, which reportedly began today, will try to further divide the rebel zone. After capturing Hill 400, a strategic point west of the airport, Assad's forces began advancing toward Aleppo Citadel from the east. If they succeed there, the district of Myassar will be isolated and would likely fall easily. Meanwhile, a northward offensive has been launched from the Sheikh Said district, likely with the aim of isolating Salah al-Din district.

In response, the rebels are retreating to neighborhoods in the old city south of the citadel, which are more easily defensible. The area's dense network of buildings, small streets, and tunnels make it a veritable anthill that will be more difficult for the army to retake than other districts.

After the current offensive, the regime's next steps are uncertain. The army may hope to wait until hunger pushes the local rebels to negotiate a withdrawal toward Idlib province, as happened recently with encircled rebels in Daraya. This could take months, however, and Assad may not be willing to wait that long. He and his allies in Moscow seem eager to establish full control of Aleppo before the Trump administration takes office, essentially presenting the new president with a fait accompli on the war's most notorious front.
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My bold, I would take that 60K figure with a big pinch of salt but the regime might have a 3-4:1 superiority the normal sort of ratio needed for attacking a dug in enemy. The rebels reported being hit from multiple sides and being forced to shrink their perimeter. There's certainly a heavy Iranian hand in this operation. The PKK also played a signifiant role, expanding their turf in Aleppo, that they've been downplaying for PR purposes.
 
On Bellingcat Assad Regime Militias and Shi’ite Jihadis in the Syrian Civil War
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The Greek organization Black lily—a more obscure and radical group than the more famous pro-Assad Neo-Nazi group Golden Dawn, and which subscribes to the Nazi philosophy of Strasserism—have claimed to have been active fighting on the behalf of the Assad regime at the battle of al-Qusayr in 2013. Regardless of the extent to which this is true and the number of Greeks in Syria, the fact is this represents the pro-Assad aspirations of many far-right groups such as the European Solitary Front for Syria [pictured above], who have been active in Syria in a noncombatant role.
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A very understandable ideological alignment but the first I've heard of it.

Bellingcat points out that while Salafi-Jihadis are our main terrorist threat at the moment there's a potential for terrorist threats emerging from regime aligned forces. Things change. Not so long ago Shia militias accounted for a quarter of US casualties in Iraq. This is certainly true if we were to tilt once more heavily against Iran as we might under Trump. The Iranians could respond asymmetrically with whatever assets are available as they do with the Israelis.
 
In TDB DARK ALLIES: Assad Henchman: Here’s How We Built ISIS

Syrian Intelligence cultivating Salafi-Jihadis as a strategic asset isn't really news. ME states do tend to export their Jihadi problem. They weren't alone in that but have perhaps been one of the worst offenders. Being added to the axis of evil and having invading armies next door the Syrian might cite as motivating factors. The feared Syrian gulag is presented here as a bit of R&R for Takfiri but then if you look at the role of the US run camp Bucca in Iraq in IS's recovery you might see rather a lot of similarities. I've read at least one only wise in hindsight account of that by a US participant. PM Maliki complained bitterly about Syria harbouring Iraqi Baath though Jordanians may have been more sympathetic. It can be overstated but the ratlines into Iraq from Syria were a signifiant factor in the first Sunni rising there. That lots of Syrians took up that Jihad rather undermines claims that radical Salafi weren't always an indigenous factor in Syria.

It did rather blow back on Damascus in time. These things often do. Most of the revolts battlefield successes involved radical beards. The Fall of the provincial capitals Raqqa and Idlib can both be put down to Takfiri. Some rebels probably also regret the early risings demands for the release of radical Salafists who came to dominate much of the revolt.

We rather turned a blind eye to IS's role in taking Menagh airbase for the FSA. Or AQ's role fighting along FSA flagged groups like the SRF who chased IS half way across Syria at one point. We only really went into a funk about our foreign fighters flowing into Syria after the fall of Mosul. A lot of people on our side seemed rather happy about the big Salafi alliance JaF taking Idlib and threatening Tartus that is until the IRGC invited the Russians to make their move.
 
On MEE Erdogan backtracks on call to 'end rule of Assad' after Kremlin protest
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"The aim of the Euphrates Shield operation is against terror, not against anyone or any country,” the Turkish president said in Ankara.

"No one should have any doubts or take our statements to mean something else. Even if Turkey is left alone, it will continue its fight against terrorist organisations."

The statement came after the Kremlin demanded an "explanation" from Erdogan over his comments on Tuesday.

"We are there to bring justice. We are there to end the rule of the cruel Assad, who has been spreading state terror," Erdogan said.
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I have this image in my head of Erdogan holding the phone about a foot from his ear as Putin shouts orders down it.
 
On Iran Tracker A New Era for Iran’s Military Leadership
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THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY

The various branches of Iran’s armed forces maintained relatively distinct operational focuses until recently. Tehran’s premier fighting force, the IRGC, is formally tasked with protecting the Islamic Revolution against internal and external threats, as well as exporting the revolution beyond Iran’s borders. The IRGC’s clandestine paramilitary wing, the Quds Force, has historically assumed sole responsibility for conducting Iran’s military activities abroad. The IRGC’s service branches--the ground forces (IRGC-GF), navy (IRGC-N), and air force (IRGC-AF)--have focused on protecting Iranian territory against external and internal threats since the Iran-Iraq War. The Artesh is Iran’s conventional military. The Iranian constitution tasks it with the much more limited mission of defending Iran’s territorial integrity rather than defending, let alone expanding, the revolution. These operational distinctions are starting to fade, however.

Iran’s growing commitments at home and abroad have placed new demands on the IRGC. The Quds Force is currently managing Iran’s military activities across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Its model of expeditionary warfare, which partners local proxy forces with a small number of Quds Force trainers and advisors, proved inadequate on the battlefields of Syria.[3] Iran’s leadership decided instead to develop a quasi-conventional model of expeditionary warfare relying on the IRGC conventional forces in addition to the Quds Force and its proxies.[4] Combat formations drawn from the IRGC-GF’s conventional brigades and divisions have therefore been supporting Iranian proxies and Quds Force activities in Syria and to a much more limited extent in Iraq for more than a year.[5]IRGC-GF units also combat unrest along Iran's borders and among restive ethnic minorities, however. Containing unrest in Iranian Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchistan province, for example, create significant drains on IRGC resources.[6]

Iran’s military leadership has expanded the use of the Artesh in Iranian military operations abroad, partly in response to these growing force requirements. The Artesh is an important component of Iran’s military capability, although it has long been overshadowed and obscured by the IRGC. The Artesh has greater manpower and fields much of Iran’s more advanced conventional weaponry.[7]Iran’s coordinated military campaign against ISIS in Iraq, for example, required cooperation between the IRGC and Artesh at least at the strategic level, although some reports also indicate the possible use of Artesh Air Force airframes to conduct strikes against ISIS positions in Iraq.[8]

The trajectory of Artesh-IRGC cooperation indicates that the Iranian regime has decided to re-posture elements of the Artesh force structure toward supporting the IRGC’s military operations abroad. Recent rhetoric hints at a fundamental transformation in the Artesh’s orientation away from its previous mission of static defense. Senior Artesh commanders, for example, have come to redefine their constitutionally designated mission of protecting Iran’s borders to include expeditionary deployments as part of a larger preemptive doctrine.[9] The Artesh rank-and-file have probably welcomed the evolution in their mission in order to prove their relevance to state officials, argue for greater resources, and gain combat experience. [10]

Artesh forces have already demonstrated a limited capability to support IRGC activities at the operational level. They did so most clearly when Tehran assigned Artesh ground forces to the direct command of the IRGC in at least two separate deployments around Aleppo during the first half of 2016.[11] The precise extent of the Artesh’s involvement in Syria remains unknown, although it is certainly broader than these two deployments. Transport planes owned by the Artesh Air Force operate in support of IRGC-backed activities in Syria, for example.[12]
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Iran's using Syria as a lab to explore it's options in hybrid form of warfare suitable for a revolutionary actor. The Artesh, it's large primarily defensive conventional army, hasn't seen that much use in Syria. The IRGC innovating with their militias has been the main contribution. For all the hype Iran is a puny military power that relies on parsimonious asymmetric tactics and strategic guile. This points out if the Artesh was armed by Russia and better integrated with IRGC capabilities it might become dangerously handy combination.
 
In The Nation Letter From Rebel-Controlled Idlib, Syria
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Later I met a Nusra soldier. Abdulkadir had a broad smile and a nice temperament. I asked him what he does for Nusra. “Everything,” he said. One day he is a policeman, the next day a suicide commando, then he’ll be a normal fighter. He is ferried to the front lines two days a week with other fighters and spends the rest of the time at his home. At the front, they while away their time drinking tea and using social media with their smart phones until the two days are up.

Abdulkadir said it is not his business if the regime or the rebels advance, so long as he got paid each month. “We don’t believe in the revolution,” he said. “We believe in the salary!”

What he said voids all meaning from jihad. That fighters are motivated only to make a living undercuts their entire rationale. They take a risk by fighting. “The regime might attack us, and then we’ll be killed. If that happens, may Allah have mercy on us. If nothing happens, all the better. Alhamdullilah [praise be to God],” he declared. “For me, it’s a horrifying picture. The Nusra Front is decaying from within. All they have is empty propaganda.”
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Accidental Guerrillas are everywhere in Syria.

Article describes a very welcome softening of AQ Syria since the rebranding with a much less repressive style of governance. Lister has been reporting splits in Syrian AQ. Not imposing their very strict Sharia with rigour would certainly be a factor in that.
 
On CMEC A Turning Point in Aleppo
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If Turkish intentions northeast of Aleppo are not what the opposition had hoped for, Ankara’s involvement in Idlib has so far been more clearly aligned with the rebel cause. The area, which fell completely to Syrian rebels in spring 2015, still receives strong support from across the Turkish border and has served as a staging ground for attacks in Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.

The Idlib rebellion is strong and well implanted. It is a real threat to Assad. But though it contains many different groups, it is strategically dominated by hardline Islamists such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the new incarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra that has links to Al-Qaeda and is riddled with international jihadis. These groups are formidable enemies of the regime, but they are also too toxic to gain Western endorsement. Policymakers in Doha and Ankara have shown a higher threshold of tolerance for jihadism than their colleagues in Washington, but Jabhat Fatah al-Sham is ultimately a step too far for everyone.

In other words, while it will remain a thorn in Assad’s side, the Idlib region is unlikely to serve as the springboard for a foreign-backed strategy to end Assad rule.
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Lund sensibly refuses to write the rebellion off but concludes the wildcard may be Erdogan.

Of course Trump is still utterly unpredictable as well his line on Syria is all over the place. His selection of Mattis as Sec Def suggests a tilt against Iran that seems unlikely to fit with his bromance with diddy little Putin. Indeed the flighty Trump might instead fall hook line and sinker for big butch Erdogan and where might that lead?

I tend to agree with the snip above but the Western policy elite seemed rather pleased when Idlib fell to JaF and over eager assumptions of Assad's rapid fall were being floated. Our ability to wear ideological blinkers in these things should not be underestimated after all at least 20% of the fighters in East Aleppo pocket do qualify as Salafi-Jihadi by our own rose tinted measures. Rebel offensives coming out of Idlib attempting to break the siege were not greeted with dismay despite radicals fronting them. The difference with Idlib is one of degree with various FSA flagged mobs having a substantial presence. Idlib is also where most FSA flagged fighters from the pocket and many of their supporters will probably evacuate to which would change the mix. The revolt came into Aleppo City from the surroundings it's not inconceivable it might again.
 
camouflage said:
just a quick waffle break-

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Priceless but not in an entirely different universe from Heller's reporting on Mukhabarat haunted Damascus. Worth watching for the straight faced comparison of the popular young reformer Bashar Assad with Jesus "who was crucified".
 
In CTC Sentinel THE GLOBAL TERROR THREAT AND COUNTERTERRORISM CHALLENGES FACING THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION
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Finally, the importance of Syria to al-Qa`ida’s plans may be seen in the roster of senior commanders deployed to this critical theater. Among them was Muhsin al-Fadhli, another bin Ladin intimate who, until his death from a U.S. airstrike in 2015, had commanded the Khorasan Group. This elite, forward-based al-Qa`ida operational arm in Syria is well-positioned to act either on its own or on Core al-Qa`ida’s orders to strike in the Levant, across the Middle East, and potentially in Europe as well.34 Even before the Khorasan Group had insinuated itself into the Levant, Haydar Kirkan, a Turkish national and longstanding al-Qa`ida operative, had been ordered in 2010 to return to his homeland—presumably by bin Ladin himself. Kirkan’s mission was to facilitate the movement of key personnel hiding in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas to the Middle East so that they could escape the escalating American drone attack campaign.35 Described by Pentagon officials as “a senior external terror attack planner in Syria,” Kirkan was killed just weeks ago in a U.S. bombing raid in Idlib, Syria.36 And in late 2015, al-Zawahiri reportedly dispatched Saif al-`Adl, al-Qa`ida’s most experienced and battle-hardened senior commander, to Syria after his release from detention in Iran.37 With this senior command structure in place in Syria, al-Qa`ida is thus well positioned to exploit the Islamic State’s weakening military position and territorial losses. The Islamic State, in any event, can no longer compete with al-Qa`ida, whether in leadership depth, influence, reach, manpower, or cohesion. In only one domain is the Islamic State arguably stronger than its rival: the ability to mount spectacular terrorist strikes in Europe. And this is only because al-Qa`ida appears to have decided to suspend these operations for the time being. The leader of the group’s wing in Syria, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in an interview with Al Jazeera in May 2015 revealed al-Zawahiri had instructed him for the time being not to use Syria as a launching pad for attacks in the West.38And other al-Qa`ida affiliates have not attempted or plotted attacks in the West for the past three years, at least as far as has been publicly disclosed. Even the January 2015 attack on the Charlie Hebdo satirical newspaper in Paris that was ordered by AQAP dates back to plans apparently hatched in 2011.39
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Assesses threat levels as greater than when the GWOT started.

Recommends a more kinetic GWOT anticipating developing threats. What could go wrong? One of lots policy papers being re-scribbled with the Trump administration in mind.

I'd point out that threat even in French speaking Eurabia where I live is diddly squat compared with Russian capabilities that we can end up being on the wrong end of if too distracted. And it's not hard to argue much of the GWOT has been a counterproductive game of Whackamole. A decade and a half in Afghanistan only spread AQ activity into Pakistan. Going all kinetic on Iraq's been a predictable disaster from a terrorism perspective. That bleed into Syria where we got fixated on regime change until IS bit us in the arse. Both Libya and Yemen have enabled Takfiri. Worse a proxy war in Syria has ended up enabling both Iran and Russia and might be better seen as a old fashioned game of states than through a distorting CT lens.
 
On LWJ Turkey is on a collision course with the Syrian regime and its backers
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Further compounding the complexity is the US-led Coalition’s support for YPG advances in Syria, reluctantly seeing the Kurdish group and its SDF allies as the only effective local partner to destroy ISIS. This pragmatic partnership has been a major source of tension between Ankara and Washington for over a year, and the reason why Turkey launched operation Euphrates Shield without coordination with the anti-ISIS Coalition. While the US and Turkey did temporarily come to an agreement for the US to support Euphrates Shield’s southward advance, poor coordination and a lack of trust between the two NATO allies has resulted in the US pulling its air assets and special forces from participating in the effort to seize al-Bab.

Without U.S. air cover, Turkish forces are particularly vulnerable to SyAAF or Russian airstrikes if al-Bab is indeed a red line for the regime as reports suggest. The Turkish Air Force (TAF) is desperately low on pilots in the wake of July’s coup attempt and the subsequent purges of the military’s officer corps (reports indicate more than 350 pilots, including many of the force’s most experienced, were dismissed). Even if fully staffed, the TAF would struggle to penetrate Syrian air space because of the formidable Russian air defense bubble over western Syria – which extends to al-Bab and deep into Turkey.

Yet, Turkey appears undeterred, with Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan declaring that Turkey’s intervention is to “end the rule of the cruel Assad.” Moreover, the FSA branded factions fighting alongside Turkish troops are determined to advance through al-Bab and towards regime lines to help relieve their besieged comrades in Aleppo. Once al-Bab falls, whether to Turkish and FSA forces or pro-regime elements, the buffer that now separates Euphrates Shield and the regime’s eastern flank around Aleppo will be too small to prevent clashes. Such a scenario risks pulling the United States further into the Syrian theater – not to strengthen the fight against ISIS, but to defend an incorrigible NATO ally.
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LWJ bit behind on Erdogan's positioning but then the Turkish Strongman is as agile a deceiver as anybody in the Kremlin.

The WIB post on al Bab above correctly detects Assad looks to be well ahead of the leery Russians in being willing to dispute al Bab in fact trying to provoke the TSK into overplaying its hand. Think of reckless little Serbia pulling the Czar into WWI.
 
On War Is Boring A New Plan Calls for Safe Zones in Syria — Backed by the U.S. Military
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“Isolationism is a dangerous illusion,” said the report, which was obtained by Reuters on Tuesday. It calls for outside nations to help wind down conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Yemen and back home-grown reform throughout the region.

Its key recommendation for Syria may be moot when Trump takes office on Jan. 20 if government forces seize eastern Aleppo, the opposition’s most important urban stronghold. Syrian Pres. Bashar Al Assad has been dramatically strengthened by Russian military support over the past 14 months.

“The United States should be prepared to employ air power, stand-off weapons, covert measures and enhanced support for opposition forces to break the current siege of Aleppo and frustrate Assad’s attempts to consolidate control over western Syria’s population centers,” the report said.
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That Albright&Hadley construction for the inevitable Clinton probably about to be trampled by triumphant Trumpism but who knows he did flirt with making American safe by incarcerating all the terrifyingly dusky Syrians in Syria.
 
CrabbedOne said:
Priceless but not in an entirely different universe from Heller's reporting on Mukhabarat haunted Damascus. Worth watching for the straight faced comparison of the popular young reformer Bashar Assad with Jesus "who was crucified".
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quoted to preserve the opportunity for an the interesting comparison of your interpretation with what was actually said in the vid.
 
camouflage said:
quoted to preserve the opportunity for an the interesting comparison of your interpretation with what was actually said in the vid.
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He gets to Jesus at about 7:30 after quoting BBC reports on Assad the young reformer before the Arab spring. You know the trickle down economics that buggered much of provincial Syria's economy. The areas that rose like Idlib he confesses never having been to. Conflating Assad with Allah is a frequent loyalist trope in Syria. Assad isn't Superman either apparently it's the State. He even mentions the sacred Syrian Constitution which the Assad clan rejigged to anoint Basher overnight. Well I think he won't be getting any trouble from the mukhabarat next time he's in Damascus and in his shoes I'd pick my words carefully.

Heller above on the other hand is prepared to risk his press credentials and point to the dire state of the economy and unshakable goons that can't quite suppress Syrian cynicism leaking out.

The Septic burbling about there being pictures of the ruling family everywhere like in any despotic state made me giggle as well.
 
On Politico In Aleppo, I Saw Why Assad Is Winning
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The government, supported by Russian fighter jets and Iranian backed Shi’i militias, is confident it can retake east Aleppo. But it has been slow to move into the remaining besieged areas which shelter between 5,000 to 15,000 rebels according to local activists and insurgent group leaders. Whether it can deploy the forces necessary to do so remains to be seen. But what is certain is that the pain of Aleppo’s civilians will endure long after the last mortar falls. Sectarian enmity and distrust will complicate a rebuilding process that is already estimated at more than $260 billion. If Assad wins, most Western observers will attribute the triumph to his use of naked force. But it his reliance on primordial loyalties, a fear of post-revolutionary chaos and appeal to the self-interest of Aleppo’s merchant class which will have been the real keys to his success. In the end it may well look like a victory that would have been better avoided.
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Barak Barfi, describing the different layers of Regime support in Aleppo as he's ferried around by regime minders.

Business elites close to the regime who see the rebels as Turkish backed robbers. The better sort of chap in pre-revolt Aleppo was doing ostentatiously well out of Bashar's narrow crony capitalism. That the Baath revolution nationalised everything (i.e. made most businesses Assad clan assets) is not forgotten. The clusters of foreign Jihadists and occasional thick necked Russian. The military closed mouthed about $260 billion's worth of damage mostly caused by R+6 air. On down to some penniless IDPs grateful for a government dole quite contemptuous of the revolt that is largely of their class and sometimes isn't much better than bandits.

Read Heller's long article above on rebel the topsy turvy governance in Idlib sustained by foreign donations because the locals would revolt if they were taxed and there is a basic set of realities here. It still relies on Baathist bureaucrats to some extent despite the locals hatred of them. It's development has been crippled by constant bombing but more by rebel factionalism. Salafist Idlib perhaps provides a more just system but its also somewhat corrupt. Power ultimately rests not with the people but paramilitaries and their kin. In The Nation article above describes a moderating regime under AQ in Idlib since its rebranding. Clearly the enforcement of harsh Sharia was very unpopular even amongst conservative country folk. A frustrated AQ cop complains he's impotent to stop parking violations as the driver might be from another armed group simply shoot him. This isn't the brutalist discipline of IS's extractive Caliphate. How this revolutionary experiment develops is unknown and it may well be crushed out of existence. It's likely the nearest model we have to what a future Syria after Assad would look like and it's loaded with obvious drawbacks.

Life under the regime's familiar heel is a good deal less random. It's worse than it was, drastically poorer and with an extra layer of NDF predators above the old SAA based kleptocracy. The crumbling authoritarian state offers a familiar place of greater safety. And if that involves the government killing a few hundred thousand more of their fellow citizens that's just fine. Given a small civil servant's salary regime supporters grumble Bashar's not brutal enough. It's Assad or we burn the country. And in Syria's biggest cities loyalist however reluctant do seem to be the majority. Very ugly but then most civil wars are.

The R+6 has the military advantage but the Assad clan operating much like a semi-criminal far right 70s South American Junta looks to be winning the governance competition against the reactionary Idlibi Levellers. That latter struggle is the heart of Counter Insurgency.
 
In TDB Syria army seizes new rebel district in Aleppo: activists
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Overnight, government troops and allied forces seized the district of Tariq al-Bab where heavy fighting had raged a day earlier, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Saturday.

The government has now recaptured around 60 percent of eastern parts of the city that the rebels overran in mid-2012, according to the Britain-based opposition-aligned group.

The advance opens the road leading from the government-controlled west of the city to the international airport just outside Aleppo to the east, which is also held by the government.
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As mentioned on SST.
 
On Al Monitor Congress authorizes Trump to arm Syrian rebels with anti-aircraft missiles
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"I'm more afraid of Congress on this issue than I am of Trump,” said Robert Naiman, the policy director at Just Foreign Policy, a liberal advocacy group that lobbied for a ban. “I think Congress is trying to tie Trump's hands against making a realistic deal with Russia to end the Syrian civil war. And they are trying to pressure him in the direction of not doing that," he told Al-Monitor.

Trump was outspoken about his reluctance to get dragged into the Syrian civil war throughout the presidential campaign. He has since picked hawkish advisers and candidates for Cabinet positions, including retired Marine Gen. James Mattis as secretary of defense.

The rebels “are being slaughtered as we speak. A genocide is taking place. It's a black mark on American history," McCain told Al-Monitor when asked about the MANPAD provision. “I think [Trump] is going to listen to the people he appoints as secretary of defense and secretary of state.”

Mattis is well known in military and foreign policy circles for his aggressive determination to take on America’s foes, notably Iran, including in Syria and Iraq. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee as far back as January 2015, however, he opined that the time for supporting moderate rebel fighters against Assad's forces had "passed."
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Of course that does send strong signals for other rebel backers to add MANPADs to the mix even if a Russki bewitched Trump demurs.

There are some MANPADs in theatre already. At this stage they'd likely make little difference. They didn't in the Muhj war while Langley spent ages trying to buy them back for fear of downed airliners.
 
On MEE Russia, the middleman keeping Turkey and Syria from clashing
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Sabotaging the new cooperation between Turkey and Russia, which could pose a long-term threat to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies, could be another reason.

“Assad and Iran, although for different reasons, are not happy with the restored ties between Russia and Turkey,” a London-based diplomatic source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told me this week.

“Assad fears that such a cooperation may in the long term lead to a political settlement that forces him to share power with opposition groups.

"Iran, also, fears that the two countries [Russia and Turkey] share a common interest in limiting its influence in Syria, and therefore might have colluded with Assad to sabotage these restored relations.”

The attack also came on the first anniversary of Turkey shooting down a Russian warplane over Syria, which led to speculation that it was an act of revenge.

The people in favour of this explanation argue that, even if Russia was not directly responsible, the Syrian regime would not dare to take such an action without receiving a green light from Russia.
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Or Moscow is the monkey rather than the organ grinder.

You only have to look at a map to understand why Assad doesn't want the TSK taking "The Door" to Aleppo. He already warned the Turks that was a red line. The Syrians utterly rejected Russian overtures about federalism as well. The Russians appear quite unable to steer Assad. I suspect Russians claims to be limiting Iran's influence are a complete crock as well. Aleppo is crawling with more Iranian backed paramilitaries than ever before. The Russians are dependent on Iran providing ground forces in Syria to top up the ground down SAA. Even the Russian role in taking East Aleppo may be seriously overrated. A lot of their bombing has been on other fronts and SAA artillery was rather salient in the last offensive. Which makes a nonsense of Russia's prominence in talks over Syria. Putin is just exploiting our wishful thinking.
 

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Operation Straggle, which had involved months of planning, was eventually foiled in October 1956 by the Syrian authorities, who arrested some of the main conspirators. But British plotting with the Americans against Syria resumed soon after the failed invasion of Egypt, and by September 1957 a report entitled the ‘Preferred Plan’ was circulated by a secret working group meeting in Washington. The planning was boosted by the Syrian government’s signing of a technical aid agreement with the Soviet Union and the appointment of a pro-communist figure as army chief of staff. Despite the misgivings about the Muslim Brotherhood, this new plan once again involved soliciting them and stirring them up in Damascus; the Brotherhood’s involvement would be key to provoking an internal uprising as a prelude to the Syrian government’s overthrow. Backed at the highest level in Britain, the plot envisaged arming ‘political factions with paramilitary or other actionist capabilities’ – which is likely to have included the Muslim Brotherhood.
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And thwart villainous Russki empire building of course.

More here.
 
On Syria Direct Life in the aftermath: A wounded Homs city struggles to reconcile its past
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The relationship citizens have with the state and local security forces in Homs differs depending on where they live and the nature of their sectarian identity, residents told Syria Direct. Residents of majority Sunni neighborhoods in west Homs face the greatest scrutiny, they said.

Abu Murad, a Sunni resident of the Projects district of west Homs described a tense atmosphere in what he called the “Sunni neighborhoods.”

“We’re searched a lot, cursed by security forces or the shabiha at the checkpoints,” said Abu Murad. “They consider us terrorists. People in the neighborhood have this pervasive fear of being detained at any moment.” Checkpoints in most of Homs’s districts are manned by state security forces and members of militias, while in Alawite neighborhoods such as Zahraa, they are dominated by local militiamen whose headquarters are nearby.

There is reason for elevated security in Homs city. Namely, a string of car bombings and suicide attacks against the city, with more than half a dozen striking the Zahraa district since mid-2015, for which the Islamic State claimed responsibility. Dozens of people have been killed and wounded in the assaults, the latest this past September, leading to protests and sharp criticism of the city’s governor and security services by residents of the neighborhood.

One resident of the Zahraa district is Radwan Abbas, a professor at the Baath University Law School in the city. Despite security concerns, he says that the social fabric in Homs is “closely knit” and that “life is gradually returning to normal.”

Increased security precautions are necessary, he says, “because of the change in thinking that happened in those [west Homs] neighborhoods while they were mixed with the terrorists and takfirithought.”
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In “the capital of the revolution” the divisions created between the sects looks pretty permanent after the rising has mostly been repressed. Even here large parts of the city were loyalist or at least very hostile to the revolt. Rather different from the Stasi state near normalcy of Damascus; more like the sectarian paranoia of occupied Jerusalem.
 
In TDB How ISIS Returned to Syria
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One of the early examples of the Assad regime supporting the expansion of ISIS through military power was in Al Bab, just northeast of Aleppo, which fell to ISIS in September 2013.

“We had 500 fighters in the area and needed reinforcements in Al Bab,” recalled Isam al Nayif, then with the Liwat al Tawhid brigade of the Free Syrian Army, now living in Nizip, southern Turkey. As rebels dispatched reinforcements from nearby Minbij, ISIS sent a convoy from the vicinity of a government base to the west, in Kuweires. “We intercepted a radio call ordering the Air Force to bomb the convoy coming from Minbij,” he said. Twenty-five rebels were killed. But the ISIS convoy proceeded unhindered, and the rebels abandoned Al Bab. (Syrian Kurdish forces, aided by U.S. airstrikes and a U.S.-organized force of Arab tribes, recently ousted ISIS from Minbij.)

By late 2013, many Syrians in ISIS were convinced that the group was collaborating with the Assad government. In a lengthy video posted on YouTube in March 2014, one former Islamic State fighter, Riad Eed, who said he was from Mar’ea, a town in Aleppo province, cited repeated instances in which Islamic State forces stood by watching as Syrian government troops seized town after town from the moderate opposition.

Eed, who is now in hiding and could not be contacted, said that whenever he urged his ISIS colleagues to fight government troops, the response was: “No, no, Sheikh. There are enough Mujahidin to fight them. There is Jabhat al Nusra, and they are enough for the fight,” he recounted.

When Safira, a major town south of Aleppo, was about to fall in late October 2013, ISIS’s 500 fighters in the area were “watching from afar and doing nothing,” he said. When the Tawhid brigade, a part of the Islamic Front umbrella group, sent reinforcements, ISIS blocked them. “When I asked about that, they said it is forbidden to resort to infidels for help,” Eed said.

Government capture of the town led to the flight of its 130,000 inhabitants, according to Doctors Without Borders. Capture of the city gave the regime full control over arms factories there, which soon began churning out barrel bombs that it dropped over Aleppo throughout 2014.
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This is a rather disingenuous article but there's undoubtedly some truth in the regime at times seeing Salafi-Jihadis as useful tactical assets. Standing off while an enemy mashes up a more dangerous one and occasionally helping them is just sensible war fighting.

The PKK conspiracy theories about Ankara facilitating Takfiri have some basis in reality as well. IS territory being exchange without much fighting was rather characteristic of the early part of Euphrates Shield for instance. IS would rather have the Turks at the PKK's rear even while they defend al Bab against them both. The KRG appeared to have a non-aggression pact with IS after Mosul though it fell apart within six weeks. Just before the first incident above August 2013 the rebels took Menagh Airbase or rather IS stormed it for them and handed it to them. IS then massacred the SAA garrison only part of which escaped into friendly PKK hands. There's rather more evidence of extensive rebel collaboration with AQ Syria which we should remember was an IS seed corn operation that split from them.

It elides over the long IS siege of Deir and the rather frequent IS massacres of large SAA formations after IS took Raqqa. IS reached all the way to Palmyra and beyond. Those massacres were traumatic events for the regime with the SAA often pictured running away across open desert from numerically inferior IS units. That said IS was mostly conquering nearly empty parts of Syria and never looked that dangerous from a regime perspective which focused on holding the big urban centres. The Syrian PKK on the other hand were directly in IS's way and came near to being destroyed by them. Once US airpower was joined with PKK forces pushing back IS Assad would have been a bit daft to waste much of his scarce resources on them. After the regime grabbing Palmyra back recently a small IS unit again handed a far larger R+6 force a hiding as it tried to take back the T4 airbase. The long regime hudna with the PKK in Syria is a far closer tactical collaboration from what I can see with a few violent hiccups as they really are not chums either.

Expecting the regime to fight IS when the main forces giving it gyp are the rebels is as daft as expecting the rebels to fight IS or AQ without considerable incentives. We can clearly see that IS in Syria is now a very secondary adversary for the R+6. That's true of most of our regional allies as well.
 

...
At the same time, Landis says civilians are afraid of what's in store for them on the regime side.

"There is nobody who is your friend in this situation," he says. "The rebels are not your friend — they're using you as a shield. And the regime is not your friend because they've been pounding you. They've seen you as a pawn, or as collateral nuisance."

When civilians reach the relative safety of the government side, the Syrian authorities have lists of names. For any civilian fleeing the rebel side, Landis says, "They know this is the beginning of a long scrutiny."

And that was true for the woman reached by NPR.

As they fled, she told me, she and her husband, along with her sister, brother-in-law and their young children reached a no-man's land where they saw their first government soldiers. They directed the family to a school stadium, and told them to shelter in place.

"Every time someone stood up, we'd tell him to sit down because of the snipers," she says.

When the sun set, the soldiers directed them onward. Everyone from children to the elderly scaled the school's high walls, trekking over broken glass and rubble. The woman tells me it was the most difficult day of their lives. After hours of walking, they reached an area firmly under army control.

Their experience with the soldiers was mixed.

"There were good men and bad men," the woman says. "A part of the army were helping people and made them feel welcome. Some soldiers even helped us carry heavy bundles and suitcases. And others literally dug their hands into people's pockets and robbed them."

At a shelter in the Jibreen area of Aleppo, they were given blankets and food by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. The care they received, she says, "was exemplary."
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And then on to slow handed SAA officers always hoping to milk a fat bribe out of IDPs, through a gamut of checkpoints and finally out of sticky fingered Syrian Stasiland to rebel held countryside. Quite liable to be robbed there as well.

Rather a lot of credible reports of rebels blocking civilian flight as you would expect but when there's a big collapse in the pocket that's not going to hold up. Grim expectations of treatment by the regime are probably a bigger inhibitor. This women left a rebel son behind who'd probably anticipate a possibly terminal spell in the regime's imaginative torture gulag.
 

What that means is a Jaish al Fateh fronted offensive took Idlib with FSA TOW based fire support, Happy Face. Then the R+6 predictably escalated, Sad Face. A year later ISW was tearing out its hair about another consequence: the rising prominence of AQ in the Aleppo struggle. Idlib is a mess of competing Sharia courts dominated by radical Salafi. The Jordanians have basically pulled the plug on the Southern Front as an anti-Assad force. At no point in any of this did Assad show any sign of making concessions.

Langley eagerly embracing the delusional is on SOP unfortunately.
 
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