People setting themselves in fie in the camps now. So the arab spring ends as it started.
How and why reconstruction under the regime is a profit (in many ways) making and thieves charter. (pdf)
Summary
1 The reconstruction plans of the al-Assad regime largely ignore the needs of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The regime’s reconstruction strategy does not
address the most pressing needs of over 10 million Syrian IDPs and refugees. Instead it
caters mostly to the economic interests of the regime itself and its allies.
2 Current Syrian legislation obstructs the return of IDPs and refugees, and legalizes the
deprivation of rights of residents of informal settlements. A series of tailor-made laws
have made it legal to deprive inhabitants of informal settlements of their rights. This
includes the restriction of housing, land and property rights through Decree 66, Law No.
10, the restriction of basic rights under the counter-terrorism law, and the legal bases for
public-private co-investments. These laws also serve the interests of regime cronies and
regime-loyal forces. The process of demographic engineering in former opposition-held
territories, which has already begun, driven by campaigns of forced displacement and
the evictions of original residents, is being cemented by these laws. They considerably
discourage and obstruct refugees from returning to Syria. Funding reconstruction
under the umbrella of the Syrian state threatens to reinforce this policy.
3 Under the current circumstances, reconstruction would further strengthen the
dictatorship and its nepotism, as well as fuel new conflicts. Current housing, land and
property rights are a key driving factor for future conflicts in Syria, and are expected to
considerably increase the existing and massive social inequalities in Syrian society that
were major motivating factors at the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011.
4 Instead of providing reconstruction assistance to the country, the allies of the Syrian
regime are plundering the country’s natural resources. Iran and Russia in particular
are hardly contributing towards a base for future reconstruction. Rather they are
plundering the country’s few resources. One example is the Russian-Syrian agreement
on the use of phosphate resources, which assures a Russian company 70 percent of all
the phosphate extracted while the Syrian government will get only 30 percent. Such
agreements jeopardize the prospect of economic stabilization in Syria, as potential tax
and foreign exchange earnings are compromised.
5 Reconstruction fails as a means of political pressure on the Syrian regime. So far,
the al-Assad regime has attempted in vain to force European states to fund Syria’s
reconstruction by using the repatriation of Syrian refugees from Europe as a “bait”.
At the same time, Western states have not been very successful in making financial
pledges for reconstruction conditional, attempting to use them as a foreign policy
tool to aid political change in Syria. This is due to the fact that the military victories of
the al-Assad regime and its allies have reduced what little pressure there was on the
Syrian regime to commit to reforms or a political transition. Its current reconstruction
strategy illustrates how the promise of reconstruction funds cannot be used to pressure
for substantial change within the Syrian regime.
6 No reconstruction without peace. Experiences from other conflicts show that
reconstruction only makes sense after armed conflicts have ended – that is, when all
hostilities have ceased and a peace agreement is signed. Syria still has a long way to go
in this respect, as no notable progress has been made with the Geneva peace process.
Before committing to any reconstruction aid, there must be a political solution to the
conflict in Syria.
7 Reconstruction aid must be tailored to the needs of those affected and involve Syrian
civil society. If reconstruction is to lay the foundation for the return of IDPs and
refugees to their home country, their needs must be assessed and their participation in
the reconstruction process ensured. In addition to material needs and assuring legal
rights regarding housing, land and property rights are maintained, other obstacles to
return must also be eliminated, such as, for example, establishing effective protection
against potential state persecution. This is why Syrian civil society and the diaspora
should be involved in reconstruction planning by Germany or the European Union at an
early stage.