I caught up on this this morning, deeply disturbing.
I did not mention, at the time, the meeting that took place between the Chamber of Military Operations (the coalition led by HTS to bring down the regime from November 27, 2024) and the Syrian Democratic Forces a few days ago... With hindsight, let's look at this historic meeting in the Syrian context.
The meeting, and this is worth noting, did not take place in Damascus. But in the Dumayr airbase. Located northeast of Damascus, at the gates of the Syrian desert. Unlike all the meetings that have taken place between Ahmad al-Sharaa and the SNA, jihadist groups, foreign leaders, religious authorities of all faiths...
It was a US Army transport plane that brought SDF officials to Dumayr.
Nothing has leaked about the identity of the participants on both sides at this meeting. Even if it is possible that Ahmad al-Sharaa could have participated in person. No photos have been released for the moment... But we know what was said there.
What do we know about the discussions that took place?
They focused on several points, the three main ones being:
- What form of integration of the SDF within the new Syrian army?
- What form of place for the Kurdish-majority regions in the Syria of tomorrow?
- What sharing of revenues from the oil and gas sectors under the control of the SDF?
On these 3 points, divergences appeared on... the 3 points.
1) Indeed, the SDF, who were probably accompanied by political leaders from AANES, mentioned their acceptance of the idea of integrating the new Syrian army. But the disagreement was on the form.
The SDF wants specific and localized army divisions in the Kobane and Qamishli / Hasakah regions. HTS demands a complete dissolution of the SDF in the entire army.
2) The debate is open on the issue of the rights of the Kurdish minority. Ahmad al-Sharaa, for several months, has evolved enormously on the situation. And confirmed it recently. He is ready to recognize the cultural, linguistic and traditional specificities of the Kurds.
In particular, from what transpires, recognition and official learning of their language in schools in regions with a Kurdish majority.
But the AANES wants administrative autonomy within the future Syria. It does not necessarily demand a global federal structure. This time, it is a change in the discourse of the AANES executives. Confirming the positions of Mazloum Abdi and Saleh Muslim.
HTS has refused this principle, for the moment. But says it is open to other exchanges.
3) The most heated debate finally focused, surprisingly not on the two previous points, on the question... of revenues from fossil resources.
The AANES considers that the current autonomous region, which has become part of tomorrow's Syria, should keep half of the revenues from oil and gas resources.
The new authorities in Damascus, strangely enough, do not want all the revenues but demand at least 70% of its revenues. As in proportion, roughly, to the share of territories in Syria that they hold.
This is a stumbling block in this ongoing dialogue...
It is interesting to note that, through their own respective communication channels, the two interlocutors mentioned a "positive" meeting. And this despite tensions on all subjects.
I would like to point out that this rapprochement, even if it is not friendly but opportunistic but respectful, now dates back more than a month.
As early as the end of November, Saleh Muslim revealed that the PYD, a party close to the PKK and dominant within the AANES, had established contacts with HTS during the offensive on Aleppo that began on November 27, 2024.
And Mazloum Abdi himself, head of the SDF, had confirmed contacts with HTS. With agreements for the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo, for the evacuation of the Kurdish populations of Afrin who were stuck in Tal Rifaat, and on respect for the border on the Euphrates.
Most changes involved removing references to the regime of ousted president Bashar al-Assad and his late father Hafez, who between them ruled with an iron fist for five decades, such as photographs and mentions of the army and national anthem.
But authorities also alarmed many by removing references to pre-Islamic deities — and even the word “deities” itself — and scaling back criticism of the Ottoman Empire. Also omitted were the text for Syria’s citizenship law, a section on the evolution of vertebrates’ brains, and mention of Zenobia, a famed pre-Islamic queen of the ancient city Palmyra.
Critics feared the changes represent a slippery slope in which the Islamist rebel faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which dominates the new government, would seek to impose their religious worldview on what has long been one of the Middle East’s most secular countries.
A military convoy of HTS-linked fighters was forced to turn back to Damascus by local Druze militias on Wednesday and denied access to Suwayda province, with the militias citing a lack of prior coordination and demanding decentralized governance.
“If we are subjected to any aggression or anything that is imposed on us as a province, we will demand federalism,” Sheikh Bahaa al-Jamal, commander of the Druze operations in Suwayda, told Rudaw’s Dilbixwin Dara.
“We found that the time was inappropriate, and people were busy with New Year celebrations. They entered by trickery and in a malicious way without informing anyone and we reject this matter,” he said about their decision to turn back the HTS-linked fighters.
Impassioned debates erupted over social media and in Syrian chat groups between supporters of secularism and supporters of a state utilizing an Islamic framework. A feeling of unease swept over me as revolutionaries argued amongst themselves. It’s much easier to be united when you are standing against something than when you must articulate what you are standing for. But then I realized that this was precisely the Syria that revolutionaries had been fighting for: a country where debates could be had together in the public sphere, sharing differing opinions, and listening to each other respectfully. The hard work of political co-construction has just begun.
I am hearing that Syria sanctions will not be lifted tomorrow (Friday) but in a week or two. A lot of internal argument at NSC over when and how to exempt them. Whenever they are lifted, it will be good news. In a country awash with weapons and rent by vendettas, consolidating power will be challenging. Jump starting the whimpering economy will be key.
Update: @ibrahimhamidi writes that: "It will be announced tomorrow- Friday." I cannot find any mention of a sanctions exemption from the Biden administration. This would be groundbreaking news. Sanctions relief will be crucial to the success and stabilization of the new Syrian state.
Sanctions relief will be welcomed by almost all Syrians. They are a brutal tool that hurt the most vulnerable and poorest the hardest. I argued against sanctions from the beginning, but they undoubtedly did play a role in the failure of the Assad regime and collapse of the Syrian military. I did not think that they would lead to regime-change, only to greater deprivation and hardship for Syrians
A sense of euphoria in much of Syria has been tempered by dread in areas like Khirbet al-Hammam, where most residents are Alawites, the Muslim sect Assad belongs to. As the country’s new Sunni Islamist rulers embark on a hunt for former government figures, Alawite districts are gripped by terror and confusion, as reports spread of killings, disappearances, beatings and sectarian harassment.
They are Islamic extremists, I know I keep saying it and its obvious they are but some seem to have lost sight of what this actually means in the 21st century. delving deep into the history of the area is enlightening yet earlier in the thread learned people here and elsewhere expressed the real possibility that this sort of thing wouldnt happen.
@clashreport : Our Minister has never declared that. This fake news was circulated by RT, a media that is prohibited in Europe for its disinformation operations.
France calls for an end of fighting in Northern Syria and a political solution that gives a role to our Kurdish partners of SDF, with whom we have fought ISIS, for the future of Syria.
This is not the statement made by French foreign minister. You're publicly lying @clashreport. He called on all forces, we repeat : all forces, to disarm and integrate political life. And he never mentioned PKK in his statement. Please, be professional.
This account (@clashreport) was created during the illegal Turkish invasion of Syrian-Kurdish territory for propaganda purposes and is operated by former employees of the state-run Turkish news agency “Anadolu Ajansı.” Its goal is to promote the Turkish agenda, spread psychological warfare propaganda, and deliberately manipulate public opinion, as demonstrated in this example.
In Manbij, Turkey's terrible disappointment.
It is a failure. While Turkey pushed its auxiliaries to seize Manbij and its region as early as December 11, these same auxiliaries are now incapable of leading and holding the region. Contested by the population and in retreat against the SDF for a week and a half...
Yesterday, January 2, 2025, was the worst day for Turkey's auxiliaries against the SDF in years. One of their attacks on the Tishreen dam resulted in the death of... nearly 35 of their fighters. Losses that they acknowledged. A disaster not seen since 2019...
This military disaster cannot mask another reality: the SDF seem to be able to act as they please throughout the Manbij region. As if the SNA had no control over the area.
And, de facto, and this despite the recommendations of the United States, the SDF once again controls the western bank of the Euphrates, at least as far as Abu Qalqal (here called Abu Qilqil).
On December 30, the SDF even pushed their advantage, via an action by the YAT (equivalent of the special forces within the YPG), to the point of daring to penetrate the eastern districts of Manbij...
A terrible setback for Turkey.
This inability of the SNA to hold an area, despite Turkish air cover and regular long-range artillery fire from the Turkish army from Turkey, is a first. Until then, the SNA managed, as best it could, to push the SDF back from the conquered areas (Jarablus and Bab in 2016, Afrin in 2018, Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn in 2019).
This inability is mainly due to a massive desertion within the SNA. Thousands of men fled the front line to return... home. The fall of the regime allowed these men to return to their towns and villages.
Considerable losses, rejection by the local population who cannot stand the thefts and looting committed by the gangs of Abu Amsha and Saif Abu Bakr, inability to hold the front...
The SNA is accumulating failures and difficulties.
What will Turkey do in such a context? That is the whole question that arises.
And this chaos continues to grow. As early as December 17, 2024, notables from the city of Ras al-Ayn (Serekanye), occupied by Turkish auxiliaries and Turkish soldiers since 2019, demanded that Turkey firmly hold these groups.
And, on January 2, 2025, in this same city, attacks between SNA gangs took place one after another...
This general chaos therefore begins, in addition to Manbij, and while desertions multiply in the SNA gangs, to contaminate the other regions occupied by the Turkish army. A position that will quickly become unmanageable for the MIT (Turkish intelligence service, at the forefront in the management of the region).
Since the end of the afternoon, and especially this evening of January 3, 2025, Turkey, faced with the successive defeats of its auxiliaries, is forced to intervene with its aviation and long-range artillery.
No less than 11 strikes on a vast area extending from the Tishrin dam to the city of Tabqa via Maskanah and Dayr Hafir.
We start 2025 with many things going on. January will be a challenging month, with a race of different actors to strengthen their positions, both in the military field as well as in diplomatic influence. Al-Sharaa is putting his HTS trusted circles in key positions in the goverment. You can read some of their (newly collected) biographies on wikipedia, partly documenting their past activities as “brave jihadist fighters” of al-Nusra. How much they are just playing a theater for western audiences, or how much they really moderated themselves in exchange for power in a Nation-State, is something that will be more clear in the next months.
The statements of an insurgent “popular resistance movement”, with a certain iranian flavour and with russian fringe media echoing it, can contribute to new waves of instability if they come backed up with actions. The druze community in the south also seems unwilling to cooperate with HTS transitional government, contributing to a mosaic of actors that question HTS’ proclaimed power. Meanwhile, many people in Syria’s western cities are going out to the streets, fixing roads and painting murals, reinforcing bonds of solidarity and mutual aid among neighbors. This networks of civic organizing can easily flourish in local committees and popular councils, as they already did in the early years of the Syrian revolution. How much HTS government will give space to these local initiatives, and how much these grassroots movements will confront the authoritarian steps of HTS, is something that will be a determinant for the future of Syria.
The press statement of the ‘joint forces’ leaving the SNA coalition is an important step, moving towards a generalized meltdown of the Turkish proxy forces. It is not clear how much it is an open defection or maybe a ‘cover’ operation of Turkish intelligence, aiming to ‘infiltrate’ some of their trusted agents in the new Syrian Army. Still, together with many local reports of groups and fighters defecting to go back home, plus the big amount of losses that the resistance of SDF is inflicting against their attacks, all this is making SNA more an more unable to hold their ground. How much Turkey will try to keep SNA together or will try to invade directly if things don’t play as they want remains still to be seen.
On the other side, the ongoing talks to integrate SDF in that same new Syrian Army are an uncomfortable but necessary step, in order to build relations with the transitional government and avoid being outmanuvered by Turkey. For now, they seem similar of nature to the negotiations with the Assad regime that were held in the past. SDF never reached any agreement with the regime that wouldnt compromise their integrity and values, and the same is true for the new negotiations with HTS. Negotiations of this kind are diplomatic games, a projection of power of the different actors. If the balance of power changes, negotiations can be pushed in a new direction, with the stronger imposing their will and the other having to accept a compromise. Therefore the most plausible scenario is that those negotiations will get stalled, waiting to solve the differences on the battle field.
Very violent fighting is underway with an unprecedented engagement of the Turkish armed forces since the beginning of December 11 in the Manbij area. After weeks of defeats and retreats of its auxiliaries, the Turkish air force and artillery are investing as never before to cover the SNA in an attempt to return to the Euphrates.
Air strikes, engagement of Bayraktar drones, heavy artillery fire from Turkey...
This massive bombing campaign comes after the SDF took back a large part of the eastern Manbij countryside since December 25.
This intervention, in an area normally already under the control of the SNA, clearly demonstrates the latter's failure to hold the region. A failure that these same forces, including several Turkmen groups, have acknowledged in recent days.
The SDF are responding from the Kobane region with rocket fire on the SNA positions.
The SNA forces, completely disorganized and without any real serious coordination, have retaken some villages, but without reaching the Euphrates, and this despite the massive air and artillery engagement of Turkey. In particular the villages of Sakawiyah and Jdidah Faras. Very violent fighting is taking place between Qunaqabli and Gharreh Sagirah.
The subject will therefore arise again: the SNA is far too weak to hold, mainly since the massive desertions that have affected its ranks, the area without Turkey intervening regularly.
Either Turkey invades the area with ground troops, as is the case between Afrin and Jarablus. Or HTS will enter the area. But this situation of SNA incapacity cannot continue like this continuously, even from the point of view of Turkey's interest...
Syria's Interim Justice Minister Shadi Al-Waisi, is seen sentencing/overseeing death penalty of women for adultery/prostitution, as a part of Al Nusra Front's application of Sharia law back in January 2015 in areas the front controlled in Idlib.
- The first video was filmed in Hafsarja in Idlib, where Al-Waisi stands above the woman sentencing her to death.
- The second video was filmed a week earlier in Ma'arit Misrin of Idlib, where Al-Waisi overseas the execution, and is seen speaking before the executioner carries out the punishment, then covers the woman after she has been executed.
Will such punitive policies be considered in the revision of Syria's constitution, or will Al-Shara'a ensure that such outdated and medieval acts are entirely excluded from discussions about the future of Syria's judicial system, even if a segment of Syrian society supports them?
Defining the boundaries of discussion for drafting a new Syrian constitution is critical; it is insufficient to simply state that "the Syrian constitution will decide." as if the boundaries of discussion will not have an effect over the final outcome. The topics brought to the table reflect the policies likely to emerge, making it essential to address such matters directly.If Al-Shara'a opposes punitive measures of this nature, he needs to signal this to the hardline islamists in Syria who aspire for it. Starting by removing the Justice Minister from his position and any other members of his cabinet who represent this ideology.