And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

In The National Even after defeat, ISIL’s influence will remain strong

...
Mr Al Khaznawi cites two reasons for people turning against the Sufi clergy. First, the clerics did not support the peaceful movement against the Syrian regime in 2011. As with the tribal chiefs, they stood by president Bashar Al Assad. Also, many clerics did not show leadership at that time and instead looked after their own interests.

So, the collapse of Sufi clerical authority in the public eye added to the problems caused by the systematic war that ISIL waged against Sufism and Sufi teachings in the region.

The organised effort by ISIL to indoctrinate the population living under its control against Sufism might have a lasting effect even if people do not fully embrace the new ideology.

Takfiri (excommunication) concepts began to gain traction elsewhere in Syria, even where ISIL does not have a presence. Such a trend might include suspicion against practices some extremists deem to be un-Islamic, such as the building of shrines for religious saints or even celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed. There are already indications that at least some "awareness" of such practices has been created as a result of the rise of extremist forces in the country.

Even when ISIL is dismantled, communities that it ruled will have deep bruises to deal with for many years to come. In addition to the broken ties and the psychological scars, it is worth considering the cultural and religious transformation that this region may have experienced over more than two years.
...

Stamping out widespread Sufi inflect Sunni folk practices is very much what the Salafi-Jihadi movement is about. It's a war on fellow Sunnis not adhering to niche Salafist ways. The Muhj often clashed with "Afghani" Arabs when the foreign brothers wrecked grave markers. It includes going Takfir on other Salafists over some detail as often happens with these guys. Of course this twins nicely with sectarian trends targeting other shrine worshippers like the Shia as IS do.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The Aviationist Russian Su-33 crashed in the Mediterranean while attempting to land on Kuznetsov aircraft carrier

Well that bit of showboating is not going well for Putin.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TDB Red Cross Poll: Americans Warm to Torture and Indiscriminate Bombing

...
Ironically, while three-quarters of those surveyed believe attacks on hospitals and health-care providers are wrong, Russians actually outpaced Americans and Brits in their disapproval of such attacks —an irony in that U.S. officials frequently accuse the Russians of indiscriminate attacks in Crimea or in Syriaon behalf of the Bashar Assad regime.

But as we know from RT the saintly RuAF would never do such a thing.

Mind, self righteous Brits and Septics are pretty blind to their governments providing technical assistance and diplomatic cover for very similar Old Skool targeting in Yemen while bimbling along under the impression our "precision" bombing causes almost no civilian casualties.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Could do with a Red Army Choir soundtrack.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Not untypical of besieged behaviour.

 

[Casually Red]

just a quick waffle break-

Like a beacon in the blizzard

 

[Casually Red]

On Politico In Aleppo, I Saw Why Assad Is Winning
Barak Barfi, describing the different layers of Regime support in Aleppo as he's ferried around by regime minders.

Business elites close to the regime who see the rebels as Turkish backed robbers. The better sort of chap in pre-revolt Aleppo was doing ostentatiously well out of Bashar's narrow crony capitalism. That the Baath revolution nationalised everything (i.e. made most businesses Assad clan assets) is not forgotten. The clusters of foreign Jihadists and occasional thick necked Russian. The military closed mouthed about $260 billion's worth of damage mostly caused by R+6 air. On down to some penniless IDPs grateful for a government dole quite contemptuous of the revolt that is largely of their class and sometimes isn't much better than bandits.

Read Heller's long article above on rebel the topsy turvy governance in Idlib sustained by foreign donations because the locals would revolt if they were taxed and there is a basic set of realities here. It still relies on Baathist bureaucrats to some extent despite the locals hatred of them. It's development has been crippled by constant bombing but more by rebel factionalism. Salafist Idlib perhaps provides a more just system but its also somewhat corrupt. Power ultimately rests not with the people but paramilitaries and their kin. In The Nation article above describes a moderating regime under AQ in Idlib since its rebranding. Clearly the enforcement of harsh Sharia was very unpopular even amongst conservative country folk. A frustrated AQ cop complains he's impotent to stop parking violations as the driver might be from another armed group simply shoot him. This isn't the brutalist discipline of IS's extractive Caliphate. How this revolutionary experiment develops is unknown and it may well be crushed out of existence. It's likely the nearest model we have to what a future Syria after Assad would look like and it's loaded with obvious drawbacks.

Life under the regime's familiar heel is a good deal less random. It's worse than it was, drastically poorer and with an extra layer of NDF predators above the old SAA based kleptocracy. The crumbling authoritarian state offers a familiar place of greater safety. And if that involves the government killing a few hundred thousand more of their fellow citizens that's just fine. Given a small civil servant's salary regime supporters grumble Bashar's not brutal enough. It's Assad or we burn the country. And in Syria's biggest cities loyalist however reluctant do seem to be the majority. Very ugly but then most civil wars are.

The R+6 has the military advantage but the Assad clan operating much like a semi-criminal far right 70s South American Junta looks to be winning the governance competition against the reactionary Idlibi Levellers. That latter struggle is the heart of Counter Insurgency.

How's that 7 year old web sensation / child genius in eastern Alleppo getting on ? The one thats all over the news . Got any good quotes for us ?
Might be an idea to hurry if you have some good ones before the whole lot is liberated .

 

[CrabbedOne]

How's that 7 year old web sensation / child genius in eastern Alleppo getting on ? The one thats all over the news . Got any good quotes for us ?
Might be an idea to hurry if you have some good ones before the whole lot is liberated .

An odd focus. Strange as it may seem hating on the enemies endangered children is something that even Israeli hasbara has learnt to to avoid being tempted by. It tends to end in Telegenic Dead and those annoying little corpses can be so inconvenient in PR terms.

 

[DownwardDog]

The Kuznetsov deployment is turning into a right cock and balls show. For whatever reason they are not using the 29Ks as alert tankers and STOBAR forces them to use fractional fuel loads so a risky operation is being turned into a downright dangerous one. Both a/c were lost due to CDP failures on the deck which, while not routine, are a part of carrier aviation and shouldn't be causing airframe losses.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment Is Assad the Author of ISIS? Did Iran Blow Up Assef Shawkat? And Other Tall Tales – By Ehsani2

Casts some doubt on those slanted TDB pieces about Assad and IS.

 

[teqniq]

An odd focus. Strange as it may seem hating on the enemies endangered children is something that even Israeli hasbara has learnt to to avoid being tempted by. It tends to end in Telegenic Dead and those annoying little corpses can be so inconvenient in PR terms.

He's trolling for an outraged response, SOP. Really not worth the trouble.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Kurdish Seams Threaten Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria

...
The eruption of a conflict along one or more of these seams would directly undermine the Anti-ISIS Campaign in Iraq and Syria. The coalition remains over-reliant upon the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga for military gains against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Any outbreak of violence that fragments the coalition and turns coalition actors against one another – either politically or militarily – threatens to stall ongoing operations against Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa City in Syria. These seams also stand to fuel the widespread regional disorder that provides optimal safe haven to ISIS, al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign risks the long-term failure of its mission to degrade and destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria if the coalition proves unable to reduce tensions along these seams and rebalance its campaign to incorporate a wider variety of partner forces on the ground.

Well that took ISW a long time to figure out.

The Obama administration has behaved in the same rather indulgent way it did with Maliki with Irbil's constitution flouting strongman Barzani. You can exaggerate US dependence on the KRG. The ISF is really the key military actor in Iraq. The big difference is US basing and troop presence is much less controversial in the KRG. Iran is also a player Irbil just not as prominently as in Baghdad. For all his faults Barzani has engineered a once unlikely symbiotic economic relationship between Turkey and the KRG. There trouble there is neglected Baghdad relations and brewing trouble over the Disputed Areas.

The PKK presents a different order of problem. It's a revolutionary movement and rather active regional terrorist actor. It's perhaps the most successful opposition movement in Syria thanks to US CAS and a wobbly hudna with Damascus. Unfortunately despite bravely pushing back IS and making not a bad fist of governance in Rojava the PKK's project is really very unpopular in wider Syria. The US left with no good options has participated in creating an inherently destabilising statelet on the Euphrates with the same weakness as the Caliphate it supplants: far too many enemies. Deliberately provoked by IS attacks in Turkey the PKK has foolishly run headlong into the powerful Turkish state under another overreaching Asian strongman Barzani's boss Erdogan. Operation Euphrates Shield now threatens the PKK's rear in Syria while the PKK try to move on Raqqa and both grab for al Bab.

The US tilt behind the Syrian PKK really required a great deal of diplomatic diligence ensuring the PKK-Ankara peace process progressed. Instead this was neglected and a legalistic policy of denial followed. This mare's nest will be passed onto Trump.

 

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[CrabbedOne]

On KCRW The plot thickens in Syria

A podcast, Gutman, Landis and a couple of others discussing IS and Assad.

 

[CrabbedOne]

And Sunni Tel Afar is known for being a teensy bit militant.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Iran's Supreme Leader never takes his eye of that ball.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE Aleppo rebels tell US: We cannot leave our city to mercenaries

...
Britain's foreign minister, Boris Johnson, meanwhile said government advances in Aleppo were not a "victory for Assad" as many Syrians would continue to reject his rule.

"The best outcome is for President Putin and the puppets that he supports to get to the negotiating table and do a deal that moves Syria away from the Assad regime," he said.

Does the twit at the FO mean Trump?

Putin might actually have more sway over The Donald than he does over al Assad currently. This show to me currently looks to be largely run by the SAA and IRGC. The rebels clearly see the IRGC's militias as rather salient though SAA units have been the teeth in some assaults. There's a large concentration of R+6 manpower hitting them from multiple sides. Some reports have artillery playing a greater role than airpower. The Russians deny their air is participating and there is some evidence much of it is focused on SW Idlib. If the pocket falls it really will be Bashar's victory. The reality does seem to be in Aleppo he's much better supported than the rebels who can't even desist from fighting each other as their perimeter shrinks.

This report has 311 civilians being killed in the assault since mid November. That's much lower than I expected, about 100 a week. Especially given the lack of medical services, sudden loss of ground with tens of thousands being in flight often under fire. That's comparable to the rate of civilian casualties the last time the IDF went into Gaza. If you count civilians the way the IDF does i.e. not including fighting age males.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The Daily Telegraph Civilians fleeing rebel-held east Aleppo 'detained and conscripted' by Syrian forces

The dreaded SAA draft another regularly reported IDP nightmare. One young chap here escapes rebel held East Aleppo only to end up serving with the SAA under siege by IS in Deir a couple of weeks later. Out of the frying pan into the meat grinder.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In Rudaw Turkey’s Syria offensive slows down outside ISIS-held al-Bab

Stalled.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Bloomberg Putin Jumps on Trump’s Syria Pivot to Strengthen Hand in Mideast

...
Syria is just part of Putin’s goal in the Middle East, which is to regain the clout the Kremlin had before the Soviet Union collapsed a quarter century ago.

Last week, for example, Putin played a key role in convincing the Saudis and Iranians to set aside their differences and agree on OPEC’s first cut in oil output in eight years. And in Libya, he’s been forging ties with a powerful military leader, General Khalifa Haftar, who’s seeking Russia’s help in fighting Islamic militants.

Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria who’s now a fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said Russia is now “a factor” in Iraq, too, mainly due to the counter-terrorism center Putin established in Baghdad last year to share intelligence with Iranians and Iraqis.

“For 20 years, people basically ignored Russia on the Middle East,’’ Ford said. “The Russian role in the region now will certainly increase.”

Moscow pivoting to the Med and another attempted reset with Russia under Trump.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC The Long View

...
AL: Still, many of the people who criticize Obama over his 2013 decision are not looking at this from the weapons of mass destruction angle. They see it in terms of the effect on Syria and on the efforts to remove Assad. In practice, the chemical weapons deal led to the Geneva II talks in early 2014 and to more interaction with the Russians. For good or bad, the United States seemed to step back from confronting Assad. Would you agree with that description?

DC: It is not a question of whether the United States can overthrow a government or not. We have proven many times over the past few decades that we can. The question is what comes next.

Look at Libya today. There, we now confront the question of whether we should have gone in in the first place. Now, some say—and I’m not one of those people, by the way—why did we do it? They say it was unwise. Then there is the question of how the United States and the Europeans mishandled the post-Gadhafi period. Perhaps we should have put some troops on the ground, even over the objections of the Libyan government at the time? It’s important to understand that in Syria we were all coming from this. We had just confronted the Libyan question, which was much on our mind at the time.

Often, the debate is framed as “doing something” or “doing nothing.” That’s not true. We did a lot of things. We deployed military assets to Jordan and to Turkey. We began supplying the opposition with considerable amounts of assistance. We worked with partners in the region to help the opposition defend itself militarily.

Perhaps, in retrospect, we could have tested the risk of escalation further. But the most difficult question, for which Obama constantly sought an answer, was how to prevent this from escalating into a conflict for which the United States would be held fully responsible and that would envelop U.S. foreign policy for years to come. Iraq did envelop our foreign policy through the last decade and we wanted to prevent that from happening again. I don’t think that is misreading history. It is to have learned from history.

The costs of the Paris&London driven Libyan debacle. It really sunk the idea of a strings free airpower intervention with Obama.

Interview with Derek Chollet an Obama administration insider also emphasises their focus on securing Syria's CW capability. Something that's often forgotten. Describes what happened as an "ugly win". Certainly not how it was viewed in Riyadh.

The old WMD+terrorists meme living on after it had been used as a pretext in Iraq. Bit of an odd obsession given all the limitations of the stocks involved. Of course it does provide a realist reason for Uncle Sam sticking his nose into what really wasn't his business. Suggests to me lurking deep suspicion of the revolt. One that the Israelis shared.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From here.

This is underplaying the SAA's role which is still very signifiant especially in the defensive and in terms of fire support. Of course 20K is not an insignificant number when the rebels are also mostly stay at home types. Only the big Salafi mobs have the ability to project brigade sized offensives across the country and there's even less unity of command. The far larger all volunteer ISF's "deployable force" around Mosul is about 60K. Most of which are not particularly suitable for that battle. It has some elite units but the SAA has always been a "check point force". It's a reluctant army of conscripts with a badly paid, barrack slum dwelling, mostly Alawite officer corps. "Bashar or we burn the country" fanatics are a minority. Which is why a few thousand HA fighters backed up by the IRGC's Jihadist international matter so much in Aleppo.

Another dodgy infographic:

Note note, not very useful.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TNI The 2 Big Reasons Why Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier is Having So Many Problems

...
The reason the U.S. Navy can operate a carrier for more than half a century is because the service maintains the material condition of its ships and has superbly trained crews. The Russians—especially over the past 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union—have not always properly maintained Kuznetsov. Nor has Kuznetsov’s crew been given enough of a chance to gain the requisite proficiency to safely conduct carrier operations at sea.
...

A learning experience.

 

[DownwardDog]

On TNI The 2 Big Reasons Why Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier is Having So Many Problems
A learning experience.

This part of the article:

While Kuznetsov does not have the ability to launch a tanker—or even buddy-refueller configured fighters—the Russians should have designated a divert field for emergencies.

is incorrect.

It is possible to configure a MiG-29K as an alert tanker using a UPAZ 1-A 'Sakhalin' pod and it's standard practice for the other MiG-29K operator, the Indian Navy. The Russians are choosing not to, probably because the crews aren't AAR qualified.

All of the pilots in the Kuzentsov air wing are civvie contractors. I hope they are getting a nice bonus every time they have to hit the silk.

 

[CrabbedOne]

What's in need of being branded a war crime in ours eyes often depends on who is the perp.

Storming a city is usually a bloody business. Ordering the civ pop to evacuate may be a potential war crime but it's also on SOP. The spotless Israelis routinely demanded evacuation in the last Gaza nastiness. The pious US regularly encouraged evacuation when taking Iraq cities. The second Fallujah is an example that comes to mind. Most of AQI actually flitted amongst the IDPs and set up in Mosul. Hundreds of civilians still died I recall. Not everybody is capable of fleeing but its often both the humanitarian choice and militarily expedient. In East Aleppo the UN didn't advocate for a mass evacuation as we didn't want the rebels we were backing to lose. This was from a humanitarian point of view a rather questionable position.

We currently have a painful contrary example. In taking Mosul Baghdad's opted not to evacuate the population leafleting the city to stay put. There wasn't the capacity to handle the IDP flow. The UN warned there were only 100K camp places available. Mosul may have a population of 1.5 million. Less than a third of the city has been taken and 80K+ have fled. The initial US devised plan vainly hoped IS would flee into Syria. The campaign was rather hasty in my opinion. It's a bid to shore up a PM in trouble but it always was likely to be problematic in this respect. Now the ISF is making painfully slow progress fighting through a still densely populated city with the inevitable high civilian toll. Stalled ISF commanders have demanded Baghdad reverse its position on evacuation. It's tricky as IS also has a habit of staging punitive massacring large numbers of civilians so there is a pressing humanitarian imperative for haste.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Direct Former ambassador to Syria Robert Ford: ‘I don’t think the surrender of Aleppo will bring an end to the civil war’

...
Q: In a June interview with Robin Wright for the New Yorker, you said that there are “many indications” that the opposition can be “unified enough to present a relevant and cogent program and alternative” to the regime. Since August the regime has made significant ground advances both in the Damascus countryside and Aleppo. Do you still believe that the opposition can meaningfully unify? Would the United States even want to work with this opposition, or will it be so strongly dominated by Islamist opposition groups that a “moderate opposition” would be unrecognizable?

I distinguish between Islamists and extremists. I don’t think all Islamists are extremists. There is a broad political program embodied in the High Negotiations Committee, with a large amount of consensus between someone as secular as Riad Hijab and someone as Islamist as Mohammad Alloush. On that level, I can see the outlines of a moderate, political opposition. There’s enough unity there that you can take that seriously.

However, [the opposition] has two big hindrances. First, they are becoming way too sectarian in terms of a failure—an unwillingness even—to reach out to communities that are still supporting the Assad government. It is not a secret that communities in places like Tartus, Latakia and Qardaha have suffered terrible casualties. A lot of their young people have fled the country because they don’t want to be sucked in to military service. But despite that, neither the political nor the armed opposition has ever reached out to them. They’ve never said “we’re not coming after you, we’re just trying to rid the country of Assad.” I think that’s a terrible mistake by the armed and the political opposition. They have allowed extremist language to seep into their normal day-to-day language. How many times do you hear the word Nusayri [Ed.: A derogatory term for Alawites] instead of saying “people who support the Assad government?” It’s a terrible mistake.

The second problem is that there’s an unwillingness to publically confront the Sunni extremist elements that are also fighting Assad. In so doing, the opposition leaves Sunni Arab communities in places like Damascus, Homs and Hama thinking that Riad Hijab or Mohammad Alloush actually support the Al-Qaeda program for Syria even though they do not. This isn’t a new problem. It goes back years, but the opposition’s time to fix it is diminishing.
...

The rebels had lost the support of an awful lot of urban Syrians who'd been prone to demand reform even before the revolt militarised. It always had the ghost of the very sectarian MB rising of the early 80s within it. It's far too late to repair that. That and political fragmentation has made the rebels ever ruling Syria in any organised representative way an unlikely prospect for a few years now.

There is some wisdom here but Ford in this piece is recommending the rebels switch over to insurgent tactics rather than try to hang on to Idlib's cities. That is likely; there's plenty of expertise in such war fighting available. But it might be like the sectarian savagery of the first Iraqi Sunni rising that killed masses of enemy civ pop. Not something I'd wish on Syrians just to spoil an Assad victory. At some point resistance does become a futile source of employment.

He clearly favours dropping the PKK and Trump swinging behind Ankara and against the meddling Iranians. Well as far as I can see the Ford school of ME policy has only tended to ease Iran's path to far greater influence in Syria. If the PKK and Turks could be brought to peace talks there may be fewer problems with the PKK ruling a good chunk of Syria than the current administration of Idlib.

He has a clever suggestion that the rebels release captured Iraqi Shia militia back to Najaf in order to try and split the Iraqis from the Iranians. He may miss that Iraqi Shia genuinely fear the advance of the sectarian rebels he has encouraged. They were not popping Champagne corks when JaF took Idlib. Aleppo for them is just up the road from Mosul. The Shia Hashd is popular with Iraqi Shia for very rational defensive reasons. It's not just an IRGC front. The Iraqis, a people not so long ago patriotically united in a bloody war against the Persians, joke that if the Americans wanted to defeat terrorism they should bomb Riyadh. They mostly think the US is behind IS, which is ridiculous, until you look with their eyes on the inconsistencies of US policy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Some truth in that.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From DIIS ISRAEL’S CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN THE SYRIAN WAR

...
However, even limited military intervention and assistance by Israel carries serious risks or may have unintentional consequences in terms of 1) assisting the rebel forces, 2) ending the war and/or tilt the balance of power, 3) undermining Israel’s own security. First, any direct Israeli military operations in favour of the rebel groups risk undermining these groups’ legitimacy in the eyes of Syrians and the Arab world at large. In Arab politics, Israel is not a “normal actor” and Israel’s capability to shape actors and outcomes in the Syrian war is therefore very limited. Secondly, we know from other civil wars with intense proxy-war dynamics that enhanced military engagement tends to lead to escalation by rivalling powers. In Lebanon’s protracted civil war, which has many similarities with the Syrian war today, external interventions led to a prolonged and destructive war, without significantly altering the balance of power at the end of the war. Thirdly, once involved, Israel may risk being dragged into further conflict and involvement, without achieving its initial objective. Israel’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war was also meant to be limited in scope and time, but in effect lasted for 18 years. Israel became embroiled in Lebanese infighting, allying itself with a Maronite Christian militia, it engaged in asymmetrical warfare against a myriad of militia organizations and paramilitary forces that were increasingly supported by rivalling regional powers in Syria and Iran. Israel ended up exchanging one adversary on its northern border (PLO) with another (Hezbollah). Moreover, the war was highly unpopular in Israeli domestic society, in part because of the atrocities committed against civilians, and partly because the Lebanon War was seen as a war of choice, rather than one of necessity.

Caution and restraint is therefore needed. Israel may be effective in influencing US policy on Syria in a more pro-active direction, it may provide intelligence, and some humanitarian relief in the south. However, Israel should stay the course and remain only minimally involved on the side of the rebel forces and within the limits of the “red-line policy”.

Anybody winning in Syria is probably bad for Israel though a weaker divided Syria is almost certainly a bonus. Unfortunately for them I'd predict more threats emanating at Israel from Syria than before the Arab Spring as Assad was rather a passive aggressive neighbour even if Iran aligned hardly a puppet.

In their shoes I'd certainly be unhappy with the growing strength of Iran in Syria. All that IRGC militia beard power projected at East Aleppo can't be a comforting sight. That wasn't what this proxy war was advertised to do by Beltway hawks. Israeli moves within it have mostly focused on countering Iran. The Russians shouldering in to set set up shop next door is also viewed with great wariness. The Israelis are certainly the least involved of the neighbours. Their painful experience in Lebanon is probably a big factor in that. Something rather akin to the Pentagon's chastening Iraq war.

This paper is a little out of date as the IDF did recently tangle with an IS affiliated group. I'd expect the Israelis to become more involved in shaping the end state if the R+6 continue to win.