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And next, Syria?

teqniq said:
Inerestingly

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Corridors of humiliation. Well that's an accurate enough shaming. I see the rebels are warning civilians that fighting at the edges makes flight impossible. I'd not be sure after such a long lazy SAA siege if they've yet taken in what's coming as the pocket is reduced. If IS had held the population in Anbar's cities an awful lot more civ pop would be unavoidably dead. But IS never cared much for popular support.
 

Talk about slow learners. It should never really have been a question about wether the rebels where moderate but rather if backing them served US goals though those have proved poorly defined and to have very moveable posts.

After all talk to most Syrians and you'll rapidly realise Israel is hated by them and by association the US. That was always going to resurface. It does even in supporters of FSA flagged bands when protesting against AQ in Idlib. Hence the very wary eye the Israelis always had on the revolt and their division on the wisdom of toppling the reliably passive aggressive Assad.

The CIA's program was always a dubious venture that seemed more to pander to poorly calculated KSA interests than serve those of the US. It has made increasingly little sense since the US started backing the PKK's rival somewhat regime aligned revolt in 2014 and that was damage limitation after the rebels screwed up and lost Raqqa to IS. Every attempt to get the rebels to fight IS rather than Assad offensively has proved pretty futile. Turkey now has some rebels fighting the PKK while Washington tries to sell the fancy that the Afrin YPG is a separate organisation from the Eastern mob that are openly eager to unify their cantons.

By mid 2013 it was pretty clear Baghdad was facing a revving Sunni Arab revolt of its own. That was only going to be complicated by stoking a similar revolt in Syria that was just providing IS with a useful rear area. Baghdad wasn't much slower than Iran to pick a side in Syria and it wasn't the one we did as any sort of likely rebel victory over Damascus was also contrary to their interests. After having sunk trillions of US tax dollars in creating Shia Baghdad preserving it and some semblance of US influence to balance Iran there was always going to take priority.

And then you get the Russian intervention last year provoked by flooding Idlib with TOWs that gave JaF desnse fire support at which point sensible people like the always ambivalent Israelis and Jordanians basically said sod this for a game of soldiers and deconflicted with Moscow. Even the bullheaded Turks got the fear when the S-400s moved into theatre.
 

Well it's nicely symbolic of how the revolt is misunderstood in the West.

Lady Liberty standing at the gateway to Mall America is emphatically not what these huddled masses are headed towards. Most of the rebels these days agree on Sharia being the basis for their ideas for a future Syria. Islam is the solution though that embraces a lot of contending ideas within the revolt. Inherently that isn't sinister as most Arab states including Islamist Iraq have Sharia as the basis of law.

Based on what I've read of implementations by groups like Jaish al Islam it's often a rather authoritarian vision though not without support. For popular groups like Ahar al Sham consent of the people may feature strongly but democracy itself is a very contentious issue. In practice it's hard to see how these people could rule much of urban Syria without a good deal of coercion as their ideas have limited appeal even when stacked up against rotted out Baathism. And that's probably the two most powerful groups. Half of the beards in the revolt would be worried as that image is very clearly the worst sort of idolatrous shirk that their stricter interpretations of Sharia demand be destroyed.

It is after all referencing a statue of pagan Roman goddess. She's not even wearing a veil and shamelessly flaunting bare arms the minx. If you built one of these for real in liberated Idlib while some of the activists who started the risings might emerge from the shadows and celebrate it an enraged mob of Salafists would be along tear it down faster than you can say Allahu Akbar.
 
There's a weird hypocrisy about fundie Islam's neurotic fear of "idolatry". Representations of people and animals are inherently idolatrous even if their builders don't intend them to be. Yet at the same time it's A-OK to build massive shopping malls and lavish hotels - Temples to Mammon and worldliness if there ever were any - in the holiest of cities.
 
On War On The Rocks TURKEY’S SYRIA INTERVENTION: NO GUARANTEE OF EASY VICTORY AT AL-BAB
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The Rebels of Euphrates Shield: Divided, Poorly Trained and Low on Men

Even a well trained force would have trouble taking al-Bab and the rebels are not well trained, even by Syrian standards. Good marksmanship is the exception rather than the rule. Key groups in Euphrates Shield, such as theAmerican armed and trained al-Moutasem Brigade, routinely fail to sink mortar base plates resulting in inaccurate and ineffective mortar fire. Many of the rebels have little combat experience, having been recruited from refugee populations in Turkey just prior to the start of the operation.

A lack of manpower is another a major issue for northern Aleppo rebels as shown by the aforementioned recruiting drive. Syrian government victories against rebels in Aleppo city has made it harder for Turkey to recruit from core rebel areas elsewhere in northern Syria. For rebels in that part of Syria, breaking the Syrian government siege of rebel-held eastern Aleppo is more of a priority fighting alongside Turkey in northern Aleppo. For instance, the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army Mountain Hawks Brigade withdrew from Euphrates Shield in mid-September due to government advances around Aleppo City.

Internal divisions within northern Aleppo rebels also bodes badly for a Turkish-led offensive against al-Bab. Relations between Islamist rebels, like Ahrar al-Sham, and American backed FSA groups, such as the al-Moutasem Brigade, have been poor for some time. Al-Moutasem is strongly disliked by many Islamist rebels due to their close association with the United States. For instance, Islamist rebels briefly kidnapped an al-Moutasem commander in June 2016. In recent weeks, tensions between Ahrar al-Sham and American backed FSA Hamza Division have risen over Ahrar units refusing to allow the burial of a deceased Hamza Division commander in his hometown. Such tensions are not visible to outsiders but can seriously damage the coordination and trust between rebels that is needed for a successful offensive on al-Bab.
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And he says IS appear to be well dug in in al Bab so it might well be a tough fight like Manbij.

The Syrian PKK is perhaps ten times bigger than the few thousand strong rebel force Turkey has assembled East of Aleppo. It can call on fighters from all across the region they'd like to rule. The PKK was sinewy before IS appeared to kick their arse all the way to Kobane having fought the SAA, local tribes and the TSK. They are even tougher now. Perhaps more importantly they have a united command and a fanatical commitment to clear revolutionary objectives. Taking Manbij fitted right in with their revolutionary goal of unifying the cantons. Plus they had lots of US air support they are used to working with.

Yet Manbij was a hard battle for the PKK. I read elsewhere Manbij had them gouging into its reserves of skilled fighters in Syria and having to conscript more kids to guard their rear. There was some hostility to the PKK there but IS lacked much popular support in Manbij. In al Bab the youth of the area often went off on Jihad to fight the US in Iraq. IS are reckoned to be popular. The local rebels who IS evicted are even hostile to Turkey's beards.

It's one thing walking into large villages like Dabiq that IS have tactically withdrawn from but it's hard to see how Turkey's force as its currently configured could take al Bab if IS mount a similar level of resistance let alone hold it. Retired Turkish Generals were very skeptical. The rebels talk about taking al Bab and then breaking the siege of Aleppo. This seems even more fanciful as they could well get attacked by IS sleepers the SAA and maybe the PKK as well while being bombed by the Russians. What the Turks can do is make a grab at al Bab rather tricky for the PKK but then this is all a distraction from the rebels' main focus: holding East Aleppo.
 
On ISW Syrian Opposition Plans Operation to Break Aleppo Siege
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It is possible Turkey will play a direct role in the upcoming Aleppo battle, however. Turkish-backed opposition forces have shifted their focus west to confront the YPG north of Aleppo City after the YPG started advancing eastward in an apparent "race for al Bab," trying to take the town before Turkish-backed forces do. Turkish-backed opposition forces declared their intent to recapture from the Kurds the town of Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, on October 21. YPG forces seized Tel Rifat from the opposition with Russian air support in late 2015. Turkey conducted airstrikes against YPG positions in the area amidst local clashes between YPG-led forces and Turkish-backed on October 20, prompting the regime to threaten to shoot down Turkish planes over Syrian airspace. Turkey has since conducted extensive shelling of YPG positions and deployed additional tanks to the area. The YPG's positions north of Aleppo City buffer the regime's encirclement of opposition-held areas of the city. Turkish-backed opposition forces participating in Operation Euphrates Shield have stated their intent to attack the regime's encirclement of Aleppo from the northern countryside. These opposition forces could seek to transition Turkey's support against the YPG into an attack against pro-regime forces in support of an operation to break the siege.

A successful operation to break the siege of Aleppo could enable the United Nations to deliver desperately needed humanitarian aid to over 250,000 starving civilians. It would also have negative second order effects, however. It would further limit the already constrained policy options available to the next U.S. president by cementing the leadership of Jabhat Fatah al Sham and Ahrar al Sham over Syrian opposition groups that were previously reconcilable to US interests. Russia and the Syrian regime will use growing support for Jabhat Fatah al Sham and Ahrar al Sham to legitimize continued war crimes in opposition-held areas such as the intentional targeting of hospitals and use of improvised chemical weapons. Turkey's role in the upcoming battle will also signal the trajectory of Turkish-Russian relations in Syria, which are currently characterized by a primarily economic détente despite incompatible strategic goals in Syria and the region. Finally, an escalation between Turkish -backed opposition forces and the YPG north of Aleppo City risks fracturing the unity of effort the US is attempting to negotiate in order to make a Raqqa operation possible in the near term.
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So a repeat of last time with Idlib's beards coming in from the SW. I doubt the al Bab part will materialise unless the TSK throws in a lot more resources. Might stretch R+6 resources preparing for it.
 
On LWJ IRGC to expand Basij special forces
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Mehdi Hadavandi, the commander of the Fatehin Basij Tehran unit as well as the unit’s Syria operations, said the IRGC has set up “special courses” for “resistance forces,” which include Iranian as well as proxies, for combat in Iraq and Syria. The commander told an audience last week that “the required forces are in Syria right now,” though registration is open should the situation demand more boots on the ground. He described the war in Syria as Kafai Jihad (meaning if the number of fighters are sufficient for jihad, the obligation to wage jihad is lifted for others).

“Resistance in Syria is different than all the fields until today,” Hadavandi said last week week. “Many of warriors and commanders who have served in areas such as the northwest and northeast of the country, Iraq, and Lebanon admit that Syria is different than all others. Training demands operations field, which has been created in Syria.”

“Because the Basiji fights in Syria the Basij of the Islamic world has taken shape. The blood of Iranians, Lebanese, Afghans, Pakistanis, etc., have been mixed in Syria,” Fatehin commander Hashemi said on Friday. “The enemies must know that the Fatehin is ready to Israel.”

“Armed struggle of the Islamic revolution beyond Iran’s borders is a very big and divine blessing that not everyone will have,” proclaimed IRGC chief commander Jafari on Friday. He vowed that all “shrine defenders would continue armed struggle until fulfillment of goals.” Jafari then boasted that “the blood of the martyrs and the preparedness of the forces” have strengthened the Islamic Republic’s hand, forcing “regional countries who claim to determine the destiny of Syria to negotiate with Iran.”

Jafari then claimed that “the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic resistance” have prevented “Israel’s territorial expansion.” He then proclaimed that all of the plans of Israel and the United States “have been defeated.”

“Today we are witnessing the formation of the army of the Master of Time [12th Shiite Imam Mahdi who will herald the apocalypse] in Syria,” proclaimed Hadavandi earlier this month at a ceremony for Ashura religious mourning ceremony in Tehran.
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Not just IS talking End Times in Syria.
 
On TAC Rise of the American Mercenary
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Over the summer, a no-bid contract was reportedly awarded to Six3 Intelligence Solutions, a company based in McLean, Va., which in 2014 was acquired by major defense-industry player CACI International. The $10 million award, according to an otherwise pedestrian Pentagon notice, was for “intelligence analysis services” to be performed “in Germany, Italy, and Syria.” It was probably the first sliver of proof that U.S. contractors are actually operating there, despite persistent evasions by military officials.

“I don’t know if there are any contractors in Syria but I suspect there are a lot. We just can’t sustain military operations today without the private sector. We are strategically dependent on the private sector,” said author Sean McFate, also an Army special-forces veteran and assistant professor at the National Defense University.

When asked about the Six3 contract—what it’s for, how many contractors would be in Syria working under it—Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. David S. Hylton said the Syria part of the notice was “a mistake” and has been since amended.

“The Performance Work Statement (PWS) for the contract states that ‘support is required at multiple locations to include fixed sites in Central Europe (Germany and Italy), possible future fixed sites in Eastern Europe (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, Poland), in deployed contingency operations areas to include the Balkans, and other contingency areas,’” said Hylton. The contract is on on behalf of U.S. Army Europe and “intended to provide … intelligence analysis, operations and planning, security support, and information systems operation, maintenance and sustainment.”

“The PWS does not contain the word Syria, nor does it make any reference that would directly lead to Syria, e.g., the Levant, counter-ISIL, Assad,” Hylton added.

McFate said he was told by other reporters about the “error” in the notice. “I’ve been watching these things for 20 years—I’ve never seen a ‘mistake’ like this.”

The Pentagon did provide quarterly numbers on the private forces currently in Afghanistan and Iraq, but when asked how many, if any, contractors are in Syria at this time, officials did not respond.
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Points out Obama's drawdown in Afghanistan to under 10K is supported by 26K contractors, a third US citizens. Of course every army is mostly support people not combat soldiers. Supply trucks need driving, meals must be cooked, the head cleaned, Air Con kept running, base perimeters secured and I expect the odd Colonel's shoddy PowerPoint prettified.

The Pentagon rotating out troops in Iraq before they stop being classed as temporary also massages down the numbers into the 5K admitted too. There you also have to add a massive Baghdad embassy with lots of diplomatic protection, CIA and JSOC operations that never went away.

It is perhaps a bit of a scam that bulks out what are sold as light footprint deployments. The reality behind ground troops creeping up in Iraq is simple enough and a general problem. All that expensive air power has proven to be of limited application and it needs to be augmented by having not just proxies but US troops on the ground even if the voter has grown resistant to that.

The Russians are reported to have over a thousand mercenaries on the payroll in Syria. It's also easier to deny what's going on with the private sector and lines blur with the regular military. Unlike the martyrdom loving Iranians the Russian public is rather casualty adverse these days. Their dead don't tend to get much press space compared with the occasional fallen Little Green Man.
 

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The new majority in Syria does not refer to the Arab Sunni majority. It rather refers to a social majority that is cross-communitarian. Not only do Sunnis in Syria lack unity or political convergence, but the regional and class cleavages dividing them are equal to, if not exceeding, divisions between them and other groups. More importantly, the Sunni character would not avert minoritarian rule anymore than the Arab character has. While Arabs constitute a very large majority of Syrians, Arab nationalism has undeniably failed in preventing minoritarian rule or producing political majoritarianism.

Of course, it is most likely that a majority of this new Syrian majority would be Sunnis. However, the mere fact of them belonging to the Sunni sect does not inherently undermine the prospect of establishing a stable political majority, unless Syrian Sunnis were unified or behaved as a distinctive and homogeneous group. Such, in my opinion, is untenable, as evident by the course of five and a half years of the Syrian Revolution. If it ever were to actualize, homogeneity among Sunnis would require extensive coercion that targets Sunni environments before others, thus leading to a compounded minoritarian rule: a minority among Sunnis and a minority among Syrians.

Despite the fact that one could define Islamists by their will to sectarianize and unify the Sunnis, it is certain that if rule were to be consolidated in their hands, they would not be comfortable with two thirds of the population staying united and publicly active. They would focus on dividing them and bringing them back to passivity, namely imposing a “Sunni minoritarian rule” and renewing despotism on Islamist grounds. However, if Sunnis were to remain politically active, then some Islamists would seek partners and allies amongst other communities. The result of this is likely to be a political majority of the type that emerged in the early 1930s against the French, or against al-Shishakli in the wake of the 1954 Homs conference.
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Very interesting piece by a Syrian activist, a nationalist hoping for a different outcome in Syria based on the will of the people.

He has the Baath ruling by exploiting division. He sees the Salafi-Jihadis and the PKK as a similar problem, divisive extremists. And Syrians often being more divisible by other markers than sect.

This snip isn't intended to but actually encapsulates the main problem with the rising(s). They may be united in outrage against the awful Assad regime and the failure of Arabism but that's about it. The various shades of Islamists who dominate the rebel fighting groups are also a minority that would have to rule by coercion. Unfortunately nobody else has a cat in Hell's chance of defeating Assad. Some of these groups are very extreme and determined. Revolutions often tend to be shaped by such vanguards not fuzzier popular sentiments. And the PKK's cause profits from Syrian Arab division.

That yet to mature progressive strain many hoped for in the Arab Spring is blocked by the reactionary Beards. The better organised Egyptian MB played a rather similar non-violent role in Egypt before the military coup. It was heading towards a one party state that many Egyptians feared more than their awful but familiar military rulers. In contrast in Turkey a minority mutiny in the military was squashed by not just the AKP's popular support but also that of other parties even those that feared Erdogan's direction might be similar to Morsi's.
 

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Meanwhile, some of Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s key regional allies have also increased coordination with Russia, adding to the Gulf countries’ sense of isolation. Saudi Arabia had long worked with Jordan to coordinate support to the Syrian opposition, but in early 2016, Jordan established an operations center in Amman with Russia to direct operations in Syria.45 Meanwhile, Qatar’s main ally in the Syrian conflict, Turkey, has also signaled a possible shift in its Syria policy. In June 2016, Turkey normalized relations with both Israel and Russia, and then released ambiguous statements about the desire to return ties with Syria “to normal.”46 A sudden U-turn in Turkish policy is unlikely given the significant resources it has expended on supporting the Syrian opposition, but the current recalibration of Ankara’s foreign policy is likely to cause unease in Riyadh and Doha. Even fellow GCC countries such as Bahrain and the UAE have indicated that ensuring regional stability is a greater priority than regime change in Syria. Broadly, opposition to Assad’s regime among key regional players appears to be softening.

The prospect of a jihadi victory in Syria appears to have made Bashar al-Assad more secure. In part, turning the conflict into a battle between Assad and the jihadists seems to have been Assad’s strategy all along. But it also represents a setback for the strategy Saudi Arabia and Qatar embraced—that is, support for “effective” opposition fighters now and plans for sidelining the jihadists later. For the GCC as a whole, which was unified on the need to limit Iranian influence in the Levant, the current situation is far from favorable. Leaders certainly hope for a decisive change in U.S. policy with the coming of a new U.S. president in January 2017. Absent that, however, it seems unlikely that either Gulf approach will yield the desired results.
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Things have not gone well for the KSA and Qatar in Syria.

Elsewhere Qatar's Arab Spring policy and been described uncharitably as a series of vanity projects. It was a failed bet on the MB in the region and then went on to embrace the hard fighting likes of Ahar al Sham. Relations with KSA and UAE which were often fearful of The Brothers deteriorated. The Saudis competitively backed other parties. The result increased the fragmentation of the revolt. The Saudis were also appalled by US behaviour finding out only via CNN that the US wasn't going to bomb Assad to punish CW use as promised. The Saudis also had frequent changes of mind about who they'd back typical of their somewhat chaotic ways in these things. Under new management they tried to align with the Turks and Qataris and backed JaF in Idlib with some initial success. Though leveraging hardline Salafists made the US increasingly sceptical of the revolt. Then came the hammer blow of Russian intervention in response to Latakia being threatened. That radically changed Jordanian and Israeli calculations which buggered the Saudis plans for a thrust at Damascus from the South. It made the prayed for US intervention much less likely. And all this time what was evident to me is far from being bled white in Syria Iran's influence grew as they fought a fairly parsimonious war and also advanced their agenda in Iraq.
 

Clapper not prepared to rely on the Russians being cowed easily.

Well a couple of weeks ago the US threatened to shoot down Syrian air if they dared put US soldiers out among the PKK at risk of being bombed. These things go without saying.
 
Half hour talk by Lebanese academic Gilbert Achar, attempting to sum up the current state of play, and slim chances of a just peace. Interesting description of a 'convergence of interests' between the regime & its backers, & the GCC to describe, reduce, transform the initial revolt into a Takfiri fundamentalist uprising.

'We reached a point where we were afraid of stopping'.




(Medium quality vid, plus I'm nothing to do with the uploader org)
 
Pilger is a top dude, sums up western complicity and arrogance in that region...



...and the propaganda tools and methodology that they use...
WHAM - Winning Hearts and Minds

 
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iraq_afghanistan_libya_syria_iran.jpg
 
On Vox 3 big problems with plans to escalate in Syria

Well on the 1st obviously an escalating conflict with Russia would be very problematic.

However on the 2nd: the situation in Syria is clearly not good from a narrowly selfish terrorist threat perspective. You can argue that lack of a US intervention to hand Damascus to the rebels created an area of opportunity for Salafi-Jihadis. Absent a politically coherent revolt that could rapidly take power I doubt we'd be regretting such haste considerably. The rebels issuing the call to Jihad was also a strategic mistake. Various actors backing the contending threads of largely provincial risings just increased the carnage. The focus should have been on deescalation not a bloodily escalating regime change which we now baulk at for very real reasons. It's the retreat of the incompetent Syrian state that opened the country to Takfiri. The divided revolt was also incapable facing a relatively weak but effective revolutionary actor like IS. AQ Syria only differs in its longer subversive game from within the revolt. An early US airpower intervention would have created a different area of opportunity and it might well have been worse than Libya. The political will to more than tinker with lost causes remains absent.

IS emerged out of the failed reconstruction of Iraq not Syria. The chaotic conditions in Syria aided IS's cause. Clearly our bad; as a damage control measure the US did intervene heavily behind the PKK's better organised revolt which has entirely contradictory goals to those of most rebels. We should probably live with the consequences of that decision and worry about Rojova slowly collapsing or becoming a Russian fiefdom if we wander away. The PKK is also a big problem for the Turks and the region that there's a duty to help peacefully resolve.

The third problem is US boots on the ground. Well there are hundreds of US troops in Syria and over a Brigade in Iraq. It's simply a hard to sell to voters if done on any scale. But I'd put it another way: the problem is no skin in the game airpower interventions are a crock far too easily sold. Military interventions are always unpredictable; those focused on airpower in fact are of limited utility with uncontrollable results as we've seen in Libya and to some extent in Syria and Yemen. Even with proxies on the ground its necessary to seed them with "advisors" and sometimes you are better directly using your own troops. The Iraqi's needed support in dealing with IS and US troops are playing a useful combat role. The numbers should more be constrained by what Baghdad will tolerate. If you are going to intervene and putting troops in harms way is clearly necessary then this has to be an option. We should not whittle at military interventions to fit what the public will tolerate. Policy should at least try to live within the constraints of a democracy and realist goals.

The fact is after facing widespread disappointment in Iraq the case for regime change in Syria as a path to regional stability has always been very weak. But the missionary impulse remains in policy circles almost undimmed by painful experience. It's not what can be done but what has a decent chance of achieving strategic goals. If that can't be sold to voters we've really no business intervening.
 

Well if that's true the Aquil mountains are 6.3 kms from al Bab. From that map it looks like the Afrin PKK are near to controlling the roads North as well. However how would they ever take a well defended IS city with the Turks sniffing at their rear.
 
On Bloomberg U.S. Stuck With Nobody Left to Sanction in Russia Over Syria
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“While the president has full sanction authority, there’s nobody left to sanction in Russia besides the janitor in the Kremlin,” said Michael Kofman, a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute in Washington. “In terms of expanding any kind of commercial or financial sanctions, we’re basically maxed out.”

Penalties against Russia already include hundreds of people, from senior allies of President Vladimir Putin to the Night Wolves, a motorcycle gang led by a former medical student accused of aiding Russian forces in Ukraine. The State Department had to issue an exemption from sanctions on Russia’s main weapons exporter, Rosoboronexport OJSC, because the restrictions made it impossible for Afghanistan’s security forces to get spare parts for their Russian Mi-17 helicopters.
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Well DC could ask London to bar Russian thick necked oligarchs from buying up half of SW1 with their loot.
 

The ever agile magician Brett McGurk and his incredible vanishing terrorist group designation.

US officials fawning to Ankara as it buggers up US anti-IS policy in both Syria and Iraq while in pursuit of the PKK seems to in vogue.
 
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