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And next, Syria?


Turkish intelligence in practice already owns quite a lot of the rebels in Idlib. Not sure why they'd want formal basing and probable conflict with AQ led HTS as well. The PKK and IS are elsewhere and the Turks have tended to deconflict with HTS and direct their rebels there. The regime isn't focused on the Northern border areas of Idlib either.
 
On JPost ANALYSIS: IS SYRIA BEING PARTITIONED INTO ‘DE-ESCALATION’ SAFE ZONES?
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The agreement maps out four de-escalation areas. The largest is in Idlib province in northwestern Syria. The zone is about the size of half of Israel or the size of the whole state of Connecticut.

This is what is left of the rebel heartland that once stretched to Aleppo and beyond. Another area north of the city of Homs, is a smaller pocket of rebels. An even smaller enclave known as eastern Ghouta is located next to Damascus. In southern Syria along the border with Israel and Jordan, an area in Deraa and Quneitra provinces is also included in the agreement.

The inclusion of Quneitra, which borders the Golan, is of particular interest to Israel. For almost two years there has been a series of cease-fires and relative quiet along this front. But the regime and its Iranian and Hezbollah allies have wanted to push the rebels away from the Israeli border. Prior to the agreement this posed a threat to Jerusalem because it meant the Lebanese group and Tehran could threaten Israel on a new front.

Up to now, this has been prevented by Syrian rebels in Quneitra who have fought against these common enemies. Thousands of Syrians have been treated in Israeli hospitals, coming from this rebel-held area. The rebels have kept the border relatively quiet and this is of essential importance for Israel. The de-escalation agreement could be welcomed in Jerusalem but its barring “aerial assets” in theory warns off Israel against any strikes in Syria.

The Syrian opposition has criticized the agreement as vague, yet another attempt to reinforce the regime’s power. The fact that two of the three signatories to the agreement support Assad, suggests that in the case. The rebels were so angry at the inclusion of Iran as a signatory, they walked out of the talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, where the agreement was signed.
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An Israeli opinion that appears less hostile than some of the rebels. After all the Israelis main concern is their border security not who rules Syria and there is not much to be done about the easily cowed Assad being weaker but more under Teheran's more aggressive influence.
 
I don't share Yassin al-Haj Saleh's politics of promoting a moderate Islamist - liberal alliance, but even putting that aside his theory about neo-imperialism (which is how he characterises the regime) seems to simply repeat the problems with what he calls the anti-imperialist left. Translating class into sect and even race (first world Assadist elites against third world "black Syrians"!!) and the struggle against the regime is translated into a struggle against Islamophobia. Simplifying the conflict, polarising the conflict. This is ideological crust on the same tired explanation of the Syrian conflict as a conflict between sects, except one sect is now imperial and one sect is now black. Despotic regimes and revolutions to overthrow them are not uncharted territory, what we're being offered here is not a new theory to explain something new but a certain gloss to justify a certain political position.

Besides the problem he is identifying here is not anti-imperialism. (There is only one group that takes a consistent view on this and that's the Sparts with their "military defence" of ISIS which is the only consistent anti-imperialist force.) There is indeed an array of old Stalinists, assorted conspiracy theorists, counter-jihadis and outright fascists who support the regime and they are tapping into a certain alternative RT viewing political fashion. I'm not sure if anti-imperialism or old Stalinist allegiances explain this phenomenon beyond a few lingering sects. Not now in 2017, 26 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
 
In MilitaryTimes Syrian Kurds are now armed with sensitive US weaponry, and the Pentagon denies supplying it
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Photos of YPG commandos brandishing American gear first appeared on social media in late March, during a U.S.-backed mission to liberate Tabqa, a town west of Raqqa where ISIS has launched attacks and stockpiled weapons. The images depict a YPG unit outfitted with clothing, weapons and enhancements once issued to U.S. Marine Corps special operations personnel but subsequently phased out as the Pentagon procured newer and better products.

The items include advanced combat helmets, digital camouflage uniforms, Patagonia cold-weather attire, chest rigs that hold ammunition, body armor and first-aid kits, plus M4 rifles with various modifications, including infrared lasers used for targeting during nighttime raids. Taken together, this ensemble makes the YPG more lethal and offers greater protection.

“Basically, if I can move, shoot and communicate at night far more effectively than you can, I have a significant advantage over you.” said Adam Routh, a defense expert at the Center for New American Security, a Washington think-tank. Routh served in Army special operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment and deployed to Afghanistan several times.

Indeed, YPG commandos now bear strong similarities to other American-trained foreign special forces, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Tunisia, suggesting a deliberate intent to equip and enable the Syrian Kurds to hold their own against terror groups and regional adversaries. The U.S. is authorized to sell night vision equipmentonly to approved states, not militia groups. Defense officials who spoke to Military Times suggested there are myriad ways this equipment could have been acquired by the YPG, including through the black market. It’s also possible, officials said, that the gear was stolen when Iraqi military facilities fell to ISIS beginning in 2014.
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My bold, or a pixie could have brought all that kit in the night.

DoD trying to replicate Iraqi CTS.
 
On ARANEWS Russia pushing Turkey into Rojava to force Kurds submit to Assad rule: PKK official
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Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, told ARA News that Russia is playing all parties to conflict in Syria.

“Russian is seeking to drive a wedge between Turkey and the United States. It is leveraging Kurdish fear of Turkey to help the regime encroach on their territory. Likewise it is leveraging Turkish fear of the Kurds to wrest concessions on the rebels and Idlib,” she said.

“The YPG’s [Kurdish People’s Protection Units] recent talk about going to Idlib after Raqqa is again probably encouraged by Russia so as to goad Turkey into action against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (HTS). The surest way to squeeze them would naturally be for Turkey to seal that part of the border which continues to be a logistical lifeline for HTS and Idlib-based groups,” Zaman told ARA News.

“The Kurds do not have US protection west of Manbij, so it’s easier for the Turks, Russians and the Assad regime to cut deals there. At the same time the US is very keen to address the HTS threat as well, so it won’t necessarily oppose Russian-Turkish collaboration on that front,” she stated.

Timur Akhmetov, a Russian analyst on the Middle East, told ARA News that Russia prefers a strong government in Syria.

“For the Russian officials the PYD [Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria] and Turkey have never been equal alternatives. The importance of the PYD in the Russian calculations is based on their presence along the strategically important Turkish border, non-conflictual stance on Assad and considerable fighting potential on the ground. But major disadvantage of the PYD is that it is a non-state actor that potentially may challenge central government,” he said.

“Russia thinks that a strong and effective central government [in Syria] is a cornerstone of a regional stability. This is why Russia engages the PYD with great diligence. On the other hand, Russia perceives Turkey as an important regional power and wants to make it a part of the solution in Syria. It would give Turkey self-confidence, reduce concerns about instability on its borders and, in the long run, more open to Russian suggestions on Syria’s political future,” Akhmetov told ARA News.

Moreover, he said that Russia is eager to plage the Kurdish card against Turkey to get concessions.

“In addition, Russian officials seem to acknowledge that the PYD may represent a serious threat to the Turkish national security. This is the reason why Russia is eager to play the Kurdish card against Turkey when it wants from Ankara concessions on Syria. However, Russia will never willingly push the Syrian Kurds against Turkey,” he concluded.
The headline here looks entirely accurate to me. The PKK official is wise to be wary but of course is playing to American fears.
 
On MEE No, the US has not made 'well-meaning efforts to broker peace' in Syria

How Lister described it.

Piece overstates the chances for a settlement in Syria but it would be fair to say the US didn't display any interest in any humanitarian deescalation until Russia complicated the game in Syria by intervening and making it part of a real Great Power geopolitical struggle. The UK and France have been consistently disappointed that the US wasn't more wantonly belligerent. This war has always been a pretty unhinged miscalculation of their own interests by Western powers.
 
On AP Syrian troops shift focus to IS-held east
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Syrian government forces have kept a presence in Deir el-Zour— most of which was taken over by IS in 2014— holding onto an airport there at a high cost. It will not allow Western-backed rebels to turn it into some “rival power base or source of reserve leverage,” said Sam Heller, a Syria expert with the Century Foundation.

“I don’t think a U.S.- and Jordanian-backed rebel offensive on Deir el-Zour is imminent, or even really viable. But Damascus and its allies nonetheless seem to view it as threatening and unwelcome, and they’re probably happy to preemptively undercut it,” Heller said.

Syrian media were rife with reports about an imminent Russian-backed Syrian military operation in the east. The government-controlled Syrian Central Military Media said the Syrian army and its allies have completed the first phase of an operation aimed at securing the Syrian-Iraqi border, advancing some 45 kilometers (30 miles) and seizing an area that puts government forces between IS and the rebels.

Western-backed Syrian rebel groups have made quiet advances against IS in the large swath of desert south of Palmyra and west of Deir el-Zour, along the border with Jordan. A rebel faction known as the Eastern Lions responded to the government advance by moving west and attacking a government-held military base.

“It is a race to Deir el-Zour,” said Tlas al-Salameh, the commander of the Eastern Lions, which is backed by Jordan and the U.S. “The Iranian and Hezbollah militias are in the operation because it concerns them to secure a land route from Beirut to Iran that goes through Damascus and Baghdad, and they want to block our way to Deir el-Zour,” he said.

Omar Abu Leila, an exiled activist from Deir el-Zour, said retaking the provincial capital will not be easy. Even if the government forces manage to push the rebels aside, once they reach the city they will face an estimated 10,000 IS fighters defending their “last fortress.”

But opening a new front against IS might speed the extremists’ defeat. “The fight can’t be only in Mosul and Raqqa. It must be on the Deir el-Zour front as well,” he said. “The three fronts distract IS.”
 

Given the often dire conditions of service in the SAA you could make a pretty good case that being drafted amounted to an HR abuse. Half starved, beaten, treated as cannon fodder often abandoned by officers to be slaughtered. Joining the rebels to be bombed can look preferable.
 
On SST Why Deir Ezzor and why now? - TTG

TTG sees a drive to Deir and the Iraqi border coming and Astana as essentially holding R+6 gains in the West as that happens.

A few observations. Astana gives the Russians a good basis for entangling the US once more in negotiations. Lavrov is already flatteringly calling it a version of Trump's vague "safe zone" plan for Syria. If the Turks stand down their rebels in the NW by simply not supporting further offensives there's basically little direct threat in the Aleppo countryside. That leaves AQ led HTS making worried noises about what the Turks are up to in Northern Idlib and as the main threat in the NW but pretty much contained in central Idlib. Hama and Latakia face possible problems but dealing with those can be deferred.

The Iraqis have taken 80% of the Caliphate's territory. Mosul will fall in the next few months. After Mosul the Iraqis will move on IS's Syrian border territory at al Qaim etc. Damascus has welcomed such collaboration. Hashd commanders have signalled intent to pursue IS into Syria. There are also signs of a anti-Turkish PKK-Hashd working relationship developing in NW Iraq.

The US is moving against IS but also to block Iranian ground communications via Iraq. The SDF is moving down from the NE and will take Raqqa pushing IS forces towards regime held Deir probably endangering it. Jordanian backed rebel mercs have been gobbling up IS territory for their masters and are moving up from the SE while a big US Jordanian exercise gathers a reserve on Syria's border. Idlib in this situation isn't going to be an Iranian priority.
 
On MEI Jordan Confused by Trump’s Flip-Flops on MidEast
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n a rare reaction, Jordan’s government spokesman lambasted Assad, while local commentators rebuked him for questioning the kingdom’s independence and sovereignty. But it was not until April 26 that King Abdullah brushed aside reports that Jordan was about to get involved in a military operation inside Syria. He told local media figures that while developments in Syria will not be allowed to threaten Jordan, the kingdom will defend itself from any threats, “without the need to have a role for the army inside Syria.”

The shift in Jordan’s position was most probably necessitated by an ambiguity and hesitance on the U.S. side, and growing local opposition for military involvement in Syria. Despite the king’s denial, Jordan remains worried about the growing presence of ISIS militants and proxy groups on the Syrian side of the border. While an outright military intervention is ruled out for now, Jordanian Special Forces remain active with their American and British counterparts, at least in theal-Tanaf base near the Jordan-Syria-Iraq borders where ISIS fighters waged a failed attack on April 10.

Jordan’s stand was recalibrated again when Trump made another flip-flop on Assad, whom he had earlier called a “butcher,” when he reportedly told U.N. Security Council ambassadors on April 25 that the future of Assad was “not a deal breaker” in negotiations on ending the war.

That prompted Jordan to dispatch Safadi to Moscow on April 29 to underline the classic position that only a political solution can work, and that both Russia and the United States must cooperate to hammer out a solution. And even though Jordan attended the latest Astana talks as an observer, it declined to commit to the May 5 agreement to create de-escalation zones in Syria as it waited for a formal U.S. position on the deal.

Whether it is on Syria or Israel-Palestine, Amman is nervously analyzing the shifting positions by Trump. Under President Barack Obama, Jordan was able to chart a more consistent policy, often described as holding to a precarious middle course. Now with a mercurial and moody Trump, walking the tightrope for Jordan has never been more difficult.
Perhaps the US's most reliable ally in the ME coping with Trump's half baked strategic flip-flops on both Israel-Palestine and Syria.
 
On BuzzFeedNews US Special Forces Are Secretly Training Syrian Rebels And Fighting Alongside Them
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Mohannad Ahmed al-Tallaa, the commander of the rebel battalion stationed at Tanf, said they began working with US troops at the base late last year. A former officer in an elite Syrian army unit, he defected early in the civil war and has been a vital player in the rebel fight in Deir Ezzor, a province in eastern Syrian that has become a major ISIS stronghold. He created the battalion, called Maghaweir Al-Thowra, or Commandos of the Revolution, with the aim of working with the US-backed coalition to free Deir Ezzor from ISIS, he said, adding that he and his men now live with their US partners. “I’m sitting with them right now,” he said when reached by phone on Tuesday night; men with American accents could be heard speaking English in the background.

Tallaa said the US had provided his battalion with “good weapons,” though not tanks, and that the coalition has backed them with airstrikes. He also said the US troops accompany the battalion on operations regularly. “In general they make the plans with us and they come with us on the operation in the second line. If we need support in the first line, then they come and support us there,” he said. “And sometimes ISIS [attacks] from other directions, and [the US troops] stop them.”

“The Americans are really good fighters, and they know how to implement the strategy,” Tallaa added. “I’m proud to fight beside them.”

But he declined to provide more details of how the US troops operate in the field. “Please don’t ask me these kinds of questions, because I’m not allowed to talk about this,” he said.

Tallaa said the operations had been mostly small-scale so far; in the last three they had captured ISIS checkpoints around a nearby mountain. But they were building up to a larger offensive to take Abu Kamal, an important ISIS-held city in Deir Ezzor near the border with Iraq.

At the same time, he said, he was also keeping an eye on the regime, which has attacked US-backed rebel groups throughout the war. “They are about 70 kilometers [43 miles] from us — not only the regime, but also Hezbollah, Iran and other militia. We saw their flags,” he said. “And if they attack us, we have to attack them back.”
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“The U.S. military will be going in [to Raqqa] and trying to figure out who the tribal leaders are,” said an American official involved in the anti-Islamic State campaign. “The regime knows these details. They have a natural home-field advantage and have a way of slowly getting back in. We won’t be in Raqqa in 2020, but the regime will be there.”

Western officials say the SDF operation that unfolded in the northern Syrian city of Manbij last year could serve as a blueprint for Raqqa’s eventual handover to Damascus. The Kurdish-led force took Manbij from Islamic State in August and handed over some surrounding towns to the Syrian and allied Russian armies in March.

An official from the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, which is fighting for the Syrian regime, recently described increasing Kurdish cooperation with the Syrian government as a win for both sides. With Damascus poised to retake much of the country with help from Iran, Russia, Hezbollah and other Shiite foreign fighters, the official said the Syrian Kurds realize they can gain from cooperating with Mr. Assad’s government. The regime treated the ethnic minority as second-class citizens before the outbreak of war in 2011.

“Now the regime needs the Kurds and will count them as loyal citizens and improve their services if they cooperate,” the Hezbollah official said. “For a long time, many of them didn’t have the Syrian nationality or even basic government services.”
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Whoever rules Raqqa and Deir after IS is suppressed will not have an easy time.
 
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On Jonathan Spyer's blog Assad’s Hollow Crown
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On our last night in the city, a member of the delegation was threatened at gunpoint by a drunken Russian journalist. The authorities in the area said they could do nothing, because the man was Russian. This small episode says more about the true state of affairs in government-controlled Syria than all the regime’s verbiage. The Assad regime’s servants do not enjoy unquestioned sovereignty even in their own capital. The regime is today largely a hollow structure. The vigorous regional ambitions of Iran and Russia, and the smaller but no less notable intentions of a vast variety of pro-regime militia commanders must be factored into any assessment of regime capabilities and intentions.

The closeness of the Sunni Arab rebels to the regime’s urban centers, and the absence of Assad’s power from almost the entirety of the country’s east are further testimony to the erosion of the regime. It is a very long way from the days when Hafez Assad ran Syria as his ‘private farm’, as a Syrian Kurdish friend of mine once put it. The Assad regime cannot be destroyed for as long as Moscow and Teheran find a reason to underwrite its existence. But the mortar shells landing in Damascus in close succession are an unmistakable testimony to its reduced and truncated state. The anachronistic rhetoric of its officials and its supporters does not succeed in disguising this reality. Assad is wearing a hollow crown.
 
In The Atlantic The Fatal Flaw in Trump's ISIS Plan
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Most worrisome: evidence that Sunni-Arab extremists learn and adapt from their own mistakes. In Idlib province in northwest Syria, al-Qaeda shifted away from the brutal tactics it honed in Iraq from 2004 to 2009. Instead, by transitioning into something of an “al-Qaeda, Version 3.0,” it has reduced violence against local populations, provided infrastructure-service delivery through local administrators, and integrated more with local communities. If the Arab communities of eastern Syria perceive that the PYD-YPG seeks to dominate them, wiser al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders in Syria may be poised to pick up more recruits and embed in communities, making the coming Arab insurgency harder to contain.

For now, ISIS is still in Raqqa and hasn’t yet shifted into wide-scale insurgency mode. But it won’t be long until Washington will have to decide who will control and govern Raqqa and eastern Syria, and who will pay for it. As Colin Powell told George W. Bush in 2003, if Bush toppled Saddam, America would “own” Iraq and have to take responsibility for it. America may soon have 1,000 more troops on the ground in eastern Syria, and its proxies are seizing new territory from ISIS every week with U.S. support, including a Marine artillery battalion and regular airstrikes. There are even U.S. peacekeepers deployed in Manbij and near Tel Abayad to keep Turkish, Syrian-Arab, and Syrian-Kurdish fighters from shooting at each other. America now effectively owns eastern Syria.

The Obama administration knowingly launched America in this direction, but Trump, who denounced nation-building in his campaign, will pay the larger bills now coming due. America’s difficulties will be even worse if Turkey stokes further anti-PYD-YPG sentiment in this Arab-majority region. Thus, we will need to cut a deal with Erdogan.
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Former US ambassador Bob Ford pointing to the obvious. IS as it already has in Iraq will switch to insurgent mode and it likely won't have trouble recruiting pissed off conservative Raqqa-Deir area tribesmen not much liking the progressive aspects of Apoist rule. I'd note there are signs of lingering regime support but some younger folk appear to rather approve of IS and aren't eager to have the Baath back either. Governance wise this looks less promising than on a wing and prayer Iraq did in 2010.

He also points out the US is likely to betray its auxiliaries in NE Syria just as it did Barzani's Kurds in the 70s. The American attention span in these things is short. I'd add US supported Syrian rebels and the Iraqi Sahwa were also abandoned after they served a tactical purpose. That was just Uncle Sam's institutional ADHD here US geopolitical interests lie with Turkey which is deeply hostile to Rojava and capable of considerable disruption. Is the US really going to keep thousands of peacekeepers strung between the Turks and the Syrian end of the PKK once IS is once more suppressed and victory declared?
 
In The Times Of Israel In US meetings, Israeli minister tries to keep Iran out of south Syria
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“The intelligence minister warned against Iran and Hezbollah establishing themselves in Syria in general, and southern Syria in particular, and against the creation of a contiguous territory from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon,” Katz’s office said.

Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel has been concerned that Iran, an ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad, would be able both to create that “land bridge” to Lebanon in order to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah and also to form a base of operations near the Golan Heights from which it and its proxies could attack Israel.

The intelligence minister called for new sanctions on the Islamic Republic over its support of the Hezbollah terrorist group.

“He also pointed out the inherent threat of Hezbollah being capable of independently manufacturing advanced weaponry in Lebanon with Iran’s help,” his office said, a reference to reports that Iran built weapons factories for the terrorist group in Lebanon.

In recent weeks, the fighting in southern Syria has intensified in an at times three-way war between the Assad regime, more moderate rebel groups and the Islamic State affiliate in the region, the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army.

Katz “called for the US and Israel to reach understandings about dealing with the Iranian threat in Syria and in the region,” his office said.
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Israelis sensibly far more worried about the Islamic Republic than little old IS. Anticipating an Astana style carve up and wanting US to finally recognise their sovereignty over the Golan Heights as well. Not that unlikely under Trump.
 
From The Washington Institute From Qamishli to Qamishlo: A Trip to Rojava’s New Capital
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Qamishli is experiencing an advanced Kurdification process. It is hard to know how far the PYD will go in its "cooperative" economic project, but it is likely that it will only serve to reverse the power relations between the Kurds and the Arabs. As a Kurdish intellectual said to me in 2011: ‘’Kurds have lived as a minority on their territory, Arabs will have to learn to live as a minority in the historical territory of the Kurds if they wish to remain.’’ Behind the smoke screen of their egalitarian ideology, the Kurdish national project manifests itself. The PYD tried to disguise it as long as possible to ally the Arab tribes of the area against the Islamic State and to maintain international support. Some will surely argue that the PYD project is revenge for years of oppression under Arab authorities and a measure of social justice for the Kurdish people. However, according to Ibn Khaldun, the PYD political project is just spoliation in favor of a new assabiyya (group cohesion). It is also necessary to consider the sectarian factor in the process of ethnopolitical purge since the Kurdish pro-KDP middle class is also a victim. Qamishli becomes Qamishlo, and the Hotel Semiramis, the high place of the "little Paris" of the 1950s, is occupied by the small children of the agricultural proletariat. The former owner, a Syriac Catholic, has fled to Canada, and there is no more French wine.
Balanche visits Qamishili and recalls how its changed since previous visits. Actually sounds pretty bad in 97 during Baath Arabfication. The currently KDP dominated KRG in Iraq has responded in a somewhat similar way in pushing forward Kurdish identity just as the state once tried to suppress it.
 
On Syria Deeply Expert View: U.S. Decision to Arm Syrian Kurds Will Boost Fight Against ISIS
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I believe that once ISIS is defeated in Syria, the U.S. will stop or reduce their cooperation with the Kurds and the U.S. and Turkey may become closer again. U.S. cooperation with this group is not based on their “democratic qualities.” The U.S. selected the Kurds as allies on the ground because they are well organized with many fighters and the U.S. felt it had few options after failing to build up a Syrian armed force. The problem is that, until then, weapons delivered to the Kurds in Syria may well be used against the Turkish army in Turkey, or against Kurds or others in Syria who are critical of them.
Not confined to Syria or PKK affiliates. Post-IS conflict brewing across the Kurdish region in general. Already simmering in Sinjar and Diyala. Erdogan's Turkey stirring the pot and just making it worse.
 
On Jihadica Abandoning al-Qaida: Tahrir al-Sham and the Concerns of Sami al-‘Uraydi
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Reconciliation?

In early May the London-based jihadi scholar Hani al-Siba‘i issued a statement calling on Zawahiri to broker a reconciliation between the two sides, citing “what happened in terms of the smoke surrounding the issue of the breaking of ties.” The appeal recalled al-Siba‘i’s request several years back that Zawahiri clear up the issue of the Islamic State’s historical connection to al-Qaida. In that case Zawahiri responded with a detailed answer. Perhaps such a reply concerning Tahrir al-Sham is in the offing, or perhaps not. It would be highly embarrassing for Zawahiri to admit that his al-Qaida affiliate disobeyed him, especially since he has accused the Islamic State of doing the same.

Apart from complaining, it remains unclear what the group of al-Qaida stalwarts in Syria intends to do. They do not appear to be on the verge of forming a new al-Qaida group—they are probably too small for that—but nor are they itching for reconciliation. Just yesterday, Tahrir al-Sham’s chief scholar released a three-page defense of his group’s methodology, insisting that the stage of “the one organization” and its “ideology” had passed and refuting the idea that this meant “a descent to concessions as some are wont to imagine.” With these words, commented a thinker in al-‘Uraydi’s circle, Tahrir al-Sham has rejected Zawahiri’s latest advice and “shut the door permanently on walking back the breaking of ties.” It is hard to imagine how al-Qaida’s leader could put an end to the cycle of mutual recriminations.
Splitters!
 
On ISW Syria Situation Report: April 20 - May 10, 2017
Russia, Iran, and Turkey agreed at a new set of Astana Talks on May 3 - 4 to establish four large “de-escalation” zones over opposition-held regions of Western Syria. The deal allows for the three countries to deploy forces along the borders of the “de-escalation zones” to monitor a faltering nationwide ceasefire that excludes all opposition forces “associated” with Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria. Activists reported a general decrease in violence except along key frontlines such as Damascus and Northern Hama Province after the deal went into effect on May 6. Russia likely intends to leverage to “de-escalation zones” to subordinate the political process to its objectives, reset its military deployments, and block future unilateral action to implement so-called “zones of stabilization” by the U.S. in Syria. Pro-regime forces will likely also use the relative lull in Western Syria to refocus their military campaign towards Eastern Syria to preempt the U.S. from establishing a long-term foothold in regions formerly held by ISIS in Syria. Conditions on the ground remain unfit for a durable ceasefire or political settlement to end the Syrian Civil War.
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What Astana did in nutshell. Appears tightly aligned with Iranian priorities to me. With the Turks as a signatory the CIA probably have only limited options for escalating rebel actions in response which would be the logical thing to do if thwarting Iran's a priority. Astana deal not incompatible with SDF taking Raqqa quickly. I imagine that's the dominating factor on the US side.
 
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