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And next, Syria?

Going off this it still isn't clear whether all the SNA factions are included.

Rebel groups in Syria, under the supervision of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, have agreed to dissolve and merge into the country’s defense ministry, the new administration announced on Tuesday.

“A meeting of the leaders of the revolutionary factions with the leader of the new Syrian administration, Ahmed al-Sharaa, results in an agreement to dissolve all factions and merge them under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense,” an announcement from the office of Sharaa, who is better known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, read.
The statement did not clarify if the decision applies to the Ankara-supported Syrian National Army (SNA).

eta: some discussion on who's in and who's out.
 
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Women's Council of Syria opens office in Damascus.

Meghan Bodette
A women’s institution from NES that’s close to the Autonomous Administration has opened an office in Damascus and met with the Women’s Affairs department of the transitional government, per Kurdish media.

Translation of news report in link:
The Syrian Women's Council's Cizre Office Director Muna Youssef told our agency that since 2017, the council has been trying to open its offices in all Syrian cities, saying: "During the era of the oppressive regime, we did not have any offices in Damascus, but there was a ready ground. Representatives of the council were in Damascus and were organizing their activities in the name of the council."

Muna Youssef noted that the Syrian Women's Council sent a diplomatic delegation of women to Damascus on behalf of the council to meet with the interim government's head of women's affairs, Ayşe El Dibis, and said: "We held many meetings and consultations to open a council office in Damascus, and the conditions were prepared for opening an office in Damascus. We officially opened our office in Damascus yesterday (December 23rd)."

Muna Yousif stated that the Syrian Women's Council wants to transfer the successful experience in North and East Syria to Damascus and develop these achievements, saying: "It is necessary to have women's representation in the constitutional committee, all institutions and aspects of life." Muna Yousif stated that the aim of opening the office is to strengthen relations and establish unity among women in North and East Syria, Sweida, Jarablis, Idlib and all other cities.
 
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An opinion on relations with Turkey, translated from here
The frequent visits of Turkish officials to Syria and the increase in diplomatic delegations does not mean that there are strong relations or Turkish hegemony. I see the opposite. There are clear Turkish fears and there is a race on their part to try to fill the void. I believe that if the Turks do not obtain gains that satisfy their interests, they have pressure cards in the north that they have not given up yet. Personally, I hope for very good relations with Turkey, but a relationship based on equality and respect for the interests and security of both countries. Turkey has a very important role in reconstruction and in the economic and commercial openness that Syria needs in the coming days.
Turkey decides to increase the salaries of the employees of the interim government affiliated with the coalition in northern Syria by 70%. Isn't Turkey supposed to merge the two governments into the central government!

This supports my idea that I said yesterday that the frequency of Turkish visits is not evidence of complete agreement or dominance, but rather fear of a deal between the new government and the SDF.

Until now, northern Syria is considered more like an autonomous region despite all the laughter and drinking tea on the slopes of Qasioun.
 
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Wladimir van Wilgenburg
The General Command of the SDF says that they are preparing for operations against Turkish-backed groups in Tal Abyad and Serekaniye. "The time has come to liberate these areas from Turkish occupation and unite Syria."

The SDF also calls on SNA fighters and their families "to take advantage of the final opportunity offered by our command. We urge them to return to their homes in their original towns and cities within Syria."

"We extend a helping hand to any fighter or individual wishing to safely return to their areas within Syria or to the regions of North and East Syria." - SDF

eta: It looks like this statement has now been taken down
Article was deleted. Maybe it was not an official statement.

Some SNA fighters have tried to defect to SDF controlled territory.
The Sultan Murad faction, affiliated with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) detained on Wednesday several militants who were attempting to cross to areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.

An SNA leader told North Press that the faction arrested 25 militants from the “Hasakah Shield” faction, an armed SNA group, as they tried to cross from the city of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) into SDF-controlled areas to surrender and return to their homes.

According to the source, the militants were attempting to return to their homes near the village of al-Aliyah, located in the Sere Kaniye countryside, close to the front lines under SDF control.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg
The Turkish-backed faction "Sultan Murad" has arrested around 20 members of the "Hasakah Shield Brigade," a faction affiliated with the "Syrian National Army," as they attempted to cross the earthen berm separating areas under the latter's control from areas under the control of the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) near the Alia silos in the countryside of Ras al-Ain, northern Al-Hasakah.

According to activists from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the individuals were attempting to cross from areas controlled by the "Syrian National Army" to areas controlled by the SDF to surrender and return to their original regions. However, they were arrested and taken to an unknown destination, and their fate remains unclear.

On December 23, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that following the fall of the regime in Syria on December 8 and the assumption of power by the Military Operations Administration, hundreds of members of Turkish-backed armed factions, along with their families, are seeking to return to their original regions in various parts of Syria.
 
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An outbreak of sectarian conflict yesterday between the new regime and the Alawite minority on the coast. This followed the circulation of a video showing the burning of an important Alawite shrine a couple of weeks ago. Some of the details are confusing with lots of claims going around.


Mohammed Elnaiem
HTS is not reforming quick enough. Anti-alawi sentiment, the frame of the "arab sunni majority", the legitimately afraid accused of being Shabiha, the promise of an iron fist against "conspirators", claiming everything is an iranian plot. Lack of discipline of extremist fighters.

And of course remnants of the regime and Iran are capitalising (not causing) the unrest happening now.

Ofc these are impossible circumstances, but many of the decisions/statements made in the past few weeks contributed to this. HTS has taken some surprising steps to alleviate concerns of minorities but also seems to have a pecking order.

And yes HTS is doing nothing to protect Kurds and seems to hate SDF Kurds and Arabs from its al Nusra days. Not at all opposing the SNA/Turkish attempts at ethnically cleansing Kurds.

One last thing i will say because credit needs to be given where its due. HTS did coordinate with alawi leaders after the shrine was attacked for calm and did explicitly denounce it. The leadership doesnt seem to have control over all of its factions.

Joshua Landis
Syrian forces burned down the Mausoleum of al-Khasibi in Aleppo. This is a game changer for the Alawites, who already have been shaken by the growing number of revenge killings.

Khasibi is the most important Alawite Shaykh, who had close ties to eleventh Imam Hasan al-Askari. The 5 civilian caretakers of the mausoleum were killed.
When Assad's Mausoleum was burned down and dug up in Qardaha, the Alawites shrugged it off as an understandable attack on the grave of a brutal dictator.

The burning of al-Khasibi's Mausoleum is an attack on the Holy of Holies.

The burning of Khasibi's mausoleum was on the 5th of December when Aleppo was taken by HTS.

The video only leaked out today, which is why the demonstrations.

HTS sent officials to the site to apologize and promise that the burners would be brought to justice. This video was also taken on the same day as the burning of the mausoleum, but only released today, when the video of the burning leaked and became public.

HTS clearly hoped to conceal the burning of the Mausoleum, knowing that it would be incendiary.

Cedric Labrousse
The largest security operation launched by the new government against former Assad loyalists.

Since this morning, thousands of men from the Damascus government linked to HTS have launched operations across western Syria. And not just on the Alawite coast.

These operations target the surroundings of Tartus. Where the violent fighting took place yesterday in Khirbet Ma'zah. But also the surroundings of Latakia. It appears that thousands of supporters of the old regime remain armed. The forces of the al-Bashir government have entered the game.

As proof that Assad's loyalists remain heavily armed and capable of action, there is much fighting in the countryside of Tartus and Latakia. As here in Zarqat, where supporters of the old regime are harassing the security forces of the new regime on motorcycles.

The operation is not concentrated, as I said, in the so-called Alawite country on the coast, but in the entire west of the country. And in particular the former loyalist strongholds. Very violent fighting broke out in Qudsaya, near Damascus, during a raid to arrest people wanted for crimes of the former regime.

On the political side, the new governor of Tartous, Ahmad al-Shami, appointed in December 2024, loyal to HTS, received Alawite notables and personalities to remind that their actions were not targeting the Alawite community, but rather the former loyalists to the regime who are being sought.

The advance is long and complex in the rifs of Latakia and Tartous, where many elements of the old regime have taken refuge. A veritable maquis of mountains, small villages and long winding roads. The forces of Damascus are advancing slowly.

H.A.Hellyer
Against the background of reports regarding what's happening in Tartous in Syria, important to recognise the impact of purposeful disinformation. Verify, verify, verify. Far too much is being put out without due regard to facts, and all about ideological positions.
The unrest can't be simply reduced to Iranian regime provocations, although that's difficult to remove as a factor; there are other, enduring issues at play in Syria, which are unavoidable considering the Assad regime's instrumentalisation of sectarianism for decades.

Rami Jarrah (video)
SYRIANS MUST AMPLIFY THIS MESSAGE

Amid the chaos and divisive sectarian rhetoric, the quietest yet most powerful voices are those from the coastal region, calling for unity in Syria:"

From Tartous to Aleppo, no blame after today, Sunni, Shiite and Allawites.. All of us are Syrians..no to sectarianism, yes to coexistence".

Some have chosen to share this video trimming out the part where they say, "no blame after today," assuming it refers to granting amnesty to regime remnants responsible for atrocities under Assad.

In fact, these people are asking that sectarian grudges be diminished, trying to conceal that fear they are addressing in this demonstration is not only a distortion of their message, but misguided.

Town of Dreikeesh, Tartous.

Joshua Landis
My Alawite mother-in-law in Latakia, Syria explained to me that HTS soldiers calmed down the large demonstration in Latakia, protesting the burning of Khasibi’s mausoleum, by chanting with the demonstrators. She was full of praise for the HTS men, who have been doing the right thing, in her opinion. She is critical of the Alawite demonstrators.

Other Alawite friends lament that there is no Alawite leadership and believe that Alawites must find a voice and stand up for their needs. Assad destroyed any Alawite leaders as surely as he destroyed Sunni leaders or those from other Syrian communities.

Aymenn al-Tamimi
I've seen attempts to dispute the translation of the video, but it's accurate. There's a guy from Salqin (north Idlib) the armed men let go on the presumption he's Sunni. The reference to 'Alawite dogs' & the humiliation of making them whelp like dogs have happened more than once
Also, I have to say that some of these scenes that have been coming out of the coastal regions have raised some concerns in Druze areas (al-Suwayda') about need to maintain arms & armed groups - which will then pose a challenge for integration under a new army/defence ministry.

Rami Jarrah
Stomping on people's heads and making them bark like dogs at gunpoint, extrajudicial killings, screaming "Alawite dogs, Shia pigs," while others, including the activists who opposed Assad for this very nature, make unworthy excuses for them.

This is extremely hard to watch.
 
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Translated thread on the SDF's weakening position in the majority Arab areas that it controls.

Cedric Labrousse
A thread to follow the evolution of the situation in Raqqa and its region.

This evening of December 12, 2024, the Liwa Thuwar Raqqa, a silent group for at least a year and a half, very old in the region, publishes a press release ensuring that the region must be led and defended locally.

The group is historically established in the region and has fought against the Islamic State since 2014. And cannot be considered a tool of the Turks: the brigade has always, also, kept its distance from the neighboring country.

That same day, HTS and the SDF concluded a pact ensuring that the two groups would not cross the Euphrates.

Corresponding to the agreements already established between these two forces. Deir Ezzor being south of the Euphrates, the SDF consider that their withdrawal was therefore logical. Raqqa is located north of the Euphrates.

Problem: this does not guarantee in any way that other groups, internal to these Arab regions of the Euphrates valley, will not rise up. And this does not involve the Turkish auxiliaries who, for their part, are only bound by guarantees from the United States.

This December 13, reactivation and creation of new civil opposition organizations demanding the departure of AANES and the establishment of an autonomous administration in Raqqa within the framework of the Syrian state now freed from Bashar al-Assad. This administrative and civil council wants to be ready to run affairs.

In the northern countryside of Raqqa, in Suluk (under Turkish control), where refugees from the Raqqa region live, a demonstration was organized today after Friday prayers to celebrate the fall of the regime and call for the departure of the AANES and the SDF.

A well-known opposition group in Raqqa, which denounced the actions of al-Nusra between 2013 and 2014, and then the actions of the Islamic State between 2014 and 2017, is calling for a demonstration on December 20 in Raqqa against the policies of the SDF and AANES in the city in recent weeks.

Adding fuel to the fire, and refusing the agreement between HTS and SDF, the SNA auxiliaries in the service of Turkey are gathering in the Tal Abyad region, north of Raqqa, previously already occupied by Turkey. Turkey does not listen to anything from local actors and only follows its agenda of interference...

Desertions within the SDF continue regularly. Mainly from the last, predominantly Arab area south of the Euphrates. Major Yahya al-Omar, a former SDF official from the city of Tabqa, joined the HTS-controlled areas two days ago.

Several former Arab SDF fighters have done the same, from villages near Tabqa.
 
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This is the first suggestion I've seen that the SDF are willing to form part of the new national army. At the same time some factions in the SNA have agreed to join the new army but the SNA as a whole hasn't, presumably following instructions from Turkey.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced on Tuesday their willingness to merge with the newly formed Syrian Army, following the fall of the Assad regime. Farhad Al-Shami, head of SDF’s media center, stated to SkyNews that this move aligns with efforts to unify military forces across Syria under a single command.

Farhad Al-Shami emphasized that while the SDF is open to diplomatic solutions, it is also prepared for any military confrontation, particularly against Turkish-backed factions. He added, “Turkey seeks to expand its control over Syrian lands, and the SDF stands firmly against such plans.”
 
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Article from last year on the workings of the Syrian Interim Government, the political authority in SNA/Turkish controlled areas. So far Turkey doesn't appear to have made any move to fold this into the new regime in Damascus. Presumably doing so would mean a loss of control of its armed proxies and ability to take military action against the SDF/autonomous administration.



Human Rights Watch on the situation in SNA/Turkish controlled areas.

Based on interviews with 58 victims, survivors, relatives, and witnesses of violations, as well as various representatives of non-governmental organizations, journalists, activists, and researchers, this report documents abductions, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, including of children, sexual violence, and torture by the various factions of the SNA, the Military Police, a force established to curb such abuses, and members of the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish intelligence agencies, including the National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) and a number of military intelligence directorates. It also documents violations of housing, land, and property rights, including widespread looting and pillaging as well as property seizures and extortion, and exposes the abject failure of most of the accountability measures introduced in recent years to curb abuses or to provide restitution to victims.
While the SNA officially reports to the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), a self-declared, internationally recognized governing body representing the Syrian opposition and headquartered in Azaz, its factions ultimately answer to Turkish military forces and intelligence agencies. Military and civilian police forces established under the SIG’s supervision to enforce the rule of law following allegations of rampant abuses also answer to Turkish military forces and intelligence agencies, two informed sources with direct knowledge of the inner workings of the SNA told Human Rights Watch. “Nothing takes place without their knowledge,” said one of them. Human Rights Watch was not able to find published directives outlining Turkish authorities’ role in the command structure in Turkish-occupied territories of Syria.
 
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Translation of article by Joseph Daher (with google translate so there may be mistakes) source

Oppose Turkish-led military attacks on Kurds in Syria
In recent weeks, the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of armed groups mostly composed of former Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Islamist groups that has served as a Turkish proxy in Syria since its establishment in 2017 and receives funding, training, and military support from Ankara, has, with the support of the Turkish military, launched deadly attacks on areas controlled by the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria and its armed forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). On December 23, the SDF launched a counteroffensive against SNA forces, pushing them back from various areas they had captured in recent weeks and reaching the outskirts of the city of Manbij.

SNA attacks on Kurdish-majority areas

The current offensive against Kurdish-majority areas controlled by the SDF began around the same time as the military offensive that led to the fall of the former Assad regime. SNA forces, backed by the Turkish military, took control of the cities of Tal Rifaat and Manbij in northern Syria, displacing over 150,000 civilians and committing numerous human rights violations. Following these attacks, the Syrian National Army has been continuing its military operations against the SDF at Tishrin Dam for more than a week. The dam is located on the Euphrates River, upstream from many towns and villages as well as urban centers such as Raqqa, downstream from the border city of Kobani. Tishrin Dam provides electricity to most of northeastern Syria, which is under the control of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The SDF has controlled the facility since 2015, after it ousted ISIS with the help of US military forces. In addition, the Turkish military has been shelling the area around Kobani, causing casualties and material damage, including targeting a grain center south of Kobani, which destroyed 300 tons of stored wheat.

Despite US attempts to broker a temporary truce between the SDF and Turkey, Ankara has refused to negotiate a ceasefire with a “terrorist organization.” Turkey considers the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which forms the backbone of the SDF, to be the Syrian front for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – which Ankara has designated as a terrorist group.

Several demonstrations have been held in several towns and cities under SDF control to condemn the Turkish-led attacks. Fears of a scenario similar to the 2018 invasion and subsequent occupation of Afrin are on everyone’s mind. The occupation of Afrin has led to demographic change with the forced displacement of hundreds of civilians (with some estimates reaching 300,000), the vast majority of whom are Kurds. Many human rights organizations have condemned the ongoing and systematic repression of the Kurdish population by the SNA in Afrin. The latest Turkish-backed offensive is therefore seen by many as an existential threat.

Turkey’s Destructive Role in Syria and HTS Follows Ankara

After the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey has become the most important regional actor in the country. In addition to its continued support for its proxy, the Syrian National Army, Ankara’s support for HTS aims to consolidate its authority over Syria by assisting the group in the transitional phase. Turkey now has three main goals in Syria. In addition to encouraging or implementing the forced return of Syrian refugees in Turkey to Syria and taking advantage of future economic opportunities in Syria, especially in the reconstruction phase, Turkey’s main goal in Syria is to deny the Kurds their aspirations for self-rule and more specifically to undermine the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which would set a precedent for Kurdish self-determination in Turkey, which poses a threat to the regime as it currently stands. In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared during a joint press conference with HTS leader Ahmad al-Shara (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani) that Syria’s territorial integrity is “non-negotiable” and that the PKK has “no place” in the country. The Turkish military has also been continuously targeting civilians and vital infrastructure in northeastern Syria with bombing campaigns since the end of 2023.

While HTS has not engaged in any military confrontations against the SDF in the past few weeks, the organization has shown no signs of opposing the Turkish-led attacks on the SDF, quite the opposite. For example, Murhaf Abu Qasra, a senior HTS leader and the newly appointed defense minister of the transitional government, stated that “Syria will not be divided and there will be no federalism, God willing. God willing, all these areas will be under Syrian authority.” Furthermore, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa told a Turkish newspaper that Syria would develop a strategic relationship with Turkey in the future, adding: “We do not accept that Syrian territory threatens Turkey or other places and destabilizes them.” He also stated that all weapons in the country must be under state control, including those in areas controlled by the SDF. This is without forgetting that HTS has repeatedly supported Turkish attacks against the SDF in the past.

This is despite several statements by SDF officials seeking to negotiate with HTS. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has declared that his group supports some form of decentralization and self-administration for their region, but not federalism, and is open to being part of a future Syrian national army, when it is formed. In addition, he has declared that the SDF is not an extension of the PKK and is prepared to expel non-Syrian fighters once a truce is reached.

Despite the moderate and open statements, HTS’s current main goals are, for its part, to consolidate its power in the country and state institutions, as well as to achieve regional and international recognition. Both goals are progressing steadily. On the national scene, for example, this is evident in the appointment of Ahmad al-Sharaa to an interim government of men from the same party as the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib, and the appointment of governors belonging to HTS, or from the same Salafi ideological orientation, in various regions.

The US military presence in the northeast is the main obstacle to Turkey’s complete elimination of the SDF in these areas. At the same time, HTS seeks to establish good relations with the United States and lift sanctions. However, Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House at the end of January 2025 could lead to an agreement with Ankara that would encourage the United States to withdraw from northeastern Syria, which would give the green light to a Turkish invasion, with the help of the Syrian National Army, of the northeast. This would have dire consequences for the civilian population, especially the Kurds, and would put an end to the project of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

Lack of popular opposition to Turkish-led offensives

However, it is unlikely that HTS will be willing to support the demands and orientations of the SDF and the AA, especially regarding Kurdish national rights. Moreover, the northeastern regions are strategic because they are rich in natural resources, oil, and agriculture. On the Kurdish national issue in Syria, HTS is no different from the Syrian opposition in exile, which is dominated by Arab groups hostile to Kurdish national rights, represented first by the Syrian National Council and then by the National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces.

In general, the main problem is the relative absence of organized signs of solidarity or opposition to the Turkish-led military offensive against SDF-held areas and threats to Kurdish civilians among the Syrian Arab opposition, just as happened with the invasion of Afrin in 2018 and the subsequent occupation mentioned above.

Opposing Turkish military threats with the help of its proxy, the Syrian National Army, against the northeast is a political imperative for a democratic, progressive, and pluralistic future for Syria.

Moreover, it is a first step to addressing the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. Progressive and democratic forces must wage a clear struggle against Arab chauvinism to overcome this division and establish solidarity among these peoples. This challenge has been present since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, and it must be confronted and resolved in a progressive manner in order to truly liberate the people of the country.

There is an urgent need to return to the original aspirations of the Syrian uprising for democracy, social justice and equality – and in a way that supports Kurdish self-determination.

While the Syrian Democratic Forces, or YPG, can be criticized for their mistakes and repressive actions at various times, they are not the main obstacle to this solidarity between Kurds and Arabs. These were the aggressive and chauvinistic positions and policies of the Arab opposition forces in Syria mentioned above, and today the positions of the two main military forces, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian National Army. In fact, it is not enough to acknowledge the historical discrimination that the Kurdish population in Syria has faced since the founding of the state in 1946, but to fight against it.

In this context, progressive forces should seek cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, including the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria project and its political institutions represent large segments of the Kurdish population and have protected them from various domestic and external threats. The outbreak of the popular uprising in Syria in 2011 allowed for the emergence of a profound Kurdish national dynamic unprecedented in the country’s history. The Kurdish issue in Syria in general raises many other issues about the future of the country, especially by looking at the pluralistic identity of Syria instead of relying on one exclusive identity, whether Arab or Islamic religious, or on the nature of the state and its social model. All these issues, which in themselves constitute challenges, are not separate in this context from the Syrian uprising, but are intrinsically linked to it and to the real liberation and emancipation of the popular classes in Syria. Liberation cannot be expected with the elimination of one of the country’s components.
 
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I'm not sure from this exactly where they've withdrawn to.

Levant24
The Israeli army withdrew from the towns it entered in the Yarmouk Basin area in the western countryside of Daraa including Jamla, al-Shajara, Beit Ira, Koya, Maariyah and Saida Golan to their previous positions in the occupied Golan. This coincided with the return of UN patrols and the redistribution of their units to the separation points again.
Patience rather than freaking out about this seems to have been the best response.
 
Report of an interview with Salih Muslim from the YPD

Salih Muslim, a senior official of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), warned that Turkey’s recent diplomatic engagements with Syria could marginalise Kurdish gains and escalate regional tensions. Speaking in an exclusive interview with Delal Akyüz of Mezopotamya Agency on Wednesday, Muslim stressed that the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) seeks to be part of Syria’s political solution.

Muslim’s remarks come amid shifting dynamics following attacks by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that led to the collapse of Syria’s 61-year-old Baath regime. Turkey responded quickly, establishing contact with HTS leader Ahmad al-Shara through high-level visits. Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalin visited Damascus on 12 December, followed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on 22 December.

According to Muslim, Ankara’s strategy aims to isolate Kurdish groups and prevent any formal engagement between the Syrian government and the Autonomous Administration. Muslim said Turkey is urging Damascus to reject any dialogue with the Kurds and block relations with the Autonomous Administration. He accused Turkey of pursuing neo-colonial ambitions reminiscent of France’s past mandate over Syria.

Muslim criticised Ankara’s claims of promoting Syrian stability, arguing that Turkey labels Kurdish defence forces like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), People’s Protection Units (YPG), and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) as terrorists to justify intervention. Turkey uses the pretext of counter-terrorism to control Syria. Their policies are unacceptable to both the Syrian people and the region, he stated.

Highlighting the origins of Kurdish defence forces, Muslim said these groups emerged after 2011 to protect civilians against attacks. Muslim asserted that Kurdish forces were formed to defend their people and gains, and disarmament is only possible if threats are removed and safety is guaranteed.

While HTS has not clashed directly with Kurdish groups, Muslim acknowledged ongoing communication. HTS claims it will not target Kurds, and so far, they have kept that promise. They also advocate unifying Syria’s armed groups, which ‘we do not oppose in principle’, Muslim explained.

He indicated that HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani opposes Turkish-backed groups and seeks to dismantle them. Muslim added that if Turkey halts its intervention and divisive policies, common ground could be found with HTS.

Muslim revealed that discussions with the Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNCS, also known by the acronym ENKS) continue, despite Turkish efforts to obstruct Kurdish unity. He said they are committed to achieving Kurdish unity and addressing shared goals.

Expressing hope for future negotiations with Damascus, Muslim advocated a collaborative approach to drafting laws and addressing disputes. Muslim concluded that they are part of Syria and want to be involved in the political process, adding that dialogue remains the healthiest path forward.

From the interview:
Salih Muslim, who stated that there has been no direct conflict between HTS and the Kurds to date, said, “The messages they received were that they would not attack the Kurds and they have kept their word so far. Groups under Turkish control are constantly attacking us. HTS’ recent statements were that all armed forces in Syria should be connected to Syria. We do not completely reject this view. We also do not want Syria to be divided. However, this is possible if the threats against our people are removed. Jolani is also against the existence of groups under Turkish control and wants to disband them. If Turkey withdraws its hand from Syria and ends its efforts to create separation here, we can reach an agreement with Jolani".
 
Interview with Loubna Mrie


On that note, the rebellion was led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group (though they’ve moved away from their Salafist roots); you come from the Alawite minority — what are your thoughts on the possibility of a non-sectarian future for Syria?

For those familiar with the Syrian uprising, there's a town called Kafr Nabl, famous for its banners of political commentary and humor in both English and Arabic. The banners were created by a team, one of whom was Raed Al Fares. Raed later founded a radio station, called Radio Fresh.

Over the years, the station was raided multiple times by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. They ordered Raed and his team to stop women from being on air; strangers shouldn't hear their voices. To comply temporarily, the station began editing the voices of women presenters.

Raed, however, kept challenging them until 2014, when masked men attempted to assassinate him. When I visited Raed after the incident, covering my hair to avoid trouble at HTS checkpoints, he told me to take it off. He said, "If you stand against Assad, you should also stand against anyone who tries — or is trying — to shape who we are."

Raed refused to close the station despite escalating threats. In 2018, HTS assassinated him alongside his colleague Hamoud Jneid — whose family often hosted me when I visited Kafr Nabl.

I am sharing all of this with you to explain that our grievances with HTS aren't just ideological. They killed friends, sources of clarity and guidance when the situation became too chaotic to navigate — people who represented what the uprising, which I joined when I was 20, stood for.

For now, it is morally hard for me to navigate. It's a feeling I’ve had before — like when Nasrallah was assassinated. His death felt like justice, but a challenging one, knowing it was carried out by the same fighter jets flattening Gaza and entire buildings in Lebanon.

At the same time, Assad's downfall, even if it was led by HTS or similar forces, is indeed something to be celebrated. We deserve this moment of joy. After fifty years of one family ruling and terrorizing a country, Syrians deserve to see him fall. However, if we're serious about building a just future for Syria, we must call for accountability not only for Assad's crimes and prisons but also for those of all other forces, including HTS.

How seriously should people take HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani’s supposed moderation?

I cannot speak on behalf of all Syrians, but for me, whatever moderation or rebranding Jolani is attempting, it is meaningless as long as he refuses to address the Syrian activists who were killed by HTS.

If he is not willing to hold accountable those responsible for kidnapping and torturing activists in jails simply for criticizing him, then his so-called moderation holds no weight. That is what truly matters — not shaving his beard or wearing a tie. Rebranding without accountability is just theater, and Syrians deserve more than empty gestures; they deserve justice and closure.
 
Here's a critical report on the Kurdish project in northeast Syria, published in 2021. The Dutch journalist Rena Netjes, one of the co-authors, now comes across on twitter as hostile to the SDF/PYD and a bit of an apologist for the SNA.


 
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The question of alcohol regulation in Syria, recently raised by secular advocates, is far from a minor detail. It strikes at the core of the discussions about the future nature of the Syrian state. The statement by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), during a recent BBC interview that the country is dealing with more serious challenges at this stage was undermined by his own admission that legal experts drafting Syria’s future constitution were looking into this very issue as well. Framing alcohol regulation as a constitutional matter places it within the broader debate over Islam’s role in governance — a matter of profound significance.
Historically, alcohol consumption in the Middle East, including during Islamic rule, was an accepted facet of daily life, with taverns ubiquitous. But modern Islamist movements have weaponized alcohol bans and strict dress codes as symbols of moral superiority and “authenticity,” often coupled with populist sentiments about opposing “colonial influences.” These measures became instruments in their broader ideological struggles, distinguishing them from other political movements while resisting modernization efforts imposed by the ruling elite that governed most Middle Eastern states after independence.

This debate, therefore, is not a trivial matter to be shelved for later. The fiery exchanges that have been taking place on social media over the last few days underscore the centrality of this issue in the ongoing transition of the country. If it were a mere detail, it would not generate such interest and inspire so much anger on both sides. The debate encapsulates the fundamental question of who controls Syria’s state and society.
 
Another interview with Tekoşîna Anarşîst (scroll down for the English version)

6.- Do DAANES have contact with people of southern Syria and the idea of the confederation can be expanded to those regions? Do the local councils returned in any place in Syria or all the country is under dominion of islamists of different currents?

As we just mentioned before, yes, there are political relations that date back for several years already, especially in Sweida. The co-president of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC, the Syrian “national” political body of the DAANES) is called Evin Sweida. In several regions, specially in the south, local councils never really disappeared, even if their work was very limited and often clandestine. It is now a question how the provisional government of HTS will relate to those councils.

HTS have its stronghold in Idlib. The provisional prime minister is from Idlib himself, but in other regions HTS will need to negotiate with local forces if they want to build any stable system of governance. The self-administration of NES has been an example of integration of different regions in a confederal model, and the proposal for a federal Syria is on the table. HTS wants to reorganize the centralized model of the Baath regime with them in the central government, and their behavior in Idlib over last years give clear clues of how their ideal model would look like. Their politics of divide and conquer, arresting leaders of other Islamist groups and even collaborating with US to eliminate the leadership of the more extremist groups, allowed them to build their hegemony as the dominant force there. This was promoted also by Turkish support, that provided supply routes over the Turkish border and placed military bases to protect them from the regime attacks.

Many ethnic and religious minorities continued organizing their local councils, and they probably won’t have much interest on a centralized HTS rule. Those local councils can easily get more interest in a confederal model inspired by what NES is doing. Right now HTS have the upper hand, aiming to build an Islamist authoritarian state, but many people in Syria won’t accept that. The DAANES can become a spearhead for revolutionary transformations and a confederal Syria but HTS, Turkey and other Islamist forces will oppose that. Right now is not clear how much will be discussed on a political table and how much will be resolved on the battlefield.


eta: for discussion on councils back in the early days of the Syrian Revolution see these articles by Leila Al-Shami and Omar Aziz


 
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Human rights abuses in SNA controlled areas

The report is based on 18 first-hand interviews, conducted with victims who were arbitrarily detained, tortured, and subjected to inhumane treatment in detention centers run by the SNA’s factions, affiliated with the Syrian Interim Government and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. The testimonies reveal systematic violations targeting civilians without any legal evidence or fair trails, as part of a policy aiming at consolidating the SNA’s control over the region and its residents.
 
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Interview with journalist Wladimir van Wilgenburg on post-Assad Syria and the future of the Kurdish communities




Wladimir van Wilgenburg also gave this talk a few years ago on how the Kurdish project in Northern Syria was working in practice.


This event launches The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, written by Harriet Allsopp and Wladimir van Wilgenburg and published by Bloomsbury in July 2019. Based on unprecedented access to Kurdish-governed areas of Syria, including exclusive interviews with administration officials and civilian surveys, The Kurds of Northern Syria sheds light on the socio-political landscape of northern Syria. The first English-language book to capture the momentous transformations that have occurred since 2011, the authors move beyond idealized images of Rojava and the PYD to provide a nuanced assessment of the Kurdish autonomous experience and the prospects for self-rule in Syria. The book draws on unparalleled field research, as well as analysis of the literature on the evolution of Kurdish politics and the Syrian war.
 
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From today's Tekoşîna Anarşist war update
After a month since the offensive of HTS started, we have now better ground to evaluate what is going on in Syria. The unexpected collapse of al-Assad regime was followed by celebrations and hopeful dreams of an easy and bloodless transition in Syria. But this is something we only see in movies and history books. In real life most revolutions are followed by periods of instability and warlordism, where different factions struggle to impose their hegemony.

The recent protests of Christians, as well as the uprisings of Alawites, are complex events that are getting polarized in social networks. These two social groups had certain privileges during the regime of al-Assad, privileges that were partly established with the old French colonial rule, favoring them over sunni arabs or kurds. But those privileges are also limited to some higher classes, and not all members of those groups were aligned with the regime.

Those uprisings are not simply “uncontrolled regime/Iran/Israel elements/agents” as HTS like to claim, it is also a reaction to the attacks of “uncontrolled HTS elements”, like the fire on the christmas tree in Hama and the desecration of the grave of an important Alawite scholar. Those attacks are manifestations of ethnic grudges that many sunni arabs may share, but when ethnic simplifications like this are used to call for ethnic cleansing, things can very easily spiral out of control.

Many Alawites and Christians had power positions in the regime, but many sunni arabs too. Kurds know very well what it means to be part of a secondary class, to be at the bottom of the social pyramid. That’s why it has been so important for the DAANES to develop respectful and inclusive methods for everyone, allowing autonomy and self-organization to all different social groups. HTS sectarian visions, with islamic fundamentalism as a ground to build a fake national unity, pose serious threats to the diversity of Syria.

The DAANES is already making calls to stop the attacks against Alawite people, to put an end to the sectarian violence, to build the nation under a base of diversity and respect for the other. The call for a “democratic nation project” should be understood in that sense, as part of a wider project for democratic confederalism, questioning old patterns of tribalism, patriarchy and nation-state. It is a call to continue the revolution all around Syria and beyond.
 
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
"A country cannot have two armies. The SDF is ready to be integrated into Syria's Ministry of Defense, but only through negotiations." - @MazloumAbdi to Belgian newspaper De Morgen

"Some players in the region, and by that, I specifically mean Turkey, are encouraging the Syrian government to exclude the SDF from building a stable post-conflict Syria."

"Meanwhile, our allies, such as the Americans, acknowledge that we should play a role in this. The way I see it, Syria has only one army, of which the SDF is a part, but this is not the disarmament Turkey would like to see."
 
Thread from Karim Franceschi
How Turkey’s “Mamluk SNA Legion” in Syria—fueled by @EU_Comission billions—holds an entire people hostage, forcibly conscripts desperate IDPs, and issues shoot-to-kill orders to keep them from fleeing. A thread 🧵

1/ On Dec 17, @vonderleyen flew to Ankara, pledging another €1 billion atop the €10 billion the EU gave Turkey. She praised Erdogan’s “responsibility” for hosting millions of Syrian refugees. "We have stood by you in this effort.”

But behind the façade of hollow EU reports lies the material reality: Turkey has exploited this crisis to arm and bankroll the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA), displacing more than half a million Kurds, Christians, and Yazidis, while preying on vulnerable internally displaced persons (IDPs) to recruit them as cannon fodder.

2/ Most assume the SNA = a single rebel group. In truth, it’s an umbrella of dozens of militias. Some factions operate like cartels—e.g., Sultan Murad or Ahrar al-Sharqiya—exerting muscle, confiscating land, and terrorizing local populations. Meanwhile, many rank-and-file “grunts” are desperate IDPs pushed into uniform for a meager $50/month. Two very different realities under one label.

3/ Documented Orders to Kill Would-Be Deserters

A newly surfaced document (see attached photo) from the “Joint Force Command” in SNA-held areas—linked to factions like Suleyman Shah and Sultan Murad (under Turkish intelligence influence)—explicitly orders killing SNA soldiers originating from Homs, Aleppo, and Hama if they attempt to leave Serêkaniye (Ras al-Ayn), Girê Spî (Tell Abyad), or Afrin to return home. The text states:

“Any SNA member who tries to exit Joint Force–controlled areas under the pretext of returning to his home village should be arrested. If they refuse to stop, our fighters have full authorization to open fire… We stress the need for immediate compliance with this directive.”

This effectively makes many SNA recruits forced conscripts—unable to leave without risking death.

Under the Rome statute, forced conscription is always a war crime, similar to involuntary servitude or abduction, because nonstate actors do not have the same privileges as a sovereign state.

4/ We’ve already seen this in action: recently, 25 militants from the SNA tried crossing into SDF-held territory to surrender and go home. They were seized by Sultan Murad and handed over to the Turkish Military Police in Tel Abyad. That’s the order from the leaked directive. It’s not rumor—it’s happening. The “cartel” factions enforce these brutal rules, leaving rank-and-file SNA as prisoners, not volunteers.

5/ ‘Cartel-Style’ Factions

Names to know:
  • Jabhat al-Shamiyya
  • Faylaq al-Sham
  • Firqat al-Sultan Murad
  • Ahrar al-Sharqiyya (US Treasury-sanctioned for torture, abductions, property seizures)

They enjoy near-free rein. In Afrin, the commander of "Sultan Murad", Abu Walid Al-Azi, seized ~75% of the olive groves (~$150 million/year market value). Turkey purchases tons of Afrin’s olives, funneling revenue back to these militias. Turkey's Agriculture Minister Dr. Bekir Pakdemirli openly justified it, claiming "it prevents profit from reaching the PKK."

6/ Christian Farmland Also Seized
  • September 9, 2024: An Islamist commander seized 500 acres from Christian farmers near Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ain).
  • Local sources blame Al-Hamzat Battalion (led by Seif Boulad) & Jaysh Al-Sharqya (led by Abou Hatem Shaqra). Both groups sanctioned by the US. They threatened to raise “taxes” on farmers from 20% to 35%.
  • Christian NGOs decry these acts as crimes against humanity, urging the UK, US, and EU to intervene. No words of condemnation followed.

7/ - Core “cartel-like” factions wield power, confiscate land, pocket extortion fees, and crack down on lower-tier SNA fighters who dare desert.
- Recruits often join out of utter poverty. Some are IDPs living in squalid tent camps, making under $50/month, which is under the extreme poverty line. Now that the Assad regime is no more, many want to go back to their villages, but fear imprisonment—or worse—from these “mafia” groups enforcing Turkish state directives.

A video surfaced showing an incident where recruits were subjected to a collective beating by the cartel-like faction, "Sultan Murad".

8/ EU-Turkey Refugee Deal & ‘Safe Zones’
  • Since 2016, the EU’s billions have ostensibly aimed to curb migration flows.
  • Turkey then used the “safe zone” concept to forcibly relocate millions of refugees, citing “security concerns.”
  • A façade for mass demographic engineering—particularly in Kurdish-majority areas—while entrapping IDPs in heavily policed camps.

9/ The Mamluk Foreign Legion

Need mercenaries for wars abroad? Enter the SNA. Turkey has flown these fighters to Libya, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), and possibly Ukraine. Pitched as “volunteers,” they function as Ankara’s expendable foot soldiers, waging someone else’s battles for a stipend—paid partly by EU money intended for “refugee support.”

Recruitment offices pop up in SNA-controlled towns, offering “contracts” to impoverished fighters who see no other survival option.

10/ The calculus: The Turkish defense sector can produce its armed drones, use them, sell them, and deploy them in overseas bases, while relying on a "burner infantry," often composed of child soldiers.

Turkish elites seek greater freedom of movement by transforming the Turkish Navy from a coastal deterrent into a blue-water, power-projecting asset.

Proxy warfare has become its go-to tool for intervening without international accountability. Turkey is redefining itself, driven by an urge to reshape its borders.

Final Tweet/ Now, with Damascus’ grip eroded and millions of IDPs desperate to return home, the SDF has pledged safe passage—even to ex-SNA fighters and their families—so they can finally leave these nightmarish camps. But that runs headlong into Ankara’s agenda: to keep a steady pool of hopeless recruits for its border-cleansing project, effectively blocking any mass return. Meanwhile, as humanitarian needs skyrocket—16.7 million Syrians in dire need, 7.2 million still displaced, a shattered economy, and rampant gender-based violence—SNA factions continue to commit abductions, extortion, and worse, as recent UN reports detail.

It’s time the international community—particularly the EU—faces the truth of where its billions are flowing. I’ve stood alongside those who fought to liberate Raqqa; I’ve seen how Syrians yearn to rebuild their lives, not languish in these endless cycles of exploitation. If we don’t demand accountability now—if we let Turkey’s Mamluk-like legion hold millions hostage—we forfeit any claim to stand for justice. Let Syrians finally return. Let them heal. Enough profiteering off people’s ruin.
 
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subtitled video
OFFICIAL TASKED WITH EMPOWERING SYRIAN WOMEN:

"I urge women not to surpass the priorities of their inherent nature as created by God, her nurturing role in the family"

That's what women have been told for millennia?

Did we really need a Women's Affairs office to conclude this?
Syrian Director of Women's Affairs office Aisha Al-Debs:

"in the end, I will not give room to those who disagree with my way of thinking"

This in response to whether or not she will allow NGO's that empower women and defend their rights to be active in Syria.

I kid you not.
But if women do decide to work, there are likely limits:

AL-DEBS: "with training/skills, women will be able to participate in gov. legislation/executive roles, as for judicial roles, the constitution decides..

PRESENTER: "the constitution decides?"

AL-DEBS: "uh.. no.. our foundation is also Islamic Sharia"
 
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Medya News weekly update from Sarah Glynn

This has left the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in a difficult position. They have always argued that their region is part of Syria and that the SDF should be part of the Syrian Army, but they don’t want to give up all their autonomy within the state, nor to expose themselves to the aggressive forces by which they are surrounded without means of defence. Their position was laid out in an interview given by SDF Commander in Chief, Mazloum Abdi, to Asharq as-Aswat. “The priority,” he explained, “is for military operations to stop throughout Syrian territory, especially the attacks carried out by Turkey and its loyal factions on the Syrian Democratic Forces, so that we, as Syrians, can discuss the future of our country among ourselves without external interference or guardianship. The areas of the Autonomous Administration are Syrian areas and their representatives must have a role and a voice that is heard, and they must participate in building the future.”

The SDF call for dialogue, and for the system of government to be decided by the Syrian people. They agree that Syria must have a single national army for defence of the country and its citizens, and that the SDF will integrate into this, but they need direct discussions on how this would work. They are ready in principle to transfer border control to Damascus, and they will work with the new government to fight ISIS. Abdi made clear that Syria’s natural resources belong to the whole country, and that the SDF have no organisational links with the PKK – some PKK members have been there to fight ISIS, but they will leave at the end of military operations. He noted that they had had field coordination with HTS since the second day of their operation against Assad, which was needed to prevent clashes in Aleppo and to facilitate the evacuation of al Shahba. And he admitted that the danger of a Turkish attack on Kobanê was still very high.

Veteran Kurdish politician, Salih Muslim, notes that Turkey appears to be giving a message to al-Sharaa (or Jolani) not to establish relations with the Autonomous Administration. He observes, “If Turkey withdraws its hand from Syria and ends its efforts to create separation there, we can reach an agreement with Jolani.” And he points out, “If the attacks on our people stop and assurances are given, there will be no need for weapons.” But, “As long as our gains are targeted, it is our natural right to defend ourselves.” These are incredibly difficult conditions from which to negotiate and to salvage something of the dreams that so many have worked and died for.
 
I'm actually surprised by how simplistic a lot of the reporting is.
Sadly I am not: most MSM geeks couldnt find their own arse unless the editor/producer told them. This months story is how nice and liberal HTS are: not least because they do not have the ability (military infrastructure destrpyed) or will to counter the IDF attack dogs rampaging throughout Syria. And of course the EU is funding Turkish expansionism
 
Interview with Ahmed al-Sharaa

In an exclusive interview with Al Arabiya News, Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa said on Sunday that organizing elections in Syria could take up to four years, while drafting a new constitution may require three years.

The Syrian leader, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, explained that holding legitimate elections is a task that could take up to four years as it requires a comprehensive population census.
On protests, he affirmed the right of every citizen to express their opinion peacefully, as long as public institutions remain unharmed.
Al-Sharaa confirmed that the transitional administration is in talks with the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria, with the aim of eventually integrating the SDF into the national armed forces. He reaffirmed that Kurds are an integral part of Syria’s fabric, ruling out any plans for partition.

“There will be no division of Syria in any way,” al-Sharaa assured.

“Negotiations are ongoing with the SDF to resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria,” al-Sharaa said, adding that the new government would not allow Syria to become a launching pad for PKK attacks.
 
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