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And next, Syria?

On TDS As Syrian deaths mount, ‘responsibility to protect’ takes hit: experts
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One problem is that R2P stems from a 19th-century concept of international relations that states should intervene “when a country is unable or unwilling to protect its own population,” said Ghassan Salame, a former senior adviser to the U.N. secretary-general.

“But R2P has also suffered from a general decline of the ideological impact of the West on the rest of the world,” Salame said in an interview.

Trust in the West’s ability to resolve conflicts and build peace took a nosedive after R2P was invoked in Libya in 2011 to stop Gadhafi killing his own people, Salame and other experts said.

In March 2011, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution endorsing military action to protect civilians against Gadhafi’s forces.

But after the Libyan leader’s overthrow and death, the country became mired in a slow-burn civil war between two rival governments, one in Tripoli and one in the east.

“In Libya we went in, we did the job ... [then] we walked away instead of creating a network including for instance Turkey which would have helped to reconstruct a peace in Libya. It’s a bloody mess,” Ashdown said.

“By the way, so is Iraq,” he said.
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Well R2P is foundering on lack of US capability to satisfactorily fix any sizeable civil disturbance by armed force. People seemed to forget that even tiny Kosovo was a big task that ran way over budget and beyond its timelines. It was rather unpopular with Republicans.

Bush came to office promising not to do nation building but then stumbled through the window of opportunity 9-11 provided towards Baghdad. Iraq presented far bigger problems that the US at the height of its powers struggled to extract itself from with almost no reward and then found itself dragged back in. It clearly worsened the terrorist threat that many Americans thought it would address. In humanitarian terms there's no telling what cruelties Saddam would have inflicted but the sad fact is the civilian toll was considerable; in the same ballpark as Syria. Righting Afghanistan by itself after decades of war was a huge task that was compromised by overreach into other wars.

Libya was an example where an unwilling US polity was dragged in by irresponsible Europeans who weren't looking beyond the next electoral cycle. The unplanned post-conquest Phase III was seen as the problem in Iraq and so there simply would not be one in Libya. It would sort itself out with a little light diplomatic work that was then skimped by the British and the French. The people who faced the music over this inshallah operation were US politicians and they did look like they'd been taken for a ride.

Over Syria we had many of the same crowd essentially calling for similar half measures on a wing and prayer as Libya collapsed into chaos. What was done to intervene short of that mostly covertly has probably has made Syria much worse than it needed to be.

The US is simply not well cast in this role. It's a country that was largely unwilling to join WWII until the affront of Pearl Harbour despite the tricksy FDR's best efforts. Even the far sighted Marshall Plan was political disaster for Truman at the time. Such great generosity is there but it is a scarce resource to be used carefully. It can't be easily be mobilised for such thankless tasks.
 
I already knew this, pages ago. And it's reportage as having been influenced by said funding has also been refuted.
 
On FP The Great Myth About U.S. Intervention in Syria

Dismisses the idea that the US's reputation is on the line in Syria. Well I'd say US involvement in Syria so far has clearly hurt it with its Muslim regional allies. In terms of global reputation I think is overshadowed by the far larger US cockup in Iraq.

Obsessing on the ME for the last three decades has done bugger all for the US. What policy folk wringing their hands here really are concerned about is diminishing US primacy. I'd say it's been rather undermined by interventionists over using US military power in areas where it has limited applicability. If anything is signifiant here in terms of reputation it's how the US handles an uppity Russia and that will be tricky.
 

That as the Pentagon appears to be rushing to Mosul and Raqqa on a US electoral timeline.

Stein has Ankara seeing Arab councils like the one in Manbij as a bit of a PYD fig leaf concealing Kurdish control and reckons that's an accurate view.
 
Two pieces with & by Yassin Al Haj Saleh - veteran dissident, long term political prisoner, currently exiled in Istanbul, & quoted on this thread previously by butchersapron (i think)

One via Robin Yassin Kassab - Yassin al-Haj Saleh on the Syrian Majority

And another from The Intercept - Syria’s “Voice of Conscience” Has a Message for the West
I read the top one yesterday. I thought I found it on this thread but it seems not. Worth a read and offers some hope of a livable post Assad Syria as opposed to the Jihadi nightmare posited elsewhere. Pretty weak on how to get there though.
 
I already knew this, pages ago. And it's reportage as having been influenced by said funding has also been refuted.
By? I don't know how much they are funding them but it is probably significant as they do not advertise. If the State Department are funding it for their own consumption they're not going to want something overly biased and usless but it will likely have some effect on output. What stories they pursue may be chosen with the thoughts of the readers with the deepest pockets in mind.

From your link
“Right now, there are 26 people confirmed dead,” he told Syria Direct on Wednesday.

The death toll is likely to rise, doctors said, as many of the airstrike victims are in critical condition, and first responders continue to remove bodies from the complex of five different schools that educated up to 900 children until Wednesday. A total of 18 students and eight teachers were killed, Munther Khalil, the head of the opposition’s Health Directorate in Idlib province told Syria Direct.

“We do not have anyone who specializes in wounds this intense,” Hussein, a doctor in the nearby town of Maarat a-Numan who is treating many of the wounded, told Syria Direct. More than 30 people are in critical condition,” he said, adding that around 80 wounded people were brought from Hass to his hospital.

“There were dozens of dead bodies,” said eyewitness and Civil Defense volunteer Jalal.

“Students, teachers and passersby from the street—it looked like a scene out of the apocalypse.”

What can you even say about this?
 
Their own managing director?
I read Syria Direct quite a lot I just thought you had something more substantial than that. I just assume the money has some effect rather than none and bear that in mind when reading it.
Sorry no nothing more substantial. It's just that when I read that report it seemed pretty genuine and unbiased - I fully appreciate that anyone can say any old shit to anyone else. For my own part I've contacted them directly myself when I saw a weird story purportedly involving Israel in murky goings-on in Syria asking their opinion. They dismissed the story out of hand (I think it was in the Torygraph) as they felt that there had been nowhere near enough fact-checking.

E2a also in the article they have one Elliot Higgins, aka Brown Moses and the the guy behind the Bellingcat site giving them his approval. Now there's people who will immediately say he has his own agenda for whatever reasons so I suppose it comes down to who do you choose to believe?
 
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Most of the reporting on Syria has inherent biases. That includes The Guardian, the easily led NYT and certainly Russia Today. All sides do throw up masses of propaganda. The PKK is notably good at this coming across basically as the heavily armed wing of the Girl Scouts. The rebels present very differently in earnestly oppressed English as compared revanchist Arabic calling to Gulf donors charitable impulses. The regime is terrible at it and made the idiotic mistake of excluding journalists from its areas early on which allowed the opposition to control the MSM narrative. The most glaring example is Aleppo which is only rarely presented as a regime stronghold a fraction of which proved sympathetic to a rising that came in from the countryside. Journalists are thin on the ground in Syria and it can be very dangerous trying to confirm stories. There is much reliance on press briefings. Like politicians journalists have invested in a narrative and are slow to change it. But there really isn't any denying that the regime's brutal and inconclusive methods simply provoke a lot of disgust and that makes for good copy. Russia behaving just as it did in Chechnya should surprise no one and certainly won't Russians who rather approved.

It's a little idiotic to dismiss sources simply on the basis of who funds them. You can end up with a theory of Syria that looks like global warming denial. Syria Direct clearly has a pro-revolt bias but does not need to be creative to make the regime look bad. I've found them pretty reliable compared to the MSM. Syria wonks like Lund who'd I'd regard as fairly objective do quote them occasionally.
 
From The Atlantic Council Lessons from Russia’s Intervention in Syria
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Russia’s tactics and strategy have also altered Syria in profound and likely irreversible ways. Russia’s destruction of opposition-controlled population zones and civilian infrastructure has made large areas of Syria uninhabitable, altering the country’s demographic map to favor the regime to a far greater extent than the regime could on its own. Population displacements are also a deliberate tactic. Largely Sunni Arab rebel groups that surrender are forced to leave strategic geographies to the more remote province of Idlib. Since pro-regime allied forces, including Russian air support and mercenary fighters, retook Palmyra from the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in March 2016, they continue to prevent residents from returning, instead allowing Shia militiamen to confiscate homes and settle their families there. Similar events have occurred in Homs city. Around Damascus, the regime, at times using Russian intermediaries, negotiated local ceasefires that held until the regime no longer felt it necessary maintain them. At that point it forced opposition-held cities to renegotiate on worse terms or be attacked again, with the basis of new agreements being the departure of opposition fighters and their families.
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Well parts of Iraq really don't look much different. A chunk of the Sunni Arab population tarred with infiltration by insurgents end up displaced. What's left are those willing to collaborate. Consider what happened to the Sahwa: swapped sides and then was hung out to dry.

Ends concluding that if Russia can be pressured to drop Assad and the US may share interests in Syria but not world views. It was always obvious that the Russians were sticking with Assad despite hints they might edge him out. They had no other formula that could make any sense strategically and never had Assad's head in their gift. This is unlikely to change unless the US risks a full blown confrontation sufficient to humiliate Russia and even then it's not clear what US interest taking Assad's head actually serves.

The US has pretty much already come to the position that its main interests in Syria are Counter Terrorism and the place not being the arse end of another Iraqi insurgency. That's based on institutional Pentagon preferences that view an unstable Iraq as an embarrassment. A bipartisan consensus of US voters simply are not interested in removing Assad. If those remain the same under the next President the US will have to come to terms with Russia as it fights a different Sunni Arab insurgency its way.
 
The US has pretty much already come to the position that its main interests in Syria are Counter Terrorism and the place not being the arse end of another Iraqi insurgency. That's based on institutional Pentagon preferences that view an unstable Iraq as an embarrassment. A bipartisan consensus of US voters simply are not interested in removing Assad. If those remain the same under the next President the US will have to come to terms with Russia as it fights a different Sunni Arab insurgency its way.

Do you think it will stay the same under Hillary Clinton? Clearly a lot of the US National Security establishment, people who are very close to Clinton and in many cases have crossed party lines to endorse her and will be expecting influence and probably jobs in return, see Obama's lack of direct intervention in Syria as a significant and historical mistake.
 
Do you think it will stay the same under Hillary Clinton? Clearly a lot of the US National Security establishment, people who are very close to Clinton and in many cases have crossed party lines to endorse her and will be expecting influence and probably jobs in return, see Obama's lack of direct intervention in Syria as a significant and historical mistake.
Well the problems with that are its moot and the moment for trying the sort of strings free pro-revolt intervention imagined past us by four years ago.

What I read is the Pentagon Brass is deeply skeptical and has no appetite for a scrap with Russia over Syria. The Israelis are uninterested which means so is most of The Hill. The main pressure for different action is from the KSA. A lot of the ideas floated like the NFZ are just a half decade old legacy of policy that hasn't adjusted to major changes in the revolt, the consequences of backing the PKK and most of all the reality of risking a nail biting confrontation with Russia and its deep air defence systems. You've got to get past all that on the political basis of less than a third of US voters supporting action against Assad.

Meanwhile history moves on. The R+6 have got till January 20th to knock over East Aleppo. That probably makes arguments for gaining leverage against Assad at the negotiation table irrelevant. It'll be more about negotiated surrenders and rides off to Idlib or the torture gulag.

I tend to agree with Aron Lund that the differences may be incremental as despite being a hawk she'd face the same constraints as Obama. There'll first be a new debate on what to do and then that'll bounce around Congress. Which will probably take us into Q3 2017. Unless of course the unpredictable Trump wins then all bets are off as the touchy old bugger's word is wind.
 
On MEE The inevitable confrontation between Turkey and Syrian Kurds
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The damper
But why the abrupt and unexpected ending of the offensive?

The sudden shift followed an announcement by the Turkish president on 22 October that the Turkish-led forces would press on to the IS-held town of al-Bab.

There are several reasons that could have led, either individually or collectively, to this strategic decision. The Turkish-led attack on the SDF pushed the Syrian regime to threaten to respond to the violation of Syrian airspace by Turkish warplanes and down them with all available means. However, the attacks continued for a few days after this threat was announced on 20 October.

The attack may have stopped as a result of a ceasefire brokered by the US, which is affiliated with the SDF as a main partner in the fight against IS in Syria. Kurdish officials reportedly pressured the US to quell the Turkish-led offensive against the SDF, threatening to suspend their participation in the fight against IS.

The US was "asked to put a stop and take a clear and direct position regarding this Turkish aggression. Otherwise, the project of combatting terrorism may be delayed or totally fail in Syria," said Ahmed, the Kurdish official. The US was able to broker a ceasefire between Turkey and the SDF, when similar clashes erupted in August.

Another potential reason: rebel groups fighting in the Turkish-led operation also did not have enough fighters to capture Tal Rafaat and advance toward al-Bab at the same time.

“FSA groups backing Turkey do not have enough manpower to fight on different fronts. Even if they were able to capture Tal Rafaat, they would not have been able secure it and have enough resources to advance towards al-Bab. Al-Bab is less problematic and more important for their long-term goals,” said Mustafa al-Abdullah, a media activist in northern Aleppo, commenting via WhatsApp.
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Another indication that Euphrates Shield is under resourced.
 
On ISW Syria Situation Report: October 20 - 27, 2016
Key Takeaway: U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated on October 25 that coalition operations against IS in Ar-Raqqa City will begin “within weeks” and “overlap” with ongoing operations to seize Mosul in Northern Iraq. The statement comes one day after Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) Representative to Paris Khaled Issa stated that “conditions are not in place” for an operation to seize Ar-Raqqa City, stressing that the Syrian Kurdish YPG could not participate in the offensive amidst ongoing clashes with opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield in Northern Aleppo Province...
And that does not appear to be PKK misinformation as they are clearly clashing with Euphrates Shield.

The PKK's main goal was to unite Rojova's cantons. While the Turks are set on thwarting that "terror corridor" with a very secondary eye on the lesser threat of IS. It appears Ankara also wants to disrupt US-PKK relations. That's not hard as the US probably only plans a transitory tactical relationship with the PKK while maintaining a strategic one with its NATO ally. The PKK are an awkward means to end an insurgent threat like the Iraqi Sahwa. This may be a little myopic but that's often the way with the Pentagon.

I've also seen US officials insisting the SDF is the only force available in the short-mid term to take Raqqa. There is some talk of training up a rebel force with the Turks. It was stated some time ago that the intent to have an Arab force take and hold Raqqa as it's a heavily Arab city with the PKK remaining outside. Though they said the same about Manbij and it seems to have been BS with the PKK doing most of the urban fighting. So far the rebels the Turks are deploying East of Aleppo are only a few thousand beards who appear to often be plucked out of refugee camps and only hastily trained. Others are from Idlib groups. It's not a given that not being Kurds makes them more acceptable to Arab locals. Of course there are the Arab elements of the SDF some from Raqqa but these are also relatively small. At least one tribal group that's allied with the SDF had asked to participate in Mosul a few weeks ago which might support some action between the cities. I doubt there'll be a real move on Raqqa City itself in the electoral time frame Carter is floating though that may have been on the original PowerPoint.
 
On Informed Comment Int’l Conflict over Aleppo & Mosul is Making local Civil Wars Worse

In which a contrast is drawn between Aleppo and Mosul with the latter being not a civil war but a war of eradication against IS. I think the distinction is purely a subjective one in former Ambassador's Hill's mind. This is exactly the way the regime talks in Syria as if the revolt was something alien that can bed excised rather than mostly organically Syrian if with rather a lot of foreign backing that Iraqi led IS lacks. International involvement in Syria on both sides has made the war longer and bloodier. He's right to point out the similarity of Syria to Lebanon's civil war which only ended due to exhaustion. Iraq's long insurgency is already in its second decade and taking Mosul is unlikely to end it anymore than the fall of East Aleppo will conclude Syria's troubles.
 
In TNI The Clumsy Case for U.S. Intervention in Syria
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• First, they must explain how they intend to control the risks of confrontation with Russia over Syria in the wake of a U.S. attack, particularly if Russia takes steps to escalate.

• Second, they must identify vital U.S. interests at stake in Syria that justify taking such risks, especially given the chance that Russia will act against U.S. interests elsewhere.

• Third, they must show that intervention will be effective in defending those interests.
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That last bullet was always tricky even before IS grabbed Raqqa (giving the US a tangible reason to get involved) and Russia intruded.
 
On ISW Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 20 - October 25, 2016
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Russia partnered its ‘humanitarian pauses’ with a campaign of disinformation that aimed to draw parallels between the actions of Russia in Aleppo City and the Anti-ISIS Coalition in Mosul in Northern Iraq. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued on October 25 that the U.S. and Russia are both conducting military operations against major urban centers held by ‘terrorist groups’ and accused the U.S. of hypocrisy for its condemnations of Russia in Syria. This rhetoric marks an attempt to establish a moral equivalency between the actions of the U.S. and Russia in the Middle East and bolster its false narrative that Russia has solely targeted terrain occupied by jihadist forces. Russia will likely continue to cultivate this narrative as coalition forces move to recapture Mosul in Iraq and Ar-Raqqa City in Syria in order to justify even more aggressive pro-regime operations to clear opposition forces from Aleppo City.
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Well it's an easy parallel to draw and the assault has not yet closed in on Mosul even if the intent is different. There inevitably will be civ pop killed and while the scale is smaller the CENTCOM does tend to be a bit dishonest about the fact its careful strikes often kill noncombatants. The UN is anticipating a very large humanitarian problem in Northern Iraq that may dwarf Aleppo.

And consider the politics from a Russian perspective. The US is also currently involved in restoring the authority of three ME governments largely by bombing. In Iraq both Irbil and Baghdad may be flawed democracies but give sticky fingered Damascus a run for its money in terms of corruption and poor governance. In Yemen the US and UK act as facilitators for the GCC coalition attempting to restore another deeply corrupt government. It is a good deal less popular than Assad's, has even slimmer claims to be democratically elected and its allies demonstrate a rather similar punitive attitude to the risen population that Russia takes in Syria. The near famine situation in the much younger war in Yemen due largely to the blockade appears to be worse than Syria.
 
On MEE Frontline at your front door: Aleppans watch helplessly as street fighting rages
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While in territory terms the government advance has not been huge - street-to-street fighting is not its strength - the effects on freshly engulfed areas have been devastating.

And residents of Saif al-Dawla and Salah al-Deen, are trapped with nowhere to run.

Samao moved to to Saif al-Dawla a year ago from Marja, on the city's southern outskirts near the Castello Road, after her house was devastated by air attacks which injured both her and her husband. She cannot move again.

"This is our daily life over the past few weeks - the regime advances, takes control of new ground, and then the rebels counter attack and take it all back," the 38-year-old said.

"Bombing, fighting, that's it, that's life. I don't see or know when this will end, every day seems like it’s the first day of fighting, the fighters battle on and most of them don't care about the suffering of the residents.

"My home is very close to the frontline, in the last days the clashes haven't stopped at night as the regime tries to advance. And I have no choice but to stay as there are no other options."

Nader Saaqa, a librarian who lives in nearby Salah al-Deen with his four children and wife, fears government forces will be in his street within days if they continue their gains.

"The fighting is furious in the city and lately around my street," he said. "The frontline is not far, I can here sounds from regime side swearing and other from rebels side saying 'Allah Akbar', then clashes and bombing.

"I am scared. The regime's advances are slow but steady. I don't want to wake up one day to see regime's forces in my streets.
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Life in the shrinking pocket.
 
In Al Monitor Who will liberate Raqqa?
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The Americans told the Turks that no Islamist group will be allowed to participate in the Raqqa operation, because Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra had previously held Raqqa and gave it up to IS, Barabandi said. Turkey said the SDF and Kurds are a red line, and from their perspective, the only way to go forward is to have a major Arab force to do the job.

Erdogan repeated that view Oct. 27, saying he had told Obama as much in their phone call Oct. 26.

"We do not need terrorist organizations like the PYD/YPG,” Erdogan said he had told Obama in their phone call. “I said, 'Come, let's remove Daesh [IS] from Raqqa together. We will sort this out together with you.' We have the strength.”

The SDF is also wary of providing up to two-thirds of its 25,000-strong forces for the operation to isolate Raqqa, leaving smaller numbers to defend against potential Turkish attacks on cities it is holding in other parts of Syria, said Aaron Stein, a Turkey expert with the Atlantic Council.

“The SDF doesn’t want to leave front-line positions vulnerable to Turkish attack, particularly around Tell Abyad and Manbij,” Stein told Al-Monitor.

“The US wants Raqqa because … that is where it [IS] plans external operations,” Stein said. “If the mission is to degrade and destroy IS, they need to push it out of there, so it is more difficult to plan external attacks.”

“My guess, they [the US-led coalition] will do what they did in Manbij, set up a military council ostensibly run by Arabs,” Stein said. “But it’s a fig leaf. The US did not keep their promise to the Turks. Manbij still has YPG in it. Switching their patches, thrusting a few Arabs in, does not cut it.”

“The SDF does not actually exist,” Stein said. “It is a made-up name to the give to the YPG. The SDF doesn’t function without the YPG. It is the complete backbone.”

“But the difference is, compared to rest of Syria, the YPG is completely homogenous, with one command structure,” Stein said. “It is ideal for the way the US fights wars, it is not hostile to the US, [they] don’t have to worry about the YPG kidnapping US troops,” as it does with some elements in Arab rebel groups.

Barabandi, commenting on the US administration’s critique of the call to recruit a new Syrian Arab force to take Raqqa, said the US administration said the problem is that it would take too long, and who would make up the Arab force.

“I told them, ‘Syria is Arab,’” Barabandi said. “So it is difficult you don’t see Arabs.”
My bold, well that's a bit of a drawback if you want to use Ankara's beards. Mind it was Ahar and JaN that threw IS out of Idlib. Raqqa was a loyalist area but rather isolated and local tribes switched sides when they saw the regime was unable to guarantee security. I recall some of the local rebels that took it flirted with both IS and AQ before joining the SDF basically for safety. It's that sort of rent but not buy an Arab situation.

Basic question here is can the PKK be levered away from their own strategic aims while their traditional enemy Turkey is nipping at them.

It does not take much of a set up to plan external terrorist operations of the sort IS have been connected to. Certainly not the control of a small city. The idea that taking out Raqqa might impede attacks will play well with US voters though. It's the one thing the US electorate supports doing in Syria if you look at polling.
 
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