And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

In TDS Syria regime penetrates Daesh-held Deir al-Zor

...
“Backed by Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi fighters, the Syrian army entered Deir al-Zor province from the southeast, near the Iraqi border,” said Rami Abdel-Rahman, who heads the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. He said the pro-government forces had advanced 8 kilometers into the province. They are now just 12 kilometers from the key T2 oil pump, which lies on a pipeline extending from Iraq through central Syria to its western coastline.
...

T2 is here.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Der Spiegel Kurds Seek to Expand Reach in Northern Syria

...
Filling a Political Vacuum

She doesn't mention that Manbij had a democratically elected city council as early as 2012, made up of lawyers, business leaders and teachers, all of whom fled the advancing Islamic State in 2014. Now, they are being prevented from returning and their homes have been seized.

The economy in Manbij is flourishing. You can find grain, potatoes, fruit and olives along with consumer goods from regime-controlled areas in Syria and from Iraq. Goods are even smuggled in from Turkey. There is bread and electricity and people are even allowed to smoke again. In the self-proclaimed IS "caliphate," smoking was punished either with lashes or with the breaking of fingers.

Öcalan's party, with its numerous acronyms, has effectively filled a political vacuum: After over six years of war, perpetual bombing and over three years of IS dictatorship, many people are simply exhausted and prepared to accept any political power as long as it leaves them alone.

The battle for Raqqa has almost nothing to do with the beginning of the conflict, which saw Assad's troops up against the Syrian rebels. Today, the fragmented groups that grew out of that original conflict are fighting against each other. Islamic State had hoped that it could, with a disciplined and brutal intelligence service and military apparatus, defeat the rest of the world. That plan is failing right now.

The Kurdish party is similarly obsessed with control, but it has taken the opposite approach: It is seeking out cooperation with the West and has exhibited as little brutality as possible. That strategy could result in the control of large swaths of northeastern Syria. "Manbij is our model for Raqqa," Commander Clara and other officials say openly. Some are even willing to go further: "First Raqqa and then Deir al-Zor," says one official while attending the funeral of eight fallen fighters.

The town, further to the south, isn't home to any Kurds at all anymore. But as PKK, with new groups and new acronyms, has established itself in the background as the central power of the Kurdish ethnicity, it has also lost its Kurdish core. The goal is no longer merely the long-propagated establishment of Rojava, a Kurdish state covering western Kurdistan and carved out of what's left of Syria. Now, the new name for the Kurds' growing sphere of influence is the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. And a city council is already standing by for Raqqa to take over the administration of the city once it is conquered.

As the party has become more successful, its ultimate goal has become less clear. And perhaps, given the uncertainties of the entire region, it is smarter to avoid having an overly predetermined plan. Or, at least, to avoid communicating that plan.

Still, one young fighter voiced his own enthusiastic version of the future prior to the storming of Raqqa. "We will liberate everyone, first from Daesh and the former Nusra Front, from the FSA and the from the regime, from Hezbollah, from the Iranians. Everybody, out!"

My bold, admirable ambition and momentum but that can be dangerous. They're being carried along by events.

I doubt if Apo ever imagined his revolution would be carving out such an empire in Syria. At least not one that depends on the constancy of US air support and the whims of a treacherous Queens real estate billionaire. That may be conditional on taking on the Iranians after victory is declared over IS. The odds there are long ones because the Americans do usually lose interest and move on to poke other hornets nests.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From Atlantic Council Lawlessness in Syria's Regime-Held Areas and the Future of Governance in Syria

Lawlessness is a major problem in Assad regime-held Syrian cities, especially those on the coast. This is despite the large number of security agencies that control those areas, along with armed militias that commit daily abuses against civilians and government institutions—violations the government ignores as it relies on the militias’ continued support. Such lawlessness raises questions over the regime’s ability to control the areas it holds and whether it can still be thought of as part of the solution in Syria.

The deteriorating economic situation in these areas, resulting from the regime’s inability to provide for the needs of their inhabitants, especially Alawites, is the main reason for the rising crime rate there. Latakia residents say this appears to be a deliberate policy; the regime appeases militias that fight alongside it by failing to act against them and allowing them to benefit from such lawlessness.

One of the worst results is the sense of society being ripped apart in these areas, most notably manifested in theft and armed clashes among families. A large number of crimes are committed every month, and the regime does little to stop them, resulting in the rise of local Alawite gangs that steal and carry out kidnappings to extort well-off merchants. There are even women in these gangs, along with teenagers seeking educational qualifications using the same methods as the gangs—extortion and murder.
...

Details a series of incidents in the Alawite heartland. This is reminiscent of the societal decay that the first round of the Iraqi civil war induced. Lots of simply criminal activity often stemming from a proliferation of militias and the basic fact that Damascus is skint. There was always an element of underpaid officers being granted a license to steal in Syria but not a chaotic decline of state authority like this.

Admits there are lawlessness problems in rebel areas as well.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On FP I Fled the Islamic State’s ‘Caliphate’ in Raqqa — But Fear Its Liberators

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Ahmad, a middle-aged man who owned a currency exchange shop in Raqqa’s al-Mansour street before fleeing to Manbij, favors the SDF. “Under the FSA, I couldn’t keep my shop open, fearing looting for any reason. Under ISIS, businesses like mine thrived as they protected our properties. You could come to my shop with a pocket filled with $100,000; you wouldn’t bother about safety,” he said. “Now under SDF, it is just as safe, with the exception that we don’t have to pay zakat,” he added, referring to the obligation in Islam to give alms.

For women, the shift from the Islamic State to the SDF brought radical change. Sameera, a pharmacist who graduated from Damascus University, was one of thousands of women who were forced to wear black cloaks and veils from head to toe during the jihadi group’s rule. She kept her drugstore in Raqqa’s central Fardous neighborhood open when the Islamic State took hold. But it wasn’t easy.

“It was a hard time selling medicine,” she said. “I’d have gotten into trouble for handing [Islamic State members] tablets without covering my hands with sleeves.”

Sameera comes from a conservative family in Raqqa, and wore long clothes before the Islamic State but never covered her face. Now in Manbij, she’s waiting for her hometown to be liberated to return to her normal life.

The SDF governance is widely seen by Arabs as a restoration of the pre-revolution Assad regime — only now with Kurds on the top, replacing Alawites. “Kurds are just like the regime,” said Ahmad. “There are individuals in charge who happen to be persons of integrity, but sometimes you couldn’t go on without bribery or connections. But of course they are still far better than ISIS or the others.”

The years of war have shifted some Raqqans’ views on what they want for their lives, and for their city. For some, simple survival has become the only goal after years of jihadi maniacs on the ground and roaring jets in the sky. A “Manbij solution” may be the best short-term option available for Raqqa — that is, if the city survives obliteration.

“We are seeing frightening footage of destruction coming from Raqqa,” said Abu Merei, an old man who left his house in Raqqa’s al-Noor street. “If only they [Islamic State fighters] withdraw soon. Our hope is that we return to our houses and find them still standing. I don’t care who’s going to rule.”

Piece by a nervous Raqqa native who looks at how Manbij is administered and sees some upsides.

 

[teqniq]

At 15 I was tortured in Assad’s prisons. I escaped, but thousands still suffer | Anonymous

 

[teqniq]

Britain will back future military action in Syria

This will end up with direct confrontation with both Russia and Iran at some point. Maybe that's what they want. The chemical weapons thing increasingly appears as a pretext to me especially when put against the numbers that have already died via conventional weaponry and in the prisons.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On BuzzFeedNews White House Says Syria May Be Preparing Another Chemical Attack, Warns Assad Will "Pay A Heavy Price"

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Five US defense officials reached by BuzzFeed News said they did not know where the potential chemical attack would come from, including one US Central Command official who had "no idea" about its origin. The officials said they were unaware the White House was planning to release its statement; usually such statements are coordinated across the national security agencies and departments before they are released.
...

CENTCOM obviously not shouting at the TV as much as folk in the West Wing.

 

[teqniq]

Which is what it actually says in the link I posted above, but just to be clear from the linked article.

...In a statement released late on Monday, the White House said preparations being taken by Syria were similar to those undertaken before an April 4 chemical attack that killed dozens of civilians and prompted Mr Trump to order a cruise missile strike on an air base.

White House spokesman Sean Spicer added: "The United States has identified potential preparations for another chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime that would likely result in the mass murder of civilians, including innocent children.

"If...Mr Assad conducts another mass murder attack using chemical weapons, he and his military will pay a heavy price....

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Millitary.com General: US Pilots Made the Call to Shoot Down Syrian Aircraft

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'ISIS Is a Sideshow'

To abide by the rules of engagement, the unit works with the Combined Air Operations Center, which from another location would direct a pilot to shoot, but that process "didn't have to happen -- in all three cases, it was self-defense," Corcoran said.

"If you're shooting at U.S. forces, we'll self-defend," he said.

Such calls may happen with more frequency as ISIS continues to lose ground in Syria, where a civil war has raged since 2011, and the U.S. finds itself operating in airspace increasingly congested by forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and backed by Russia.

During an interview in his office, Corcoran underscored, "We're here to fight ISIS," but he also pointed to a map of Syria and Iraq to outline areas as "red," or controlled by the Islamic State.

"It's pretty clear that at some point the 'red' is going to go away," he said, "and we're going to have state-on-state" forces fighting. "ISIS is a sideshow ... but what happens when the [other] two meet? Strategically, when ISIS goes away, that's the real issue."
...

As Brig. Gen. Corcoran says of the mission in Syria after contrasting it to Iraq later on "it's really an odd place to be." Lots of interesting details in this one. Corcoran's language is telling. The Pentagon is on an anti-IS mission but he's wondering about "What next?" How can he know as the signals from the executive are all over the place. Mattis apparently opposing to fight two wars in parallel in Syria doesn't mean the next war isn't with his old enemy Iran.

You don't have to be a military fella to see the Syrian end of Operation Inherent Resolve is confused.

Meanwhile the Iranians scamper up to al Bukamal with Pentagon spokesmen saying that's fine and the Coalition's "not in the land-grab business".

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CTC Sentinel THE BATTLE FOR RAQQA AND THE CHALLENGES AFTER LIBERATION

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Understanding the jihadi-tribal relationship is crucial to building local rapport, establishing credibility for the liberating forces, and avoiding continued jihadi infiltration of these communities. Some locals, for example, fear that a Kurdish expansion into their areas would change the demographics of the population and would see the Kurds even scores for the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s settlement of Arab families in Kurdish areas near the Turkish border after the creation of Lake Assad and the Euphrates dam in the 1970s. Kurds claim that tens of thousands of Kurds were displaced from their home areas by the regime for the resettlement of Arab families, known as the Arab al-Ghamr (the Arabs affected by flooding).

Another source of tension in the liberation of Islamic State-controlled areas in both Iraq and Syria has been how the liberating force determines which residents were members of the Islamic State.o This becomes even more complicated in tribal areas where informing on relatives or neighbors to “out-of-towners” is frowned upon. Many government employees continued to work, either because the Islamic State pressured them or because they saw their work as service to their town. If such people in Raqqa are ill-treated or killed by militias operating under the YPG’s command, it risks inflaming ethnic tensions. The tendency of anti-Islamic State forces on the ground in Syria and Iraq to view residents who continued to live under the Islamic State as fellow travelers or family members of jihadis as complicit could complicate efforts to prevent the Islamic State or other jihadi groups from winning back influence in Raqqa. Tribal pragmatism, embodied in the popular tribal proverb “the wolf shall not die, nor shall the sheep perish,”93 keeps the door open for a working relationship with any force in control of the city, regardless of its ethnic or political orientation. It is not impossible that a Kurdish-dominated force could be accepted if it successfully reassured the population about its long-term intentions.

Tribal alliances are not static, as demonstrated by the swift shift of Raqqa tribes from ostensible allegiance to Assad in 2011 to Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013 to the Islamic State in 2014. “We tribes do not go after anyone who does not go after us,” Abu Nasser, an elder of the Abu Shaaban tribe in Raqqa told the author last month, “If the devil itself liberates our areas from the Islamic State, we do not have a problem. Just give us our rights. Even if the Syrian army comes, we will provide it with logistics. We do the same with the [SDF].”94
...

Long piece by Hassan Hassan. He's been critical of the US strategy to take Raqqa. Here he's a bit more optimistic. Thinks the SDF is gaining acceptance. Partly because it's seen as an American venture and that brings various guarantees. Also the perception that the Turks have run out of steam.

The snip here emphasises the pragmatism of tribal politics there. He points out many tribesmen who have joined IS often do so out of loyalty to kin and may have almost no bond with the organisation. It occurs to me the same is probably true of parts of the SDF. It's the same pattern of huddling up to external power brokers that existed when Raqqa was a loyalist area. Tribal leaders proved fickle when that power faded.

 

[teqniq]

It looks pretty much finished as a fully functioning state to me, as it does to the authors. How you bring about the idea discussed in this piece what with all the competing interests is another matter entirely.

It's Time to Break Up Syria

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Turkey's real target on way to Idlib: Kurds

...
Meanwhile, Kurdish news media report that since the United States shot down a Syrian plane to purportedly protect the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at Tabqa, Russia in retaliation will turn a blind eye to a joint operation by Turkish and Syrian armies against Tel Rifaat and Afrin.

While assorted speculation continues, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had not been referring to Syria of late, suddenly came out with a statement directly targeting the Kurds. “The PYD and the YPG are trying to achieve something. They should know that no matter who is behind them, Turkey will never allow establishment of a [Kurdish] state in northern Syria,” he said. The United States has been backing the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Union Party (PYD), which Turkey says is the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey considers the PKK a terrorist organization.

Turkey's army deployments at Dodian, Kere Mazraat and Shava villages of the Azaz district suggest Afrin is in its sights. But Afrin, where the PKK has been robust since the 1990s, has thwarted all attacks by groups to which Turkey has supplied artillery.

Developments on the ground point to an operation more complex and far-ranging than just Idlib. There are Kurds living between the Turkish border and the targeted Kurdish corridor in places such as Tel Rifaat, Sheikh Issa and Kafr Naya, all controlled by the YPG and its allies. The area between the southern YPG-held land and Aleppo is controlled by the Syrian army. The YPG is defending Afrin like a fortress.

So, in addition to severing the Kurdish corridor from Kobani and Manbij to Afrin, Turkey now wants to complete its half-achieved Euphrates Shield mission by declaring Idlib its next destination.
...

Post-Astana Afrin is beginning to look like a hostage situation. Afrin's lines of communication with the East of Rojova are in Turkish or regime hands. The US doesn't usually support Afrin. The Turks can say they are going into Idlib to counter AQ led HTS and create a rebel safe haven just like Trump said he would and that's maybe part of it. The regime won't like another Turkish intrusion. It certainly doesn't want Afrin being taken over by TSK backed rebels that's worse than the current tenants. However Iran's priorities in Syria are out East where the Great Satan supported SDF with its backbone of PKK fighters is a potential problem. If the Russians don't care for how things are going in the East they might pull the same treacherous trick they did at al Bab and green light TSK operations against their old friends. Which provides some leverage over their new Iranian friends. The regime has just sold a Russian company a large tranche of it's future oil production and that's mostly based on fields in the East. There's some justified paranoia about such R+6-Turkish collaboration over Afrin in PKK media. Of course a hostage alive but going hungry and maybe with some bits missing often goes up in value.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog The History of the Rapid Intervention Regiment: Interview with a Commander

...
Aymenn: The Iranian friends did not help you financially?

Ja'afar: No, by God. Never.

Aymenn: A little strange. I thought the Iranians help all the factions that are working to defend Sayyida Zainab.

Ja'afar: No brother the Iranians only help those affiliated with them.

Aymenn: What you have told me about lack of Iranian support for you is an important thing, because there are people who think that Iran created the Rapid Intervention Regiment. [7]

Ja'afar: No, impossible. I am sure of this thing that I am telling you.

Aymenn: Yes, of course. Ideologically, most of the people in the Rapid Intervention Regiment were affiliated with the Sadrist movement?

Ja'afar: Yes, approximately, with the Sadrist movement.

Aymenn: Yes exactly. i.e. Not affiliated with Khamene'i ideologically.

Ja'afar: Actually, half and half.
...

Intriguing interview with a Iraqi resident in Syria before the war started now with HA. Note the Iraqi Sadrist connection. The firebrand leader of that movement Muqtada al Sadr lately has been a big player in Baghdad and tended to oppose Iranian influence just as fiercely as the American variety while having good relations with HA. The al Sadr religious dynasty goes back a long way with Lebanese Shia. When in the now defunct Rapid Intervention Regiment this guy only got paid $35 a month. A lousy rate even in Syria that would reflect a lack of Iranian support.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TCF Why Haven’t Chemical Weapons Inspectors Gone to Syria’s Shayrat Air Base?

...
But in light of the renewed U.S. accusations of chemical weapons activity at Shayrat, the failure to inspect the base is starting to look problematic.

If security fears are at the root of the OPCW’s apparent unwillingness to visit Shayrat, that should be brought to light and, if possible, addressed. If other concerns, outside pressures, or fears of political smear tactics are involved, this, too, deserves to be brought into the open. If there is genuinely agreement from both the OPCW and the Syrian government, even the issue of the fact-finding mission’s narrow mandate could surely be sidestepped through some creative arrangement, and Shayrat could certainly be visited under the auspices of the OPCW-UN mechanism, which has a more permissive mandate.

The Shayrat air base is now at the center of U.S. claims that the Assad government is illegally hoarding and using nerve gas, and it has become just as central to the government’s defense against those accusations. The United States has already struck Shayrat with missiles once, and now points to the air base as the potential trigger for another act of war.

In these circumstances, if anything at all can be gained from an inspection visit to Shayrat, it seems strange that such a visit would not be attempted—however much Russian or Syrian media may gloat over the likely result of an inconclusive finding.

Lund on the lack of inspections.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The Syrian Observer Fifth Corps Officer to Assad: Our Forces Are Drained and the Russians Humiliate Us

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The officer addressed the practices of the Russian officers and how they insulted members of the regime forces and humiliated them with the monthly salary they gave them, saying: “The Russian officer who is coming to us from Russia, if he wants to tell you, ‘Good morning,’ he would start with the sentence, ‘We’re giving you $200 or $300.’”

He added: “Yesterday in one of the meetings, the chief of staff was talking and I told him we wanted bulldozers to make sandbanks. He told me that his hand was already in his pocket and said, ‘Why should I bring you bulldozers? You’re Syrian and you should bring the bulldozers… We are paying you $300 a month.”

He also spoke about the humiliation the Fifth Corps fighters receive from the Russians, by shooting over their heads or between their feet and insulting them in a language they do not understand, according to the text of the message.

The officer said in his message: “Every military plan had to motivate people under the lie that warplanes would scorch the earth or there would be artillery and mortar cover. We didn’t see any of that. If there were mortar or tank shell strikes, it was on us and not the enemy.”

The officer said two of the “strongest” regime officers were killed by “friendly fire”, saying: “Two of the strongest officers were martyred in the Corps by friendly fire, tank fire, First Lt. Osama al-Mustafa [was killed] by friendly fire in Palmyra, and Captain Hussein in a similar incident in Hama.”

The officer addressed the failure of the Fifth Corps and its lack of sufficient equipment, saying: “Neither artillery, tanks or mortars nor even ambulances, which are the simplest possible demand we could make for the Corps operations, are there. The Corps’ equipment is a failure, there is no equipment, just automatic rifles and nothing else.”

The officer added that the “martyrs and wounded” in the Corps did not receive benefits and compensation, and added that three batches of fighters had been changed because every time a new batch of volunteers or reservists arrived, they fled from the Corps because “they brought us to die.”

The officer closed his message by describing the formation as a “farce,” asking about the point of a failing regiment bleeding regime officers at the cheapest prices, saying: “The Fifth Corps … is a corps of questions without answers … a corps of failed operations.”

A number of those who have dealt with it confirmed what the officer said in his message, including members of the Fifth Corps. One of them, commenting on the message, said: “What this officer is saying is 100 percent true. I’m a lieutenant in the Corps and have been abused a million times. They made us hate this thing called a country.
...

Groaning about conditions in the SAA is a Syrian military tradition. There are elite units but life in the SAA appears grim. It's always been badly paid. The officers often live in slum barracks and prey on their men's supplies and local populations in order to supplement their income. Conscripts report being underfed. It's an often reluctant conscript army that's come off rather badly in terms of attrition. It's not surprising there are morale problems.

The Fifth is a recently formed volunteer unit that's meant to be relatively well paid and have better conditions. An attempt by Assad to re-nationalise Syrian forces that have often ended up as often localised privatised militias. The sort of offensive army he needs for his ongoing reconquista which will place a strain on it. It was to some extent a Russian project. Regular abuse of recruits to toughen them up is often part of Russian army training though it may just be cultural insensitivity.

 

[CrabbedOne]

So the US airlifted the rebels it was backing out of al Tanf to Rojava. No sign of withdrawal from al Tanf but it looks like that round went to Iran.

Hassan Hassan reckons negotiations about this are still ongoing.

He reckons:

The US first wanted to relocate them to Rutbah in Iraq The plan then changed to Shaddadi. The plan then shelved after Iran escalated.

That whole thing is a mess.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks THE SIGNAL IN SYRIA’S NOISE

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Washington’s Syria policy needs to be calibrated to the war’s second-order connections and linkages if it’s going to work – particularly if the United States wants to ultimately leave Syria, not just wage unlimited rounds of proxy war to no obvious end.

That’s not to say that America ought to embrace and invest in all these dynamics. Just because the Assad regime is winning, for example, doesn’t mean the United States should help. It shouldn’t. But as Washington gauges where to selectively, productively engage in Syria – with an eye on extricating the United States from what’s still likely to be a slow-burning, years- or decades-long conflict – it shouldn’t necessarily resist some of Syria’s native mechanics. If a PYD-regime accommodation over the administration of al-Raqqa shores up the relationship between the PYD periphery and the regime-held center and brings the country closer to a more sustainable, stabilizing equilibrium, then America doesn’t have an obvious interest in frustrating that.
...

Sam Heller on how he sees Syria. The rebels are hopelessly fragmented politically and geographically. In Idlib not really separable from kin and comrades in the two big radical outfits Ahar and HTS. IS is going back into the grass along the middle Euphrates. Rojova built on a spine of PKK trained cadres with Arab rebels and tribal forces loosely lashed on is deeply problematic because of their war with Turkey. The regime may be fragmented but it's the most resilient actor and now holds nearly all of Useful Syria.

It's arguable how internally coherent the loyalist side is. This isn't something you can tell from one visit to Damascus. There are clear signs of decay, weakness and failing control but Syria has never been North Korea. The Assad's power was always been mediated via local power brokers like a 70s South American junta. Even the SAA always had elements of being multiple divisional state run extortion rackets. What is certain is Damascus is no longer able to rent loyalty being skint and deep in hock to its allies. It's ability to project power outside Useful Syria is limited and even holding that is reliant on its allies. Even with them it often faces sudden reverses. It needs the oil in the East, the electricity from the Tabqa dam and supply lines out into Iraq. Rojava can buy a lot of autonomy with that and can't rely on the fickle US to hold back the Turks forever.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEI Al-Qaeda Affiliate and Ahrar al-Sham Compete for Control in Idlib

...
While H.T.S. faces these internal and external challenges, it is also evolving. Its leadership clearly realized the importance of building stronger connections with local communities in order to compete with Ahrar al-Sham. H.T.S. adopted new tactics in governing. Instead of appointing foreigners or military leaders, H.T.S. has appointed local civilians as its representatives in most of the towns under its control in Idlib.

H.T.S. and Ahrar will continue to compete in governance and service provision, which is key to building loyalty, increasing influence, and widening public support. The groups are also cautiously following regional and international developments as they prepare for different scenarios. If the de-escalation agreement collapses or an external force intervenes in Idlib, all dynamics will certainly change. Ahrar and H.T.S. might confront each other, become allies, or re-shuffle their respective coalitions. The situation in Idlib is far from stable.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The NYT In a Desperate Syrian City, a Test of Trump’s Policies

...
The visit to Tabqa on Thursday was a first opportunity for Mr. McGurk, a small group of senior coalition officials and the Western news media to get a look at the newly liberated city, still struggling to recover from the physical and psychological scars of nearly three years of harsh control by the militants.

“Basically, what you’ve got here is hundreds, if not thousands, of bodies in the rubble, which is causing a lot of flies, the flies are biting kids, the kids are getting infected,” said Al Dwyer, a senior official with the United States Agency for International Development, as American Special Operations forces drove to Tabqa in armored S.U.V.s. “Lot of rats. Smells. This is keeping people from coming back in.”
...

Bodies in rubble where a big problem in Ramadi as well. Lots of other problems in Tabqa including a generation of kids educated to love the Caliphate. The dam in the past supplied a great deal of Syria's electricity but has been sabotaged by IS. Interesting that the regime stopped paying salaries in Tabqa some months ago.

Not having detailed well budgeted Phase IV plans for reconstruction is a mistake we've repeatedly made. Expensively breaking things and killing people with precision munitions is all very well but the process of war fighting can create more opportunities for the likes of IS. It doesn't have to go as far as nation building just get things up and working so people can get back to their lives. Isolated Rojova isn't oil rich Iraq and the US relying on the UN here doesn't really make any sense.

 

[butchersapron]

A barrel bombed thread.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks THE POST-CALIPHATE GAUNTLET IN EASTERN SYRIA

...
There have been some improvements of late, as I learned during my most recent trip. In Manbij, increased prodding by U.S. officials and deft coalition-building by key self-administration personnel yielded notable changes in style and substance: The YPG flags and posters of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan that blanket much of northeastern Syria (including majority-Arab areas) are absent in the city. Day-to-day security tasks are handled by local recruits. And Arab members of the local governing council have been afforded more responsibility than is evident elsewhere. That said, Qandil-trained Kurdish cadres are still widely seen as the ultimate authority and backbone of local governance.

Those adjustments have been sufficient thus far in Manbij, but more will be required in Raqqa. There, the YPG is preparing to expand a strained governance network to the largest Arab-majority city it has yet attempted to control. Without significant changes to its model and increased external support, there is a real danger of overstretch — which would present opportunities for jihadists to exploit.

Avoiding this trap will require increased engagement and investment from the U.S. and European members of the anti-ISIL coalition — both to incentivize appropriate shifts by the YPG, and to ensure that the nascent local government in Raqqa has sufficient resources to establish stability and earn local credibility. The U.S. has already taken important steps by establishing a training program for local security forces, and directly pressing organizers of the new “Raqqa Civil Council” for wide representation of Raqqawi society within the body.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Political Violence @ A Glance Why Civil Wars have Gotten Longer, Bloodier, and More Numerous

...
No explanation has yet been offered for why civil wars are becoming more frequent, bloody, fractious, and internationalized. In a new paper “The New New Civil Wars”, I argue that these changes are due in part to the advent of the Web 2.0 in the early 2000s. Today’s civil wars are the first to be fought in an era of global, instantaneous communication, and this is the reason they are changing.
...

Well you might also blame crappy divisive Baathists shredding societies, the likes of Saleh similarly dancing on the heads of snakes, sectarian Salafi movements and their Iranian enemies, a fashion for external intervention and the obsessional blundering GWOT. The internet probably has been a pernicious factor though.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The NYT Russia Deploys a Potent Weapon in Syria: The Profit Motive

...
Fontanka’s latest article on the topic, published last week, detailed how Evro Polis was cooperating with a shadowy Russian private security group called Wagner, which American sanctions suggest has also provided contract soldiers to the war in Ukraine.

The deal is distinct from the common practice of oil majors and other corporations outsourcing security in hot spots in the Middle East and elsewhere. Under the contract, the wells are not just to be guarded, but to be captured first, the article said.

“The arrangement returns to the times of Francis Drake and Cecil Rhodes,” it noted, referring to two figures from British history whose careers mixed warfare and private profit.

Evro Polis, according to Fontanka and public company records in Russia, is part of a network of companies owned by Evgeniy Prigozhin, a St. Petersburg businessman close to President Vladimir V. Putin and known as “the Kremlin’s chef” for his exclusive catering contracts with the administration. His company, Concord Catering, also supplies food to many of Moscow’s public schools, according to Russian news reports.

Journalists have reported that Mr. Prigozhin engaged in another recent Russian experiment in restoring influence abroad while keeping costs down: He set up a factory of so-called internet trolls in St. Petersburg, an office packed with low-paid people posting online under assumed identities to influence public opinion in foreign countries, including the United States.

Last month, the Treasury Department in Washington imposed sanctions on Dmitri Utkin, the founder of Wagner, the private security group the report said would capture the Syrian oil and gas wells for Evro Polis. Fontanka first linked Mr. Utkin to Wagner in an article in 2015.
...

War for oil and a return to privateering with it.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TCB The Messy Fight to Come in Northern Iraq and Syria

...
TCB: Does Iran see a way to present itself as a possible ally to the Kurds by establishing its presence along the border, especially if the U.S. follows through on its promise to abandon Syrian Kurds after the battle against ISIS is over?

Stein: Iran and the Kurds have a very complicated relationship. The Barzanis [the ruling political dynasty of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)] spent their time in exile in Iran. [KRG Prime Minister] Nechirvan Barzani speaks Farsi, [KRG President] Massoud Barzani spent his exile in Iran. Even though the KDP is supposed to be closer to Turkey than they are to Iran – whereas the opposition Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party and its leader Jalal Talabani are supposed to be closer to Iran – nothing is neat. The PKK has an affiliate in Iran that attacks the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps every once in a while, but they often come to quasi-cease fires and Turkey accuses Iran of using the PKK as a tool of policy.

On the YPG, the regime has been very clear that they want to take back all of Syria, and Iran backs the regime, so they will have a choice to make. When the regime and Iran consolidate control south of the Euphrates river, with U.S.-backed forces north of the river, I think that probing attacks like we saw near the Tabqa dam earlier this month will become a daily occurrence. If they want to go all in and try to fight through as many as 50,000 SDF troops, we will see this war extend for years to come. That will be their choice.

TCB: How far do you think Russia is willing to go to protect the Syrian regime in these probing attacks?

Stein: Not very far. For Russia, I think places like Tabqa are not that important. Because the YPG is not wedded to regime change, they are not antithetical to Russian interests in basically smashing the rest of the opposition to ensure that it’s Bashar al Assad and nobody else.

Whether the regime shares that assessment remains to be answered. If not, how far will they ignore Russia to attack U.S.-backed forces?

What the U.S. will do in response also remains in question. I can tell you that the U.S. has no policy on this, they haven’t figured it out yet. We’re making it up as we go along.

There's some interesting incentives here. Tabqa is pretty important to Assad. I read there were disputes amongst the SDF about exactly who would control it. Of course it's just a trophy if you can't get it working. The dam once generated a large part of Syria's electricity. IS wrecked it. It's old Soviet tech in need of spare parts and suitable engineering expertise. Then you just need a market for all that surplus power and the obvious one is Useful Syria. Perhaps some thick necked oligarch will be sniffing out a nice little earner here as well.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The LAT A schism among Syrian rebel fighters threatens to slow down the battle against Islamic State

...
After about 700 Kurdish forces freed the devastated neighborhood last week, it was recaptured by Islamic State. Militants gained ground after some of the 350 Free Syrian Army troops deployed there lost two fighters to sniper fire and fled, Bilind said. Kurdish forces retrieved the bodies, and launched a new attack.

In the ensuing battle, eight Kurdish soldiers were killed (they had already lost 20 in the fight for eastern Raqqah). The survivors returned to find that the house they had used as a base had been burned by the militants, although their staircase command post was relatively unscathed. Late Monday, Islamic State launched a new mortar attack up the street. Sniper fire sounded nearby Tuesday afternoon.

“They are delaying the liberation of Raqqah,” Bilind said of Free Syrian Army forces, after numerous Kurdish overnight offensives. “At night we are controlling and in the day they are leaving. We have two options: Force them to fight, or let them go and replace them.”
...

Note in this snip the FSA are a holding force not being asked to take ground. Goes on to give an example of Arabs from elsewhere (Deir) not being well motivated in Raqqa.

 

[teqniq]

What, really?

America and Russia broker Syrian ceasefire deal for major region of country

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Washington Institute A Half-Million Syrian Returnees? A Look Behind the Numbers

...
FACTORS COMPLICATING A RETURN TO SYRIA

The main obstacle to return remains lack of security. This perception varies according to geographic origin, socioeconomic level, and, of course, potential involvement in resistance to the Syrian regime. However, a common thread links all Syrian men ages fifteen to forty-five: fear of being conscripted into the Syrian army or rebel groups or the larger Syrian Democratic Forces, depending on their place of residence. Many families still therefore prefer to leave Syria preemptively when their sons approach their eighteenth birthday, the age of conscription. As long as the fighting keeps up, refugees will continue to flow out of the country -- and the return of significant numbers will be limited. Once the fighting is over, only amnesty could reassure the hundreds of thousands of "deserters."

Corruption from Syrian officials is the second reason for staying in Lebanon. For their part, men do not dare return to Syria for fear of being arrested arbitrarily and having to pay a large sum to be released. One interviewee in Lebanon related that he'd had to pay $3,000 to be set free from prison while he was in good standing with the Syrian authorities. His uncle, who works in Kuwait, paid the Mukhabarat (secret police) $15,000 to release his seventeen-year-old son, who was jailed arbitrarily in Damascus. Furthermore, since the beginning of the civil war, a tremendous number of kidnappings have occurred in Syria, with the principal targets being men of military age, sons of wealthy families, and those with families abroad.

The Syrians who return to their former homes often do so with horror stories. The testimony of a refugee from Aleppo who visited his house in April 2017 carried a particular eloquence, while appearing to represent a broader reality: "I went back to our apartment in Ashrafiya [a neighborhood in northeast Aleppo]. From the Lebanese border to Aleppo, I had to pay a $100 bribe [two months' salary for a civil servant]. I had packed a food bag for my sister: tea, coffee, powdered milk, and so on. But once I arrived at Aleppo, my suitcase was empty because at every checkpoint on the road they took something. Our apartment could be rehabilitated with some work, but it is too expensive and there is almost no electricity. Our shop was destroyed and looted. We prefer to stay in Lebanon and wait for a visa to leave for Europe or Canada."
...

Balanche calls bullshit on optimistic UNHCR claims of refugee returns to Syria. Large numbers of IDPs are returning home but few refugees. After gathering some data in Lebanon he only has 6% of refugees planning to do that soon.

The snip is revealing. Avoiding conscription is a major reason for flight. I think this isn't likely to go away. The SAA is much smaller than it used to be and even if fighting subsides Assad will need holding forces. Fear of conscription may drop as the terrible attrition the SAA has suffered slackens. Even then economic conditions in Syria are dire and a state which always gave officers a licence to racketeer in their Divisional area has become even more kleptocratic. High levels of criminality plague even loyalist areas. With Assad asset stripping the country to pay off his Russian and Iranian backers a return to normalcy is liable to be slow at best.

 

[donkyboy]

On Reuters Hezbollah says future Israel war could draw fighters from Iran, Iraq, elsewhere

 

[CrabbedOne]

On FP Russia and U.S. Broker Another Ceasefire in Syria

...
But “the biggest risk is that the Syrian government will not respect it in the intermediate and long term,” said Ford. Moreover, he said, Tehran supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and “would back the Syrian government if it violates a U.S.-Russia brokered deal.”

But Israel, a close U.S. ally, has expressed opposition to Russian military involvement in any local ceasefire arrangement. According to a July 7 reportin Haaretz, senior Israeli officials told an American envoy that Israel would oppose Russian policing of such a zone.

That’s because Moscow is close to Iran, while Israel’s main goal in Syria is to eliminate Iran’s influence there, and push Shiite militant group Hezbollah away from Syria’s border with Israel. In Israel’s view, the United States can be relied upon to warn away and even bomb Iranian-armed groups that may transgress a potential cease-fire zone — as U.S. warplanes did just last month.

Russia, on the other hand, would not be Israel’s pick to police that area, Ford noted.

“The Russians, for many years, have looked the other way while Iran has sent supplies to Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon against Israel,” said Ford. Since Russia never tried to check Iran’s backing for anti-Israel groups, “the Israelis don’t trust the Russians,” he said.

In the past, Russia has displayed an unwillingness to pressure the Assad government to abide by ceasefires. But this time, said the State Department official, it seemed that Russia was serious.

“It was certainly worth our effort and worth our time to test them on this,” said the official.

The specifics of the deal are not yet known, including monitoring agreements on the ground, but the United States and Russia have been secretly discussing the possibility of some kind of safe zone in southern Syria since May.
...

The Israelis are smelling a rat. The Russians agreeing to a ceasefire after a major R+6 advance while assuring the Septics they have Assad on a short leash is something of a pattern in Syria. So far it's always proven to be bullshit. The regime had already declared a four day ceasefire which was probably for operational reasons.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor The Kremlin’s contradictory behavior in Syria

...
Some Russian analysts, referencing their sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, argue that Russian military and political leaders are well aware that Iran and Assad intend to prevent the UN's peace plan from succeeding. (The UN Security Council unanimously adopted the plan, Resolution 2254, in late 2015.) The analysts worry that Tehran and Damascus might try to convince Moscow to not cooperate as well.

Russia openly stands by its allies. For instance, to justify the Syrian government’s blocking of Tabqa, Moscow went so far as to accuse the United States and the Kurds allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of colluding with the Islamic State (IS). Moreover, Russia has warned that it will target US planes flying west of the Euphrates — though US aircraft hardly ever operate there anyway.

One of the weakest points of Russia’s de-escalation zone plan is the problem of how to fight radical forces if Assad would have to launch an offensive through territory controlled by moderate opposition, given that Assad and moderates have signed a truce. The exacerbation of relations between the Kurds and Assad’s forces will give Turkey more leeway regarding Idlib, positioned deep in enclaves controlled by the radical opposition alliance Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Yet such exacerbation would discourage new players from engaging in the peace settlement, which the Kremlin would have welcomed.
...

Goes on to suggest Moscow hopes to work with Ankara on Idlib with Turkish inroads into Afrin being a sweetener.