To what extent, and why, is 'freedom' a 'problem'?

[Johnny Canuck3]

But I can only say again that our pre-conscious selves are also us. .

Well yes, your leg is 'you' also.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

I don't agree with Dennett on this. His argument appears to be that the notion of qualia is of no explanatory value, and so it is therefore not a valid concept..

This appears to be the introduction of the notion of 'qualia', and imo, it doesn't follow from, nor add to, the discussion, including the most recent before this post, about organisms not being reducible to their atoms.

 

[Jonti]

You're transparent JC2. 'Embue' is listed in dictionaries.

And if you wish to complain about jargon, it may be best to avoid words like 'obfuscate' and 'abstruse'.

But if you are going to start such foolishness, it may be best to avoid ...

When one finds oneself arguing over the definitions of the words instead of the ideas, then the focus of the discussion has been lost.

... 'cos it makes you look ... unaware, you know.

 

[Jonti]

So when a child darts into the street, and given the one second reaction time - I hit the brakes at about 1.5 seconds, the decision to hit the brakes was made sometime before that?

When?

One could not hope for a more elegant and lucid answer to the questions posed by Libet's results!

Less dramatically, one decides to catch a bus, and heads for the nearest stop, which happens to be a request stop. The right bus comes into view, and one signals for it to halt. At what time did one make the decision to raise one's arm to signal one's intent to the driver?

Decisions may be made in response to particular, 'atomic' events; but the making of such decisions is not momentary, but is more to do with one's general intent and stance.

 

[Caecilian]

'Embue' isn't listed in my 2-volume Shorter Oxford Dictionary, so it probably isn't a word.

But what does it matter? Who cares? Everyone makes occasional spelling mistakes. Its only an issue, surely, if someone's posts are littered with spelling errors, which lbj's aren't.

And 'imbue' is hardly an obscure technical word, unlike 'qualia'.

 

[Knotted]

I left this - had to think more carefully.



With regard commodity fetishism, it is the perfection of the object, presented only in its exchange value and, therefore, in some way, as self-equivalent. This appearance not only obscures the process of production (including exploitation), this same process includes the worker's experience of himself as a fragment within the social production that creates the temptation to make up for his estrangement from himself and others in the form of the appropriation of the commodity. To some extent, the same goes for the capitalists, only to a lesser extent. It extends itself to the hyperreal, to culture in general, and not just the commodity form.

Sorry, I missed this.

I've no problems with the above.

Isn't this 'pure thought/abstraction' again? What about experience?

The two are closely related. Experiences are placed within a framework.

Remember the embedded context. There is a fundamental difference between metaphysical freedom (which, I think, is real) and freedom as it is embodied in relations between people (social freedom, independent from metaphysical powers). It becomes a political question because of the technocratic form of politics that excludes most people from its project, and thereby precludes real freedom.

I'm not sure. What is metaphysical freedom?

And we need to break out of it. But how?

What worries me is that this passes for politics here but in the united states, the power-centre of capitalism, there is the possibility that there could be revolution (I think so), but a desirable revolution isn't likely to happen, without a real project/class to take over power there is more likely fascism.

We don't just break out from the grips of ideology, the question isn't seperate from practice. During a big strike ideologies get put to the test. It simply becomes necessary to question basic assumptions about the functioning of capitalism. Labour power is a commodity like any other commodity.

I don't know what's going to happen in America. But I don't think there will be any revolutions or fascism in the forseeable future. There is a certain frenzy amongst the middle classes - tea baggers and all that - but there is no challenge to the ordinary rule of capital. There is no revolutionary movement and consequently no need to deal with a revolutionary movement by putting fascists into power.

 

[Knotted]

Here's a provisional definition of qualia:

Qualia are the phenomena in experience that appear in that experience ready-processed. All qualia are produced by parts of the brain, to be presented in the integrated model of existence that we experience in our consciousness, already embued with the qualities that show the particular qualia's meaning.

This definition needs to be proven to be valid - it assumes certain contentions.

When you see a blue object do you see a blue quale? Is that the same blue quale if the lighting is different? Is it the same blue quale if the blue object is against a red background instead of a white background?

When we talk about blueness we are not talking about an inner experience of blueness but rather what we know others of our species will agree about the blueness of an object.

If there is an objective seeing blue experience, then it can be defined in terms of neuroscience. But why assume that the experience is something that corresponds exactly to the functioning of the brain? Isn't the experience partly to do with the outside world?

 

[Knotted]

The problem with the qualia concept is not that is irreducible to the material functioning of the brain but that it reduces subjective experience to indivisible qualities. You see a blue square on a white background at 3:00pm and we assume that we must be seeing the qualities of blue, whiteness and squareness standing in a certain relation. We assume that our mode of communication - "I saw a blue square on a white background at 3:00pm" - has some sort of direct connection with our subjective experience (or perhaps the functioning of our brains). Was it the same nexus of qualia at 3:01pm? Is it the same nexus of qualia of the square is a fractionally different shade of blue? What is it that we are isolating and calling a quale?

I know some people think that denying qualia is absurd, but the more you think about it accepting that qualia refer to anything in particular is absurd.

Why are we so fixated on this idea? Surely it's the tradition of empiricism to blame. The empiricist places sense data at the foundation of knowledge. Since empiricism has been one of the dominant philosophies of the last 300 years, it is little wonder that observations seem to be analysable in terms of their discrete qualities.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

If there is an objective seeing blue experience, then it can be defined in terms of neuroscience. But why assume that the experience is something that corresponds exactly to the functioning of the brain? Isn't the experience partly to do with the outside world?

No. The input comes from the outside world, but the output of meaningful qualia is the construction of the brain.

Think of synesthesia, where sounds can produce the sensation of colour. The colour the individual experiences on hearing a particular sound is the result of the colour cognitive pathway being mistakenly activated by input that should really be left to the sound pathway.

We generate all the qualities of our qualia ourselves.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Why are we so fixated on this idea? Surely it's the tradition of empiricism to blame. The empiricist places sense data at the foundation of knowledge. Since empiricism has been one of the dominant philosophies of the last 300 years, it is little wonder that observations seem to be analysable in terms of their discrete qualities.

I'm very comfortable with the idea. It seems clear what it means, and it doesn't impinge on any other problems. So what if our qualia are only accessible to us?

 

[Caecilian]

This is missing the wood for the trees, like saying a painting is a set of brush strokes on canvas, rather than a work of art (true, this is simply taking the position of subjectivity).

I'll look into this more, but one possible response is what I said earlier: what is considered to be 'pre-conscious' isn't so, rather being simultaneous with 'conscious' (i.e behaviour, rationality etc.), since the conscious mind is an entire circuit and that separation isn't truly possible. This happens to correspond to the materialist 'reduction' of consciousness, yet:

The crux of the problem of consciousness has always been: how can matter have subjectivity? Evolution hasn't explained this (for most people). Likewise, if an 'artificially intelligent' (but why not consider it organic if it possessed consciousness?) box were created able to ask the same question it wouldn't get a satisfactory answer.

So, if mental states aren't ontologically reducible to physical states, does it imply dualism/idealism/religion? Not necessarily. The answer might be darker, that the notion of materiality/physicality is flawed or naive. Consciousness, and freedom, might be the concession of a disappearing universe that is only partially 'material', tangible, determinable. But with plurality built into it.

Autonomy. Yay!

The question of how matter can have subjectivity is indeed the crux of the problem. AFAIK no one has a convincing answer to that one; certainly not me.

A good start IMO is to view mental states as being environmentally extended, rather than reducible to the brain states of some particular individual.

This perspective comes in 2 flavours. The radical flavour, which personally I find unconvincing, says that mind isn't 'in the head' at all. Two of the main proponents are Alva Noe and Evan Thompson.

A less radical version, which I do agree with, says that the mind is extended. That is: mental states are best seen as being neurological states plus environmental states. Language, in particular, is a 'tool' existing in our social environment which hugely extends our cognitive capabilities- to a large degree we think in language. This view is particularly associated with Andy Clark.

Don't understand what the last paragraph of your post means, so can't/ won't comment.

 

[Knotted]

No. The input comes from the outside world, but the output of meaningful qualia is the construction of the brain.

Think of synesthesia, where sounds can produce the sensation of colour. The colour the individual experiences on hearing a particular sound is the result of the colour cognitive pathway being mistakenly activated by input that should really be left to the sound pathway.

We generate all the qualities of our qualia ourselves.

Where is it output to though?

My point is that just because we can reference (ie. name) certain qualities of the world and these references are often accompanied by certain private experiences it does not follow that the experiences are analysable in the same way that our references are analysable.

So when we refer to something we are not refering to our private experience of the object we are refering to.

I'm very comfortable with the idea. It seems clear what it means, and it doesn't impinge on any other problems. So what if our qualia are only accessible to us?

But what are you that accesses qualia? How can you seperate qualia from you when they are internal to you?

This confusion seeps through all discussion of qualia. One minute they are units of private subject experience the next they are objects that we "access" ie. they are not the experience itself.

The whole qualia thing seems so 17th century (Descartes and Locke). Surely we're past this empiricist naivity by now.

 

[Jonti]

By my reading, there's no intent from lbj to separate qualia from the experience of qualia.

All that's being asserted, I think, is that some sort of sensorium (the sensory space in which 'qualia' appear) is part and parcel of being conscious. Consciousness has intentionality; one cannot be conscious, except one is conscious of something. So one is more identifying a consciousness with its sensorium, than imagining, with Descartes, some inner eye that 'sees' the sensorium apart from itself.

If I've charactarised this position correctly, it's a long way from the "empiricist naivity" of Descartes or Locke. It's far more nuanced in allowing that perception, like memory, is constructive, and by leaving it an open question as to how the generation of meaning in a conscious body relates to physical causes and consequences.

 

[Knotted]

By my reading, there's no intent from lbj to separate qualia from the experience of qualia.

I don't think that was lbj's intent either. The problem is that when you start talking about qualia, you get into this sort of problem with language.

Qualia aren't the input. They aren't the process because they are subjective experience rather than objective processes. They must be an output of the brain. But output to what?

All that's being asserted, I think, is that some sort of sensorium (the sensory space in which 'qualia' appear) is part and parcel of being conscious. Consciousness has intentionality; one cannot be conscious, except one is conscious of something. So one is more identifying a consciousness with its sensorium, than imagining, with Descartes, some inner eye that 'sees' the sensorium apart from itself.

I don't have a problem with this, however I don't think it says very much. If our sensorium contains a cat, all this means is that we have seen/heard/touched a cat. Nobody is denying that we have senses.

If I've charactarised this position correctly, it's a long way from the "empiricist naivity" of Descartes or Locke. It's far more nuanced in allowing that perception, like memory, is constructive, and by leaving it an open question as to how the generation of meaning in a conscious body relates to physical causes and consequences.

OK I accept that the brain constructs memory and perception and that this fact is an advance from Descartes and Locke. But when we talking of meaning, surely we cannot seperate meaningful observations from the outside world and our life in the outside world. It isn't entirely internal.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Qualia aren't the input. They aren't the process because they are subjective experience rather than objective processes. They must be an output of the brain. But output to what?

Output of the brain to the brain. The qualia are produced by particular sets of neurons in the brain, or even by single neurons (the Jennifer Anniston neuron). They are what provide the meaningful input for the rest of the brain. The external input has no meaning until it has been processed, and it is presented pre-processed to the sensorium. This is of course a dynamic process – so new meanings are created all the time, and we constantly revise old meanings in light of new information.

Our sense of consciousness comes from the apparent unity of the myriad qualia that we are constantly producing. They are all coordinated to tell the story of our existence. This story is our subjectivity. If this coordination breaks down, as it can with psychosis, the sense of subjective self also breaks down. Those experiencing psychosis report exactly this, that they feel themselves disappearing – there is no longer any story to tell.

[The question 'How come that story is witnessed?' is ultimately unanswerable by us, I think – because we'd be trying to answer it from within the story, and we would need to be able to see outside the story. In that sense, notions of a universal consciousness are as good as any, but don't really tell us very much.]*

I don't have a problem with this, however I don't think it says very much. If our sensorium contains a cat, all this means is that we have seen/heard/touched a cat. Nobody is denying that we have senses.

No. Our sensorium can contain a cat where there is no cat in the external world. Hallucinations can be convincing down to the very last details – those meaningful qualia being produced by their particular specialist teams of neurons despite there being no external input to justify it. We can produce entirely convincing worlds like this, which is why I think it makes sense to talk about the brain constructing a model – I know you don't like this idea, but I think it has legs.


*ETA: I've edited to add the square brackets because I'm not entirely happy with this point. I'm far from sure that this is the best way of looking at it yet, whereas I am happy with the rest of what I write. But I simply don't like the Dennett approach, which says, effectively, that because this is a problem we cannot answer and also a problem that does not need to be answered in order to answer other questions about how we work, it isn't a problem. I do not agree with this.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

A less radical version, which I do agree with, says that the mind is extended. That is: mental states are best seen as being neurological states plus environmental states. Language, in particular, is a 'tool' existing in our social environment which hugely extends our cognitive capabilities- to a large degree we think in language. This view is particularly associated with Andy Clark.

Funny enough, I used to take that view myself. But I don't think it is any more explanatory as a 'feedback loop'.

Don't understand what the last paragraph of your post means, so can't/ won't comment.

I think that the universe is only material/physical (as we'd understand) in part. This owes to the dualism with which we try to pick apart natural reality.

For example, time doesn't exist in my opinion. That is, it doesn't exist insofar as it corresponds to our experience of causality, rather we are only trying to explain what physically allows for our perception of it to be so. But following it through... time dissolves.

Like all things, my opinion is that we form our meanings in a circuit which includes the counter-intuitive antithesis of the notion we create. This allows even higher meanings to be created - the same goes for time. It's even the same for the most basic mathematical statements.

Or chaos theory. CT confirms the fundamental paradox of our consciousness which is that our dualism/reason cannot account for that from which it itself arises. The result is 'chaos', because our logic cannot accept it. This says something about the 'materiality' we refer to. It is dependent upon fixed notions within the mind.

All of our discourses, including computer science cannot accept the paradox, for the same reason that it is impossible for the result of the equation to be included in itself. It is a fundamental limit, yet that possibility is a necessity for the operation of any discourse. There is no foreseeable escape from this impasse.

Our universe is unstable and transient. Materialism assumes a complete, eternal universe. But there is no such thing. God left half of it missing needing us to complete the rest of it.

 

[DotCommunist]

I actually understand what you are on about for once. I think it is balls, mind. Yin yang assumptions

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

.

 

[Jonti]

...

OK I accept that the brain constructs memory and perception and that this fact is an advance from Descartes and Locke. But when we talking of meaning, surely we cannot seperate meaningful observations from the outside world and our life in the outside world. It isn't entirely internal.

I certainly agree with Caecilian that mental states are best seen as being neurological states plus environmental states. I'd prefer to say the sensorium combines information about the environment with info about the organism; the sensorium represents the constraints on the body, and its possibilities for action.

So, yes, things may be inextricably mixed, albeit in a dialectical way, but the meaning flows entirely from bodily processes. One might say, the colours seen by my eyes, the musical tones heard by my ears, the scents if the garden, none of these things exist in physics. They exist only in the organism's sensorium. In that sense, it seems to me, we can say they are entirely internal.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

How does the feedback of the environment give us internality? Man is contained in himself. Environmental states don't explain consciousness or subjectivity.

 

[Caecilian]

So, yes, things may be inextricably mixed, albeit in a dialectical way, but the meaning flows entirely from bodily processes. One might say, the colours seen by my eyes, the musical tones heard by my ears, the scents if the garden, none of these things exist in physics. They exist only in the organism's sensorium. In that sense, it seems to me, we can say they are entirely internal.

How does the feedback of the environment give us internality? Man is contained in himself. Environmental states don't explain consciousness or subjectivity.

In my view, language and linguistic meaning are external. Consciousness and subjectivity are IMO substantially dependent on linguistic meanings (e.g. the idea of 'self'), and accordingly are also substantially external. Of course, that doesn't amount to any sort of explanation of consciousness and subjectivity, but like I said its a step in the right direction.

My reasons for viewing language as external are the usual Wittgenstinian ones- meaning must be determined by public rules; you can't have a private language.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

^The message of Islam today. Yet you know it not, like a man who lit a fire around himself and then was blinded.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

Islam made modernity possible.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

The Quran is basically Talmud and Republic, with the temporal-logical distinctions combined therein.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

.

 

[Spion]

You should rename yourself Ibn Majnuun

 

[littlebabyjesus]

In my view, language and linguistic meaning are external. Consciousness and subjectivity are IMO substantially dependent on linguistic meanings (e.g. the idea of 'self'), and accordingly are also substantially external. Of course, that doesn't amount to any sort of explanation of consciousness and subjectivity, but like I said its a step in the right direction.

My reasons for viewing language as external are the usual Wittgenstinian ones- meaning must be determined by public rules; you can't have a private language.

Just because the meanings of language are shared meanings, that doesn't make them external – rather, the internal meanings are arrived at with reference to the meanings others seem to have, as communicated by language.

A great deal of philosophy involves sorting out the semantic dissonance between people whose internal meanings for a word or phrase are different. This process doesn't require any kind of external repository for 'absolute' meanings – merely the accurate communication of an internal meaning to another.

I don't think the source of subjectivity is to be found in language. Thought and reasoning are perfectly possible without language. The feeling of subjectivity is rather to be found in systems of internal feedback.

 

[Caecilian]

I don't think the source of subjectivity is to be found in language. Thought and reasoning are perfectly possible without language. The feeling of subjectivity is rather to be found in systems of internal feedback.

I'd suggest that language and internal feedback are important.

Language: An external resource (set of public rules) that permits much greater complexity in thought. In particular, it gives us the means to think about thinking (reflexivity). That we identify ourselves as subjects is only possible due to language.

Internal Feedback: We identify our bodily sensations as our own.