bhamgeezer
Dogs bark
I am pretty set into the belief that freedom is simply an epistemological problem, I don't know why it just seems more feasible than any alternative I have encountered.
Can you explain what you mean by that?I am pretty set into the belief that freedom is simply an epistemological problem
Yes, meaning is crucial. We are beings that look for and create meaning. This desire for meaning may be a good way into answering the question of where our purpose comes from.
so if they don't facilitate the illusion they are the illusion. their self-referentiality cannot save them.
Ibn Khaldoun said:well, hold on, what do you say?
they can give it a social importance, whose value you stand against capital. assert freedom and organic labour.
Re: 'Pre-conscious' - choice is not the same as rationality.
I don't understand what you're getting at with these posts. Sorry.Also, all of the mind is integrated and coordinated. We are aware of subconscious drives, and can choose our passions.
Why talk about illusions? Does a demagogue sow illusions? Possibly. But also possibly not.
If the problem is illusion, then what is needed is a stripping away process. But is it not possible that the problem is that something needs to be added?
Why do you have to translate what I say into this sort of language? Do I really mean something different? Your translation is a translation to a depiction of a simplistic world. The problem is that the world isn't simplistic.
I was talking in a generality. But the generality isn't about content - this or that illusion. It was about the form demagogic discourse takes.
If someone says they are fighting for freedom they are not offering you a vision. They need not be presenting you with an illusion, they maybe sincere. They are not offering you a way to think and apply your thought for yourself. Rather they are posing as someone you should identify with.
Of course this not to ban all talk of freedom. If, for example, someone says they are fighting for the freedom of political prisoners then it is clear what they mean.
Or the opposite.
You reminded that the more talk about freedom the less there really is. I thought you meant liberal capitalist democracy, ideology, 'false consciousness' and that.
Ibn Khaldoun said:Sorry. I was rather jolly.
Ibn Khaldoun said:Oh, I agree.
And there is also the 'honest', 'transparent' 'operational' non-demagoguery presenting itself as just implementing a consensus, serving, managing. Gordon Brown seems like one.important.
I was talking about ideology. You are right to see that. But is ideology an illusion or even a false consciousness? The point I think you are missing is that ideology need not be like a filter on reality. The lack of a filter may be just as much ideology. In the Marxist sense. For example, commodity fetishism is a reality. It isn't a false understanding. You cannot overcome it through education. You cannot dissolve the illusion.
I wasn't annoyed, if that's the impression you have. I don't mind you interpreting what I say, I just question the impulse that made you do it.
I don't know. I'd say that is demagogy as well. New Labour is extremely demagogic. The only time I could watch Blair on television without wanting to throw a slipper at him, was during the Iraq war, when he was at least clear about his intentions and his reasons. He was even clear that the alleged WMD's were just a pretext. I find it bizarre and troubling that New Labour became deeply unpopular at precisely this time. I suspect it's a backlash against Thatcher's style of government. We don't like politicians, but politicians with opinions - that's just unspeakable.
Fromm suggests that many people, rather than utilising it successfully, attempt to minimise its negative effects by developing thoughts and behaviours that provide some form of security. These are as follows:
1. Authoritarianism: Fromm characterises the authoritarian personality as containing a sadist element and a masochist element. The authoritarian wishes to gain control over other people in a bid to impose some kind of order on the world, they also wish to submit to the control of some superior force which may come in the guise of a person or an abstract idea.
2. Destructiveness: Although this bears a similarity to sadism, Fromm argues that the sadist wishes to gain control over something. A destructive personality wishes to destroy something it cannot bring under its control.
3. Conformity: This process is seen when people unconsciously incorporate the normative beliefs and thought processes of their society and experience them as their own. This allows them to avoid genuine free thinking, which is likely to be anxiety provoking.
They're not separated, they're part of a circuit, alluding to recent neuroscience that explains consciousness as the coordinated activity of the entire brain.
It's just another word for nothin' left to lose.
Whichever sense (or facet) of ideology we are talking about, it is still the same matter. That we have real social freedom or individuality in capitalism, or even that we're post-feminist, post-racist, or that we 'communicate' more, are all facets of ideology that we are able to believe in because of the means by which those very things are denied. These are the kinda of things you have been talking about. Although I agree that ideology isn't inherently false or illusory ('true consciousness'?), 'false consciousness' is the result of how socialisation is stagnated and fragmented - it's part of Marx's conception of alienation in capitalism.
Ibn Khaldoun said:Commodity fetishism, by definition, is a mystification, that even functions as part of capitalism in economistic ways. But why does that stop it being illusory? It is a result of social reality; it is also false.
We try to remove the lens, then we can get something more real than itself because it is built on the same sand. The point being we are just altering the lenses so that they appear to be transparent.
Someone who sees things in reality that aren't there is said to be deluded. But what is someone who, instead, realises what is missing..?
Ibn Khaldoun said:OK.
One reason is that I was referring to how 'we' [the 'chimeric 51%' who are 'pro-war'?] don't like politicians with opinions. Well, they no longer like to have opinions. But it can't work - all the self-referentiality of language, a normativity, tensionless of politics, a counterfeit of politics. That still can't work.
I was drunk and can't account for it.
Despite what I said above, "You are the power; the power is you". Any trace of politics is to be removed. We are dealing with an attempt to construct a truly positive world.
I like the above. I've highlighted a bit I think is right, but you don't draw out the significant point.
Why is false consciousness the result of social stagnation and fragmentation? What is false consciousness? What is being hidden? What is it that appears to be there but isn't really there?
For marxists, ideology is not about the failure to see the world as it is, but to see the world as it is as the inevitable result of cold, hard logic. That capitalism is the natural state of things.
Perhaps if we see the above in the light of what I have said, then we can see that even if we build elsewhere we are still building on sand as long as we are taking part in a philosophical investigation into the role and relation of ideas. The critique of ideology needs to be political. This is why we should address questions of freedom in a concrete political light rather than a philosophical light. When someone talks about freedom, whose freedom are they talking about? What is obscured?
You see this is the interesting thing. Why is New Labour's apparently apolitical politics so accepted? Another interesting thing is this scandal about expenses. People are really pissed off all of a sudden. It's like politicians are supposed to be dutiful public servants. It isn't like those at the centre of the scandal were selling out their politics. We can't think of politicians as being motivated by political ideals.
When we have really strange ideas that are so nearly universal, we know we are in the grip of ideology, even if it is an anti-ideology ideology.
How has the notion of freedom become marxist political philosophy
If this question is practically useless, how did you determine that it is important or shares importance?We experience the possibility of choice, and we make choices.
But why is this question important? It is practically useless.
that gives us the basis of the question? *Why* is it important?
If this question is practically useless, how did you determine that it is important or shares importance?
(e2a: added s to "share")
Well I understand as far as that, it's a non problem. That makes sense. It's just as unimportant as discussing whether God exists or not.It seems to be important. People talk about it for hours and hours. So did I. But now I think it is a non-problem. It's not that either side is incoherent. The problem is.
The other dimension of the term I think comes into play. Is it a roundabout way of addressing less speculative problems?
Hope it makes sense.
the 'determinism vs free will' question, if it is a non-problem. maybe it's just religion, or is it a roundabout way of addressing what i just mentioned? or something else?
I think that theres certainly a link between the free will/ determinism question and the issue of political freedom, but like you say its kind of a roundabout link. I'll try to explain what I mean.
Free will/ determinism is one of the big problems in philosophy of mind, a very real philosophical issue, and very important if you're interested in that stuff (which I am). We certainly experience having free will, but also we have good reasons for thinking that higher-level phenomena reduce ontologically to lower-level phenomena. Which makes our 'freely chosen' decisions ontologically reducible to sets of neurological events. And since these events are physical and therefore either deterministic (think Newtonian Mechanics) or probabilistic (think QM), in what sense are they 'free'?
An added complication is the work of Libet, which appears to demonstrate that there is a physiological event ('readiness potential') which occurs prior to a 'freely chosen' decision, but which is predictive of what the decision will be. Exactly what Libet's work does demonstrate is a continuing source of argument for neuro-psychologists and philosophers.
There are 3 basic responses to this:
1. No, we're not free. Free will is an illusion. Skinner eek:) was a real enthusiast for this view.
2. Mental states aren't reducible to physical states, even ontologically. Free will is therefore possible. This implies some sort of dualism/ idealism, and tends to shade into religion .
3. Compatibilism (my favoured position), which says that free will has nothing to do with ontological reduction in the first place. Rather, when we say that we do something of our own free will, its a way of taking responsibility for the action.
At this point, we start to approach the issue of political freedom. If free will is about responsibility, and freedom is a good thing, then we want to be giving people greater responsibility for their own lives. This is particularly true if (as I would) we link up the compatibilist position to a notion of biological autonomy (derived mainly from the theory of Autopoiesis), in which case we get something like freedom = autonomy, clearly a political position.
I think the problem here is that "higher-level phenomena" includes stuff like colour perception. There is a cogent and convincing argument that the perception of a colour, for example, is not ontologically reducible to physical process. However much one knows about the physical process, one can still know nothing at all about what it's like to have colour vision.Free will/ determinism is one of the big problems in philosophy of mind, a very real philosophical issue, and very important if you're interested in that stuff (which I am). We certainly experience having free will, but also we have good reasons for thinking that higher-level phenomena reduce ontologically to lower-level phenomena. Which makes our 'freely chosen' decisions ontologically reducible to sets of neurological events