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And next, Syria?


Or you could read that as a fair number of Arabs seeing the Syrian intifada as more important than the boring old Pal one but scary IS being as big a worry. Really not giving a monkey's about the messes in Iraq, Libya or Yemen and having given up on the US as a spreader of democracy. The urge to tell the US to butt out is understandable; the 21st century version of missionary work can't be said to have gone well.
 

About 900 civilians killed by us in Syria with CENTCOM actually fessing up to 19. The former is a commendably low figure but it is liable to rise rapidly as the coalition moves on to take Mosul. Amnesty are talking about 250 being killed taking Manbij where I recall the PKK complained bitterly about the lack of CAS and IS inflating civilian casualty figures.

Mind on Mosul at the rate IS are killing civilians a heavier hand might be justified to finish them quickly. They were reported to have killed 300+ people in Moshairefa alone. Rather puts Aleppo in the shade.
 
On TSG Hizballah and Lebanon’s New President
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For Hizballah, the election of Aoun symbolizes a national consensus over its role in Syria. Days before the election, Aoun met with Secretary General of Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah, who urged national unity in electing Aoun. In his inaugural speech, Aoun mimicked Hizballah’s stance on Syria, asserting that he would deal with terrorism ‘preemptively’—a point that Nasrallah has made profusely. The FPM even lauded Nasrallah as its ‘partner in victory’ in the presidential election, demonstrating how far the FPM-Hizballah relationship has come in the ten years since their reconciliation.

With the election of Aoun, Lebanon is likely to move closer to the influence of the Syrian regime, as well as Iran. Aoun has already promised to coordinate with the Assad regime in returning Syrian refugees. While Aoun has stated his commitment to pursuing an ‘independent foreign policy’, it is unclear what that will mean in light of Syrian and Iranian influence in the country.

Just as Hizballah emphasized the FPM’s endorsement prior to the 2006 war, the group will continue to tout the election of Aoun as a national consensus on its activity in Syria. Hizballah will likely continue to operate extensively in Syria, as the group’s own survival and the fate of Lebanon are increasingly tied to the endurance of the Syrian regime. Thus, the election of Aoun is likely to push Lebanon ever deeper into regional entanglements, as the lines between national priorities and those of Hizballah are increasingly blurred.
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In short: Beirut moves closer to Damascus.
 
From The Atlantic Council Russia and Risk: Who is Answerable?
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But those who have, albeit inadvertently and with the best of intentions, transmitted messages of American weakness, confusion, and doubt to the likes of Vladimir Putin also bear an explanatory burden. They have left millions of Syrian civilians defenseless and have placed at risk the credibility and reputation of the United States in the process. They have much to answer for. But first things first: explain to your countrymen how you are not putting global security at risk by acceding to mass murder in Syria and by encouraging Mr. Putin to think he faces an empty suit. And in so doing, please: do not try to attach the specter of World War III to those who have urged, in the context of Syria and for over five years, a convergence of word with deed.
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Fred C Hof puts the case for confronting the Putin over Syria just like the way JFK stood down the Russkis over putting in Cuba the potential to fry Florida. Meanwhile a majority of Septics aren't even happy with putting a few thousand volunteer military into Syria let alone risking a rerun of the bad old days of the Cold War with a long shot of getting barbecued by ICBMs.
 
In TDB Pentagon Walks Back Promise to Attack ISIS Capital ASAP
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So far, U.S. officials have yet to reach any kind of deal with Turkey and but remain optimistic, albeit less so with each passing day.

“Nobody feels the need to take that off the table,” the official said of Turkey’s offer to take part. “There might be some role.”

Ideally, the Americans want Turkey’s support for the operation on Raqqa, but for now, would settle for their acquaintance, which to date has not been forthcoming.

“There’s a significant Arab element of the Syrian Defense Forces—a third of them—who would be willing to work with Turks,” the official added.

In addition, the U.S. military hopes to have roughly 6,000 Kurdish YPG troops positioned to cut off ISIS flight from Raqqa, a fourth senior defense official explained to The Daily Beast.

It is all part of what the U.S. military is calling the isolating and shaping campaign of the battle for Raqqa—a process that took eight months before the battle started for Mosul. Raqqa is a smaller city but could have a higher concentration of ISIS fighters.

Carter said that the Raqqa assault would begin within “weeks” and overlap with Mosul one, which appeared to be part of a messaging campaign to suggest ISIS would face a two-front war. Iraqi forces launched an offensive to take back Mosul from ISIS, on Oct. 17. On Wednesday, Iraqi forces entered the eastern edge of the city.

The premature prediction of an imminent Raqqa assault could be more about the Obama administration trying to paint its ISIS fight in the best light during the last few weeks of an election.

“I think that any administration in the last few months in office is going to try to shape their legacy and wrap up things they don’t want to leave to the next administration. It could be that Carter’s statement is linked to that desire,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

But there is a risk with rushing such a campaign, even one that, if successful, would likely mark the demise of the so-called caliphate.

“The hastier your desire to enter, the uglier your allied forces will be,” Gartenstein-Ross explained.
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Well they also walked backed premature talk of taking Mosul a year ago. Interesting that they are effectively talking about breaking up the SDF.

From Ankara we might see Turkey as deliberately encircled by its old enemy Russia. There are strong incentives on our side to work with the awkward Erdogan despite Turkish priorities on terrorism being very different. The Pentagon is now faced with Russia breaking out of containment. Reestablishing the USSR's ME policy centred on Syria. Expanding its Syrian infrastructure on the Med as it builds up its Black Sea basing in the Crimea. It's developed an awkward but worrying relationship with Iran as a military partner. This threatens NATO's Southern front of which Turkey is a vital part.

The Pentagon clearly wanted the Turks to be its primary partner against IS in Syria but the PKK's hudna with Damascus and successful revolutionary operation in the chaos of Syrian revolt queered that. When IS attacked Rojova Ankara saw it as no bad thing.

IS may be what gives the easily spooked US voter the Willies but the serious business of geopolitics is likely starting to take priority. With that background the relationship with the Syrian PKK is an awkward but expedient alignment in what is a secondary theatre against IS. An enemy that compared to even a weak Russia is really very small fry. The Syrian PKK has largely served its purpose as a pawn and may be unwisely discarded. The awful Bashar in this game also becomes a player more like his father than Saddam or Qaddafi. Consider the huge bribe in the form of military aid the US has just handed it's other useful but stroppy ME ally Israel in this context as well. I think the Pentagon is to some extent putting away the childish things of the GWOT in anticipation of real big boys trouble.
 
In FP The Blob Is Back: The Revenge of the Syria Hawks

Well Lister, Ross, Tabler etc with some version of strings free bombing. Itani wanting to build up the rebels to gain leverage in negotiations (that won't budge Assad) but baulking at a NFZ as impractical. Bowen favouring a transitional Assad government. I suspect all that will transition to is a reliable Baath pair of hands in a very shaky authoritarian state.

Landis a lonely voice recommending deescalation. I doubt that'll happen; even Obama got locked into an incremental escalation in Syria even as evidence mounted that it was going badly wrong. It's very hard for Syria hawks to back down and the US policy establishment, "The Blob", has leant that way. Acknowledging error is harder than fighting to the last Syrian. After Obama the urge will likely be to try a different tack rather than pulling away from deepening carnage.
 

I did not get past the NYT's paywall to read the content but what are they thinking?

Much of rebel Idlib is a prototype for an authoritarian Salafist Emirate. It's not even functional; there's a damning article on it's corrupt court system up thread.
 

Well there is that poll up thread suggesting most Arabs just want us to butt out and quit it with the retreaded white man's burden schtick.
 
On Offiziere.ch Ankara vs Damascus: The al-Bab Impasse
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Ankara is not willing to acquiesce to an SDF/YPG capture of al-Bab from ISIS, and Damascus doesn’t want a bunch of FSA fighters itching to fight in Aleppo takeover a city about 45km to its northeast.

On the other hand Damascus would certainly view Turkey’s greatest nightmare in that region, an SDF/YPG takeover of al-Bab, as a far lesser evil to a Turkish-FSA victory there. Damascus and the YPG haven’t gone to war against each other – for their own immediate tactical priorities and prudence more so than anything else. Also, while they have violently clashed against each other in the recent past none of those clashes escalated into a full-fledged war. Consequently YPG forces in the Kurdish district of Aleppo are viewed by a lot of Syrian opposition groups as little more than proxies of the regime since they have never joined their armed insurgency against it.

What will happen in the long-term is far from clear. What is clear at present is that ISIS militants entrenched in al-Bab will benefit the most from this impasse until some compromise, or a third plan to rout those militants out which is acceptable to all sides, is put forward.
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Turkey may well be content with an impasse. If the Afrin PKK starts to take al Bab from IS the Turks are going to be in an awkward spot. The Turks can spoil that without risking an airframe with their 155s within range from inside Turkey and the rebels may hit the PKK in the flank. Like Ankara Damascus might well prefer IS to hold al Bab for the time being but may support the PKK to block a rebel move on the city. Al Bab might be next after East Aleppo but IS isn't a R+6 priority rebel Idlib is a bigger threat to securing Aleppo.
 
From TSG Al-Qaeda’s Growing Influence in Aleppo
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Unless the siege is broken again, the exchange of a few neighborhoods is unlikely to alter the military balance in Aleppo. At this point, it is less a question of which flag flies over what battered neighborhood than which rebel units are still independent from Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; photos showing the group’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani directing the assault from a command center reinforce the impression that Jabhat Fateh al-Sham represents the opposition as a whole.

On November 2, the U.S. announced that it had killed senior al-Qaeda operative Haydar Kirkan in a drone strike in Idlib province. Kirkan had reportedly been in Syria preparing attacks against the West. The area of Idlib province where Kirkan was killed is controlled by many of the same rebel groups now attempting to break the siege of Aleppo—lending an air of credibility to the claim that the Syrian opposition is in league with al-Qaeda, whether intentionally or by necessity.
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AQ has a bit of a win win situation here.

Support to the revolt has enabled AQ's cause rather than yielding much leverage against it as was hoped. Together with Ahar al Sham they've a often been at the tip of spear in rebel offensives. Shock troops backed by Langley's TOWs who have promoted themselves as leading voices in "liberated" rebel Idlib. Further incremental escalation of support to the rebels isn't likely to yield different results. But now if the "international community" turns away from the tainted by association rebels this plays into AQ's rhetoric of being the only righteous defenders of the Sunni Arab cause. The "Far Enemy" for half a decade implicitly over promised the "Near Enemy" Assad's head but finally only betrays.

And thanks to Bashar's well advertised brutality this really has global appeal even to rational Sunni simply outraged by the carnage inflicted on their sect newly defined by victimhood. You don't need to be a convinced Salafist dreaming of a Taliban style state as a path to the Caliphate the cause is just. It's a call very similar to missionary R2P but in a truly Holy Land.
 
This is not an endorsement or anything along those lines. I am simply astonished at the size of the explosion.

 
teqniq said:
This is not an endorsement or anything along those lines. I am simply astonished at the size of the explosion.

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Impressive, I'd only seen a still. That's at least a few of tons of explosive directed at the 3000 housing project by the folks who brought us 9-11.
 
On Oryx Blog Photo Report: Syrian Armed Forces Calendar 2015
a-007.jpg

Oddly no shots of them running away across open desert.
 
On Reuters Rebel groups clash with each other in Syria's Aleppo
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Fighters of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki and Abu Amara attempted to seize positions and weapons from Fastaqim, one of its officials said. Fateh al-Sham is a jihadist group. Zinki and Fastaqim fight under the Free Syrian Army (FSA) banner.

An official from the Zinki group's politburo said the clashes had finished and there were efforts under way to resolve their dispute.

The clashes took place in the al-Ansari district and the neighboring Salah al-Din district, both of which are close to the front line with government-held areas, said the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based war monitor.

The Observatory said the Islamist groups had succeeded in taking most positions and weapons from Fastaqim and detaining its fighters, but the group's official said its situation was not so bad.

Both Islamist and FSA groups are taking part in an offensive against government-held western Aleppo that began last week, which is partly aimed at breaking the siege on the rebel-held east but has made little progress after some initial gains.
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I read elsewhere Fastaqim seem to have kidnapped a Zinki leader initiating this but it looks like AQ consolidating its influence. The remnants of Fastaqim are joining Ahar al Sham.

Interesting when considering the the trajectory of the revolt to look back a couple of years The Mujahideen Army of Aleppo a previous Islamist alliance formed to fight IS in Northern Syria containing Nour al-Din al-Zinki and Fastaqim.
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The Mujahideen Army factions all portray themselves as faithful Islamists, albeit of slightly different stripes, but most of them seem to have evolved from fairly non-ideological FSA factions, spawned out of the villages and towns of the Aleppo hinterland. There is no ideological or political program to this organization, and in all likelihood this is—like most Syrian rebel groups—an opportunistic coalition glued together by necessity or foreign funder pressure.

When asked by Al Jazeera why he hasn’t attempted to unite with the larger and more ideological Islamic Front, Shahabuddin promises in vague terms that he will seek further unity in the future. An Islamic Front commander with good relations to the Mujahideen Army has also said that the two organizations have opened membership negotiations.

But in his Al Jazeera interview, Shahabuddin acknowledged that the real raison d’être for the Mujahideen Army is geography: all member groups were fighting side by side in the same region. It made sense to band together when faced by both the regime and the ISIL. Perhaps, then, the real question is not whether the Mujahideen Army will go on to unify with other groups but whether it can survive its own victory over the ISIL in western Aleppo?
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Shahabuddin, the founder of al Zinki. Lund notes their association at the time with anti-AQ clerics. Fastaqim is mentioned here as arresting an unveiled Christian opposition activist, a PR mistake they reversed.

You might take Zinki for the more moderate at the time. It withdrew from the mainly Turkish backed alliance in order to get richer KSA funding by distancing itself from the Syrian MB that the Princes feared greatly at the time. It recently joined Jaish al Fateh putting it alongside Ahar al Sham and AQ in the Salafist alliance. It looks like an increasingly reactionary trajectory starting from a very conservative Islamist position but that may be more about funding and picking winners than ideology.

Together with Ahar al Sham and AQ the Mujahideen Army did help drive IS out of NW Syria though in retrospect that might be seen more as an act of radical Salafist consolidation eliminating a peer competitor. Now one of these FSA flagged groups is an AQ ally in the East Aleppo pocket dismembering the other.
 
On War On The Rocks THE WASHINGTON-ANKARA DISCONNECT
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Absent broader, PKK-Turkish government reconciliation, Washington cannot achieve any semblance of political stability in Syria, both between Turks and Kurds, and between Arabs backed by Turkey and the PYD. Thus, for the longer-term strategic benefit of the United States, Washington now has an incentive to directly address the current fighting inside Turkey and publicly call on both the PKK and the Turkish government to return to peace talks and offer to mediate between the two parties. Such an announcement would prompt considerable backlash in Ankara, perhaps contributing to the downward spiral of the relationship. However, it would leverage the only tool the United States now has: The power to write newspaper headlines and shape talk show debates with rhetoric from senior officials, simply by speaking on the record to the press.

This policy will, without question, prompt a very, very negative Turkish reaction and would break with tradition. However, given the current climate in Turkey, a change in policy is required to advance American interests and to address the continued use of anti-Americanism/Westernism as a populist tool. Absent a change, the U.S. will have trouble realizing its goals in Syria, while the U.S.-Turkish relationship is further undermined by conspiracy theorizing.
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It's been obvious since Kobane that the US should engage in the Turkey-PKK peace process with the same sort of seriousness it gives the Israelis and the Pals or for that matter the pretty pointless Geneva talks with the Russians over the Syrian revolt.

Article points out Erdogan is clearly playing to Turkish far right preferences over the PKK for domestic political reasons.
 
In Politico Memo to the Next President: Avoid the ‘Vision Thing’ in the Mideast
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First, the administration has to purge the vocabulary it uses to describe America’s role and responsibilities in the region. With apologies to Madeleine Albright and Hillary Clinton, for whom both of us worked, it is not helpful to talk of the United States as the indispensable power able to jump tall buildings in a single bound. De Gaulle had it right: The cemeteries of France are filled with indispensable people. America does not have the capacity or the interest to set itself up as the go to power for every hopeless Middle East cause, particularly when those causes cut to the core of issues such as sectarian or national identity and internal governance (see Syria)...
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I know, you could call it "A humbler foreign policy." Has a ring to it no?

It follows with advice not to spout empty bullshit. Don't piss away US credibility on lost causes. Not every Russian move need be treated as a dire affront. The quest for leverage via the same old new gimmicks may be quixotic. Something's marching in the ME but it sure ain't freedom: get used to it. Pandering to clients will only increase their entitled neediness. Avoid futile efforts to chivy Pals and Israelis towards a peace neither appear to want in practice. Keep pivoting to Asia as Obama tried to as there just ain't much to be had but grief in the ME.

Never fly in the world of dreams that is aptly named Foggy Bottom of course.
 
On ISW Warning Update: Russia Prepares to Escalate Military Intervention in Syria
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Implications

The Russian escalation as part of a Syrian regime offensive in Damascus and a counter-offensive in Aleppo will accelerate the radicalization of the opposition. Russian strikes by air and by sea will target acceptable opposition groups as they have during previous escalations to eliminate legitimate alternatives to the Assad regime. This continued pressure will hasten the ongoing transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-Jihadist groups such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. In the absence of better options, acceptable opposition groups will increasingly cleave to extremist factions for self-preservation in the face of concerted pro-regime advances enabled by the Russian air campaign. Russia’s support to the Assad regime continues to remove potential partners for the U.S. against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria from the battlefield. The U.S. must therefore be willing to counter the support that Russia is currently providing to the Assad regime in order to achieve its national security objective in Syria.
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ISW a year ago was hoping the likes of AQ could somehow be separated from the opposition but the momentum has run in the opposite direction since Idlib fell. I'd not blame that entirely on the Russians the escalation behind JaF in Idlib helped the AQ tendency as well. Radicalisation is usually the path in revolts and our moderate rebels were often congregated around very conservative Beards to start with.

I haven't noticed Russian air assets being built up in Syria but the smokey fleet arriving shortly is about as plain a signal as you could ask for that it's time for no more Mr Nice Guy. ISW sees the failing rebellion around Damascus as ripe for a hammer blow as well as East Aleppo.

What exactly the US under the reluctant Obama might do about that as it's about to elect a new President who won't take office till mid January isn't made clear.
 
CrabbedOne said:
From TSG Al-Qaeda’s Growing Influence in Aleppo
AQ has a bit of a win win situation here.

Support to the revolt has enabled AQ's cause rather than yielding much leverage against it as was hoped. Together with Ahar al Sham they've a often been at the tip of spear in rebel offensives. Shock troops backed by Langley's TOWs who have promoted themselves as leading voices in "liberated" rebel Idlib. Further incremental escalation of support to the rebels isn't likely to yield different results. But now if the "international community" turns away from the tainted by association rebels this plays into AQ's rhetoric of being the only righteous defenders of the Sunni Arab cause. The "Far Enemy" for half a decade implicitly over promised the "Near Enemy" Assad's head but finally only betrays.

And thanks to Bashar's well advertised brutality this really has global appeal even to rational Sunni simply outraged by the carnage inflicted on their sect newly defined by victimhood. You don't need to be a convinced Salafist dreaming of a Taliban style state as a path to the Caliphate the cause is just. It's a call very similar to missionary R2P but in a truly Holy Land.
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Won't matter. Yet more desperate jihadi offensives , numerous suicide bombers etc, have crumbled in the face of stiff Syrian resistance. This time without even Russian air support, as Putins been cocking about with another limited ceasefire. Very shortly the Russian carrier will be there , major Ir support, and it'll be lights out in east Aleppo. After that the jihadis are finished.
 
On SST ISW Warning on Russian Reinforcement in Syria

Col Lang thinks the Russians need to throw in a lot more ground forces. He's right the regime side still suffers from a chronic lack of militarily useful manpower.

Points out unlike the busybody US they've little current expeditionary experience. This is first sizeable projection of Russian military power beyond their borderlands since the Cold War. The model is clearly the brutal domestic operation in little Chechnya but sans the 80K army deployment. It's been a relatively modest low cost air operation. The naval part has the flavour of an experimental exercise and a great deal of show boating.

I doubt Putin will surge in ground forces as Russian voters are as casualty adverse as Septics. This has already morphed from what was sold as a short decisive air intervention into a permanent commitment. Putin bigging himself up internationally at US expense goes down well. Hammering the hated Muslims is fine with Russians but lots of corpses coming home not so much. It was a popular war but losing more than a Brigade in the 2nd Chechen War caused a fair amount of domestic dissent. Syria's a distant war of choice that could become unpopular quickly. Doing the dying in Syria is the Iranian's end of this. Unlike Ivan the enough daft Persians enjoy a bit of military martyrdom.

The Iranian regime constantly talks up their commitment to Syria as being like the defence of a vital domestic provence but it's a very patient one. The Iranians are also feeling their way in Syria. This isn't the sort of deployment they are used to. The Persian military mentality is rather focused on the defensive. Only IRGC-QF has specialised in expeditionary work and on a small covert scale. In Syria they've deployed lots of IRGC line officers, leading a international set of Shia Jihadist militias. It's the first time the Iranian regular army has sent soldiers abroad in more than a border incursion. Tactically it's been quite unlike HA's wars with the IDF. I've not seen signs of a big Iranian build up to finish things off quickly. Just an incremental increase in militia assets around Aleppo. Recently there was a demo in Iran with an anti-Syria flavour demanding resources get spent at home instead. The Iranian public may be tiring of of the considerable expense of propping up the bankrupt (in more than one sense) Assad. Meanwhile the Supreme Leader has been talking down the nuclear deal which is widely seen as promising economically.

Recently Iraq Hashd figures and at least one Baghdad official have been telegraphing a surge into Syria but after Mosul is retaken. Mosul has become a hot issue in Iraqi nationalism. It finally has taken priority over Aleppo with at least one Iraqi militia shifting forces to Nineveh. I suspect that would delay a larger Hashd involvement in Syria until at least Q1 2017. By then the next US President will take office. They're liable to take a tougher line on Iran especially economically.
 
On War Is Boring Does the Russian Air Force Even Know What Is Going On in Syria?
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Such experiences raise important questions, namely — what is Russia’s military intelligence in Syria actually doing? It does not appear to collect much intelligence on the Islamic State, as Russian aircraft carried out fewer than a dozen air strikes on the extremist group during all of October 2016.

It is obviously not collecting much intelligence on any of Syria’s major rebel groups, nor on the Al Qaida-linked JFS. And it is either ignoring or completely missing every major re-deployment of the forces Moscow has officially declared to be its enemies.

Perhaps the Kremlin is still working out how to actually wage network-centric warfare, or alternatively, considers the term to mean something entirely different in practice.
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Russians relying very heavily on Signals Intelligence and sometimes rather crude technology. The US Coalition doesn't suffer from the same lack of up to date kit but also has often appeared to have rather a poor grasp of what's happening on the ground in Syria as again its heavily reliant on SigInt in targeting. It's a hard theatre to develop Human Intelligence in and Salafi-Jihadi groups have often proved difficult to penetrate.

Article points out while the Russian are methodically bombing civilian infrastructure the Syrian Arab Air Force famous for dropping barrel bombs actually has a rather good record of decapitation strikes against rebel groups. That's because Syrian intelligence has heavily penetrated rebel networks. It helps that a lot of rebel commanders are defected SAA officers whose motives for joining the revolt are sometimes dubiously mercenary. When the Russians do whack a notable beard its often because of information passed to them by Damascus.

There's something missed here. Very few Syrian rebel commanders are worth a damn and in the egalitarian Salafist groups pruning the leadership cadres often seems to strengthen them. Ahar al Sham got almost its entire leadership killed in a mysterious explosion a few years ago and went on to thrive. Years of decapitation strikes on AQAP in Yemen has not inflicted sustained damage. The Russian style of COIN is population centric in a very Old Skool way. It does not follow our FM 3-24 theories and it could be argued these are flawed ideas based on colonial wars in the 50s the French lost.
 

I'm sure the PKK viewed allying with the US as temporary. There's little chance of the lefty PKK rubbing along happily with Salafist rebels who largely see them as regime allies anyway. They've been at daggers drawn with large numbers of Salafist Kurds in Turkey for decades.

Damascus under Assad is probably too weak to seriously attempt to reclaim all of Rojova while the PKK has to hold IS territory some of which was once the rebels. The rebels can rely on Ankara's active assistance including TSK fire support. A return to the regime-PKK hudna is likely. Around Aleppo it never really stopped.

If the myopic US sticks to form and backs away from the PKK once IS is suppressed the obvious fallback option is for the PKK to get very friendly with Damascus's security guarantor the Kremlin. So we go back to Cold War days when the KGB/GRU saw the PKK as a valuable ally undermining a NATO enemy from within. The Iranians may not like that but they probably have bigger problems with Russian detente with Israel.
 
On AMN Syrian Army takes control of Aleppo Infantry Academy after peace deal with Kurds: map
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DAMASCUS, SYRIA (6:30 A.M.) - The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is in full control of the strategic Aleppo Infantry Academy and its nearby towns after a deal was put in place between their High Command and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

In exchange for the Infantry Academy, the Syrian Arab Army agreed to let the Syrian Democratic Forces capture the key town of Al-Bab, should they reach this Islamic State stronghold before the government.
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Well that will annoy the Turks.
 
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