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Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion

You didn't answer my questions though Sam, you dismissed them by saying they've been doing it for years/nothing to see here.

I got some answers anyway. Happy to leave it here.

Nice try. Not comparable in any way though with the snarky bullyboy routine you tried which led me to tell you to back off on the Finsbury Park thread.
so it's ok for you to dish it out to all and sundry? and get to decide what's out of order too? :confused:
 
The other NYT article is pretty good

U.K. Officials Said Material on Tower Was Banned. It Wasn’t.

Critics of the material have warned for years that aluminum surface sheets can melt in a fire, after which flames could race through flammable insulation. If other protections fail and fire penetrates the cladding, “It is like you have got a high-rise building and you are encasing it in kerosene,” said Edwin Galea, director of the Fire Safety Engineering Group at the University of Greenwich. “It is insanity, pure and simple.”
 
it doesn't matter how much your dad knows about stuff as you don't have access to all of the stuff you need to know.
I have no issue with properly sourced information, however there are so few known facts at the moment the constant theory chasing and posting without thinking by some is getting a bit wearing.
The level of known facts has increased as this thread has gone on.

The following are some of the known relevant aspects of the situation
  1. The insulation used was certified for use in above 18m buildings (BS 8414-2:2005) only if a specified installation method is used with regular fire stops and with a certain type of intrinsically rigid and non-combustible cladding.
    The cladding in this installation was not the cladding used to gain the certification, and had an HDPE core to provide rigidity that would melt at around 115-135 degC.
    Fire stops appear to have been installed (judging from photos of before and after), but the building looks incredibly difficult for this to have been done in a way that created fully sealed fire stops throughout.
  2. The cladding was using Renubond PE. The manufacturer claims both this and the Renubond FR cladding meeting class O under BS 476 UK fire regs, which would mean that either would seem to meet the requirements of Diagram D (page 95) of ADB2 for external finishes of walls. However it gives no further details, and doesn't included the PE version at all in the more detailed fire safety document for high rise buildings. It also has a diagram showing the PE should only be used for cladding on buildings under 10m on page 1 of that document.
  3. The building was recently refitted with combi boilers in each flat, each needing to be vented through an external wall.
    This provides a potential route for fire to get out to the cladding, a route for smoke and fire to enter the building from the cladding, and a potential additional fuel source for any cladding fire if any boilers were damaged.
From this it seems that the exact combination of cladding and insulation used here were not certified for this use, unless they'd been specifically tested by the installation company or either supply company for this installation method and that test result isn't available online.

It's also possible to see why the specifiers would have missed this, as you need to really dig into the literature to sus this out, the datasheets do not make this clear and the cladding by itself actually would have been allowed as it meets the required BS 476 standard, it's only the combination that probably isn't certified.

There is a serious problem though with the all the standards involved here. OU took the piss out of my burner test, but essentially that is the main BS test that's used other than it also being electrically heated and under STC.

This article explains the different fire regulations standards, and why the PE variant of the cladding might pass the UK standard but not the German standard (flame applied to the side of the cladding vs the base of it).

There's also the issue that with the external insulation the class 0 requirement is lower than for other elements, it's allowed to flame for up to 10 seconds, and give a 25 deg temp rise, vs the standard requirement of no flame and a 20 degree maximum rise. So even a Class 0 pass isn't the same standard for all products. ie for insulated cladding it's allowed to catch fire and flame, so it will add to any fire that is already burning but that's fine as long it goes out within 10 seconds of the other source of the fire going out.

What was and is really needed is a requirement for all elements of the cladding and insulation to be non-combustible, to not flame at all, rather than allowing all these complex varieties of it being allowed to burn a bit in certain situations but then being controlled by xyz additional measures and installation methods.
 
What I said before.

You're wrong. It's a discussion on current affairs, not a memorial. There's been some very enlightening posts from people with experience in construction and for the most part people veering towards conspiracies have been told to fuck off. If you don't like it don't read it but I don't see what people should be posting other than a discussion of what might have happened.
 
What I said before.

That's actually a pretty detailed explanation which contains the facts as are known. You may not be interested in the finer points of building design and fire regulations and that's fair enough, actually it'd be a bit weird if you were, but I don't really see anything wrong with what is being written. I don't think its sensationalist or lacking in respect in any way.

At some point in the future there will come a sweeping under the carpet of what has happened. To understand how that will play out it is useful to know as much as possible.

There are potentially a lot of people living in similar buildings right now and I guess the question is do we trust the regulations?

There are people now working their socks off the assist the homeless and the traumatized, there are people contributing what they can. I would say it is incumbent on those who have knowledge in this area to attempt to ensure that the lessons really are learned (and not in the normal fobbing off way) and this never happens again.

ETA: Personally I'm not sure I see the value of the day of rage march which is going on at the moment. Actually I do, I'm just not sure what it will achieve. I do recognise though it is people acting in their own way to try to do something so in that respect I'm not going to criticise them.
 
The level of known facts has increased as this thread has gone on.

The following are some of the known relevant aspects of the situation
  1. The insulation used was certified for use in above 18m buildings (BS 8414-2:2005) only if a specified installation method is used with regular fire stops and with a certain type of intrinsically rigid and non-combustible cladding.
    The cladding in this installation was not the cladding used to gain the certification, and had an HDPE core to provide rigidity that would melt at around 115-135 degC.
    Fire stops appear to have been installed (judging from photos of before and after), but the building looks incredibly difficult for this to have been done in a way that created fully sealed fire stops throughout.
  2. The cladding was using Renubond PE. The manufacturer claims both this and the Renubond FR cladding meeting class O under BS 476 UK fire regs, which would mean that either would seem to meet the requirements of Diagram D (page 95) of ADB2 for external finishes of walls. However it gives no further details, and doesn't included the PE version at all in the more detailed fire safety document for high rise buildings. It also has a diagram showing the PE should only be used for cladding on buildings under 10m on page 1 of that document.
  3. The building was recently refitted with combi boilers in each flat, each needing to be vented through an external wall.
    This provides a potential route for fire to get out to the cladding, a route for smoke and fire to enter the building from the cladding, and a potential additional fuel source for any cladding fire if any boilers were damaged.
From this it seems that the exact combination of cladding and insulation used here were not certified for this use, unless they'd been specifically tested by the installation company or either supply company for this installation method and that test result isn't available online.

It's also possible to see why the specifiers would have missed this, as you need to really dig into the literature to sus this out, the datasheets do not make this clear and the cladding by itself actually would have been allowed as it meets the required BS 476 standard, it's only the combination that probably isn't certified.

There is a serious problem though with the all the standards involved here. OU took the piss out of my burner test, but essentially that is the main BS test that's used other than it also being electrically heated and under STC.

This article explains the different fire regulations standards, and why the PE variant of the cladding might pass the UK standard but not the German standard (flame applied to the side of the cladding vs the base of it).

There's also the issue that with the external insulation the class 0 requirement is lower than for other elements, it's allowed to flame for up to 10 seconds, and give a 25 deg temp rise, vs the standard requirement of no flame and a 20 degree maximum rise. So even a Class 0 pass isn't the same standard for all products. ie for insulated cladding it's allowed to catch fire and flame, so it will add to any fire that is already burning but that's fine as long it goes out within 10 seconds of the other source of the fire going out.

What was and is really needed is a requirement for all elements of the cladding and insulation to be non-combustible, to not flame at all, rather than allowing all these complex varieties of it being allowed to burn a bit in certain situations but then being controlled by xyz additional measures and installation methods.

Have you seen this?

http://www.kingspaninsulation.co.uk...Bulletin--Routes-to-Compliance--Fire-Saf.aspx

(For others reading, this refers to a Kingspan board that's very similar to the Celotex one. Kingspan and Celotex are the "big two" manufacturers of this kind of insulation board in the UK)

It mentions the acceptability of "desktop study reports" as a means to approval. We don't know if something like this might have been done in this case.

Screen Shot 2017-06-21 at 17.14.30.jpg
 
That's actually a pretty detailed explanation which contains the facts as are known. You may not be interested in the finer points of building design and fire regulations and that's fair enough, actually it'd be a bit weird if you were, but I don't really see anything wrong with what is being written. I don't think its sensationalist or lacking in respect in any way.

At some point in the future there will come a sweeping under the carpet of what has happened. To understand how that will play out it is useful to know as much as possible.

There are potentially a lot of people living in similar buildings right now and I guess the question is do we trust the regulations?

There are people now working their socks off the assist the homeless and the traumatized, there are people contributing what they can. I would say it is incumbent on those who have knowledge in this area to attempt to ensure that the lessons really are learned (and not in the normal fobbing off way) and this never happens again.

ETA: Personally I'm not sure I see the value of the day of rage march which is going on at the moment. Actually I do, I'm just not sure what it will achieve. I do recognise though it is people acting in their own way to try to do something so in that respect I'm not going to criticise them.
Ok, I accept that. I didn't read fs's post as the length of it made me itch. Maybe I'm just having a bad reaction to what looked like a self-serving competitive geek off, but I accept that people just want to find out what happened.
I best just not read anymore as it makes me feel physically sick to see such detail repeated over and over again.
 
I would say it is incumbent on those who have knowledge in this area to attempt to ensure that the lessons really are learned (and not in the normal fobbing off way) and this never happens again.
This is my purpose in posting this stuff on this thread. I come from the perspective of 'Knowledge is power', and the wider that knowledge can be spread among those affected or potentially affected the harder it will be for the authorities / building owners to brush off their questioning.

That along with being able to be sure that any work we're involved in / have been involved with isn't going to result in a similar risk / knowing what to watch for.

Ultimately if this is down to a failing in the building regs then this can't wait for a public inquiry to report before it's rectified, it needs an urgent revision now.
 
Ok, I accept that. I didn't read fs's post as the length of it made me itch. Maybe I'm just having a bad reaction to what looked like a self-serving competitive geek off, but I accept that people just want to find out what happened.
I best just not read anymore as it makes me feel physically sick to see such detail repeated over and over again.

Yeah I get that. It is a bit like an autopsy I guess but I do think there is a meaningful purpose to it.
 
This is my purpose in posting this stuff on this thread. I come from the perspective of 'Knowledge is power', and the wider that knowledge can be spread among those affected or potentially affected the harder it will be for the authorities / building owners to brush off their questioning.

That along with being able to be sure that any work we're involved in / have been involved with isn't going to result in a similar risk / knowing what to watch for.

Ultimately if this is down to a failing in the building regs then this can't wait for a public inquiry to report before it's rectified, it needs an urgent revision now.
Indeed.

This was posted by a (non-newbie) member on SkyScraperCity:

it seems very likely from reports that another 20 towers in London have the exact same cladding as Grenfell. Making the assumption the cladding was the main fire factor, at this moment anything between 7,000 and 10,000 Londoners may be sleeping, surrounded by a ring of highly flammable material. With the London fire brigade aware that it is probably incapable of preventing or significantly slowing another major combustion event if/when it occurs.

If we knew a type of aircraft carrying this number of passengers at any time had such a fatal flaw, it would be grounded immediately (for example the Boeing 787 with unstable lithium batteries). Can we really cross our fingers and hope no other fires occur in these tower blocks until the country eventually gets round to sorting the problem?
 
A nice corporate social responsibility gesture from Harrods.

Harrods, which is located in the borough, announced it is to donate £1m to the British Red Cross London fire relief fund, to help support individuals and families affected. The store said some of its employees had been personally affected. Its in-house cooks had been producing food for local relief centres, while other employees had been collecting blankets, toiletries and toys for donation, it said.

Michael Ward, the Harrods managing director, said: “Over the past week, we have been overwhelmed by how the community has come together to support our neighbours at this terrible time.” He added that through the donation “we want to play our part in helping our neighbourhood recover from this tragic event”.

Grenfell Tower: May apologises for 'failures of state, local and national'
 
Have you seen this?

http://www.kingspaninsulation.co.uk...Bulletin--Routes-to-Compliance--Fire-Saf.aspx

(For others reading, this refers to a Kingspan board that's very similar to the Celotex one. Kingspan and Celotex are the "big two" manufacturers of this kind of insulation board in the UK)

It mentions the acceptability of "desktop study reports" as a means to approval. We don't know if something like this might have been done in this case.

View attachment 109850
I'd not seen that, but had been reading a council building control guide that basically showed the same thing.

One way or another someone in the chain that decided on this option would seem to have either taken the datasheet specs at face value, or got someone to sign off on it via one of those other routes who's not grasped the difference between the 'class 0' panels and the fully non-combustible panels used in the make up that celotex used in their certification test.

Had building control been involved instead of this being self certified (apparently) then I doubt they'd have let that one pass however it had been done.
 
Just stop it. I haven't dished anything out other than a request not to condescend to me. Keep trying to shit stir though, yeah?
no you were out of order to Sam, my point is that you think it's ok to both dish it out and call people on dishing it out. not trying to stir anything
 
To clear up the matter:

Affordable housing is social rented, affordable rented and intermediate housing, provided to eligible households whose needs are not met by the market.

From here Definitions of general housing terms - GOV.UK

Intermediate housing can be for sale, affordable housing is for rent. These were always going to be rental properties. I don't know if the sale to City took place before these events or not but it's such a long process that I suspect it was already in the works. They're not extra housing, in any case.

In real terms though, "affordable housing" almost always now means "intermediate housing for sale OR rent", and qualifies as "affordable" by virtue of sitting at 70-80% of market rent or purchase price.
 
Here's the problem with the call for public inquiries. We've already had a full parliamentary inquiry into a very similar fire, but nothing was done as a result.

This is some of the evidence submitted by the fire brigade union to a 1999 DETR parliamentary inquiry into a cladding fire on a high rise block of flats in Scotland.
2.11 It is for these reasons that we believe that all cladding used on multi-storey buildings over 25 metres in height and the fixing systems should be completely non-combustible, or achieve a fire resisting standard equivalent to the external walls.
We have been particularly concerned for some time with the principle of small scale fire testing of large building components such as composite cladding, or insulated sandwich panel systems. We believe strongly that such testing and its findings should be validated by large scale testing of the complete system under realistic fire conditions. However, it appears that the real barrier to large scale testing is the question of cost rather than that of scientific prudence.

We understand that since 1991 work on a more realistic test has taken place and between 1995 and 1996 a new test procedure for external cladding systems was developed jointly by leading board manufacturers and the Fire Research Station. This is entitled "A Test Method to Assess the Fire Performance of External Cladding Systems" and we also understand that it was submitted for acceptance by the DETR, but nothing has since been heard on its progress towards adoption.

What ever happens in the future, we believe that the existing small scale test method is unsatisfactory and that a new test for both internal and external cladding systems and sandwich panels should be developed which should be based on the ISO 9705 Room Corner Test.

5.6 In the case of new buildings or alterations to existing buildings then we believe that the following requirements should apply:


  • — in buildings up to 25 metres in height all external cladding used should be of limited non combustibility and the fixtures should be capable of retaining the cladding system in place for at least one hour when exposed to a fire, any infill panels should afford the same fire resistance as the walls surrounding them; and

  • — in buildings over 30 metres in height all external cladding or infill panels should be inherently non combustible, or afford the same fire resistance as the walls to which it is attached; and

  • — a new large scale fire test for all cladding and sandwich panels should be introduced by the DETR and British Standards Institution as soon as possible.
6.1 We believe that the role of the Building Regulations Advisory Committee (BRAC) in this matter and generally as to its constitution and working practices should be discussed by the Sub-committee. BRAC exists to offer guidance to the Secretary of State upon the content and application of the Building Regulations in England and Wales. In Scotland a similar body called the Building Standards Advisory Committee, or BSAC also exists.

6.2 Members of BRAC are nominated by professional bodies, or associations, but are appointed on a personal basis by the Secretary of State for Construction at the DETR, currently Nick Raynsford MP. They are then asked to sign the Official Secrets Act and theoretically from that point on they should not discuss any matters they may collectively consider with anyone else, including their nominating bodies.

6.3 This secretive procedure has caused some concern in the fire industry, as fire risk matters that we may identify, such as the fire risks of sandwich panels and external cladding systems, are submitted to the DETR who pass them to BRAC where they are apparently considered in closed session. Having done so BRAC then send their conclusions back to the DETR who seem to then issue a public consultation document on what they perceive to be the best way forward.

Once that public consultation process is complete BRAC then consider the responses received, before coming to their final conclusions, which in turn becomes their advice to the Minister.

6.4 As an example, in December 1997 the Building Regulations Division of the DETR undertook an extensive public consultation exercise upon amendments that BRAC proposed to Approved Document B (Fire). Approved Document B is the guidance document to discharging functional requirement B (Fire) of the English and Welsh Building Regulations. Since closing the consultation exercise in March 1998 the 170 plus responses received, have been analysed at the Building Research Establishment (BRE) and the outcomes passed to BRAC for consideration.

6.5 As yet and some 19 months later, no announcement has been made on the final proposals which will, when published, amend the English and Welsh Building Regulations for at least the next five years. We understand that BRAC has now concluded its deliberations and their advice has now gone to the Minister, with an announcement being likely in November of this year.

6.6 Secretive processes and delays of this nature only serve to bring the process of government into question and given that this government is committed to a far higher degree of openness than its predecessors we are surprised and disappointed that the government permits BRAC to continue to work under a cloak of secrecy.

6.7 By comparison, Health and Safety Commission Committees and the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council operate an open system of meetings that is much more in line with a policy of open government and enables interested onlookers to keep abreast of current thinking at a government departmental level.

6.8 We believe that the constitution of the Building Regulations Advisory Committee should be amended and reformed to permit it to become an open committee whereby it's discussions and deliberations are in the public domain.

The DETR lost responsibility for this area of law 2 years later, so any changes that could have come out of this inquiry would have been lost at that stage.

Little of this is new, the dangers have been known about and widely discussed in fire safety & building design circles for 3 decades but the recommendations above were not implemented. Had they been then this fire would have almost certainly been contained and put out within a few minutes.
 
And further evidence about the problems of the class 0 rating from the fire safety development group at the same inquiry.
2.3 A material of limited combustibility can achieve a Class 0 rating as defined by the regulations but a Class 0 material is not equivalent to a material of limited combustibility. A material of limited combustibility is generally a material which is totally non-combustible or which contains a small amount of combustible material. Combustible materials, like plastic, wood, etc are not materials of limited combustibility but can achieve Class 0 performance by adding fire retardant chemicals or facing the combustible material with a metal foil or sheet. Thus there is a fundamental difference between products that are inherently Class 0 and products modified to enhance their performance. This serves to undermine the integrity of the regulations and therefore reduces fire safety.

2.4 Confusion often occurs because some manufacturers refer to Class 0 products without due consideration for the way the product will be used or treated. The performance of an external cladding sheet which, when tested alone and meets the requirements of Class 0, could easily be downgraded to an inferior level by painting the sheet with the wrong type of paint.

2.5 We believe that both methods can suffer from technical problems, particularly for products used for exterior applications, when the additive may not be durable. With time, the performance will fall to a lower level. If a facing foil or laminate has been used on the plastic material, this could be damaged with time or delaminate due to loss of adhesion between the foil and the substrate. These types of products still remain combustible and will contribute to fire load in the event of fire. Higher levels of smoke will be developed when combustible materials burn than for materials of limited combustibility. Furthermore, in the case of thermoplastics, they could drip in the event of a fire and this will exacerbate fire spread.
 
The articles about these flats are all really weird - basically gushing adverts for the luxury development, then tucked away in the article it's revealed the flats in question were purpose built social housing - so the flats will be used for the actual purpose they were built, they're just being completed a bit earlier.
 
I was thinking that maybe the technical side of things should be taken to another thread, but I do think that it needs to be more widely understood how long these problems have been known about, and that the governments of all 3 major UK parties have taken bugger all action in 2-3 revisions of the regulations since that inquiry to address the concerns clearly expressed in 1999, and I'm fairly sure at other points as well.

Politicians of all stripes need to be held to account for not ensuring that these recommendations were implemented in the nearly 2 decades since the fire that led to that previous inquiry.
 
The articles about these flats are all really weird - basically gushing adverts for the luxury development, then tucked away in the article it's revealed the flats in question were purpose built social housing - so the flats will be used for the actual purpose they were built, they're just being completed a bit earlier.
They're supposed to make the reader jealous of the poor bastards that have 'won the lottery' by getting 'given' these - by being burnt out of their flats and watching their neighbours burn to death. Classic divide and rule. And from a quick scan of the comments on the Evening Standard it's working too :mad::(
 
They're supposed to make the reader jealous of the poor bastards that have 'won the lottery' by getting 'given' these - by being burnt out of their flats and watching their neighbours burn to death. Classic divide and rule. And from a quick scan of the comments on the Evening Standard it's working too :mad::(
yeh. but who reads the comments on the evening standard?
 
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