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And next, Syria?

In FP It’s Time to Give Assad’s Soldiers a Ticket Out

Interesting suggestion: undermine Assad by helping young Syrian men avoid military service.

Points out there are large numbers of deserters and draft dodgers. Better off Syrian boys simply bribe their way around service or move to Beirut. It gives a couple of tragic examples of SAA service. They may dislike the regime but very few of these reluctant young men actually join rebel groups. Most Syrians seem to want little part in the fighting. Some may be cowards, some simply won't burn their country to preserve the awful Bashar those that do may see that as their only alternative. Our current policy is essentially to drain the SAA pool of conscripts by arming the rebels to kill these young men once drafted. Probably more than 100K have already perished in SAA uniform. It might be more humane (and cheaper) to offer them an easy path to refugee status and a new life elsewhere.
 
On ISW Warning Update: Al Qaeda’s Global Attack Campaign
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The US does not have a global strategy to eliminate the safe havens that al Qaeda uses to design and execute attacks abroad. American airstrikes to disrupt imminent al Qaeda attacks from Syria and Afghanistan are necessary but insufficient. The US needs a plan to deprive al Qaeda of the terrain it holds in Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in order to deprive the group of continued ability to regenerate its attack capability. The US must also recognize that the foreign fighter problem transcends ISIS and take immediate steps to address al Qaeda recruitment abroad, including in US allies in the Middle East as well as Europe.
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The terrain AQ holds in Syria it does so in clear collaboration with portions of the revolt. So it follows you either need to turn these rebels against AQ or view such rebels as enemies as we eventually did AQ's host the Afghan Taliban. If we did the latter what remains of the divided revolt would be easy prey for the R+6. So then if we continue our line of policy it's necessary to simultaneously also "degrade" Assad which now requires a confrontation with the Russians. If you see all this through a Counter Terrorism lens and think the R+6 repeat of Chechnya in Syria is doomed to fail that may have merits. That's probably were ISW is and it's a pretty convoluted position.

It's perhaps useful to consider the Taliban's relationship to AQ. The Taliban was in part a product of a revolt we'd backed. It's young men were led by a notably disabled older cadre that had often acquired their wounds fighting the Godless Soviets. AQ was a byproduct of the Muhj war. A provider of infrastructure for the insurgency and its insignificant Arab Jihadi allies. The Taliban received strong backing from US allies including the KSA.The one eyed Mullah Omar was also a not always happy host to AQ. AQ did provide some services as Special Forces in his war with the Northern Alliance but that's very minor compared to the vital role of Salafi-Jihadis in supporting the Syrian revolt. AQ imposed on Mullah Omar's Pashtunwali derived sense of hospitality; he could not find an honourable way to give Osama up after 9-11. He was reported to be distraught and weeping at the dilemma while US airpower all but destroyed his movement. The Taliban was a nationally focussed movement that emerged out of a long chaotic civil war. It was tolerated partly because of its hostility to Iran and India. It's Pakistani offshoots are actually rather more dangerous as transnational terrorists. The Muhj had often held similar ultra-reactionary views but the Taliban was a pious Pashtun reaction to corrupt warlordism that Syria is not far from. Some more secular FSA flagged groups have been reported by Salafists to have rapey bandit like behaviours. The SAA based rentier state system with its new growth of private sector NDF mafia lords may be worse. Some in the revolt view the Taliban's austere way of governance as a cleansing model; particularly the powerful Ahar al Sham. Rural Afghan's in a frail very corrupt democracy often turn to Taliban courts for justice. It's not hard to see how this could have an appeal beside the alternatives. AQ recommend a future rebel Syrian government swear allegiance to the Taliban's leader. It's the Taliban that has the greater claim to legitimacy not the transnational revolutionary vanguard AQ.

Unfortunately if you look at the trajectory of these Syrian rebel groups its towards a closer relationship with the likes of AQ. The folks in the East Aleppo pocket are not about to expel AQ. Indeed some appear rather protective of them. Some groups have rejected heartfelt US and probably less sincere Turkish demands to break with AQ. And there is a very good reason for that: it's the radical Salafists led by AQ that have been very visibly trying to break the siege that threatens to crush the pocket.
 
From the US DOD Dunford, Turkish Leaders Create Long-term Plan Against ISIL in Raqqa
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Coordinate Operational Planning

Dunford said he meet with Akar to coordinate operational planning in many areas, including operations against ISIL in Raqqa, operations in Mosul and others. “Obviously as a close ally, we really just want to make sure that we’re completely tight as we work through some challenging issues,” he said.

The Syrian Democratic Forces has been a concern for Turkey since the inception of the anti-ISIL group last year. Originally composed primarily of Kurdish personnel, it is now more multiethnic and is actively pursuing operations against ISIL’s hold of Raqqa.

“[The SDF] are moving south to isolate the enemy that’s in the vicinity of Raqqa and in Raqqa,” the general said. “We always advertised that the isolation phase is going to take months.”

The SDF is making sure the ISIL forces that are in Mosul cannot reinforce the ISIL forces in Raqqa, and that the force in Raqqa cannot conduct external operations “into Turkey, into Europe and into the United States,” Dunford said. “We are going to limit their freedom of movement now even as we work on a long-term plan that is more viable for holding … Raqqa.”
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So months of shaping ops by the PKK but the Turks have a veto on a holding force for Raqqa. What could go wrong?
 
From The Washington Institute Roads to Raqqa: Potential Turkish and Kurdish Offensives
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CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that Turkey or the PYD will concentrate on taking Raqqa. U.S. interests would be ill served if the two sides spend most of their energy fighting each other rather than IS. The worst case for the United States would be a Turkish offensive that takes al-Bab and Tal Abyad but goes no further, since this would leave IS in Raqqa while bringing Turkey and the PYD to blows. Yet given his longstanding desire to prevent a united Kurdish zone in Syria, Erdogan may calculate that a sudden attack is a risk worth taking, especially if America is preoccupied by the post-election transition -- in his view, winning Washington's forgiveness after the fact may be easier than securing U.S. permission beforehand.

The current U.S. objective appears to be assembling a substantial Arab force to fight alongside the PYD, persuading the Kurds to lead these fighters against Raqqa, and asking Turkey not to oppose their advance. Yet this would be very difficult to accomplish, particularly in the near term.
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Balanche again; points out it would be relatively easy for the PKK to take Raqqa. They have been very close for some time and there are really few obstacles. The question I have is more could they or their small Arab contingent with their support really hold it and the surrounding countryside. The Pentagon seems genuinely concerned about that.

The Turks could take a year to get to Raqaa if they fought down through IS territory after taking al Bab. While al Bab's flanked by the Afrin PKK and SAA and has Russian controlled air above it I think that's a very iffy project liable to lead to a stalemate.

Using Raqqa as part of a pretext to hit Tal Abyab looks like a far more likely Turkish gambit to me. This would be another low risk border incursion like Jarabulus with simple logistics and no likelihood of Russian problems. Carve a hole in Rojova's hard fought for Kobani canton. Pairs nicely with the Turks trying to build up influence in Iraqi Nineveh further East. Tal Abyab is only 10% Kurdish and there have been grumblings about PKK rule. The TSK would be robustly resisted by the PKK but the Turks could probably spin it as just them backing a local Arab revolt as it might well get local support. That would put the US in a very awkward position. If successful it would crush PKK morale.

I doubt the Septics would give Erdogan much gyp. With the Russkis on the move Ash Carter is already rubbing up against Ankara like a horny dog. It would really disrupt any hope of a PKK backed thrust to Raqqa. It could be sold as putting a NATO ally backed "sustainable" holding force temptingly close for the Pentagon.
 

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Sam: Well, there’s obviously more reporting to be done on the ground, which is valuable, even within the parameters imposed by the government. And it’s just useful to hear from people inside Damascus and the regime-controlled west—from officials and elites to taxi drivers and passers-by—about subjects ranging from the regime’s strategy and outlook to how hard it is now to get replacement phone parts. Whatever your politics as an analyst, it’s important to get a fuller sense of how Syrians understand the war. And frankly, if your contacts with Syrians are limited to people sympathetic to the opposition, I think you’re prone to get a severely distorted idea of the bounds of Syrian discourse and debate. The center of gravity will be all wrong.

Obviously, you have to account for the fact that you’re operating in an environment that is essentially un-free, and that many of your interlocutors have agendas. But while the limits on speech and the incentives to dissimulate are exceptional, nearly everyone I talk to—on all sides—has something ulterior at work, or at least a perspective. Whether it’s rebels, activists, or Western officials—everyone is partially untrustworthy. All you can do is talk to people, try to pick apart what’s real, and contextualize and caveat your reporting how you can.

So I’ll go back if I can. That said, I’m not always great at cultivating access. Not to say I’m some brave truth-teller, but occasionally I write unflattering things. Lately, most of those unflattering things have been about Syria’s rebels, just as a function of the stories that have grabbed my attention. But individual rebel commanders and factions don’t get to decide whether I enter Turkey, even if I might have to periodically look over my shoulder in Reyhanli. So let’s see what happens if I write something similar about a government that can turn my entrance visas on and off.

Thanassis: It’s great to have you back and we’re looking forward to reading more of your analysis and dispatches from the trip.
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One of the wiser comments on trying to understand what is going on in Syria.
 
In Al Monitor Russia emerges as a center of gravity for Israel
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The involvement of Russian officers in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s military planning will discourage Damascus from taking any action against Israel, which is as good a guarantee as Netanyahu can expect in current circumstances. The Israeli prime minister traveled to Russia twice this year and insists that he received assurances from Putin that the country’s borders would not be violated in the course of the ongoing war, something Washington, Israel’s closest ally, is presently unable to guarantee. To that end, Moscow and Jerusalem have agreed to coordinate their actions in Syria as well as share intelligence.

Despite occasional cross-border operations, Israel would like to avoid interfering militarily in Syria due to the high risk of being drawn in deeper or provoking retaliation. Intelligence-sharing also greatly benefits Moscow, which receives more balanced intelligence, allowing it to put into perspective the kind of information provided by its allies from the Baghdad coordination center. Initial stages of the Russian operation in Syria showed that intelligence gathered by Damascus and Tehran was not always accurate.

It's not so much Assad that worries Israel, but rather Iran's influence on Assad. Containing Tehran and its allies in the region, including the Syrian leader and Hezbollah, is the endgame for Jerusalem at the moment. Controlling the arms flow to Hezbollah fighters is part of the effort to contain unfriendly forces, and Russia is instrumental in achieving this. After Russia increased its aid to the Syrian government in mid-2014, Israel noticed a spike in deliveries of surface-to-surface missiles to Hezbollah. Jerusalem demanded that the Kremlin control weapons turnover in Syria.

Some sources in Israeli diplomatic circles told Al-Monitor that Russia went as far as to intentionally delay the delivery of S-300 missile systems to Iran for breaking its promise not to transfer Russian weapons to Hezbollah. These incidents encouraged Moscow and Jerusalem to reach an agreement whereby Israel reserves the right to attack Hezbollah convoys carrying weapons that could potentially be used against it, and Russia received assurances that as long as Israel’s territory is not threatened, Israel will refrain from a military intervention in Syria.

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Russia has sold the idea that its forceful presence in Syria diminishes Iran's grip on Damascus to both Israel and Jordan. That may be a crock of wishful thinking but this aspect of Russian-Israeli detente puts naturally very pro-Israeli US hawks in a bit of awkward spot.
 
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On DefenseOne Russian Influence on Hezbollah Raises Red Flag in Israel
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Given Russia’s practice of integrating local, elite forces on the ground, it is “reasonable,” Adamsky writes, to expect that Hezbollah’s Radwan special forces battalion has internalized the doctrine and practical lessons of joint commando operations. More than that, he writes that Hezbollah’s battle-hardened special forces will serve as “knowledge agents” capable of training even more elite forces for future war with Israel.

But beyond actual combat, he suggests that Russian influence may be driving a paradigm shift in Hezbollah’s “theory of victory” vis-à-vis Israel. Instead of its low-signature strategy of staying in the fight against Israel as long as it can without losing, Russian influence could be expediting Hezbollah’s long-expected transition to higher-signature, initiative operations into Israeli territory.

“Until now, the Radwan force was employed as a type of advanced infantry. But following joint operational experiences [in Syria], it can turn into a type of commando force not only for supporting the overall war effort, but for creating meaningful operational effects [against Israel],” he writes.

The more Hezbollah is capable of using its special forces for cross-border raids or to seize Israeli territory — if only for a short while — it will deny the IDF the ability to deliver the so-called victory picture that is demanded by Israeli leaders.

And even when waging defensive operations, lessons from Russian special forces, particularly in nighttime operations, could make it more difficult for the IDF to maneuver deep into Lebanese territory.

“Massive training in the techniques of Spetsnaz (Russian special forces) could considerably improve the general readiness of Hizbolloah and its ability to deal with Israeli special units that penetrate into different theaters,” he writes, using an alternative spelling of the Lebanese militant group.
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HA has always been a learning organisation. It's not unlikely some Russian operational art will rub off on them particularly in planning larger operations. I would expect the IRGC to also benefit there as that's always been a weakness. The Iranians are clearly building up capabilities in Syria for a future war with Israel. I'd not build up the Russian as mentors too much here. If you look at Chechnya they still had a lot of weaknesses especially in the first war.

HA have tended to learn from fighting capable enemies particularly the IDF. Groups like IS and AQ are no tactical slouches building on global experience including fighting the Russians. In Syria HA have had to develop their offensive side and command other militias. That probably will give the IDF headaches not least because HA can now draw on a big pool of foreign manpower.

On the other hand the rebels are generally pretty poor opponents and that could make HA not so able to face the very different IDF. The IDF's experience of hapless Pal intifadas if anything made them overconfident in 06 when they suddenly ran in to the competent light infantry of HA's village reserves.
 

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On Syria, as on all things, the Trump campaign has been a one-man show. The candidate’s own manifest lack of interest in foreign policy seems to have prevented the formulation of a clear strategy, and not even his closest associates seem to be sure of what goals a Trump White House would pursue in Syria, beyond attacking the Islamic State and stopping refugees. Yet, taken together, Trump’s strong anti-interventionist streak, his conciliatory view of Putin’s Russia, and his distrust of any policies espoused by Obama or Clinton indicate that a Republican victory in November could be a devastating blow to the Syrian opposition. That’s unless, of course, Trump suddenly changes his mind again.
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Points our Trump does have some noted opponents of Assad in his team.
 
CrabbedOne said:
On DefenseOne Russian Influence on Hezbollah Raises Red Flag in Israel
HA has always been a learning organisation. It's not unlikely some Russian operational art will rub off on them particularly in planning larger operations. I would expect the IRGC to also benefit there as that's always been a weakness. The Iranians are clearly building up capabilities in Syria for a future war with Israel. I'd not build up the Russian as mentors too much here. If you look at Chechnya they still had a lot of weaknesses especially in the first war.

HA have tended to learn from fighting capable enemies particularly the IDF. Groups like IS and AQ are no tactical slouches building on global experience including fighting the Russians. In Syria HA have had to develop their offensive side and command other militias. That probably will give the IDF headaches not least because HA can now draw on a big pool of foreign manpower.

On the other hand the rebels are generally pretty poor opponents and that could make HA not so able to face the very different IDF. The IDF's experience of hapless Pal intifadas if anything made them overconfident in 06 when they suddenly ran in to the competent light infantry of HA's village reserves.
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The first Chechen war was an age ago . Russia..and particularly it's military..has been transformed since then . It's even been much upgraded and professionalisized since the Georgian conflict, were key weaknesses were identified and addressed . The US generals are wailing about it now .

And the IDF were occupying Lebanon for years . They didn't just "suddenly run into" HZB fighters. HZB had already driven them out of southern lebanon in 2000 and kept harassing them right up until the last failed Zionist invasion . IDF were still no match for them despite having direct and regular experience of HZB capabilities and tactics for over 20 years .

Gaza is tiny and beseiged, and none of the Zionist offensives have delivered any kind of decisive blow against the Palestinian fighters there . Especially not the last one . They were well organised, far from hapless .HZB trained them not to be .
 
On War Is Boring Donald Trump Wins and We Have No Idea What Will Happen: Neither does Trump
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“You cannot count, I’m here to tell you, I’m sad to say this — you cannot count on Congress to check a President Trump. They will not be able to do it.”

Congress won’t be able to stop Trump if he wants to ban Muslim immigration or resume torture. But America needs strong relations with its Muslim communities to fight terrorism at home and abroad. Banning immigration, not just of newcomers but the family members of current citizens stranded abroad, destroys that relationship.

So does torture and promising to kill the family members of terrorists. But again, it’s hard to know how many of Trump’s stated plans will come to fruition — and Trump is an enormously unusual president-elect.

He’s an isolationist who wants to rebuild the military. He wants to fight terrorists and abandon nation-building, and thinks that America prematurely abandoned nation-building in Iraq. He hasn’t said how he’ll handle the war in Afghanistan.

What about the wars in Iraq and Syria? The Islamic State is losing ground, and Iraqi troops are taking Mosul back street by street. At the same time, a U.S.-backed coalition of Syrian Kurdish and Arab fighters have begun an assault on Raqqa.

These twin cities are the heart of the Islamic State’s power base and the terror group is about to lose both. Once the militants lose their cities, they could go underground and revert to insurgent tactics, like the Islamic State’s predecessor after the toppling of Saddam Hussein.

There’s a chance that coalition forces will drive the Islamic State underground before Trump takes office — and the offensive may be trying to do just that. Will he then reveal his secret plan to defeat Daesh, or will he just let America’s generals finish out the war? Who knows, he might fire them.
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Casually Red said:
The first Chechen war was an age ago . Russia..and particularly it's military..has been transformed since then . It's even been much upgraded and professionalisized since the Georgian conflict, were key weaknesses were identified and addressed . The US generals are wailing about it now .

And the IDF were occupying Lebanon for years . They didn't just "suddenly run into" HZB fighters. HZB had already driven them out of southern lebanon in 2000 and kept harassing them right up until the last failed Zionist invasion . IDF were still no match for them despite having direct and regular experience of HZB capabilities and tactics for over 20 years .

Gaza is tiny and beseiged, and none of the Zionist offensives have delivered any kind of decisive blow against the Palestinian fighters there . Especially not the last one . They were well organised, far from hapless .HZB trained them not to be .
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The Pals have never really been worth a damn in a fight and it has stayed that way despite HA training and at times Iranian support. Too practical and peaceful a people perhaps. Hamas's performance in the last Gaza siege was mostly a pitiful spectacle of hiding behind and under piles of dead Civ Pop. They then went back to obediently policing Gaza for the IDF; a job they are better at than actual resistance. It's all a political calculated display of containment by Likud.

The 21st century Russians are much like the IDF: only special facing inferior foes. Rolling over the Israeli trained Georgians or the disorganised Ukrainians is child's play. The Russian military has improved but it has done so from a very low point. It's ghost of USSR capabilities reliant on rapid escalation to tactical nukes. Russian diplomacy is impressive but Syria displays very little military development since the brutal Chechen wars apart from air defences. The IDF who come from exactly the same Czarist tradition may well be over impressed. I suspect HA who train IRGC-QF might be able at this point to teach the Spetznaz a thing or two.
 
On Informed Comment Putin targets East Aleppo rebels; Did Trump’s Election doom them?

I think President Elect Trump makes very little difference to the fate of East Aleppo. The R+6 probably has less need to crush the pocket in Obama's lame duck but they'd be foolish to take a man like Trump at his word. Trump's win probably effects rebel morale negatively. While details can't be relied on it's clear Trump's base loathes and fears Syrians.

It's not all bad; AQ do appear very pleased that the US once again has a figurehead very suitable for its "Far Enemy" schtick.
 

A little background: TAC Romney and Walid Phares
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Spencer Ackerman comments on the possible consequences of having Phares in a high-level position in government:

The idea that the Arab world’s democratic forces would embrace a man tied to sectarian massacres of Muslims, and who argued that Christian Arabs are a different ethnic group than Muslim Arabs, doesn’t survive a second’s worth of scrutiny. It would be a millstone around the Romney administration, the fodder for a million conspiracy theories, and a slam dunk for the Assads and Ahmadinejads of the region.​

This is why the selection of Phares as one of Romney’s advisers matters. It is another hint of the alarmist foreign policy Romney favors, and it tells us that Romney’s judgment in selecting advisers may not be all that good. Given Romney’s tendency to invoke expertise and his willingness to defer to those he considers experts in a field, it matters a great deal that Romney considers Phares a reliable guide to Middle Eastern affairs.
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About a thousand strong. Quite a set back on holding Raqqa I would imagine. The Turks will be delighted.

Had problems with PKK dominance before. A couple of years ago was an AQ ally as described here.
 
From The Washington Institute Water Issues Are Crucial to Stability in Syria's Euphrates Valley
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Between 1960 and 2010, the population of Deir al-Zour and Raqqa provinces increased from 400,000 to 2,000,000, and farm size naturally decreased with this rapid population growth. At the same time, the regime's ambitious plans to extend irrigated land outside the Euphrates Valley were never carried out due to lack of funds and water shortages. As a result, illegal wells and pumping multiplied, with some tolerance from the government for political reasons or simply because of corruption. Authorities were more flexible with Arab tribes along the Euphrates than with Kurds in Hasaka province, where irrigated areas were reduced considerably due to lack of state investment and a failure to modernize irrigation techniques.

The drought of 2007-2010 accelerated these problems, especially because it occurred at a time when the state was reducing its subsidies, tripling the price of fuel, making individual irrigation extremely costly, and imposing water savings through a restrictive irrigation modernization plan. These measures were largely ineffective because they were formulated under emergency circumstances and implemented within a very corrupt environment. For example, subsidies were often hijacked by rich farmers with the complicity of officials, while small farmers were threatened with penalties because they continued to irrigate in a traditional way.
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Bashar's zero trickle down economics strikes again.

Balanche from the Spring. The Eastern Syrian revolt as a water war.
Fig4-Evolution-Irrigated-Syria-POL2622.jpg
 
On Political Violence @ A Glance Erdogan’s Opportunistic War on Terror
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Although international norms reject wars of territorial conquest, the presence of IS is providing Erdogan with sufficient cover to engage in an expansionary war. It is therefore unsurprising that the Turkish media is beginning to present a redrawn map of the region, which places both northern Syria and Iraq in Turkish territory. Perhaps more troubling is the fact that there appears to be little the US can do to stop Erdogan, a leader that is only more emboldened after squashing a recent coup attempt at home. Without the use of the air base at Incirlik (in southern Turkey), the US would have considerable difficulty in sustaining its air campaign against IS. Additionally, without a supply line across the Turkish border any remaining ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels would be cut off and vulnerable to the Syrian Army and its supporting militias. The stark reality that the US has little choice but to tolerate Turkish irredentism to fight both IS and Assad portends a very ominous future if and when Mosul falls. If instability continues, Erdogan will have all the justification he needs to maintain the Turkish military presence in the territories he is “liberating.” While IS may soon be defeated, the conflict in northern Syria and Iraq is unlikely to end anytime soon.
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This is part of the problem when you undermine international norms on state sovereignty which is what we've done since the Cold War. It culminated with regime change in Iraq justified in terms of largely absent threats. Others will take that as the new normal. Consider Georgia, Ukraine and now Syria in that context with Russia.

When we play with illegal proxy warfare in distant Syria it's a bit inevitable that folk who really have business in the country will also feel licensed meddle. There is such a thing as a legitimate sphere of influence and Syria hasn't been in ours for a long time. All our regional clients except the Iraqis see IS as a secondary threat. They do not share our quirky threat assessment priorities. It's perhaps the Turks that share the greatest sunk costs in a post-Saddam Iraq out of which IS emerged due to their client the KRG. It's us that have our knickers in a twist about IS while being rather blinkered about a growing AQ presence in the Syrian revolt just like the Turks. Europeans wibble fearfully about a terrorist haunted refugee crisis while Turkey calmly hosts far greater numbers of Syrians.

This isn't really a matter of Erdogan empire building though he is playing to widen his domestic base. Turkey faces an old very clear terrorist threat from the PKK and viewed objectively a much lesser one from IS. The PKK currently does not threaten us just our NATO ally so we are perplexed by Turkey's differing priorities. The fact is they have a large civil war going on in SE Turkey that's rather connected with the PKK's US sponsored success in Syria. Unless there was a peace process in place the Turks were always going to oppose PKK expansionism in Syria. That they'd eventually be joined by most Arab rebels was also inevitable. The creation of Rojova rather tellingly named "The West" by the PKK is an obvious threat to SE Turkey i.e. "The North". Confederalist fairy tails are even more threatening to Ankara than dreams of a global Caliphate under a black flag. With IS for a few years the Turks basically had a non-aggression pact. A hudna like the one the PKK had with an Assad they equally loathed. Both are rational positions based on pressing raison d'État.
 
On War Is Boring Western Islamists Scare the Hell Out of Syrian Refugees
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In October 2016, Syrian refugee Hani Salam told Reuters he went to a Mosque in the city of Cologne. He found the congregation was full of beards and clothes that reminded him of Jaish Al Islam, the Islamist militant group that took over his hometown near Damascus and drove him to flee.

“Good Muslims grow beards, not moustaches,” one of the Mosque-goers allegedly told Salam, in apparent disapproval for the refugee’s facial hair. “Everything about this mosque made me feel uneasy,” Salam said.

There are good reasons for Salam’s concerns. Short on sources of funding, some Arab mosques in Germany have turned to wealthy Saudi financiers who in turn want to advance strict Salafist interpretations of Islam.

“The message is clear and is directed at us Muslims: ‘Don’t you dare interpret your religion. Take the Koran word for word.’ It’s a problem,” Abed Al Hafian explained to Reuters about going to a Mosque in Berlin. He stressed that he’d never heard these sorts of messages back in Syria before the conflict.

Many Syrian refugees reluctantly attended Arab mosques in Germany out of a desire to worship in their own language. A large number of German mosques serve members of Turkish community in their native tongue.

In spite of the language problem, many Syrians are now opting to join the Turkish congregations. The new arrivals say these mosques don’t try to control them or promote radicalism.

At the same time, German law enforcement and intelligence agencies are watching Salafist mosques that might target refugees for recruitment. This added scrutiny provokes other fears among refugees and their hosts.
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The intra-Sunni struggle of Beards V Moustaches; ancient hatreds innit.
 

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“I think the [Assad] regime and Russia are already in a position where they more or less have secured US disengagement.... Already Russia had maneuvered to a position in Syria where American choices are quite limited and that the US is going to have to come to terms with the Assad presidency for a while yet,” says Yezid Sayigh, senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
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And that likely would have been the same with Clinton. Trump's liable to make less of a song and dance about collaborating with Russia against "terrorists". And he'll probably find that unsatisfactory as he's pretty hawkish on Iran.
 
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