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And next, Syria?

From Atlantic Council The Battle for Idlib
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A less costly scenario would be that HTS disappeared peacefully through a deal with Turkey and rebel factions. But that would be impeded by Jolani’s bet on the possibility of being removed from terror lists and gaining political space similar to that granted to the Taliban or Hezbollah, since he has distanced his group from al-Qaeda and shown that he is pragmatic and enjoys considerable clout on the ground.

In summary, Turkey will not risk losing the biggest and most important area controlled by its Syrian rebel allies to the Kurds or the Assad regime. It will not take on the costs of an unprecedented wave of displacement, nor will it accept a continued HTS presence after repeated clashes with it, as Ankara wishes to remove terrorist groups from the area. All the signs are that a Turkish incursion in Idlib is on the way. It will impose fundamental changes on the nature of the powers controlling the area and the future of the conflict between the rebels and the regime in the north.
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I don't think the Turks will seek a clash with AQ led HTS. They've been de-conflicting so far. The most they'll do is containment. The noises Turkey has been making suggests fixation on the PKK.
 

Does look like PKK-IRGC coordination over supply lines. Serves both parties. Pentagon seems to be willing to turn a blind eye to whatever Ankara does in Sinjar in response. That won't sit well with Baghdad where it will offend Iraqi sovereignty.
 
From The Washington Institute The Kurdish Path to Socialism in Syria
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REVEALING ROJAVA'S RELATIONS WITH DAMASCUS

The application of Ocalan's theories is still modest in Rojava's economic sphere, as the PYD is aware that it risks alienating a large part of the population, especially those who only rallied to the group for fear of the Islamic State. The reopening of land communications with the Assad regime zone in western Syria is encouraging a return to the lucrative exportation of cereals and cotton. Moreover, manufactured goods from the regime zone will likely flood Rojava markets before any local production could develop. Accordingly, local authorities may resort to protectionism to defend the cantons economically, perhaps by imposing tariffs and cutting off the western Syrian market.

If the PYD's cooperative economic system fails due to these pressures, the party would have two choices: coercing locals into accepting Ocalan's theories, or declaring a "pause" in implementation due to wartime circumstances, much like Vladimir Lenin did with the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy in 1920. In the first case, the "communalization" of Rojava's economy would entail the expropriation of property belonging to certain social groups, namely, constituencies that are deemed opponents of the PYD. This property would then be redistributed to the party's own base with the objective of strengthening its influence and eliminating the Assad regime's. Such efforts would also indicate a separatist mindset, despite the federal model the PYD has been outwardly promoting.

In the second case, a "pause" in economic collectivization would likely spur the PYD to renounce its intention of changing Rojava society and agree to normalize relations with Damascus. The Kurdish cantons would then be reinstated in the Syrian economic space and the impediments to private initiative lifted. Whichever approach the party chooses, the local population -- Kurdish and non-Kurdish -- will be more inclined to accept the pursuit of some form of autonomy if their living conditions improve.
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Balanche on Apoism's likely economic difficulties as ideology runs into the difficulties of running something other than a war economy. Rojava developing useful trade relationships with Damascus and perhaps Baghdad presents some challenges to their revolution. The alternative of being a half starved mercenary dependency of DC probably isn't very ideologically appetising either. They're not daft enough to rush completely into Assad's treacherous embrace. I'd expect the PKK to cultivate all those options in order to hang onto the turf it's gained in the face of Turkish anger. They've played it pretty cannily so far.
 

Chuvlov's previous idea of a Iranian GLOC to HA following a route right under Turkey's nose and perversely fighting its way through Salafi dominated Idlib was always implausible when previous Southern routes were likely to become available. There are also other reasons for wanting to secure Deir for the regime.
 
In The Nation In Tartous, Syria, Women Wear Black, Youth Are in Hiding, and Bitterness Grows
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Today Tartous is in mourning, with as many as 100,000 dead from the fighting and well over 50,000 wounded, out of a population of 2 million in the province. Women in black fill the streets of this city of 800,000, grieving for their sons and husbands, and a dozen or more coffins arrive every day from the front. Many of the young men of Tartous are now in hiding—by some estimate 50,000 of them—and the government has to conduct house-to-house raids to find recruits.

This is no longer a city of fools. A small minority still believe that Assad is fighting terrorism, but most people I know think Assad has cheated his own people by sending them into an endless, pointless war.
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A Gutman piece.

As the revolt recedes it's plausible discontent with Assad amongst those who opposed the rebels will grow. An awful lot of young conscripts are dead or maimed their lives often wasted by a callous officer core. The regime always was shitty and now it's also poor and pitifully reliant on Iran. The IRGC is going round buying up real estate. HA is a permanent presence.
 
On AlJaz Jordanian spies provided ISIL bomb intel: officials
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The intelligence that Israel reportedly shared with the US came partly from Jordanian spies, the sources said.

Former CIA case officer John Kiriakou told Al Jazeera he too doubted the Israelis were able to run a spy inside ISIL's ranks.

Israel has the most sophisticated electronic surveillance collection in the region, however, which gives it the ability to intercept communications throughout the Middle East region.

The CIA declined to comment on this report.

According to estimates, several thousand Jordanian citizens have joined ISIL in the past few years.

Almost all the Jordanian ISIL fighters are in Raqqa, the group's de facto capital in Syria.
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Plausible, thousands of Jordanians have joined Salafi-Jihadi groups in Syria and Jordan's spooks have a reputation for being rather more able than Israel's in this area.
 
In JPost GERMAN NEO-NAZI PARTY BUILDS ALLIANCE WITH ASSAD AND HEZBOLLAH
Stronger alliances are growing between the German neo-Nazi party Der Dritte Weg and the Assad regime, as well as the Syrian dictator’s strategic partner Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The website of the Der Dritte Weg (The Third Way) published an April 30 report on the right-wing extremist group’s visit to Lebanon to champion Hezbollah’s war against Israel.

According to the organization’s website, members of the Der Dritte Weg met with the extremist Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in Lebanon and representatives of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria.

Members of the Der Dritte Weg can be viewed on the website at the Hezbollah propaganda museum called Where the Land Speaks to the Heavens in the village of Mleeta in southern Lebanon. Kai Zimmermann, a senior leader of Der Dritte Weg, posed next to a plaque reading, “No, Israel is not invincible.” The neo-Nazi group labeled Israel a “terror state” on its website.
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The Third Way? I do hope they are not flirting with unreconstructed Blairism as well.
 
On Syria Direct The deserter: How I escaped one of Syria's deadliest fronts
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III. Despair

Horror and madness grew inside me, increasing day after day, with every Islamic State attack around the airport.

They launched drones to film our positions and launch precision missiles, then would send a suicide car bomb. We didn’t have advanced weaponry to stop it, just RPG missiles, which can’t affect the armor of a car bomb coming at you with lightning speed.

When Daesh fighters advanced, those of us who could shoot did so, but without focus. Others, who didn’t know how to use the weapons, would be captured by the Islamic State. We’d see them later in some IS publication, being beheaded.

Then, as soon as IS came, they would turn back, as though they didn’t really want to take control of anything, just kill and capture people.

With each new prisoner, madness would grip another soldier or two. Somebody would shoot himself to get leave. Then there would be an inquiry. If it was discovered that he shot himself when there were no clashes, or it became clear that the bullet came from his gun, he would be executed, a lesson for the rest.

I remember one guy, we were in a trench together. The rest of us were talking and he was withdrawn, silent. Then, all of a sudden, he takes his gun and shoots himself in the chest, just above his heart. We freaked out. We didn’t know what to do. We took him to the officer’s station in the airport, and they decided to take him to Damascus for treatment. He didn’t last long. Two or three hours passed, and he died. There were no medical supplies or medication.

Once, two young guys decided to run towards IS, to turn themselves in, hoping that they would be allowed to return to their families as defectors from Assad’s army. Daesh executed them immediately and hung their heads on the front. The heads were in our direct line of sight, and the horror grew. How long could this go on?

I remember, when I saw the severed heads, a blinding anger exploded inside of me. I regretted how, when I first came, I didn’t shoot a single bullet directly at IS fighters. I had been afraid of the thought that I was killing a person. I cannot kill. But their monstrosity made me regret that I didn’t aim for them.
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Life as an SAA conscript in Deir.
 
CrabbedOne said:
In The Nation In Tartous, Syria, Women Wear Black, Youth Are in Hiding, and Bitterness Grows
A Gutman piece.

As the revolt recedes it's plausible discontent with Assad amongst those who opposed the rebels will grow. An awful lot of young conscripts are dead or maimed their lives often wasted by a callous officer core. The regime always was shitty and now it's also poor and pitifully reliant on Iran. The IRGC is going round buying up real estate. HA is a permanent presence.
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yeh. but what would this discontent do? if a bloody great civil / proxy war hasn't unseated him then it's frankly tricky to believe a bit of post-war discontent is going to eject him.
 
Pickman's model said:
yeh. but what would this discontent do? if a bloody great civil / proxy war hasn't unseated him then it's frankly tricky to believe a bit of post-war discontent is going to eject him.
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Yup, weaker, reliant on Iran but still in his palace. That won't change. You might see more state fragmentation and warlordism.
 
On Reuters In Syria, a bus ride shows shifting map of war
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The service from Kurdish-controlled Qamishli to Aleppo city goes through territory captured from Islamic State (IS) by Russian-backed Syrian government forces in February. Until then, only an intrepid few would make a journey that entailed crossing through areas held by Islamic State and competing rebel groups.

"Before, there were no passengers, very, very few, because of the security conditions," said Ahmad Abou Abboud, the head of Qamishli office of the bus company that started the service in late April.

Demand has risen steadily since the first busses - sleek, white, air-conditioned coaches with purple curtains - went into operation. Weekly trips have increased from two to three, Abboud told Reuters in Qamishli.

A Kurdish official said so far the road was being used only for travel, not trade.

The new bus service is the result of one of the most important shifts in the map of the Syrian conflict in recent times, with the areas controlled by government forces and Kurdish-allied militias being linked up near the city of Manbij.
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In The Atlantic The U.S. Strike in Syria
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The area, which is near Syria’s border with Jordan and Iraq, is where U.S. and U.K. special-operations forces train Syrian rebels.

BuzzFeed News cited a U.S. defense official as confirming the strike was launched by the U.S. That would mark the first time the Syrian regime has been directly targeted by the U.S. since President Trump ordered a missile strike last month in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons—and they also mark an escalation in the U.S. involvement in the Syrian civil war.

CBS News reported that the strikes were in response to Syrian regime vehicles violating a deconfliction zone set up around the military base in al-Tanf. It said Assad’s regime had violated the zone twice in recent days. Here’s more:

In one incident, 27 regime vehicles drove within 18 miles of al-Tanf, which breached the 34 mile radius of the army convoy. U.S. aircraft attempted to buzz the regime, but when the convoy didn't turn around, they conducted a strike against some of the vehicles.

In the second incident, an unarmed Syrian SU-22 fighter-bomber entered the deconfliction zone and was intercepted by a pair of F-22 fighter aircraft.​

Fars, the Iranian news agency that is allied with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, reported that 3,000 fighters from Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese Shia militia, were deployed to Tanf “to prepare the Syrian army and its allies for thwarting the U.S. plots in the region and establish security at the Palmyra-Baghdad road.” It said the Syrian military and others had also been sent to the region.

The base was targeted by ISIS militants last month, but U.S. and allied fighters pushed the terrorists back. Three U.S.-backed Syrian fighters were killed in the hours-long battle.
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The Russians were reported to be trying to stop loyalist forces going for al Tanf.
 
On Syria Direct US-led offensive in Syrian desert searches for ‘entry point’ into Islamic State’s Deir e-Zor province
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US outpost at a-Tanf

American military forces in the Badia number around 100 soldiers supported by armored vehicles and based out of a small military outpost near the a-Tanf border crossing between Syria and Iraq, said field commander Abu Howsha.

In early April, IS forces launched a major attack on the outpost in a-Tanf, killing several rebel fighters before ultimately retreating with heavy losses. No American or coalition personnel were killed in the attack, a spokesman from the Pentagon told reporters on April 10.

Today, the border crossing is controlled by US-backed Syrian rebels on one side and the Iraqi government on the other. About 230km of desert separate the outpost at a-Tanf from IS-held al-Bukamal.

From al-Bukamal, the US-backed Syrian rebels in the Badia intend to advance north along the Euphrates river towards the provincial capital of Deir e-Zor, one of the MAT sources told Syria Direct. IS controls the majority of the capital city while the Syrian regime retains control of two encircled districts and a nearby military airport.

While opposition forces and their American allies set their sights on al-Bukamal, the Syrian army and pro-regime militias continue to clash with IS fighters north of the Badia in the expanse of desert surrounding regime-held Palmyra.

The regime and its allies have clashed with US-backed rebels multiple times in recent weeks. On May 12, the regime captured the Zaza Checkpoint—just 100km north of a-Tanf—after hours of intense clashes with MAT and other US-backed rebel forces.

Regime ambitions to retake parts of the Syrian Badia have alarmed some rebel commanders.

“Our goals are clear,” a MAT commander who requested anonymity told Syria Direct earlier this week. “We want to outmaneuver [pro-regime] militias maliciously advancing towards Deir e-Zor.”

‘Butting heads’

IS is steadily losing territory along several front lines in Syria and Iraq. About 125km north of Deir e-Zor, the US-backed Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are advancing towards Raqqa, IS's de facto Syrian capital. The SDF has captured strategic positions along the highway linking Raqqa with Deir e-Zor, effectively cutting off movement between IS's two most crucial strongholds in the country.

Earlier this week, several pro-regime media outlets alleged that the Syrian government was massing for a major offensive to retake parts of the Syrian Badia currently held by US-backed rebel militias.

The explicit goal of the regime, pro-regime Al-Masdar News reported on Monday, is to regain control of the a-Tanf crossing and reopen the highway between Baghdad and Damascus.

“Since we announced the presence of US forces on the ground in the Badia, the regime has halted its operations,” a MAT spokesman named Mazaham told Syria Direct on Tuesday.

An FSA commander close to the US-led operation in the Badia told Syria Direct this week that the coalition is coordinating with the SDF to blockade Deir e-Zor, and to prevent the regime from advancing towards the city.
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More on al Tanf deployments.
 

Part of a thread on al Tanf incident. This just looks like the DoD responding to events following IS retreat without much evidence of policy. Russian position ambiguous. IRGC failing to be deterred by previous US threats and taking initiative. Note involvement of Iraqi Hashd. Gets bombed by US as liable to swamp US SF base. ISF hold other side of border. Fall of Mosul imminent. Hashd moving on border up there as well perhaps with some PKK coordination. US assets look thin on the ground and vulnerable to me. This can escalate into clash with IRGC assets on both sides of border. One side is playing a deep game of chess in the Levant the other barely attended to monopoly.
 
CrabbedOne said:

Part of a thread on al Tanf incident. This just looks like the DoD responding to events following IS retreat without much evidence of policy. Russian position ambiguous. IRGC failing to be deterred by previous US threats and taking initiative. Note involvement of Iraqi Hashd. Gets bombed by US as liable to swamp US SF base. ISF hold other side of border. Fall of Mosul imminent. Hashd moving on border up there as well perhaps with some PKK coordination. US assets look thin on the ground and vulnerable to me. This can escalate into clash with IRGC assets on both sides of border. One side is playing a deep game of chess in the Levant the other barely attended to monopoly.
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They are probably still deciding between hat and dog.
 
On TCF No, the United States Isn’t Dropping Syria’s Jihadis From Its Terror List
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That should be clear enough. Tahrir al-Sham may not be formally FTO-designated just yet, not under that name, but there’s no doubting the U.S. government’s hostility to it. Rumors and conspiracy theories are now spreading among the warring parties in Syria about how Trump has softened his stance against Syria’s former al-Qaeda branch, but they stem more from the State Department’s failure to clearly explain the U.S. position than from any actual change in policy—and joining Tahrir al-Sham can still bring American bombs raining down on you.
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In FP Syria Has Effectively Ceased to Exist
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The diplomacy emerging from ongoing peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, appears to suggest that Moscow is aiming to freeze the Syrian conflict more or less in place, followed by an ongoing political process. The formation of the four “de-escalation zones” looks set to leave the rebellion in control of large swaths of the country, while the upcoming assault on Raqqa by the SDF and the increasingly open U.S. commitment to this force raises the possibility of a U.S.-backed entity emerging east of the Euphrates.

With the regime and rebels now effectively reduced to client status and no great desire on the part of the patrons to commit to absolute victory for their proxies, the diplomacy on the Syrian war should presumably shift toward arrangements acknowledging the fragmentation of the country. Such arrangements would be built more or less around the status quo that will hold sway after the destruction of the Islamic State’s holdings in eastern Syria. That is, Syria will be divided between the regime enclave in the west, the Sunni Arab rebels in the northwest and southwest, a Turkish-ensured rebel enclave in the north, an SDF-controlled region in the northeast, and some arrangement involving both the SDF and Western-backed Arab rebels in the east.

As this process plays out, the Russians will continue to do as they wish by day and night in Damascus, the gap between regime rhetoric and reality will remain as gaping as ever, the rebels and the Kurds will continue to march in tune with their own patrons’ wishes. Meanwhile, the stark fact will continue to remain unsaid: namely, that the state known as Syria has effectively ceased to exist.
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We have a Syria not partitioned but often under the sway of foreign patrons. Principally the Russians, Iranians and HA behind the regime. Though I'd say Bashar stubbornly maintains more independence than this piece suggests. The Turks and Jordanians with their rebels. While the Americans are still backing some of them but relying mostly on the Syrian PKK. Opposition forces are often not much more than mercenaries but this patronage makes their survival more likely.
 

I doubt the US will choose to persist here either. The IRGC holds too many cards on the Syrian border and IS still appears to be the Trump admin's fixation.
 
On ISW Russia Lays a Trap in Syria
Russia seeks to use the establishment of “de-escalation zones” to reset its operations and constrain U.S. policy options in Syria. Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to establish four de-escalation zones in western Syria on May 4. The agreement intends to preempt the unilateral establishment of “interim zones of stability” by the U.S. in Syria. The de-escalation zone agreement has provided Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime with a period of rest and refit to refocus their efforts in Eastern Syria, particularly in areas where the U.S. is leading operations with Syrian rebels. Russia pivoted its air campaign to focus on ISIS-held terrain in Eastern Syria from May 1 - 18. Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime likely intend to use the period of de-escalation to disrupt joint U.S.-rebel operations to push north against ISIS in Homs and Deir ez Zour Provinces, while bolstering pro-regime advances against ISIS in both central Homs and eastern Aleppo. Pro-regime forces seized Jirrah Airbase from ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province on May 13 with Russian air support. Pro-regime forces also advanced towards a joint rebel-U.S. base at Tanaf in eastern Homs Province amidst the period of de-escalation. The U.S. responded to the threat against Tanaf by striking pro-regime and Iranian-backed militia forces near the base on May 18, however.
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ISW putting down thin evidence of Russia strikes Eastern Syria to lack of reporting rather than lack of action.
 
On Oryx Blog Replenishing the Stocks: Russian deliveries of T-62Ms and BMP-1s reach Syria
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The delivery of large amounts of these albeit dated vehicles could very well end up reversing the trend of widespread attrition that has decimated Syria's fighting vehicles. Perhaps more importantly, it shows Russia remains willing and capable of supporting its ally with large amounts of military equipment, despite economic hardships and the fact that Syria is bankrupt. This initiative essentially represents the re-establishment of the SyAA in organised form, and should it succeed it is certain to have far reaching consequences for future developments in the Syrian War.
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On Defense One And So It Begins: Trump, Syria, and The Lessons of Iraq
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Rather than seeing last week’s U.S. strike on Assad-affiliated forces as the start of America directly attacking Syria and its proxies, those close to the fight say the response was a warning shot aimed at keeping a tense battlefield from full eruption. It was not a game-changing attack aimed at escalation, sources familiar with the military campaign tell Defense One; instead, it was a way of keeping further escalation from happening.

“That was self-defense of our forces,” said Defense Secretary James Mattis, at last week’s Pentagon’s press briefing. “It was necessitated by offensive movement with offensive capability of what we believe were Iranian-directed – I don’t know there were Iranians on the ground, but by Iranian-directed forces inside an established and agreed-upon de-confliction zone.”

In other words, on a small plot of the Syrian battlefield in the nation’s south where U.S. and Russian commanders know where each side has staked out its fight — and the Americans work to keep eyes on all sides — taking on the Assad regime and its allies is not America’s goal. Keeping everyone in their own lane is more like it. Mattis even said the U.S. believes the Russians urged the Iranian-directed forces to stand down but they moved anyway, against Russian wishes.

For all the discussion of escalation in Syria, the military campaign under Trump in Syria is in many ways Obama’s, but faster and with fewer seat belts. Delegation downward of authorities and decision-making abilities may characterize Trump’s relationship with America’s military campaign in Syria, but this administration seems as wary as Obama’s to wade directly and fully into the nation’s civil war. America is ready to help those Syrians left standing —excluding Assad and his regime — once a final peace can be agreed upon. But the White House has not signaled willingness to put U.S. troop’s lives on the line to force who ends up at the peace talks table – at least, not overtly.
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Part of a thread, AirWars very worried by bombing around Raqqa. This they pointed out earlier was not expected as the assault on the city itself hasn't even started yet.
 
On MEE Syrian Kurds seek alliance with Baghdad to end isolation
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Fanar Haddad, a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute, told MEE it would be "perfectly reasonable that Iran would use their proxies and allies within the PMU to build a corridor to Syria," he said. "So it's not a question of whether or not the PMU want to do this, it's whether Iran will utilise their allies and proxies within the PMU to help cement this corridor."

'No corridor project'
The PMU denied any links to the PKK or PYD, and also deny they want to create an Iranian corridor.

"The PMU works under the leadership of the Iraqi forces and our operation is part of the ‘We are coming, Nineveh' campaign," PMU spokesperson Ahmed al-Asadi told MEE.

"Liberating this area doesn't mean it is for Tehran - in this desert you found a lot of IS fighters and al-Qaeda in the past, and we are going to liberate this area," he said.

Senior Syrian Kurdish officials also say they have no links to Iran.

"We have no relation with Iran, and Iran plays a bad role because they are afraid of our project, because there are also Kurds in Iran," Abdulkarim Omer, the head of foreign relations for Jazira Canton in northern Syria, told MEE.

"We want an end to the embargo. This is not related to Iran, this is propaganda from Turkey."

Hesso, the PYD official, said the US would not allow Iran to make such a corridor.

"America decides on this. Iraq is under US control. This would be difficult," he said. "If Iraq accept us, then America will also accept us. This is just propaganda to make it show that the PYD has relations with Iran, and the regime.

"They want to blacken our revolution."

But even if the Iraqi forces control the border again there is no guarantee that Baghdad would be willing to link up with the Syrian Kurds, and most likely would prefer Damascus.

"There is no relation with the Kurds in Syria, or any other party," PMU spokesperson Ahmed al-Asadi said.

"After the operation is finished and the area is liberated, the Iraqi government is not going to work with parties, organisations and politicians, only with formal governments."


However, this position could change since the Baghdad-backed PMUs and the Syrian Kurds both see Turkey as an adversary and IS-supporter.
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There's already an increasingly open security relationship between Damascus and Baghdad. As IS fades towards the middle Euphrates Ankara dominated Irbil is increasingly hostile to Qamishli. The Syrian border becomes key turf for the main ground actor in the war against IS Iraq. Another actor in that war geographically isolated Rojava looking to Shia dominated Baghdad now also has an inevitably about it. The PYD could be controlling part of a valuable land route between Mosul and its traditional sister city Aleppo. This sort of arrangement will go down like a lead ballon with an awful lot of Sunni Arabs. They'll say new security architecture is all facilitated by Teheran for the Safavids own benefit and they'll be right.
 
On War Is Boring After Bailing Out Assad, the Russian Military Risks a Syria Quagmire
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On May 18, 2017, U.S. warplanes struck Iranian-backed paramilitaries who were approaching U.S.-backed New Syrian Army militia fighters around Al Tanf near the Iraqi border, the same area where Russia dropped cluster bombs on the NSyA in June 2016. “Russia apparently tried to get the regime and Iran to turn back, but they didn’t listen,” Hauer said.

“Problems with its allies have already caused Russia to have to deploy additional ground forces to ensure its goals are achieved in key areas, with the Chechen military police coming as a response to Iranian interference with ceasefire and evacuation deals in Aleppo.”

Given these circumstances, it’s possible Russia could deploy more ground troops—most likely more military police from the North Caucasus, an option which Russian officials have suggested.

“While there isn’t a need for large-scale Russian military activities, I do think we’ll see more Russian ground personnel, in the form of Chechen special forces and Wagner mercenaries, increasingly deploying to Syria as Russia’s desire for greater influence on the ground grows.”
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The Russian footprint on the ground in Syria is about the same size as the US one in Iraq. In Iraq that's constrained by the bad aftertaste our occupation often left amongst Iraqis and by Iranian influence. In Syria the Kremlin has been careful not to get dragged in deeper relying on the Iranians to supplement a failing SAA. But airpower offers little practical leverage on the ground out among the population and that makes the details of any political settlement hard to control. Putin's was a slightly too clever tactical solution. I suspect IRCG-QF talked him into it without dwelling much on their own endgame. The Russians and Iranians may agree on the Assad's being essential but have different strategic objectives for the future of Syria. Back in the day the Iranians used to say the road to Jerusalem runs through Karbala today it's via places like al Tanf and al Ba'aj. And that can start to force the Russians to deploy more ground troops who can stand between enemies just as US troops have ended up doing up by the Turkish border.
 
On War Is Boring Russia’s Military Is Burning Through Its High Explosives
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The good news for Russia is that there are enough high-explosive compounds and rocket propellants to keep the Kremlin’s aircraft in the war for years to come, if necessary. The bad news for Russia is that the declining stockpiles will reduce its ability to engage in a large-scale, major conflict—which to be fair, is unlikely.

Russia does not lack raw materials, in many cases, but the post-Soviet decline in industry has affected production in terms of quantity and quality.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, research institutes and production plants went bankrupt. They lost valuable workers and technical documents. Machinery turned into scrap metal. The Bijskij chemical plant, one of the Soviet Union’s most important ballistic powder and composite solid propellant plants, went under.

Years of planning came to an abrupt halt. Russian plants currently manufacturing high-explosive chemicals have a poor safety record, while Russia faces a shortage of qualified engineers. Opening up a new military powder plant—which Russia hasn’t done in decades—is also a highly complex, capital-intensive project that takes years.

The engineering jobs at military-affiliated plants and institutes have become devalued, the newspaper notes, and have lost certain Soviet-era perks, such as housing and childcare provided for workers. More importantly, the Soviets relied on a centralized system which distributed graduates from universities into ready-made jobs. Many young Russians today prefer to go into other fields.
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Our supplies of precision munitions expensively expended on blowing up IS Toyotas are not infinite either.
 
From The Washington Institute Growing Risk of International Confrontation in the Syrian Desert
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COMPETING FOR ISLAMIC STATE TERRITORY

Al-Tanf rebels have become a threat to Damascus, advancing a few tens of kilometers from rebel areas that the regime took several years to encircle. They are also poised to hinder the regime's return to the Euphrates Valley. The Lions of the East Army is rapidly advancing north and east and may soon take Sukhna, an important oasis near Palmyra, as well as Baktal, the oil pipeline crossroads near Abu Kamal. Officially, the goal of these offensives is to seize IS territory and support the Euphrates tribes against the group. If successful, however, the rebels would essentially block the ongoing Syrian army offensive toward Deir al-Zour.

The regime is worried about this southern rebel expansion. The victory in Aleppo, the surrenders around Damascus, and the western ceasefire brokered in Astana freed thousands of regime troops to work on regaining control of the east. Since this spring, the Desert Hawks, integrated into the 5th Corps, have been participating in a large offensive in the Badia. They are joined by the al-Quds Brigade (a Palestinian militia from Aleppo), various Iraqi Shiite militias, and Hezbollah.

After pro-regime forces were turned away from al-Tanf by the recent U.S. strike, the army refocused on attacking the rebels from three different bases: Damascus, Palmyra, and Jabal al-Druze. In the latter case, army units are advancing rapidly along the Jordanian border to encircle one pocket of rebels, attempting to cut them off around Jabal Seis. Throughout this offensive, the regime has systematically reoccupied the network of forts located on the strategic border road. The departure of IS makes it less dangerous for Assad to put small garrisons back in place there, since the rebels do not have the same offensive capacity as IS. Iran can provide a few thousand Afghan Shiite Hazara fighters for this task; given their low motivation for heavy combat, they are well-suited to manning the forts.

Meanwhile, the army has encircled the eastern Qalamoun area between Palmyra and Damascus in order to force both IS and rebel fighters to flee. Al-Busairi, the crossroads for two major routes -- Palmyra to Damascus and al-Qaryatain to al-Tanf -- was the main target of this campaign, falling to the regime on May 25. Overall, the army's effort to reoccupy the crossroads, key water points (e.g., the reservoir at al-Zalaf), and the Jordanian border reflects a desire to cement its presence in the Badia and neutralize the offensive capacity of rebels at al-Tanf.
...
Click to expand...
Goes on to suggest this could become a flashpoint.
 
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