And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

On MEI Aleppo's Warlords and Post-War Reconstruction

...
Months after the fall, international aid organizations and local authorities are only slowly foraying into these “newly accessible neighborhoods,” as the U.N. terms them. Many roads leading into the rubbled quarters remain damaged, blocked or degraded. Restoring the more than 70 kilometers of streets in need of urgent repair alone is estimated to cost more than $1 billion. A similar sum should be required to restore Aleppo’s single large thermal power station, the country’s most important electricity production facility that, prior to the war, covered 60 percent of the governorate’s needs. By comparison, the Syrian government’s entire 2017 budget amounted to no more than $5 billion.

While state media has been busy highlighting the occasional symbolic reopening of plazas, shops, and restaurants to project a sense of normalcy, the reality for Syrians in the area is far from ordinary. Only a slow trickle of civilians has returned to the once densely inhabited popular quarters of the east. As of last month, the U.N. registered 153,012 individuals as residing in the “at best damaged” formerly rebel-held communities. They are essentially functioning almost entirely without services and highly dependent on aid. Many are returnees, as well as the poorest of the poor overflowing from the overcrowded and strained eastern districts, whose population had almost doubled with IDPs during the height of the conflict.
...

So repairing Aleppo alone would take more than a third of the regime's budget. With those sort of resources repairs will take decades. Aleppo isn't the only damaged city in Syria. Damage in Aleppo is focused in poorer quarters. I think that's so in other places as there's a class struggle element to the Sunni Arab rising.

In old reading Iran spent about $4 billion PA on direct aid to Assad; more on the IRGC's operations. The Iranians are not made of money like the Saudis who once funded a lot of reconstruction in Lebanon in competition with them. Article mentions they've set up the proudly labeled "Iranian Reconstruction Authority” in Syria. That's typical of their deep social influence operations: aid as a revolutionary tool. They seem to be buying up a lot of real estate in Useful Syria. Assad has no other means of repaying them and Persians are savvy investors. They'll have multiple motives for rebuilding but as the article says they're not really rich enough to get this done. I'd imagine they'll also focus resources on neighbourhoods where they are building support for the Khomeinist cause. Those probably won't be the poorest most damaged quarters that most IDPs have fled from.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CNN Exclusive: US deploys long-range artillery system to southern Syria for first time

...
"We have increased our presence and our footprint and prepared for any threat that is presented by the pro-regime forces," Dillon added.
One defense official said that the HIMARS move was a response to actions by pro-regime forces, who have been deploying their own artillery near the perimeter of the 55-kilometer "de-confliction zone" surrounding At Tanf. While the pro-regime artillery could not reach the base, it could reach a smaller combat outpost used by coalition advisers and their local allies.

A second official, however, said it was not clear whether the HIMARS deployment was in direct response to threatening action by the pro-regime forces.
...

I don't think the Iranians will have much doubt about what that's for.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On AP Russia says US-led coalition colludes with IS in Syria

...
Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoi of the Russian military’s General Staff also questioned the U.S. role in Syria.

“Having declared the goal of fighting international terrorism, the coalition strikes Syrian troops while letting IS militants exit the encircled areas unhampered, thus boosting terrorist groupings around Palmyra and Deir el-Zour,” he said. “It raises a question why they do it and what their real goals are.”

Rudskoi hailedg an effort by Russia, Turkey and Iran to establish safe zones in Syria, saying that it has “practically ended a civil war in Syria.” He added that the specifics related to safe zones boundaries and monitoring mechanisms are to be approved at a summit in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana later this month.
...

This could be an IRGC officer talking.

 

[inva]

Anyway, the protesters were out again on 9th June

had a little bit of a look for more info on what is going on in Maarat al-Numan and Idlib. It sounds as though the protest followed fighting between HTS and the 13th FSA lot on the previous day. I'd thought that HTS or the JaF Islamist coalition controlled the town but have now seen it described as held by the FSA so not too sure what the reality is. I'm assuming given the wider situation in the area that JaF forces would be dominant.

anyway while I was searching about that I found an article which I hope hasn't been posted already on the struggle in Idlib City itself between the armed groups (e.g. HTS) and councils/other organisations and local people so thought I'd link it. it's interesting for adding some context to the events in Maarat al-Numan and shows again that though the spirit of the uprising of 2011 has got choked by the way the conflict has developed there remains some means of contesting the nature of the opposition even against the brutal hardline Islamists. The other thing you can see though is the limits of this and how much the space they operate in is squeezed between the violence and repression of the regime and its allies on the one hand and the armed rebels on the other (and perhaps also in another way the nature and practice of the civic activists too).

this sign from Idlib in Feb of this year is translated in the article as saying “The revolution is a people’s revolution, not an armed faction revolution.”

That the author highlights as praiseworthy 43 women out of 900 voting in an election for the local council (which given the control of HTS/JaF maybe it is) shows some of the severe limitation. but it does suggest that in spite of the rule of the Islamist military and their shura council some demands have been imposed through protests and other actions and that there is an active resistance to things like the policing of women by preachers and the islamists courts.

 

[teqniq]

These look likely to be connected in some way to the above:

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The NYT U.S.-Led Airstrikes in Syria Killed Hundreds of Civilians, U.N. Panel Says

...
“We note in particular that the intensification of airstrikes, which have paved the ground for an S.D.F. advance in Raqqa, has resulted not only in staggering loss of civilian life, but has also led to 160,000 civilians fleeing their homes,” Mr. Pinheiro said in a report, presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva.

It was the first time Mr. Pinheiro’s panel had focused on American military conduct that has led to heavy civilian casualties and other suffering.

The panel’s investigators found that 300 civilians had been killed in the airstrikes since March 21, panel member Karen Abuzayd told reporters in Geneva later. They included 200 civilians killed in a single incident in March when an airstrike hit a school in the town of Mansoura, she said.

The attack on Mansoura, shortly after midnight on March 21, hit a school building housing families that had fled the fighting around Palmyra and other towns, investigators said. Initial reports said up to 40 people had died in the bombing, but rescue workers and other witnesses interviewed by the panel said that as operations to clear the rubble progressed the death toll had climbed to around 200. The United States military has said it is aware of the reports of higher casualty figures in Mansoura and is investigating.

The Mansoura attack came on a day that the American-led coalition conducted 19 airstrikes on targets in the vicinity of Raqqa and a week after 49 people reportedly died when coalition aircraft struck the village of Al Jinah in western Aleppo Province. In that strike, residents said coalition aircraft had hit a mosque but American officials said they had hit a meeting of Al Qaeda operatives, producing satellite images which showed the mosque was still standing.
...

Increasing unease about the Coalition air campaign. That's also a big surge of IDPs from a not very densely populated area.

Mansoura is about 25 kms South of Damascus. If that's been reported much I missed it.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TCF As Arabs Bicker over Qatar, Assad Sees an Angle

...
If Qatar is forced to kiss the ring or just badly battered by the Saudi-Emirati block, its influence in Syria may wane. That would have an immediate impact on Syria’s northern border, where Qatari arms and money are funneled in via Turkey. Doha’s allies are clearly worried. The Gulf crisis will have “negative effects” on the Syrian opposition, said an official in the Qatari- and Turkish-backed Islamist faction Ahrar al-Sham, and added, “the regime and the Iran-backed Shia militias will be the primary beneficiaries.”

Should the dispute drag on, the continued friction with Doha and its allies could also make the United Arab Emirates slide further down the anti-Brotherhood, pro-secular autocrat axis it is already on—very possibly emboldened by the tweetplomacy of Donald Trump. And while a hardening of Emirati or Saudi views might not benefit Assad directly—his ties to Iranremain an obstacle—it could certainly hurt his opponents. At the same time, the conflict may squeeze Qatar back some way toward Iran, which has already nimbly seized the day by flying food into blockaded Doha. Meanwhile, Qatar’s primary ally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, made good with Russialast year and is now trying to persuade Putin to stand up for Doha.

There is no clean or predictable outcome to this mess, but the mere fact that intra-Arab relations have become so tangled while Assad’s place in Syria seems secure will likely push his fate a few rungs down on everyone’s ladder of priorities. And if this happens, the isolation of his regime will seem like a lesser issue on which concessions can be granted, for a price.

The only problem is that Assad’s own dirt-poor, pinned-down government won’t be able to pay that price—if there is to be any bartering done with panicky Arab princes, it will be up to Russia or Iran. And so, as always, intra-Arab politics turn out to be not so Arab at all.

The KSA and Emirates getting in up to their oxters in Yemen must have been rather a relief as well for Assad. Trump's Arab NATO falling out almost instantly over Qatar's ambiguity on Iran and support for other palace worrying Islamists must be just gravy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On FP White House Officials Push for Widening War in Syria Over Pentagon Objections

...
Ezra Cohen-Watnick, the senior director for intelligence on the National Security Council, and Derek Harvey, the NSC’s top Middle East advisor, want the United States to start going on the offensive in southern Syria, where, in recent weeks, the U.S. military has taken a handful of defensive actions against Iranian-backed forces fighting in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Their plans are making even traditional Iran hawks nervous, including Defense Secretary James Mattis, who has personally shot down their proposals more than once, the two sources said.
...

Cohen-Watnick is a "Flynn-stone", a legacy appointment from the previous NSC head that Trump reluctantly fired. The NSC's new head failed in an attempt to to sack him. Mattis it seems remains focused on IS rather than Iran for now. Article points out a move against Iran in Syria would probably screw up the US's relationship with its main anti-IS ally Baghdad.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Atlantic Council The Perilous Race for Post-ISIS Syria

...
The regime itself seems too weak and preoccupied to threaten the US-led coalition in al-Tanf. However, Iran is far more capable, with large reserves of (proxy) manpower and little tolerance for a US-backed de facto statelet in its Syrian client’s territory. It is more likely that Iran, acting through its local proxies, would test the coalition’s resolve through increasing provocations. If so, it would calculate that the United States would back down to avoid serious escalation, thereby curtailing its territorial advances. Whether that is a sound calculation depends on the United States’ ultimate goals in eastern Syria and the importance it places on them in the face of the likely array of Iranian threats.

On May 17, the IRCG-affiliated Fars News reported that Hezbollah had deployed three thousand forces in the eastern Syrian desert, most of which were redeployed from the highly strategic Zabadani, Madhaya, and Serghaya regions near Damascus and the Lebanon border. It is unclear which Hezbollah units were deployed, but if indeed they were taken from those key areas they may be the elite Radwan units, apparently deployed among pro-regime militias. Radwan forces specialize in raids and small-unit tactics, and were critical to the regime’s tactical counteroffensives during the battle of Aleppo.

Hezbollah’s desert deployment is likely aimed at constraining the coalition’s operations by leaving as large a military footprint as possible before “an imminent large-scale operation against ISIS in Central Syria,” according to pro-Iranian regime news outlet ABNA. In principle, these deployments seem aimed at preempting and complicating US-led operations, rather than seeking a direct confrontation, and while expanding Iran and Assad’s control in central Syria. The militias would lose a direct confrontation with US forces, but the question is whether the United States is willing to take them on. If the US chooses not to take them head on, the weaker forces can indeed make things difficult. For example, last week regime forces managed to preempt US-backed fighters’ expansion north of al-Tanf simply by taking the ISIS territory itself first. The US can either force them to withdraw, or call off its mission. Neither option is especially attractive: one carries the risk of war, the other of humiliation if not complication of the counter-ISIS mission.
...

Points up the most "confusing actor" in Syria is the US. That isn't new. I'd say the US has never had a Syria policy in this war that wasn't wrecked by internal contradictions.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On AP Messy fight awaits IS’ next Syrian capital at Mayadeen

...
Islamic State group commanders have been moving their operations and families to Mayadeen for several months as coalition-backed forces began closing in on Raqqa, senior U.S. officials say. They’re arriving in an area controlled by Islamic State militants and populated by Sunni sympathizers.

Syrian opposition activists confirm those accounts, saying IS brought many of its fighters to Mayadeen. They’re now digging trenches around the city, which still draws revenue from nearby oil wells, including the Al-Omar field, among Syria’s largest.

Its proximity to the desert and Iraqi border makes ground attacks harder. Sympathetic local tribes have boosted the militant group’s authority. And most of the elite Islamic State fighters are now in the area, said Ahmad al-Hamade, a Syrian army colonel who defected early in the conflict.

Deir el-Zour province “will be the last battle for Daesh,” he said, using an Arabic acronym for Islamic State.

It will be the “new capital,” said Mohammed Khider, who heads the Sound and Picture organization that tracks atrocities in IS-held areas. “It will be the last fortress for the group, and they want it as a capital so the fighters will defend it to death.”

IS forces converging in Mayadeen face two threats. While the Raqqa fight intensifies in northern Syria, U.S.-backed rebels in the south, near the Jordanian border, had been hoping to march toward the area. Those plans may be complicated by Syrian government troops who have set up outposts around the border town of Tanf, where the U.S.-led coalition trains Syrian rebels.

Syrian government forces could lead a future attack on Mayadeen, having captured significant territory from extremists in recent months and reaching the Iraqi border for the first time in years.
...

Bit of a silly idea that IS needs a capital. They've never declared one however this is a likely spot to go to earth in. It's not the only one. Hawija in Iraq is another up coming battle. I read the ISF took the al Qaim crossing but IS are still active around there and down to Haditha. Lots of empty country with very little security presence in Iraq and Syria.

 

[danny la rouge]

This may be of some interest:


The Threat of Wider Wars in the Middle East and the Responsibilities of Socialists - Alliance of Syrian and Iranian Socialists

"The alliances currently confronting each other are fighting over the control of the region, its capital, and aim to repress any movements for social justice."

"At this time, it is the responsibility of Middle Eastern socialists not to fall into the trap of the nationalist and hate-mongering propaganda of their states. Instead, we need to demonstrate that the current changing alliances are an expression of the logic of capital, its racism, misogyny and homophobia. We need solidarity between labor struggles, women’s emancipation struggles and those of oppressed minorities, including oppressed sexual minorities, against this destructive logic and for a humanist alternative.

Frieda Afary"

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Jamestown After Raqqa: The Challenges Posed by Syria’s Tribal Networks

...
Cautious Disengagement

As the SDF sweeps into Raqqa city, and perhaps rural Deir Ezzor, the U.S. troops supporting them will find themselves providing military and logistic support to a Kurdish-led indirect-rule project of uncertain duration over local Arab tribes. The political desires of those tribes are largely unknown, and the tribes themselves may well be deeply divided.

Given that the Syrian regime, various rebel factions and an al-Qaeda offshoot drawn from local tribes have each been unable to hold these regions, the ability of what will likely be seen as a doubly foreign occupying force to do so without being sucked into a grueling counterinsurgency campaign is an open question.

U.S. policymakers need to be clear on the U.S. exit strategy and what the desired end-state is for the Euphrates River Valley region, before being pulled into an open-ended occupation by the power vacuum the retreat of IS-established borders will create.

The longstanding, if fragile, coexistence between the PYD and the Syrian regime in the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah may present an opportunity for U.S. forces to disengage from the region in the near-to-medium future (al-Araby, August 26, 2016; Syria Direct, April 26).

While advocates for the Syrian rebels will likely see a U.S. presence in the region as an opportunity to establish some form of rebel rule under military protection, the advisability of enforcing failed rebel governance structures in this volatile border region by force of U.S. arms remains questionable at best.

Instead, some form of shared governance between a Syrian regime actively re-establishing itself in the eastern governorates and a PYD-led local government structure acting through co-opted local Arab elites may be the least risky form of disengagement from the region.

My bold, this is true. Roussinos has previously said anyone trying to hold Raqqa is likely to have a difficult time. It was once an area of regime support. I've read elsewhere this is no longer the case although that lingers in the elite. The tribes in this area have long relied on external muscle to settle differences and they are quite fragmented. Given resource problems, Turkish enmity, Rojova's isolation, divides in the SDF, a remaining regime presence in Deir some sort of collaboration with Damascus isn't unlikely.

 

[yield]

US shoots down Syrian government fighter jet that dropped bombs near coalition-backed forces fighting Isis
18/06/17

American forces have shot down a Syrian government fighter jet accused of attacking Kurdish-led troops, prompting a furious response from Damascus as tensions increase.

US Central Command said the SU-22 dropped bombs near the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are being supported by the US-led coalition as they advance on the terrorist stronghold of Raqqa.

It was the most significant US attack on Bashar al-Assad's forces since April, when Donald Trump ordered missile strikes on a government airbase that launched a chemical attack.

American forces also attacked pro-government troops last month, then it bombed hostile units near an SDF training base in An Tanf.

The account was contested by Syrian army commanders, who said the plane was bombing nearby Isis positions, rather than the SDF.

Hope this doesn't escalate.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In TDS Iran says missiles into Syria hit ISIS targets

...
General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, who heads the Revolutionary Guards' aerospace wing, told state television: "The missiles were fired from Iran and they passed over Iraq and landed in Syria."

"Drones flying from near Damascus to Deir Ezzor transmitted [footage of] missiles hitting their targets," he said.

"Firing these missiles from 600 or 700 kilometres away onto a small building... demonstrates Iran's capacity and intelligence capabilities [against jihadist groups]," he said.

It came hours after supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a statement vowed Iran would "slap its enemies" in honour of the families of victims, including those killed in Syria and Iraq.

Iranian media reported some of the mid-range missiles fired into Syria were of the Zolfaghar type, a precision-guided missile with a range of about 750 kilometres.

Iran's homegrown missiles, a serious point of contention with Washington and Tel Aviv, can reach up to 2,000 kilometres.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog Fawj Ra'ad al-Mahdi: East Aleppo Militia Expansion

...
In keeping with the regime's line, Mua'mmar al-Dandan repeatedly stresses the idea of claiming every inch of Syrian land. As he told me in May 2017: "The aim is to liberate all the lands of Syria. We observe the international agreements and respect the opinion of the Iranian and Russian friends regarding the ceasefire, ceasefire pact and resolutions but the sovereignty of the state or partitioning any inch of the Syrian lands is a red line." Where then does this stance leave the town of Manbij itself, which is presently under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces? No answer was provided.

As the regime and its allies continue to expand eastward, the Local Defence Forces is likely to be an important mechanism for the raising of some forces of local origin, which, if they do not participate in the operations themselves to recapture the various places still under IS control, will at least act as partial holding forces in the aftermath. Fawj Ra'ad al-Mahdi is one case of how such trends already play out on the ground further to the west of the country: another indicative case from Aleppo is the ongoing recruitment for a formation called the Legion of the Defenders of Aleppo, a project overseen by the Local Defence Forces and the 'friends.' Given the recent administrative measures involving the Local Defence Forces and the issue of army service, these arrangements benefit both the regime and Iran: the former can have at least some forces of local origin to help maintain security and claim some basis of legitimacy without incurring too high a financial cost, while the latter can expand its networks of patronage and influence inside Syria. It will of course be interesting to see if the various formations that do arise end up competing with each other and/or existing militias and armed units and what kind of problems that competition may spark. The case of Fawj Ra'ad al-Mahdi seems to point to some rivalry at play behind the scenes, though it remains difficult to pinpoint details beyond such a general statement.

LDF unit, The Thunder of the Mahdi Regiment, very Shia name. Interviewee is very nationalist. The full reconquista thing in the snip above is something you hear all the time from loyalists. Complains of being under resourced. They're paid $100/month from Iranian sources. Not a great rate. From memory that's about a quarter of Iraqi Hashd pay and they get a package of other incentives too. This is indeed a cheap path to the sort of influence Iran has in Iraq.

 

[DownwardDog]

US shoots down Syrian government fighter jet that dropped bombs near coalition-backed forces fighting Isis
18/06/17



Hope this doesn't escalate.

The lucky matelot was flying an F/A-18E of VFA-31 (Felix is in the fight!) from CVW-8 embarked on the George H. W. Bush.

First blood for the Super Hornet.

E2A: More details from the Pentagon briefing: two Fox Two shots from 1km behind. Obviously following Bader's maxim of "get in close and give him the lot". One missed (there's a reason they don't call them "hittiles"), the second blew the arse end off the Fitter. SyAAF pilot RTB'ed via parachute and Uber.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TDS Iran calls missile attack on Syria militants a wider warning

...
Activists in Syria said they had no immediate information on damage or casualties from the strikes, nor did ISIS immediately acknowledge it. Iraqi lawmaker Abdul-Bari Zebari said his country agreed to the missile overflight after coordination with Iran, Russia and Syria.

The Guard described the missile strike as revenge for attacks on Tehran earlier this month that killed at least 18 people and wounded more than 50, the first such IS assault in the country.

But the missiles sent a message to more than just the extremists in Iraq and Syria, Gen. Ramazan Sharif of the Guard told state television in a telephone interview.

"The Saudis and Americans are especially receivers of this message," he said. "Obviously and clearly, some reactionary countries of the region, especially Saudi Arabia, had announced that they are trying to bring insecurity into Iran."
...

So much for being subtle.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Deeply Analysis: Future of Post-ISIS Raqqa Remains Unclear

...
While the U.S. is not working toward re-establishing Assad’s writ over the entirety of Syria, a U.S. official who spoke to Syria Deeply on the condition of anonymity suggested that it would be in Raqqa’s interest if Damascus is allowed some kind of role in the city.

“I don’t think anyone can rationally argue that it is not in the interest of a future Syria to have the Syrian state institutions and tissue reconnected across the country,” he said, explaining that the Ministry of Finance could take care of state salaries, and essential services like water, electricity and telecommunications could be restored.

“Ideally those local service providers that have emerged in the absence of the Syrian state can be connected back to the state so that Syrians capitalize on existing resources and expertise,” the official said, adding that “Syria’s future is for the Syrian people to decide, and it should be done so via Geneva. … But we are not going to force a top-down regime change.”

Not the song the SDF people are singing but the article goes into the practicalities.

Rather them abandoning them after they have served their tactical purpose like the Iraqi Sahwa the DoD might prop up a skint and isolated Rojava indefinitely. IS is liable to linger as a threat after all. With an angry Turkey above Rojova allied to the KRG to the East some sort of US support seems essential. I don't think that'll be Trump's preference finally. He's rather prone to ignoring the Pentagon and rounding on allies yelling something akin to fuck you pay me. Which finally leaves some sort of cooperation with Damascus and perhaps Baghdad.

 

[nuffsaid]

I recommend this, saw it over the weekend, 2 hours and no ad breaks, a comprehensive analysis covering Syria from the beginning of the Arab spring to today - and it's grim viewing.

Hell on Earth: The Fall of Syria and the Rise of ISIS

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW The Campaign for Ar-Raqqa City: June 6 – 20, 2017

...
ISIS ultimately will not suffer a fatal blow in Ar-Raqqa City. Intelligence officials and local activists report that the group has already relocatedthe majority of its leadership, media, chemical weapons, and external attack cells south of Ar-Raqqa City to the town of Mayadin in Deir ez-Zour Province in Eastern Syria. The SDF and U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition as well as the Russo-Iranian Coalition both cannot easily access this terrain – located deep along the Euphrates River Valley – with their current force posture. ISIS stands to retain safe haven for the indefinite future despite the loss of its ‘de facto’ capital. The fall of Ar-Raqqa City will be symbolic – but it will not be decisive.
...

They've made fairly quick progress in Raqqa. Mayadin is 46kms South of Deir, 91kms North of the Iraqi border, 188kms from Raqqa, population <50K.

I don't know about IS holding Mayadin indefinitely. A future joint operation with Iraqi forces to clear the Middle Euphrates from Haditha to Deir seems likely to me if not imminent.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On IRIN Aleppo militias become major test for Assad

...
Systemically corrupt and prone to political inertia, the Baathist state is now more than ever embedded in local factions that jealously guard their prerogatives. Municipal and city officials are often unable to act without top-level decision makers at their back, and the various security branches tend to balance each other out. Since so many officials are complicit in militia corruption, moving against any one group of offenders would be seen as intrusion on another commander’s turf.

In practice, therefore, very little tends to happen unless the powers that be in Damascus decide to get involved, typically by sending a direct order or an emissary to take personal charge and corral rival interests into action.

The gaze of Damascus turns to Aleppo

In this case, the presidential palace dispatched Lieutenant General Mohammed Dib Zeitoun, who, as head of State Security, is one of al-Assad’s most powerful intelligence chiefs.

Once Dib Zeitoun arrived in mid-June, Aleppo officialdom erupted in a sudden frenzy of security reform. Apart from the clampdown on criminal gangs and popular committee militants, the local boss of Syria’s ruling Baath Party, Fadel al-Najjar, also issued a decree tightening regulations on the Baath Battalions.

The party militia is especially prominent in Aleppo, having been set up in 2012 by Hilal Hilal, a son of the city who now serves as al-Assad’s deputy in the Baath’s top leadership.

Meanwhile, the Aleppo security chief, Zaid al-Saleh, is said to have withdrawn government IDs issued to militia fighters and banned armed groups from many areas, as part of an effort to restructure and centralise local forces. Provincial police chief Lieutenant General Essam al-Shelli has also called on citizens to report any disturbances, and banned cars without number plates from the city, in the hope of ending one of the most visible challenges to law and order.
...

Lund on a plague of militia criminality in Aleppo that's pissing off wealthy regime supporters. Interestingly these loyalist militia men are often rural folk not native to the city as were many rebel fighters. Not clear if the rif-medina thing is related to the friction. This often happens in civil wars/revolutions. The people who did the fighting become a menace to public order.

 

[teqniq]

See post #8501. It isn't just the 'wealthy supporters', like Assad would give a shit at this point anyway.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Direct Security ‘deteriorates’ in Damascus suburbs as rebels usurp police stations, install paramilitary

Regime not got the tightest grip on militias in Aleppo. Rebels in East Ghouta duffing up their own police officers.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In FP U.S. Taxpayers Are Helping Bashar Al-Assad in a Strategic City

...
Critics say the airdrops are potentially aiding the Syrian military operation and several observers indicated that food may be diverted to the Syrian military, or locals who are loyal to the regime. The aid drops “pull civilians into your orbit. If they want the aid they have to deal with the government. But that is the story all over Syria,” said Lund.

But it has also served another American objective: denying the İslamic State control over another critical city near the Iraqi border, according to Landis. “It’s in America’s interest not to allow ISIS to take Deir Ezzor and set up a new caliphate,” he said. “It means the Americans will not have to defeat them in Deir Ezzor.”

My this is confused. US funding food aid that often doesn't get to rebel areas but often gets expensively airdropped to Deir where it helps ensure Assad's bastion in the East holds out.

At the same time US backed rebels/PKK competing to grab Caliphate territory and stop relief of Deir/restoration of Iranian GLOC to HA/undermine regime legitimacy in the eyes of Eastern loyalists. Not so long ago CENTCOM were accidentally admitting their air was hitting IS to support R+6 operations up Palmyra way. Now they're trying to stop loyalist forces pushing out to the East and rubbing up against their FOBs. All while the (wrong) Iraqis come West to link up with the R+6. There is some talking to the (increasingly hapless) Russians about setting up "Deconfliction Zones" that look more like flash points for a nice big war with Iran. Kerry's hotline to Teheran meanwhile is no longer used as Team Trump doesn't really do much recognisable diplomacy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Ankara sends reinforcements into northern Syria

...
Syrian Kurdish officials have accused Russia of wielding the threat of Turkish aggression against Afrin to not only pressure them into letting the regime move back into the area but also to help advance the regime’s interests in and around Deir ez-Zor.

Arzu Yilmaz, a researcher at the American University of Kurdistan in Dahuk, told Al-Monitor, “Turkey cannot move against the YPG in Afrin without Russia’s consent, this is crystal clear.” She added, “The clash of interests between Russia and the United States is obviously squeezing the YPG."

Tensions boiled over on Sunday, when the United States shot down a regime jet after it allegedly dropped bombs near SDF positions in the western Raqqa countryside. The action marked the first time the United States downed a Syrian aircraft since the start of the Syrian war.

The move provoked angry reactions from the regime and its top ally Russia, both of whom want to prevent the SDF from carrying their campaign to wrest Raqqa on to the regime-held city of Deir ez-Zor. The city, the administrative capital of Syria’s oil-rich eastern desert, is under siege by IS. It is also of strategic value to Iran, which is seeking a permanent foothold in the region.

A Syrian Kurdish source with close links to the local officials who spoke to Al-Monitor on strict condition of anonymity insisted that the Syrian Kurds could reverse the situation in Afrin. The pro-YPG administration controls much of Qamishli, where the Syrian regime maintains a small presence. More critically, regime forces remain in charge of Qamishli's airport, a vital hub for its Iranian allies. The Iranians use the airport to ferry their troops and weapons to Deir ez-Zor.

The source said that the YPG could cut a deal with the Russians to take over the base, presumably in exchange for relieving Turkish pressure on Afrin. “The Russians are not so happy with Iran, either, because of its support for the regime,” the source said. “Iranian support makes the regime even more uncompromising. It is provoking tensions with America and making deals with Turkey behind Russia’s back, that is why.”

So supposedly the PKK might trade Qamishli's regime held airport for Russian aid in Afrin. Giving the Russians a lever to control Iranian operations in the East. This smells a little fishy to me but some thoughts:

1. This has R+6 supply to Deir (265kms from the airport) essentially being reliant on PKK collaboration
2. The Russians are perceived to have insufficient leverage over Iran and therefore the regime at the moment
3. But Ankara it is thought will do what the Kremlin orders over Afrin
4. The PKK are not offering their US allies, who seem to be developing an interest in Eastern Syrian real estate, the airport as a prize
   
5. How would CENTCOM take the PKK giving Russia basing in their area of influence?

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Reuters Hezbollah says future Israel war could draw fighters from Iran, Iraq, elsewhere

...
"The Israeli enemy must know that if an Israeli war is launched against Syria or Lebanon, it is not known that the fighting will remain Lebanese-Israeli, or Syrian-Israeli," Nasrallah said in a televised speech.

"This doesn't mean there are states that might intervene directly. But this could open the way for thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fighters from all over the Arab and Islamic world to participate - from Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan," he said.
...

I think the Israelis took that as read. Note the inclusion of Yemen. Not so much evidence of Houthi fighters in Syria so far.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Kurds reaching critical juncture in US partnership

...
Asked about the Kurdish response to the possible US demands to curtail Iranian influence in the region, the senior YPG commander said, “It is strategically and ideologically wrong to set up an alliance against Iran similar to the one set up against [IS]. We cannot line up with imperialist forces, neither with bigots. We have serious projects for the Kurds and also for the future of Syria, starting with democratization of the country. That is our goal. The United States doesn’t care. We are wondering whether the international partnerships we have entered into will help implement this major project.”

The YPG commander, responding to claims that the United States will deploy to Tabqa, also mentioned the Kurds' meeting June 17 with the Russians at Syria’s Khmeimim air base, saying, “The United States above all coordinates with Russia. They bargained with Russians, not with the Kurds, about Tabqa. Two forces drive politics in Syria: the United States and Russia. We are working for the integrity and democratization of Syria. That is why we are ready to fight at any corner of Syria. Russians are criticizing Kurds not because of Raqqa, but Tabqa. Two days ago, we sat down with them at Khmeimim to ease their concerns. They don’t mind [us coming] down to the Euphrates but reject our crossing to the south of the river. We came down 25 kilometers; they told us the Euphrates is a natural boundary we shouldn't cross. But this is a boundary between the United States and Russia. I said to them, ‘Don’t draw a boundary. We also want to reach Damascus. To draw a boundary is a scenario to divide the land. You are drawing such a boundary.’ The Russians were surprised by our reaction. They have to understand that our problem is not only autonomy for the Kurds.”
...

Lots of options being kept open and sides being played. Also rather an eager jump by some folk to support the formerly demonised Saudis over Qatar. Such ideological agility has served them well in Syria but you can get too clever in these things.