And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

On ARI Foreign Backers and the Marginalization of the Free Syrian Army

...
Conclusion The Syrian war has become an internationalized conflict in which local actors struggle to have some leverage on the course of the events. Fighting without outside support has become impossible. However, what is important is for all actors in Syria to be allies of foreign backers instead of mere proxies. The FSA is too decentralized and fragmented to avoid the imposition of agendas by external actors, and it is nearly impossible for the rebels to define a common long-term strategy.

In comparison, the Kurdish PKK-aligned forces have been more successful in negotiating their agenda with their backers, using the competition between potential backers Russia and the USA to push each to raise their offers. For example, they agreed to take the Arab town of Shadadi from ISIS at the request of the Americans in exchange for the guarantee that they will be supported in Minbij. They are also currently negotiating their way to Raqqa, which they will not help take if they do not get anything in return.
...

Though it does look like the PKK may be about to get shafted. Its conquest agenda just fitted with US goals but that may be temporary.

Lots of FSA flagged groups still exists but they've been rampantly exploited by foreign powers with their own agendas. While radical Salafists lead the attempts to break the siege on East Aleppo the FSA groups are often elsewhere. The US lost interest in backing anyone that didn't fight IS and was focused on Assad. Jordan once Russia got involved proved more interested in its own border security. The Turks in stopping the PKK's Rojava project. The cynical British manipulation of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans comes to mind.

The regime also continually welched on truces made with FSA groups making them look like mugs beside radical Beards who won't parley.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks WILL TURKEY PRESENT TRUMP WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI IN SYRIA?

...
The Turkish government has, at least publicly, expressed displeasure with the current U.S. approach. Ankara had previously asked the United States to delay the offensive for four months, a plan that would presumably rest on the creation of an alternative force to the YPG to take the city. The operations north of city are relatively straightforward and require little manpower, but any assault on the city itself will require that the YPG move fighters from various front lines along the Turkish border and near the Euphrates.

To slow the Raqqa offensive, the Turkish government has repeatedly threatened to attack SDF positions, particularly in Manbij and along the border. Turkey has threatened to use forces fighting alongside its troops near Al Bab to attack SDF positions on the northern and western edges of Manbij. Ankara is also reportedly training a rival force to the SDF that is culled from elements previously affiliated with Syrian Revolutionary Front. This group is part of the vetted Syrian opposition but is hostile to the YPG. Along with well-placed leaks, such a group could be used to spearhead a Turkish backed operation for Tel Abyad, an SDF-held town on the Turkish border. Alternatively, this group could end up as nothing more than a weak vanity project for exiled military commanders.

Regardless, the combination of these two factors means that YPG is now hesitant to send reinforcements to support the Raqqa operation that would leave its flanks vulnerable to a Turkish-backed offensive. Turkey’s position means that it need not actually intervene in Manbij or Tel Abyad, but instead it can use the threat of force to slow a U.S. backed offensive. Ankara could also use Arab elements based in Turkey and part of exile governing structures from cities and towns the SDF now controls to sow internal dissent — a policy that would weaken SDF control over territory over the long term.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
Pro-regime pages on Tuesday, November 15, have circulated news about Assad’s forces and allied militias preventing civilians from entering the suburb until the looting of the houses was completed, in addition to stealing furniture and electrical supplies from the postal building.

The chairman of the board at the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Industry, and a member of parliament, Faris Shahabi, said on his Facebook page: “At least they left the people the doors to their homes. I swear if the traitor thief al-Hayani was alive (the previous commander of the Badr Martyrs Brigade) he would have been put to shame by your looting of the Assad district in this record time.”
...

So patriotic and fast.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
CIA officers, particularly the station chief in Turkey, are known to routinely blow off the concerns of the Special Forces sergeants. The CIA has a careerist culture in which numbers have to be met in order for their officers to be eligible for promotion, therefore the mission takes second place to checking tick marks on a ledger. Special Forces trainers complain that they were taking on too many rebels for them to control, and that many were actually terrorists. Requests from the Green Berets for a security element from the Ranger Regiment to guard the rebels were dismissed. The CIA blew off any and all concerns that the Green Berets had leading many of the trainers to actively sabotage the programs by passively refusing to train rebels that they know are actually terrorists. Some senior CIA staffers stayed away from the mission entirely, believing that the eventual blowback would be enough to destroy their careers.
...

Points out a legal loophole provided to allow the training of designated terrorists. I doubt Special Forces trainers would be much surprised by that.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Warning Update: Russia Escalates Its Air Campaign in Syria

...
Russia will likely attempt to achieve its short-term aim to clear opposition forces from Eastern Aleppo City while positioning itself to maintain its long-term influence amidst a new incoming administration in the U.S.

• Russia will leverage the asymmetric advantage of its air and naval assets in an attempt to force the surrender of besieged districts in Aleppo City, defeat the acceptable opposition in Northwestern Syria, and precipitate the transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-jihadist groups.

• The successful bombardment of Aleppo by Russian air and naval units is meant to bolster Russian domestic support for the intervention and President Vladimir Putin’s regime.

• Strengthening Russian IADS by deploying redundant systems will further constrain U.S. options for engagement in Syria.

• Russia aims to exploit the radicalization of the opposition to legitimize its continued intervention in Syria and create leverage to negotiate a military partnership with the incoming U.S. administration. A military partnership along Russia’s terms would significantly confine U.S. action in Syria and allow Russia to consolidate its position of regional influence at the expense of U.S. national security interests.

The unsuccessful attempts to break the siege have been dominated by Salafi-Jihadi groups making hay out of the situation. A year ago ISW had been worried about their growing dominance and hoped that splits could be engineered that would separate the reconcilable rebels from them. It's gone the other way despite a great deal of obvious support via Turkey notably in the form of Grad MLRs which have pounded regime targets.

The Russians are deepening their commitment and clearly prepared for an air war with the US. US interest in Syria is currently mostly defined in terms of fighting IS. The bulk of that has mostly been done in and for Iraq not Syria. And Turkey-PKK relations are an increasing problem there. Turkey-Iraq relations are also in a dangerous state. Obama after his first meeting with Trump announced an increased focus on AQ in Syria. That implies at least a lot of deconfliction.

Part of the reason the US tilted against Assad in Syria was in order to contain Iranian influence after liberated Iraq developed into in practice an Iranian ally instead of enemy. The US has ended up facing Russia breaking out of NATO containment and building up basing on the Med and Black Sea. While regime change in Damascus appears unlikely Assad, who we hope to split from them at one point before the revolt, is far more dependant on Teheran. And Iran far from being exhausted has been rather active behind the Iraqi Hashd in Iraq. The IRGC appears to be preparing to add more Hashd to Syria after the fall of Mosul. Obama has left Trump with a ME mess far wider than the one he faced.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On SST The Situation in Rojava - TTG

Points to an R+6 build up in the al Safirah area south of al Bab as a possible spoiler for Turkish attempts to take the town.

Stein up thread pointed out al Bab might fall easily if IS withdraws forces to reinforce Raqqa. For months there has been little between the SDF and Raqqa. It's more a question of the PKK's priorities having been being to head West and unify with Afrin. The Turks threatening the PKK's rear along their border is now a complication. So are apparent divisions in the SDF's Arabs who are meant to hold Raqqa and holding it is the tricky part.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Direct ‘Hundreds’ of minority residents in northeast Syria oppose census amidst fears of Kurdish authoritarianism, according to human rights monitor

Preparations for federal elections the problem being the PKK's confederalist ideas are opposed by most Syrians and even a large minority of Syrian Kurds. The Arabs tend to cling to their flag just like Arab Iraqis. Kurds are often both conservative and rather stroppy when pushed around by folk with guns. By Syrian standards the PKK's rule my not be a big Girl Scouts picnic but appears better than most. Some locals joke that they just take down Assad's picture and put up Apo's but there's at least an attempt at inclusion. Forced conscription mentioned again here is an obvious source of tension that some emigrate to avoid.

A pity as a less centralised Syria while the Assad clan rules might actually be more realistic.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Surrenders to the regime often go this way: the terms are broken by one side or the other then worse ones renegotiated.

 

[teqniq]

Russia/Syria: Satellite, Video Imagery Confirm School Attack

 

[CrabbedOne]

On LWJ Analysis: Jund al Aqsa’s deep Gulf roots

...
Postscript

Al Nusrah Front’s 2016 rebranding, Jund al Aqsa’s original separation from it, and their recent reunification are all reflections of Al Qaeda’s strategy of diversifying its investments and downplaying its formal ties to such groups.

The Treasury Department’s Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Adam Szubin has called Al Nusrah Front’s “purported” split with Al Qaeda “transparently misleading” and warns that it “will not change our approach to combating the group’s financial and logistical support networks.” Last month, Szubin added that “we still see in some cases a lack of political will” in Qatar and Kuwait “to effectively enforce their combating financing terrorist laws against all threats regardless of their organization or affiliation.”

Now that Jund al Aqsa is under US sanctions, the administration will also want to keep an eye on this terrorist faction’s deep financial links to the Gulf, as well as how those ties may benefit al Qaeda’s renamed paramilitary army.

One of the most extreme groups in Syria rather sympathetic with IS at times.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Overdone the kitten sanctuaries a slightly.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Jihadology GUEST POST: An Interview with Rachid Kassim, Jihadist Orchestrating Attacks in France

...
The leadership of the Islamic State initially emphasized the need for hijrah, or migration, to ISIS territory. They argued that it is incumbent on Muslims to travel and live under the so-called Caliphate, where Islamic law, as they see it, is being implemented in its fullest and purest form. Attacking locally is a better option only if individuals are unable to travel.

“At the beginning, the caliphate called for hijrah,” Kassim tells me, “now, it is best to launch attacks in dar ul-kufr. Because hijrah is very difficult now.”
...

So less and less righteous Caliphate being available just stick around in the lands of disbelief (e.g. France) and cause mayhem.

Interesting interview, he's still sad about having to leave his cat behind when he made hirjah but is quite happy beheading enemies of Allah.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On HBL For our international readers: Meeting Bashar al-Assad

...
And yet, below the city’s surface of unassuming normality there is a deep well of trauma. For many Syrians, there is no longer any way back into the “embrace of the nation,” to use a stock phrase of the official propaganda. For many, making any contact with the authorities is a gamble with death, in case they have a warrant out for their arrest or some relative of theirs has been snared by the secret police. According to Amnesty International, around 17,000 Syrians have been murdered in captivity since 2011. The figure may be much higher, with opposition groups claiming that 65,000 people have gone missing after being abducted by their government.

To many, making peace with a president with so much blood on his hands is unthinkable—they’ve already lost everything and now prepare to go down fighting. To others, such a peace may well seem possible, but they still cannot bring themselves to bet that Assad’s promises of free passage can be trusted. Lose a bet like that, and you run a large risk of never emerging from your jail cell alive.

***

Nevertheless, Syrians’ utter weariness of this war and their fear of chaos have strengthened Assad’s hand. This is the hand that he will now seek to play as the conflict moves to a tipping point, by offering his enemies an amnesty. He calculates that as Aleppo and the rebel suburbs of Damascus fall, many opposition fighters will lose any lingering hope of final victory, and many civilians will conclude that their options have been whittled down to two: life in an authoritarian state under Assad’s rule, or life in stateless chaos under Assad’s bombs. Already, since 2013, more than 84,000 former fugitives have accepted to return to government-held areas, renounce politics, and accept Assad’s offer of a return to normal life, claims a colonel in the Syrian intelligence services.

To Assad, that slow in-gathering of former dissidents under his rule is in fact the best evidence that he is winning.

“Maybe they are against the Baath Party,” he says, “and maybe they are against the president and the officials and this whole structure. But they now value the state.”

And in Syria, “the state” can only mean one thing. The militia fighters write it on the walls near their checkpoints in Old Town: they’re Junoud al-Assad, Assad’s soldiers. Such is the reality of all this quaint talk of constitutions and electoral terms. On public buildings and propaganda posters, the words Souriya al-Assad tell the truth: Assad’s Syria, that’s exactly what this country is.

It now looks increasingly likely that that is also what it will remain.

Lund on a recent visit to Damascus. He finds it much as before the war but poorer. Assad is unchanged, confident and utterly unrepentant atop a great pile of skulls. The war tilts his way. The splintered opposition often towards ugly extremes. The Russians blather with the Americans about compromises and transitions that simply are not in their gift.

And based on what happened to political dissidents after Hama in 82 the Assad clan's word on amnesty is probably wind. A life for you and your kin of waiting for that last early morning call from the vindictive Mukhabarat. However the alternative maybe a miserable exile or joining something like the Taliban in some godforsaken hole that might as well be Afghanistan.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Well that looks tricky.

Qabasin has changed hands four times in as many days.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

In TJP Hezbollah Sending More Fighters to Syria

...
Hezbollah is sending more fighters from Lebanon into Syria, according to the Russian paper Izvestia.

At the moment, there are 5000 Hezbollah terrorists fighting for Assad in Syria, this latest batch raises that number to 7000, and the plan is for that number to soon go up to 10,000. These terrorist are part of a light division deployed on 4x4s, just like ISIS.
...

Some reports of HA having up to 15K fighters in Syria plus quite a lot of armour. I think 10K would be a stretch; the Iranians say HA has 65K men but the deployable reality is probably much lower. HA have been raising other Leb militias and their officers are leading Syrian units as well which might make up the numbers.

 

[J Ed]

In TJP Hezbollah Sending More Fighters to Syria
Some reports of HA having up to 15K fighters in Syria plus quite a lot of armour. I think 10K would be a stretch; the Iranians say HA has 65K men but the deployable reality is probably much lower. HA have been raising other Leb militias and their officers are leading Syrian units as well which might make up the numbers.

I thought Hezbollah were scaling down in Syria?

 

[CrabbedOne]

I thought Hezbollah were scaling down in Syria?

They were in the Summer but HA have been active in Aleppo lately and they did stage that big armoured parade up thread. Some Iraqi militias who were fighting around Aleppo are now busy West of Mosul so it's not unlikely other forces are being pulled in for the big push. IRGC rotations are quite short and I assume the same's true for HA that would make it hard to keep track of.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In TDB Nearly 300 Dead in ‘Heaviest Bombardment’ of Aleppo

About 50 people getting killed a day.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Rudaw Turkey bombs ISIS targets near Syria’s al-Bab, YPG targets near Manbij

...
Targets destroyed included four buildings which ISIS reportedly used as a headquarters.

Sunday’s airstrikes followed a bomb attack by ISIS near Al-Bab which left one Turkish soldier dead and two wounded on Saturday.

The Turkish military also reported that over the weekend it targeted a total of 79 ISIS targets with artillery. Ankara also attacked at least five targets belonging to the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with both air and artillery strikes, reportedly wounding at least four fighters west of the city of Manbij.

Turkey staunchly opposes the YPG presence on the west bank of the Euphrates River and has demanded they withdraw from Manbij. The YPG had previously announced it was withdrawing from Manbij but Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said on Friday that Ankara was still awaiting the groups withdrawal.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

Very unlikely to work for the rebels either.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND AVOIDING TRUMP’S FIRST BIG MISTAKE

...
The time has come to recalibrate U.S. policy on Syria, but how the incoming Trump administration chooses to do so will have profound implications for the stability of Syria, the broader region, and the U.S.-Russian relationship. Trump appears to have given very little thought to most foreign policy issues, although he has repeatedly and superficially returned to the issues presented by Russia and Syria. He has done so with no apparent consideration of America’s broader strategic interests. The proper approach to Syria and Russia is not to be found in unbending hawkishness; it remains possible to work selectively yet cooperatively with Russia at a time of heightened tensions. But a heedless embrace of Putin and Assad would constitute a radical volte-face that would undermine long-term stability in Syria and imperil American equities abroad.

Basically reckons the US should drop its goal of regime change in Syria as this is unrealistic but otherwise should continue as it's going. Trouble is it's really gone badly wrong and the US hasn't much leverage over its clients and neither does Russia. Focusing on deescalation is perhaps what we should have done from the start. We've done rather the opposite in a quixotic quest for leverage.

It's a fair point that fully embracing Assad would be rather toxic for the US. It's also probably stupid to assume that making nice with Russia will produce better Kremlin behaviour. In Syria there are certain shared US-Russian interests mainly focused on terrorism. A big issue for the US is Iran's strengthening position in Syria and what that means for Israel. Trump isn't stupid to see some need for collaboration. Just as backing the Syrian PKK has harmed US-Turkish relations sometimes there's just an ugly path dependency and no good choices.

You could look across the line in the sand to Iraq were Great Satan hating Iranian backed Hashd groups played a very signifiant if sometimes unhelpful role in operations where the US also participated. The Khomeinist Hashd isn't a phenomenon the US likes but the fact is they are rather popular with a lot of the Shia population and they played a role in saving post-Saddam Baghdad. The US just had to live with that reality. It would have been nonsensical to attack them as well as IS. The ghastly Assad also has a substantial base of support in a lot of useful Syria. Too many Syrians fear what the revolt's Beards may bring.

The worry perhaps should be similar to that with the very repressive Badr fiefdom in Diyala. That Assad's brutally ways will foster future movements like IS or AQ Syria that exploit the chaos of the revolt currently. The Russians believe they can do what they did in Chechnya i.e. beat the revolt into submission. I think it quite likely that this will not work as well as they hope. Syria will be the epicentre of the global Salafi-Jihadi movement. The Baathist state is too weak, rotten and near to bankruptcy. The PKK on collision course with the revolt and Turkey is going to present similar problems for different reasons. Then it's a matter of what can be done to mitigate the damage.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The John Batchelor Show Counterfactual: Russia vs US in Syria. @pappalardojoe @popularmechanics

Podcast discussing a piece on what WWIII starting in Syria might look like.

 

[Pickman's model]

On The John Batchelor Show Counterfactual: Russia vs US in Syria. @pappalardojoe @popularmechanics

Podcast discussing a piece on what WWIII starting in Syria might look like.

surely it's already started. the war, that is, not a conflict between russia and america. it's like the lazy way we date the start of the second world war to 1939 (and 1941 if you're american) rather than include the japanese war in china or spain. is the global war on terror so soon forgotten?

 

[CrabbedOne]

surely it's already started. the war, that is, not a conflict between russia and america. it's like the lazy way we date the start of the second world war to 1939 (and 1941 if you're american) rather than include the japanese war in china or spain. is the global war on terror so soon forgotten?

There are always wars. A better comparison from our perspective is WWI and the much smaller wars and colonial competition that preceded a disaster that a lot of people considered unthinkable. Historians still don't really agree on how that collapse of a well oiled globalised system happened.

We've been bombing Iraq on and off for over two and a half decades. I'd frame America's onshore dalliances in the ME as really starting with Desert Storm in Kuwait. Really part of the hubris of the post-Cold War period when we went from trying to make sure Moscow never got as worrying again to arrogantly to discount the Russians as a future threat. That move really just flows into the GWOT as a greater distraction in dusty places. Most of it is a series of relatively minor third word police actions at the edge of empire that the late Victorians and Edwardians would have regarded as normal imperial business. Butcher and bolt with drones and JDAMs. The Ottomans in the Balkans in the 1900s is another comparison.

A clash of great powers like WWI is really moving into a different kind of truly existential ballgame. Unfinished business it really ends in WWII. Then we had the often very scary and not so Cold War. To equate the GWOT is hysterical hype like comparing AQ's threat to Britain as being like the Luftwaffe.

We are probably entering a much more dangerous time once more while still rather distracted by brown bearded small fry like IS and having difficulty abandoning dangerously obsolete triumphalist 90s world views. Trump as the twitchily inadequate Kaiser with a touch of the land greedy Brits and French poaching colonies. A touchy, none too competent Czar in Moscow.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW The Road to ar-Raqqah: Background on the Syrian Democratic Forces

Disappointingly thin but does list out SDF components.

 

[Pickman's model]

There are always wars. A better comparison from our perspective is WWI and the much smaller wars and colonial competition that preceded a disaster that a lot of people considered unthinkable. Historians still don't really agree on how that collapse of a well oiled globalised system happened.

We've been bombing Iraq on and off for over two and a half decades. I'd frame America's onshore dalliances in the ME as really starting with Desert Storm in Kuwait. Really part of the hubris of the post-Cold War period when we went from trying to make sure Moscow never got as worrying again to arrogantly to discount the Russians as a future threat. That move really just flows into the GWOT as a greater distraction in dusty places. Most of it is a series of relatively minor third word police actions at the edge of empire that the late Victorians and Edwardians would have regarded as normal imperial business. Butcher and bolt with drones and JDAMs. The Ottomans in the Balkans in the 1900s is another comparison.

A clash of great powers like WWI is really moving into a different kind of truly existential ballgame. Unfinished business it really ends in WWII. Then we had the often very scary and not so Cold War. To equate the GWOT is hysterical hype like comparing AQ's threat to Britain as being like the Luftwaffe.

We are probably entering a much more dangerous time once more while still rather distracted by brown bearded small fry like IS and having difficulty abandoning dangerously obsolete triumphalist 90s world views. Trump as the twitchily inadequate Kaiser with a touch of the land greedy Brits and French poaching colonies. A touchy, none too competent Czar in Moscow.

there are, as you say, always wars. but there are not always wars in which the great powers interest themselves, and the current conflict in the middle east is in many ways a continuation of the war capriciously started by the united states and its allies in 2003. while, yes, the great powers have not yet clashed, there is every chance there will be a general war within the next few years, something i have not been entirely silent on on this site - although it has been my belief it would be a clash between china and the united states. russia on its own cannot hope to win a war against nato, as it simply does not have the allies on whom it could rely when the warsaw pact existed and when it could call on the resources of its 'near abroad'. but the involvement of great powers in syria may lead to unintended consequences in particular should china more closely align its interests with putin's.

 

[CrabbedOne]

The Chinese have been getting rather supportive of Assad. Mainly because they don't like what their Uyghur dissidents are getting up to Idlib.

In terms of personalities it looks volatile. What I notice is we are shortly going to have two very touchy men in charge of the world's largest nuclear stockpiles. One a large inexperienced bully the other a chippy little fella from a very hard school. The careful Lavrov recently derided both US Presidential teams as "Pussies". That it starts with a bit of bromance on Trump's side is only likely to lead to a very large temper tantrum.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Washington Institute Status of the Syrian Rebellion: Numbers, Ideologies, and Prospects

Balanche qualifies "Secularist" as being mostly not set on secular government but favouring a large role for Sharia in the state; "Other" in other words. The lower pies show that these groups make up the largest category of a revolt that's hard to size accurately. These are mostly the groups we are happy to back while our allies often have other preferences. Unfortunately this is by far the most fragmented category.

The Syrian Salafi-Jihadists simply have a national rather that international focus in the manner of AQ or IS, Ahar al Sham for example. Political Islamist is of the representative political but very broad Muslim Brother tradition that Ankara is most sympathetic with.

The top pie is ISW identified "power brokers" rebel groups is probably most interesting. Groups big and cohesive enough to work beyond the purely defensive like Ahar.

Balanche struggles a bit to offer a way of avoiding large parts of Syria turning into an AQ tolerating Emirate as Idlib has. Suggests we back the "Secularists" more strongly. But he points out this won't work if our allies pour in support behind other factions.

I'd add the rather obvious problem that the larger more revolutionary groups will eventually have them for breakfast as has been the growing tendency. Who has the most TOWs, Grads or MANPADs is one factor but the revolt has to consolidate to fight the R+6 effectively. It must become a revolution like the PKK not diverse risings and the political energy is with the radical shades. It's far to late to reengineer the Syrian opposition.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
Brett McGurk, the special US envoy for the anti-IS coalition, caused a stir when he tweeted on Nov. 16, “Milestone: all YPG units to depart Manbij and return east of Euphrates after local units complete training to maintain security after [IS]."

With these words, McGurk, who has become a bete noir in Ankara over his perceived affection for the Syrian Kurds, in Turkey’s eyes, “confessed” that the YPG was still in Manbij. Ankara’s ire was further stoked when American Col. John Dorrian, a spokesman for the anti-IS coalition, confirmed last week that Turkish-backed rebel moves on al-Bab were not being backed by coalition airstrikes.

Over the past weeks, Turkey has taken matters into its own hands, resuming airstrikes against IS and YPG targets near al-Bab, ostensibly with Russia’s blessing.

Washington’s frantic efforts to deconflict its Turkish and Kurdish allies are simply not working, and the YPG is threatening to pull out of the Raqqa campaign if Turkey does not halt its attacks. Erdogan might be betting that US President-elect Donald Trump will be more sympathetic to Turkey’s concerns about the YPG.

But the counterargument, that through its actions Turkey is undermining the fight against IS, may well prevail.

I do wonder how Trump will cope with Erdogan? The unpredictable huckster showman V the despotic strongman he'd like to be. The PKK remain the quickest way to Raqqa and Trump will want that in the bag for the Mid Terms. Trump tends to think in very transactional terms but that's really not a simple problem.