To what extent, and why, is 'freedom' a 'problem'?

[bonjour]

the 'determinism vs free will' question, if it is a non-problem. maybe it's just religion, or is it a roundabout way of addressing what i just mentioned? or something else?

I believe it's both.
We are determined to die. But I have the freedom to e.g lift my hand and pick my nose. I believe it is freedom because I am conciously aware of me making that decision to life my hand and pick my nose. So although it can be debated that it may be an act of determinism, there is no reason for me to believe it is.

The day we have the choice whether to die or not, then does free will>determinism.

But that's as far I as can/will go, there is no discussion available in my comment as I'm sure you're aware.

So I'll leave the thread, but thank you for your time.

 

[Caecilian]

So is autopoiesis causally efficacious or not

Well I'd say yes, but then my view of causation isn't entirely straightforward. We touched on some of this in the 'Genetic Determinism' thread.

Basically, I see causation as a heuristic/ explanatory stance rather than as an ontological category. So while higher-level states of affairs reduce ontologically to lower-level states of affairs, that isn't true of causes (which are explanations that apply to given levels). The clincher for me is that the really low levels (QM and below) don't appear very causal at all. So if causation is an ontological category, then higher-level causes end up supervening on...nothing.

 

[Caecilian]

I think the problem here is that "higher-level phenomena" includes stuff like colour perception. There is a cogent and convincing argument that the perception of a colour, for example, is not ontologically reducible to physical process. However much one knows about the physical process, one can still know nothing at all about what it's like to have colour vision.

We may imagine a very learned neurologist, who knows everything there is to know about the physical lower-level phenomena (or at least the ones we recognise!) that invariably accompany colour vision. Even so, if this neurologist's retinas lacks cone cells, there is one thing they still do not know. And that is what it is actually like to see blue, or red, or any colour.

True, the claim is made that this "perception" business reduces ontologically to the physical correlates. But, however full one's description of those correlates may be, and however complete one's understanding of the physical processes, one cannot from those construct the experience of perception. This being the case, it must be allowed that the proposed ontological reduction is incomplete.

Yeah, the 'Mary' argument. I know it well.

Its a clever thought experiment which convinces some people (Chalmers, for example), but personally I don't buy it at all. Seems to me to be based on a lot of confusions about what constitutes 'knowledge', and also on the whole 'qualia' business, which I simply don't believe in. I'm with Dennett on this one- lets Quine (i.e. bin) the whole idea of qualia.

 

[Jonti]

Unfortunately, one cannot, not without asserting that syntax is everything, and it is not. And anyway, it would be as foolish for philosophers to balk at the question of subjectivity, as it was for scientists.

There is such a thing as consciousness and perception, and it is amenable to scientific study. These days, no-one doubts it! An anaesthesiologist can extinguish all sensation and consciousness, and restore one afterwards. There's no room for any scientific doubt on that score; we understand a great deal about consciousness, and can successfully manipulate it.

Equally, I suggest there is no room for philosophical doubt either, on whether there is such a thing as subjectivity. There is something it is like to be a person. How can that assertion be remotely controversial?

It seems to me odd not to recognise that there is something it is like to be a person, if one's philosophy is concerned with people, and social change.

 

[Caecilian]

Of course there is consciousness and subjectivity. That doesn't imply qualia, though. Check out the Dennett article.

 

[Jonti]

The consciousness of making a decision is a type of qualia, as is orgasm.

These are sensations that others have, as well as oneself, and one can talk sensibly about them. They exist. I grant you, they do not exist in the manner of matter in space, but that is the point.

Orgasms are ontologically distinct from atoms, and do not reduce to them.

 

[Caecilian]

Orgasms are ontologically distinct from atoms, and do not reduce to them.

They certainly don't reduce epistemologically. But ontologically, I think they do.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I don't agree with Dennett on this. His argument appears to be that the notion of qualia is of no explanatory value, and so it is therefore not a valid concept.

But just because it has no explanatory value (and I think he's right that it doesn't), that does not invalidate the concept. Qualia are there – they are experienced – there is something it is like to be Daniel Dennett, however much he may seek to disregard it.

Examining them may not add to our knowledge of the world, and it is probably pointless to speculate how others' qualia appear to them, but they are there. I have a concept of blueness – it is impossible for me to communicate this concept to another because it is one of the basic building blocks of my consciousness – it appears in my consciousness ready made, no doubt, processed by 'blue' neurons' before it arrives – or better, produced by blue neurons, which present it proudly to the rest of the brain.

In a similar way, faces appear in our consciousness pre-primed so that we can recognise them – the youness of you is another of my qualia in effect – and similarly it is equally impossible to communicate to another what that younesss is. But you know when it's there, and you know when it is not there. It doesn't matter at which stage you've lost it – it is not presented in your conscious experience.

 

[Caecilian]

I don't agree with Dennett on this. His argument appears to be that the notion of qualia is of no explanatory value, and so it is therefore not a valid concept.

But just because it has no explanatory value (and I think he's right that it doesn't), that does not invalidate the concept. Qualia are there – they are experienced – there is something it is like to be Daniel Dennett, however much he may seek to disregard it.

Examining them may not add to our knowledge of the world, and it is probably pointless to speculate how others' qualia appear to them, but they are there. I have a concept of blueness – it is impossible for me to communicate this concept to another because it is one of the basic building blocks of my consciousness – it appears in my consciousness ready made, no doubt, processed by 'blue' neurons' before it arrives – or better, produced by blue neurons, which present it proudly to the rest of the brain.

In a similar way, faces appear in our consciousness pre-primed so that we can recognise them – the youness of you is another of my qualia in effect – and similarly it is equally impossible to communicate to another what that younesss is. But you know when it's there, and you know when it is not there. It doesn't matter at which stage you've lost it – it is not presented in your conscious experience.

You seem to be saying that the 'qualia' concept does have reference, but doesn't have explanatory value.

Not at all sure how this could be. If a concept really does refer to something, how can it not also have explanatory value? And conversely, if a concept doesn't have any explanatory value, doesn't that imply that it isn't referring to a phenomenon?

Can you think of any other concepts that have reference, but can't be used in explanations?

 

[littlebabyjesus]

It can't be used in explanations because it is particular to each of us. There is no point even attempting to describe our qualia to anyone else (we can't), let alone use them in explanations.

 

[Caecilian]

It can't be used in explanations because it is particular to each of us. There is no point even attempting to describe our qualia to anyone else (we can't), let alone use them in explanations.

If you can't talk about something using public language, then how can you know that you're using the concept correctly? And if you can't know whether or not you're using a concept correctly, doesn't that make it meaningless, even to yourself?

Qualia by your account seem very similar to Wittgenstein's 'beetle in a box'.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

No. I know how blue appears to me. There is most certainly a blueness to blue – as I said before, no doubt provided by sets of 'blue neurons' that are activated whenever the signals coming in indicate light across a certain range of frequencies and send that blueness on to the rest of the brain. To deny qualia is in effect to deny subjectivity. But I know that my subjective self exists while it is operating. It's the only thing I can know with absolute certainty. The properties of the only thing we can know with absolute certainty are the very properties that we cannot ever communicate.

I don't think qualia are in any way a problem, as such. Since they have no explanatory value, their incommunicability poses no practical problems to us whatsoever.

Actually, I have thought of one use for qualia. Blue is not red is not green is not yellow. We split the continuum of light into different colours which bear no relation to each other. Red and blue do not share any common qualities. So that tells us something about how the brain processes colour. It takes the continuum and places very specific sections along the continuum, each section dealt with by separate sets of neurons (in between the sections, both sets of neurons will fire at varying strengths to give, for instance, reddy orange). The study of our own qualia can give us insights into the way that the brain constructs conscious experience.

Ok, qualia do have explanatory value. Dennett is wrong about that too.

 

[Jonti]

They certainly don't reduce epistemologically. But ontologically, I think they do.

I'd say they are not the same sort of being at all. That is, atoms and suchlike exist regardless of our perception, but orgasms exist only in a being's sensorium.

 

[Jonti]

If you can't talk about something using public language, then how can you know that you're using the concept correctly? And if you can't know whether or not you're using a concept correctly, doesn't that make it meaningless, even to yourself?

Qualia by your account seem very similar to Wittgenstein's 'beetle in a box'.

We can talk about the colours of the rainbow, how they relate to each other and to other colours, even though we cannot communicate our personal experience of what it's like to see a particular hue.

That's just the way it is, I think. We can communicate about the structure of our experience, and in arbitrary detail, it seems! What we cannot communicate directly is the sensual reality, the semantic content, what it is like to be someone else.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Here's a provisional definition of qualia:

Qualia are the phenomena in experience that appear in that experience ready-processed. All qualia are produced by parts of the brain, to be presented in the integrated model of existence that we experience in our consciousness, already embued with the qualities that show the particular qualia's meaning.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

Here's a provisional definition of qualia:

Qualia are the phenomena in experience that appear in that experience ready-processed. All qualia are produced by parts of the brain, to be presented in the integrated model of existence that we experience in our consciousness, already embued with the qualities that show the particular qualia's meaning.

'Embued', is not a word.

 

[Jonti]

http://wordlist.com/embue.htm

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

imbued is a word.

I figure that if you misspell teh, it's no big deal. But if you endeavour to impress with a high powered vocabulary, it's best to spell the big words correctly.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Ok, imbued.

Well done, you win.

I'm not trying to impress anyone, Johnny, just trying to develop some thoughts.

You know what, I've noticed people make spelling mistakes in posts I guessed might be important to them in some way. On those occasions, I have sent them a PM to let them know so that they can correct it.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

To get back to the point, I think on reflection that we may be getting our wires crossed, Caecilian. Qualia don't have explanatory power in that you don't need to refer to them to explain anything else. But the concept has use in that we can recognise our own different qualia, and the fact that we have some rather than others tells us about the meanings we are creating in our brains. But the actual essence of the individual qualia is neither available for examination, nor indeed, of use to anybody else.

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

I think that theres certainly a link between the free will/ determinism question and the issue of political freedom, but like you say its kind of a roundabout link. I'll try to explain what I mean.

Free will/ determinism is one of the big problems in philosophy of mind, a very real philosophical issue, and very important if you're interested in that stuff (which I am). We certainly experience having free will, but also we have good reasons for thinking that higher-level phenomena reduce ontologically to lower-level phenomena. Which makes our 'freely chosen' decisions ontologically reducible to sets of neurological events.

This is missing the wood for the trees, like saying a painting is a set of brush strokes on canvas, rather than a work of art (true, this is simply taking the position of subjectivity).

An added complication is the work of Libet, which appears to demonstrate that there is a physiological event ('readiness potential') which occurs prior to a 'freely chosen' decision, but which is predictive of what the decision will be. Exactly what Libet's work does demonstrate is a continuing source of argument for neuro-psychologists and philosophers.

I'll look into this more, but one possible response is what I said earlier: what is considered to be 'pre-conscious' isn't so, rather being simultaneous with 'conscious' (i.e behaviour, rationality etc.), since the conscious mind is an entire circuit and that separation isn't truly possible. This happens to correspond to the materialist 'reduction' of consciousness, yet:

And since these events are physical and therefore either deterministic (think Newtonian Mechanics) or probabilistic (think QM), in what sense are they 'free'?

2. Mental states aren't reducible to physical states, even ontologically. Free will is therefore possible. This implies some sort of dualism/ idealism, and tends to shade into religion .

The crux of the problem of consciousness has always been: how can matter have subjectivity? Evolution hasn't explained this (for most people). Likewise, if an 'artificially intelligent' (but why not consider it organic if it possessed consciousness?) box were created able to ask the same question it wouldn't get a satisfactory answer.

So, if mental states aren't ontologically reducible to physical states, does it imply dualism/idealism/religion? Not necessarily. The answer might be darker, that the notion of materiality/physicality is flawed or naive. Consciousness, and freedom, might be the concession of a disappearing universe that is only partially 'material', tangible, determinable. But with plurality built into it.

freedom = autonomy, clearly a political position.

Autonomy. Yay!

 

[Ibn Khaldoun]

The properties of the only thing we can know with absolute certainty are the very properties that we cannot ever communicate.

Qualia = 'Beetle in the box'

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

Ok, imbued.

Well done, you win.

I'm not trying to impress anyone, Johnny, just trying to develop some thoughts.

You know what, I've noticed people make spelling mistakes in posts I guessed might be important to them in some way. On those occasions, I have sent them a PM to let them know so that they can correct it.

I can't be bothered with pms.

It's no big deal, but usually, when people use hard words that many others can't understand, it's like they're trying to impress somebody.

Misspelling the big words, ruins the effect.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

To get back to the point, I think on reflection that we may be getting our wires crossed, Caecilian. Qualia don't have explanatory power in that you don't need to refer to them to explain anything else. But the concept has use in that we can recognise our own different qualia, and the fact that we have some rather than others tells us about the meanings we are creating in our brains. But the actual essence of the individual qualia is neither available for examination, nor indeed, of use to anybody else.

This is part of it. When one has to make reference to abstruse, jargonistic words, it's as if the discussion can only be carried on on a 'higher plane', that is available only to those who understand the recondite jargon.

When you get right down to it, there's no reason that these concepts can't be discussed without recourse to this obfuscating jargon.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

When one finds oneself arguing over the definitions of the words instead of the ideas, then the focus of the discussion has been lost. Imo.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I agree totally that it is best to keep language as simple as possible, but no simpler. In this particular case, I think the word qualia has value, not least as something whose precise meaning people can debate.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

When one finds oneself arguing over the definitions of the words instead of the ideas, then the focus of the discussion has been lost. Imo.

I disagree – the argument over the definition of the word can be a discussion about the ideas. I don't think we're quite arguing over the definition of qualia, though.

tbh I'm not sure what we're arguing over. I shall leave this discussion for a while.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

We make our decisions pre-consciously. Remember that your pre-conscious self is you too.

There is experimental evidence that backs this up (Libet's famous experiment has been backed up by recent discoveries), but you shouldn't be surprised - the representation of reality that we make to ourselves in our consciousness takes time to construct – everything in it, including our decisions, has necessarily already happened.

So when a child darts into the street, and given the one second reaction time - I hit the brakes at about 1.5 seconds, the decision to hit the brakes was made sometime before that?

When?

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

Put it this way – not a single insight has been arrived at in science that requires free will.

That's because free will is a philosophical concept.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

More than that, there is no place for free will within a scientific framework as it stands now. .

Why, and so what?

The categories of human knowledge are not yet closed.