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And next, Syria?

teqniq said:
It looks pretty much finished as a fully functioning state to me, as it does to the authors. How you bring about the idea discussed in this piece what with all the competing interests is another matter entirely.

It's Time to Break Up Syria
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You and they have been predicting/announcing president assads imminent demise like clockwork for the past 6 years . You're all best ignored .
 
Is that all it is to you, a point scoring exercise? The only people losing here you vacuous tosser are the people of Syria whilst the likes of you and I are sat in the relative comfort of our homes. Moreover I never suggested by posting the above link that Assad himself is finished, nor I think did the authors. They are suggesting the country itself is finished as it was once known and the argument is reasonably compelling, one has only to look at facts on the ground. Assad himself will probably cling onto some semblance of power, scum like him nearly always do.
 
You've been cheer leading this jihadist shitshow for the past 6 years . 6 years were you've regularly predicted the impending fall of Syria . You were full of shit then, you're full of shit now .

The people of Syria are winning and they'll take back their entire country, not just the useful bits .
 
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On Bloomberg This Is What Putin Wants From His Syria Deal With Trump
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In addition, so far the only monitors on offer to police the de-escalation zone are Russian. How others might become involved and in what capacity is under negotiation, the State Department official said. The Russian view of how the zones will work is also minimalist and favorable to the Assad regime.

Russia would provide a maximum of 1,000 military police to monitor the cease-fire, according to Elena Suponina, a Middle East expert at the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, which advises the Kremlin. She said the de-escalation zones had been under discussion for months, and timed for announcement by Trump and Putin at this week’s G-20.

They were not equivalent to the safe havens often discussed in the West, where one of the warring parties is forced to leave. Assad’s forces would not be excluded from the de-escalation zones being discussed and would be allowed to conduct operations against “terrorists,’’ she said. That is the description the Assad regime uses for all armed opposition.

Russian Ambitions

Moreover, said Suponina, the zones would be attempted only where the rebel opposition is “too weak to launch an offensive, but strong enough not to be wiped out.’’

Those low Russian ambitions may also fuel suspicion that they are offering only the semblance of a peace plan to placate the new U.S. president and buy time to finish up the reconquest of Syria.

“I have no doubt what the Russians want to do with all these zones is to try to solidify Assad’s position,’’ said Fred Hof, who served as special adviser for Syria’s transition during the Obama administration. “The key question here is what kind of influence is Russia willing to bring to bear on the regime and on the Iranians to keep them quiet?”
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What a carve up.

I think Trump's is being played. It may not be what the Russian want but this is going to end up with HA and the Iranians owning a lot of key Syrian real estate including that up by the Israeli border with supply routes that stretch all the way back to Iran. They can deploy a dozen brigades of Shia militia in Syria with deep reserves and have a shit load of rocket artillery. Some "peacekeeping" force that is. The world's largest revolutionary Jihadist army is no match for them but no wonder the Israelis are nervous. Bashar having dodged one bullet is probably shitting himself about this new army of occupation as he never wanted real trouble with the IDF. Plus he has to pay the buggers off with a grand fire sale of state assets. With the Iranians it's mostly real estate but now the Russian oil majors have got scent of Syria's Eastern hydro-carbons the real looting can start. It's pure vulture capitalism really. Like when the mafia move in on a nice family business to asset strip it.
 
In The Irish Independent 'He's the biggest threat to the West he claims to hold dear' - Australian reporter's damning speech on Trump

The point here about the disconnect between Trump's speeches and the man himself is a good one. Though the alt-right scripts he's given often lie well to the right of the impulsively, unfiltered Jacksonian stealth Dixiecrat Trump actually seems to be. It's as if he had the values of a corrupt Queens Casino magnate that he's demonstrated throughout his long public life and was just going through a bit of actorly business on The Apprentice.

If you look at deeds rather than his scripted words they are eloquently contradictory. Despite the fawning Trump for instance still has NATO assets deployed in Putin's face. Trump has warmed to the Japanese. China once a pantomime villain has both been braced and embraced. THAD has been deployed in Korean and harsher measure threatened. Warning shots fired at Iranian advances. IS is pursued much as under Obama. More and more US troops are in harms way. This is almost pre-9-11 American Greatness neocon except human rights and democracy are systematically disregarded. Saudi Arabia is clasped to his breast like a beloved wallet. Israel is championed but the US embassy hasn't moved. Much of his energy is directed at shredding Obama's liberal agenda without much regard for downstream effects. NAFTA's writ still runs. His administration is so heavily larded with wealthy mountebanks and "globalist" Goldman critters it would make a Clinton blush. It may be isolated on some issues such as climate change but it's really not very isolationist by US standards. Judging by the G-20 his bluster about "reciprocal" trade deals may even have some effect but it looks like evolution not revolution. Tax cuts for the very wealthy seem to be the hot action item. Trump looks pretty comfortably complicit with the GOP establishment agenda he tactically railed against. A lot of this seems to hinge around personnel relationships more than the political.
 
On Reuters Syrian army, militias attack rebels in southeast desert
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The air and ground offensive, backed by Russian air power, was waged on eight villages from Tal Asfar to Tlul al Shuhaib that had been seized at the end of March by Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels from Islamic State after the hardline militants had retreated to regroup further north.

"This is the biggest attack by the regime and on the villages of eastern Sweida. They have used all types of weapons from aerial bombing to artillery and an unprecedented ground offensive," said Mohammad Adnan, spokesman of Jaish Ahrar al Ashaer, a rebel group composed of tribal fighters operating in the border area with Jordan.

"In the years when Daesh controlled these area, the army never clashed with them," Adnan added.

Adnan later said the army was able to seize at least seven villages. An army statement said they had recaptured several towns, villages and strategic hilltops in the eastern Sweida countryside.

BEDOUIN TRIBES

The rugged area east of Sweida is mainly inhabited by Bedouin tribes who have long defied government authority. Many of them make up the main rebel groups based in the area.

The area is not part of the U.S.-Russian brokered ceasefire for southwest Syria that came into effect on Sunday in the first peace-making effort of the war by the U.S. government under President Donald Trump.

In the southwest, where the ceasefire was generally holding, rebels said the army had stopped aerial bombardments but intermittent shelling continued on rebel-held areas in Deraa city and in the Syrian Golan Heights.
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My bold, but of course a peaceful South Western front allows resources to be diverted towards the East and current Iranian regional priorities. The R+6 South Western offensive had already paused likely to allow a build up for this offensive. For the regime this is more about denying areas to the opposition than fighting IS. Assad has always been shrewd in his threat assessment of IS. As we see here they're displacing rebels who displaced a long tolerated IS presence. Eastern trade routes and hydro-carbons are also critical for the economy of Useful Syria. That's still Assad's Achilles heel.
 
From Atlantic Council Partner Operations in Syria: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward
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Organizational Challenges for the T&E Program

The T&E and SDF programs faced challenges inherent to the composition of their partner forces and constraints on their missions. YPG members were generally motivated to fight well beyond their villages and home countries of origin largely because the group is, at its core, an ethno-nationalist, political movement fighting for political autonomy.51 The Arab-majority forces, in contrast, fought for various reasons, ranging from the formation of a new government (divided by competing visions of how that government should be structured) to cash payments, resulting in limitations to their motivation. Moreover, as an ethnically homogenous force with an internal intelligence and command and control structure, the YPG could effectively screen out ISIS or al-Qaeda-linked sympathizers.52 The various Arab groups did not have these capabilities, making the vetting process more challenging and the threat of ISIS infiltration more acute.
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Stein later notes that the Arab part of the SDF suffers from the same problems. A strong paper arguing that tactical successes at the operational level that the US military naturally seeks need well informed US government civilian guidance. Points out things in Syria got rather arse about face. The T&E Program failed entirely and the SDF based approach while a success has fundamental flaws.

The elephant in the room is Turkey. It's Obama's fault that the tricky business of allaying Turkish fears of the PKK while relying on them to fight IS wasn't addressed more seriously from the start. This needed careful diplomacy but State's attention was mostly directed elsewhere. What's resulting I'd say is even more inherently unstable than Iraq in 2010.
 
From The World Bank THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA

From Key Findings:
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  • The longer the conflict continues, the more difficult the post-conflict recovery will be. Although the rate of deterioration moderates over the course of the conflict, the effects become more persistent. Should the conflict end in its sixth year (baseline), GDP recoups about 41 percent of the gap with its pre-conflict level within the next four years. Overall, the cumulative GDP losses will reach 7.6 times the 2010 GDP by the 20th year. In comparison, GDP recoups only 28 percent of the gap in four years if the conflict ends in its 10th year (alternative scenario), and cumulative losses will be at 13.2 times the 2010 GDP. Simulations also show that outmigration could double between the sixth year of the conflict and the 20th year, in the case of a continued conflict. These results do not capture many other complications, like political economy challenges such as conflict-driven grievances. Adding these factors would only reinforce the main findings of the report: the longer the conflict persists, the deeper the grievances and divisions will run in the Syrian society, rendering it very difficult to build efficient institutions and effective economic mechanisms.
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Based on recent conflicts the mean time a civil war lasts is about a decade. A decade is an optimistic estimate for this one really cooling down. So a loss of 13 years of GDP and considerable additional population flight. They often end messily sowing the potential for further conflict. This won't be stable. The Turks will have at the PKK. Israel will clash with the Iranian occupation of Syria. Some Rebels will be sustained as mercenary forces in buffer zones. Takfiri will persist and fight an insurgent war. The immovable Assad will have his family's estates back even if it takes decades but the longer it last the poorer his realm will be.

From the conclusion:
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The importance of economic factors in shaping the outcomes on the ground has increased. An important question that arises from the analysis thus far is the following: in what direction could the economic impact of the conflict affect peace and stability? It is obviously very difficult to answer this question. However, it is unambiguous that the conflict has increased regional inequalities, war economy, and rent seeking, and further depressed civil liberties and polarized the Syrian society. Although these factors played only an enabling role for the onset of the current conflict, with much worsened outcomes now, they could play a more prominent role in further complicating a reasonable stabilization. The economic and social impacts of the conflict also amount to immense practical challenges. Syria will eventually have to overcome a multitude of urgent economic and social challenges to promote peace and stabilization.

The conflict has cast a wide swath of the population into poverty, and reoriented several million toward livelihood sectors that will not be sustainable in a post-war economy. A whole generation of children has received inadequate education. This, coupled with a significant brain-drain, has caused a dramatic decline in Syria’s human capital. The immense spectrum of needs arising from the conflict will require a strident response. Planning, coordination, and implementation arrangements will need to reflect the dual challenge of providing immediate peace dividends and humanitarian support to those in need, while also strengthening the national systems and capacities that are necessary to eliminate poverty, promote development objectives, and help to implement a new vision for Syria.
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In addition to all this damage Assad is selling off large chunks of the future means of production to his allies on fire sale terms. It was Assad or we burn the country and that they did. Now how many who have profited from the war will actually stay to live amongst the ruins? They make a desert and call it peace.
 
On DefenseOne The Next Battle: State Department, US Military Divided Over Kurdish Fighters In Syria (And Russia)
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The divide is driven by the differing mandates facing State and the Pentagon. The State Department is working to keep NATO ally Turkey in dialog and on board. The Pentagon is charged with fighting ISIS with local forces and without tackling the Assad regime.

This means that Trump’s State Department can’t fully embrace a stabilization plan in Raqqa (much less negotiate one with Russia) so long as the Syrian Kurds remain both a central part of it and aligned with the PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which Turkey considers to be a terrorist separatist group. That’s a challenge. In April, a group called the Raqqa Civilian Council was establishedto return order and forge a durable peace after the defeat of ISIS. It was founded and is led by Kurdish and Arab allies of America’s anti-ISIS coalition.

So the State Department is struggling to get behind the Syrian Kurds and the U.S. military would struggle to proceed without them. Both State and the Pentagon serve a nation that has come to see nation-building as a four-letter word rather than a necessary part of stabilization after war’s destruction ends. All of this combines to make a full-throttled rebuilding plan for Raqqa hard to envision. Also hard to envision is how a bite-sized stabilization plan that doesn’t fund governance structures, schools, and power can lead to a peace that lasts — and doesn’t descend once more into a chaos that requires U.S. forces to return.

“Gen. [Joseph] Votel and CENTCOM, and [U.S. Special Envoy] Brett McGurk, these people see their mission as defeating and destroying ISIS. That is an official mission that they have been given, they have been carrying it out for along time with ever more success, and this is a real U.S. policy,” said James Jeffrey, former U.S. Ambassador to both Turkey and Iraq. “And then there is another group of people who worry about Turkey, and that is mainly in the State Department – and CENTCOM drives them crazy.”

For State Department officials, notes Jeffrey, “Turkey is important. We are just bred on the importance of Turkey. You name the issue, beyond North Korea and the South China Sea, and you have got Turkey in the middle of it.”
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And that's with Trump's very weak, barely staffed State Department. The current US aversion to reconstruction as a part of stability operations is deeply unwise. What we have here is an instability operation.
 
On TDB How the Russians Suckered Trump in Syria, and Iran Comes Out the Big Winner
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Third, beyond the fight against the Islamic State, the U.S. looks set to lend its support—publicly or not—to Russia’s de-escalation zone initiative in Syria. This suggests we have some faith in Russia’s intentions and trust in its ability to deliver calm, and that we have forgotten that Russia has failed to secure a single neutral, meaningful and durable ceasefire since it intervened in Syria two years ago.

Russia may genuinely want to achieve calm in certain areas, but it does so only to strengthen Assad’s hand. Moreover, there remains no evidence that Moscow has the necessary leverage to control the behavior of Assad, and more importantly, of Iran. Repeatedly entrusting this responsibility to Russia, while repeatedly watching its failure, means the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of insanity—doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

It is highly unlikely that Russia’s de-escalation zones will prove durable mechanisms for stability. Moreover, by placing trust in their chance of success, the U.S. is emboldening a regime whose survival precludes the likelihood of more than 6 million refugees returning to Syria and instead sustains the drivers of conflict, radicalism, and divisions that have existed since 2011.

Fourth, a limited counterterrorism strategy paired with a tacit admission of Assad’s victory means Iran has won a huge strategic victory. Over the past several years, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have exploited instability in order to establish a large and intricate network of Shia militias across the Middle East. Today in 2017, Iran may exert overwhelming influence, if not de facto control over more than 230,000 militiamen in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon combined. That number includes 150,000 in Syria alone.

This is the realization of a long-time Iranian strategic ambition: to undermine American influence in the Middle East and to pose an acute threat to Israel. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah pointed to this victory on June 23, when he proclaimed that the next war with Israel would be strengthened by “thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of fighters” from across the region. Though the latest de-escalation agreement for southwestern Syria includes a clause requiring the withdrawal of Iran-linked militias from territory bordering Israel, Tehran has a history of extracting its assets from the area due to external pressure, before again re-infiltrating them when conditions allow. There is no reason to believe this time will be any different.

It is true that the U.S. does not have an interest in forceful regime change in Syria, but it does have an interest in stability. The U.S. has intervened in parts of Syria and has acquired a stake in its fate—we should own that stake and protect progress made in those areas. Holding and stabilizing territory, protecting it and its inhabitants from extremism or other forms of aggression, and fostering an environment in which interim reconstruction and localized governance can take shape would serve to create an alternative reality to that of the Assad regime.
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I think Lister's numbers are a fairly big exaggeration. Iran does not command such numbers in Syria or even Iraq. I also don't think there's any conceivable Syrian government in prospect that would enable large returns of refugees to a broken country but this snip is essentially correct otherwise.

The Jordanians seem to have made a similar deal with Russia only to find the Iranians were not governed by it. As Lister says this may not be Russia's fault as they have little apparent leverage. The foolish thing is believing against all evidence that they do when their strategy relies on lots of Iranian backed ground forces combining with their airpower. There's problems with using anti-Turkish Kurdish leftists as a stabilisation force in conservative Sunni Arab areas. But they are American backed fighting folk who have worn out their welcome and that was finally a selling point with the Iraqi Sahwa. A foreign legion of Great Satan hating Shia Jihadists propping up Assad are likely to prove a good deal less welcome even if they are anti-Israeli.
 
From The Washington Papers An Opening for the Syrian Regime in Deir al-Zour
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SYRIAN ARMY CAUTION IN THE DESERT

In spring 2016, after resuming the Tadmur campaign, the Syrian army tried to reopen the Tadmur-Deir al-Zour road, but quickly abandoned the project when it faced strong Islamic State resistance. Thereafter, all available forces were mobilized to take over Aleppo, where a victory in December 2016 freed tens of thousands of fighters to potentially venture into eastern Syrian. Foreign Shia militias are also on the frontlines. Since March 2017, the Syrian army and its allies have been advancing toward the east, benefiting from the withdrawal of IS around Tadmur. In early June, they reached the Syria-Iraq border, thus blocking the U.S.-backed rebels based in al-Tanf. The Syrian army now plans to seize the desert area to the east of Salamiya. Despite these advances elsewhere, a blitz offensive on Deir al-Zour does not appear likely, given the risk of bitter failure, as occurred in December 2016, when an IS counteroffensive forced regime fighters to abandon Tadmur.

The Syrian army and its allies are progressing methodically in the Badia (Syrian desert), seizing water points, communication routes, gas and oil fields, and phosphate mines. Syria needs its resources to rebuild its infrastructure and ensure economic security. The reconquest of this desert area, rich in hydrocarbons, has been entrusted to Liwa Suqur al-Sahara, or the "Desert Hawks," a private army financed by Ayman Jaber, a businessman close to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. He receives a share of the hydrocarbon production from the released wells. In fall 2016, the Desert Hawks integrated into the Fifth Corps of the Syrian army, but they retain significant autonomy and take an independent salary. They are also on the frontline to reclaim Deir al-Zour province, which produced two-thirds of Syrian oil in 2011.
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So another privatised army whose boss the Assad clan grants a share of seized hydrocarbon production in payment. At least this wealthy looter is Syrian.

Has regime forces moving slowly and methodically. A blitz being unlikely after previous fuck ups. Possibly they'll reach Deir in Q4 2017. Balanche reckons the fix is already in between the US and Russians for the regime to hold Deir province.

For me that brings up the interesting question of Mayadeen and Bukamel beneath Deir where IS have withdrawn to. With Mosul gone and Raqqa doomed perhaps their most important remaining IS real estate. I'd guess a joint Iraqi-Syrian operation in 2018. I read elsewhere Iraqi air is already bombing in Syria in collaboration with Damascus and Baghdad is buying a load of T-90s of Moscow. Moscow and DC as rivals courting Baghdad just as in the Iran-Iraq war.
 
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On Syria Deeply Analysis: Shift in Rhetoric Among Kurdish Politicians in Syria
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In an interview with the Saudi Riyadh newspaper, the co-head of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) Salih Muslim said there was an Iranian-Qatari-Turkish alliance to undermine the Kurds in Syria. “This alliance with its tools is dangerous for all the people of the Middle East, and for all the humanity,” he told Riyadh.

The PYD’s statement left some in Washington surprised. In the past, Syrian Kurdish officials opposed Saudi influence in northern Syria, since Saudi backed the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition. But things are now changing.

“I don’t know what to make out of it, Salih Muslim and PYD officials don’t really put out statements unless they are reacting to something, the PYD is a very pragmatic organization,” an anonymous U.S. official told Syria Deeply. “This could worsen the relationship with the regime and Iran. Maybe they do that to get more popular within the U.S.”

If Saudi Arabia decided to align itself with Turkey, Kurdish official Ahmed said, “There would be no chance for these of kinds of relations.” But for now, she added, “there is no direct conflict between us and Saudi Arabia.”

Sam Heller, a Beirut-based analyst and fellow at the Century Foundation, told Syria Deeply that this change in political stance was already in the works. Syrian Kurdish officials have recently shown more support for Saudi Arabia since its conflict with Qatar broke out and Turkey aligned itself with Doha, even sending Turkish army units last month.

“Qatar’s Syria policy has been closely intertwined with Turkey’s, even if the two allies have occasionally diverged. So, to the extent that Turkey is the PYD-YPG’s [People’s Protection Units] prime strategic adversary, then it makes sense for the Kurds to do what they can to weaken the Qatari-Turkish axis and to reach out to this rival regional coalition,” he said.
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Certainly admirably pragmatic in an orb fondling Trumpian manner. Any port in a storm. Points out there's a natural anti-Islamist sympathy with the likes of the UAE. Of course the revolt and the Turkish relation to it has a large Islamist component.
 
On K24 WATCH: Russia asks Kurds to hand Afrin to Syrian regime to stop Turkish attacks
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Abdo also criticized the Russians’ position towards the attacks on Afrin.

“Russians say they are supporting us when their forces enter Afrin, but unfortunately when the Russians entered Afrin, the Turkish attacks increased,” he said.

“Russians and Turks want to create more chaos and disturb people's lives and forcibly displace them,” he added.
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Not a welcome offer. Sleekit Russians playing the Turks against Afrin to benefit the regime.
 
In Haaretz Netanyahu: Israel Opposes Cease-fire Deal Reached by U.S. and Russia in Southern Syria
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During these talks, Israel presented a list of demands and voiced several reservations about the emerging agreement. Inter alia, Israel said that the de-escalation zones must keep Iran, Hezbollah and other Shi’ite militias away from the Israeli and Jordanian borders and must not enable Iran to consolidate its presence in Syria. Israel also told the Americans it objected to having Russian troops policing the cease-fire in the safe zones near its border.

In the days before the United States and Russia announced the cease-fire deal for southern Syria, Netanyahu spoke by telephone with both Tillerson and Russian President Vladimir Putin to reiterate Israel’s positions on the agreement. At the start of the cabinet meeting on July 9, Netanyahu said that both Putin and Tillerson had told him they understand Israel’s position and will take its requirements into account.
But senior Israeli officials told Haaretz that when Jerusalem obtained the text of the deal, it discovered that in defiance of its expectations, the Americans and Russians had ignored Israel’s positions almost completely.

“The agreement as it is now is very bad” one senior Israeli official said. “It doesn't take almost any of Israel's security interests and it creates a disturbing reality in southern Syria. The agreement doesn’t include a single explicit word about Iran, Hezbollah or the Shi’ite militias in Syria.”
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The Russians offered both the Jordanians and Israelis assurances about containing Iran's influence in Syria. The Israelis were always skeptical. Syria is now crawling with Iranian assets clearly making themselves at home and boasting about how well they are set up for the next war with Israel. They're plainly well advanced on doing what they did in Lebanon and then Iraq. Bibi's good friend Donald is behaving like a Russian patsy while his good friend Vlad might as well be an Iranian stooge. With friends like these...
 
From Crisis Group Will the Americans Abandon Us?
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Over the course of our meetings with YPG officials, we have repeatedly advised that their relationship with the U.S. is not a substitute for de-escalating conflict with Turkey. As the 25 April Turkish strikes showed, even now the YPG cannot count on Washington to completely deter an Ankara determined to attack. And, as ISIS continues to lose ground in Syria, interest in Washington in maintaining robust partnership with the YPG may wane, leaving the latter further exposed before both Turkey and the resurgent Syrian regime and its allies.

On this trip and in other recent conversations, I do see some signs that our message is resonating. At this point I am meeting with people who I’ve met several times before, often senior officials. Many of them have strong memories of our previous conversations, both with me and with my colleagues who sometimes join me. They bring up points that we’ve raised in previous chats. In a couple of cases, relatively senior people have come back and said: “You told me this more than a year ago and it turned out you were right”. On other issues, I could say the same to them in return. In northern Syria, as in Ankara, and indeed with most of our interlocutors, building relationships entails learning from each other.
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Noah Bonsey on a field trip round Rojava.

Rather positive about governance in Manbij but uneasy in Tel Abyad on the Turkish border which he describes as feeling like it's under Apoist occupation. Complains about the suppression of Kurdish dissent and notes some of the PYD people he speaks to think that jailing political rivals has been counterproductive.

The snip above really should be the basis of Rojava's foreign policy if its goal is to survive. They need a hudna with the very difficult Erdogan's Turkey. That would have been easier to achieve a few years ago. It's a big ask these days.

The US should also be working hard to create a state that the Turks might live with. There really should be a big well funded diplomatic and civil affairs effort. Not likely under Trump. Eventual betrayal is more so though.
 
On Syria direct A ‘shift’ in strategy in Raqqa city amid rising civilian, military toll
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“The strategy has been changed,” a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander told Syria Direct from Raqqa city, "to save civilian lives." He asked not to be identified by name.

The commander said a reduction in the tempo of battles on the eastern front of Raqqa city was to prevent civilian casualties and preserve historic sites such as the Abbasid al-Atiq mosque in the heart of the walled Old City.

“We are fighting and advancing with great caution,” he said.

Concerns for civilians are likely not the only reason that fighting has slowed in Raqqa's Old City. There, "IS fortifications appear stronger," the commander said, and in two weeks of fighting, SDF forces have made only incremental advances.
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Which rather reinforces what ISW were saying.
 
On AP Chechnya becoming major player in rebuilding war-torn Syria
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Kadyrov’s foundation said it expects to finish work on Aleppo’s Great Mosque, also known as the Umayyad Mosque, next year but wouldn’t release any estimate of the project’s cost. The mosque, which had its walls shredded by shrapnel, and the minaret where the call for prayers sounded for 900 years toppled, needs at least $7 million in repairs, Mamoun Abdul-Karim, head of Syria’s Antiquities and Museums Department, told the AP.

Kadyrov’s foundation also is restoring a mosque in Homs that holds a special importance for Muslims since it hosts the shrine of Khalid Bin al-Walid, a companion of Prophet Muhammad.

By relying on Russian Muslims to build mosques and police the streets of Syrian cities, Moscow is trying to improve its standing in the Muslim world damaged by the bombing campaign that has reportedly killed hundreds of civilians.

Putting the Chechen leader in charge of restoring the two mosques instead of portraying the work as a Russian government project was a conscious choice, Caucasus watchers say.

“A mosque restored by a Christian state that bombs the country wouldn’t have the same legitimacy,” Sokirianskaia said. “Trying to show that the donation was Muslim was aimed to compensate for this.”
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Now here's a nice PR story. Lots of good work for charity. Why Kadyrov's practically Jimmy Saville. But the kicker is how this NGO is funded:
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How much Chechen workers give to the foundation varies, activists say. Some businesses and employees are expected to furnish a set percentage of their earnings every month. Others, mostly the lowest-paid civil servants, are asked for contributions on an ad-hoc basis. The average monthly salary is about $360 in Chechnya, which has a population of about 1.4 million.

In 2016, prominent rights group Memorial received a formal complaint from employees of a provincial social security department in Chechnya. They reported that about 70 percent of their pay was withheld for donations to the foundation. Memorial petitioned prosecutors, but the investigation found no misconduct.

Refusing to pay isn’t an option. Kadyrov’s opponents have been killed or driven into exile; disappearances have become mundane; families of suspected militants have been forced to leave Chechnya and their houses burnt down. Kadyrov has recruited more than 1,000 people for his private security detail, which is technically part of the Russian Interior Ministry’s troops.

“It’s impossible to say ‘no’ because violence is pervasive,” Sokirianskaia says. “Chechnya is small. Everyone knows several people who have been seriously affected by this regime in a violent way, and they need no proof.”

The only financial data released by the foundation shows that it held 1.5 billion rubles ($25 million) in net assets in 2015. Unlike other Russian non-governmental organizations, which are obliged by law to submit financial reports to authorities or face hefty fines, the Kadyrov Foundation closely guards its finances.
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On Informed Comment Trump hands Putin gift, cancels Support for Syrian Rebels
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Al-Akhbar (leftist, Beirut) wonders if this move will have an effect on the rivalry between US-backed rebels in the southeast near the Jordanian border where the US has a small base. That base is aimed at ISIL to its north but also at Iran and Iranian logistics for supplying Hizbullah. It could be that US troops will now be evacuated from this southeast pocket which would be a victory for Iran more than for Russia.
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Something to watch. There was talked these rebels would be air lifted to Rojova but last I heard they'd refused. Jordanian interests won't have changed. So far this is more a symbolic gesture of submission to Russia.
 
On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki Splits from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
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Internal tensions through the presence of NZM in Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham have now developed into NZM's split from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in a statement from NZM's leader Tawfiq Shahab al-Din. The immediate context and cited causes of the split are a new round of infighting in Idlib between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, partly coming amid increasing talk of the possibility of a Turkish intervention into Idlibthat may target Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. Each side accuses the other of aggression, and an initiative emerged to resolve the conflict between the sides, to which Ahrar al-Sham agreed but Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham only under certain conditions, whereas Tawfiq Shahab al-Din himself had agreed to it.

What of the future for NZM? For now, Hamamer says that "God knows best" as to whether NZM will remain an independent group, with things depending on the circumstances. NZM's history does provide a lesson that the moral judgement of whether a group is ideologically 'moderate'- sometimes derived from mere observation of one event that gains media traction- is not always a useful measure for assessing why some groups shift affiliations over time. Ideological differences cannot be overlooked in the wider Syrian civil war, but in NZM's case, its relationship with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham was more driven by naivety and a bet on the supposed 'strong horse' to uphold what it saw as the interests of the 'revolution' (sentiments that had arisen from the close cooperation in the field with Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) rather than a newly found love for jihadist ideology.
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In MilitaryTimes US armored vehicles seen pouring into Syria
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However, the videos of U.S. armored vehicles headed towards the embattled city of Raqqa calls into question the type of aid being delivered to the Kurdish allies and its adequacy to liberate the city from ISIS fighters.

Armored vehicles are a part of coalition aid to the SDF, officials at the Pentagon said. Those vehicles are Guardian armored trucks and U.S. up-armored Humvees, according to officials at OIR.

However, American-made M-ATVs and MRAPs are not included in the aid package for the SDF. Also, pictures of the M-ATVs show mounts for the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, or CROWs system — a remotely operated weapons system that can be controlled by troops from inside the vehicle. CROWs systems are also not included in aid to Kurdish fighters.

These vehicles have commonly been operated by U.S special operations forces in Syria. The timing and appearance of the large convoys of M-ATVs calls into question their purpose.

When asked by Military Times about whether the U.S. was planning to increase troops in Syria or engage in a more active role beyond advising partner forces, OIR would not confirm or deny, citing operational security.

The clips also show armored bulldozers and earth movers. According to the Defense Department's fiscal year 2018 request for funds for the train-and-equip program for Syrian partner forces, these vehicles are included in aid to “vetted” Syrian groups.

Armored bulldozers have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and especially Mosul where more than 100 Caterpillar D7R dozers have been sent since 2015, according to a report by the Washington Post.

The bulldozers in Iraq were used to help move Iraqi forces block by block in Mosul, while also helping create ad-hoc defenses.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights — a human rights watchdog reporting on the conflict in Syria — Kurdish forces have entered the Yarmouk district in Raqqa, where clashes are ongoing.

“The Coalition has anticipated the battle to liberate Raqqa will be tough and may take some time,” said an official at OIR. However, ISIS fighters in Raqqa “will eventually be defeated… this is certain.”
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Of course the Pentagon under Trump has become far more tight mouthed about rising troop deployments and men being in harms way.
 
On Syria Deeply How Turkey Is Governing in Northern Aleppo
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While the military campaign to oust ISIS and to block Kurdish expansion ended in March, Turkish efforts to provide governance and security in this territory will continue for the foreseeable future. Despite these efforts, the security situation in the territory remains poor. Turkey has also been unable to create effective governing institutions that can provide services in the territory, largely due to its strategy of micromanaging local councils and civil society bodies. Instead, Turkey could empower local civil society bodies to govern the area, rather than micromanaging them or placing them subservient to Ankara’s political interests.
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Turkish ideas of governance running into more Islamist rebel ways and the usually problems of opposition division and infighting. Does not bode well for Turkish expansion in Idlib. Compares rather poorly with 3rd party accounts of governance in Rojava.
 
On TCF America Had Already Lost Its Covert War in Syria—Now It’s Official
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Another concern about ending the covert arms program has been that, without foreign support to sustain the FSA, rebels would migrate en massefrom the FSA to the Nusra Front and other jihadist factions. This likewise seems exaggerated.

It’s true that the shuttering of the covert program will basically mean the end of what’s left of the “FSA,” at least in the northwest. These factions likely have enough cash and weapons stores to go on for a few months, but not much longer. But it’s not a sure thing that these rebels will migrate to hard-edge jihadist factions that many of them find extreme and alarming, as opposed to just abandoning the battlefield. And it’s not clear that the jihadists actually want to absorb large numbers of new fighters, or that they have the resources. The Nusra Front’s financials are not transparent and public, but locals have told me the group is cash-poor—that’s why it’s been hunting for new, extractive revenue streams.

The end of the covert arms program is likely to weaken the Nusra Front, not strengthen it. The Nusra Front has succeeded as the tip of the spear for the northern insurgency—but to succeed, it needs the shaft of the broader armed opposition behind it.

That doesn’t mean the northern opposition will suddenly disappear, however. The existing Qatari funding channel to Ahrar al-Sham and several other factions could continue. And both the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham have sufficiently diverse portfolios of local commercial holdings and revenue streams that they can survive—or they could have, if Nusra didn’t seem on track to just kill Ahrar first. But in any case, the northern rebellion will be substantially reduced.

The south is different. In the southwest, the United States, Russia, and Jordan have just negotiated a de-escalation that should leave rebel areas mostly intact and keep Iranian proxy factions away from the Jordanian and Israeli borders. There are compelling, non-regime change reasons to pursue this de-escalation arrangement, primarily related to the security and stability of America’s regional allies. An abrupt halt to U.S. support would risk unbalancing this deal, but I was told by a southern commander that sections of the southern arms program would be repurposed and continue. In what form and to what end was unclear—potentially oriented more directly toward counter-Islamic State operations, or toward defending U.S. allies’ borders.
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Heller points out Trump's deal with Russia wasn't reciprocal. He simply caved and cut a dead duck CIA program rather than extracting concessions that might have guaranteed greater Northern rebel safety.

I think Heller's heart's in the right place but on a hiding to nothing in hoping the US might focus on the mitigating the humanitarian conditions for Idlib rebels it has now officially sold out and persuading the Turks to take in even more desperate people. If that's the way Putin whims take him it might happen and he The Kremlin has more influence with Ankara than DC does currently. Trump won't lift a finger if Idlib is turned into aa bloodier version of Chechnya which is rather more likely if not imminent.
 
Effectively trashes the lie that that it's the religious extremists on one side (it never was in the first place, they came along later) and the regime on the other.

https://diary.thesyriacampaign.org/saraqeb-walls/

Saraqeb, we love you.

This is a lesson in resistance. The people of Saraqeb liberated their town from the regime and Isis. Now they are going after Al Qaeda.
20 July, 2017 – This is an update to a post published in 2014. It will continue to be updated as events develop in Saraqeb.

This Tuesday, the legendary little town of Saraqeb, famous for kicking out both the Syrian regime and Isis, held democratic elections. That morning, 2,500 of its townspeople went to the polls to choose its next representatives for the local council –and these democratic men and women put into motion a fateful chain of events. The election elicited a violent reaction from yet another group of fighters: Tahrir Al Sham, formerly known as Al Nusra, also known as Al Qaeda in Syria. But Saraqeb wasn’t about to be cowed. ....
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