And next, Syria?

[teqniq]

I read all this on Twitter already, but didn't feel the need to post it here. Also if you'd looked the wild boar story is from Iraq, not Syria and bimble already posted it yesterday on the Islamic state thread.

 

[CrabbedOne]

I read all this on Twitter already, but didn't feel the need to post it here. Also if you'd looked the wild boar story is from Iraq, not Syria and bimble already posted it yesterday on the Islamic state thread.

HH thinking it untrue was the main thing interesting about that.

 

[bimble]

Bring back bronze age fake news, has a pleasing mythical quality about it. More of that sort of thing please.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Lawfare The Perils of Impulsive Promises for Justice in Syria

...
There is also the broader question of whether the pursuit of criminal accountability in Syria harms the prospects for a resolution to the conflict. Thus far, neither peace nor justice has been achieved. In Yemen, immunity for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh has facilitated his thunderous political comeback. Embroiled in a brutal civil war that, like Syria, has several regional actors involved militarily, Yemen has seen neither peace nor justice since 2011.

In such a complex, deadly, and gruesome conflict, the priority is clearly to find a way to end the violence in Syria. There are no reassurances, however, that the conflict will end soon.

The Chinese and Russian veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have referred the Syrian situation to the ICC was a blow to those seeking accountability in Syria. Hopes were then raised with the creation of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed in Syria.

Such mechanisms, however, still have to contend with the challenge of establishing responsibility for individuals engaged in an ongoing and raging conflict. An ICC referral might have marginalized the Assad regime in certain international circles. But it would also renew accusations that the Court is imperialist, prosecuting the weaker countries and not the more powerful ones. Regardless, if Sudan provides any example, criminal charges would not necessarily help bring the conflict to an end.

It is, then, crucial to take a step back and consider other more realistic options for the pursuit of justice—whether now or in post-conflict Syria.

This is why the heroic efforts of Syrian activists, lawyers, civil society organizations, victims, and witnesses to document violations in Syria are vital. Such documentation is a treasure trove for investigations and future prosecutions. But it also lays the foundation for a meaningful national reconciliation process, the preservation of memory, and a potential truth commission.

While calls for justice are typically reactive, they must not be reckless. Empty promises of holding perpetrators to account will only further torment victims of the deadliest conflict of the 21st century.

A meaningful SA style Truth&Reconciliation process in Syria is rather unlikely.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TNI Is Donald Trump About to Launch an Operation in Southern Syria?

...
Building “safe zones” has long been debated. But, because of the risks, most policymakers have stepped back. The Trump administration began seriously considering safe zones as a policy option within a month of entering office. Since then, the idea has gained more traction, principally among Israel and Jordan. In February, President Trump met with King Abdullah to discuss building and enforcing a safe zone. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported last week that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now lobbying for the creation of a buffer zone inside Syria. Yes, there are an amalgam of complexities that must be overcome, but the concept seems to have taken root among America’s regional allies. The larger question remains, is this the goal of an anti-ISIS operation in southern Syria? If so, is the Trump administration willing to put American soldiers on the ground to make such a zone a reality?

The Trump administration has left many uncertain about America’s next step in Syria, or if there will even be a next step. Senior officials have echoed several open-ended comments about the option of further action against Assad. If Trump approves a military operation in southern Syria, it will be imperative that it does not bring U.S. soldiers into open conflict with the regime. That would be hard to avoid.

Rather obviously setting up a Southern "Safe Zone" is more about HA than IS for the Israelis. They once had little problem with the rather passive aggressive Assad essentially policing their Golan border for them. It's only when he failed to do this during the revolt that Bibi became angry. Now the Golan might end up with a Division of Shia Jihadis on it. HA is about the only imminent threat of any size the IDF faces these days so it is always going to be a priority.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Regime making only slow progress down by Palmyra. Last time they tried to drive East from it a small aggressive IS unit wrecked their chaotic advance.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The Cipher Brief Hezbollah Fundraising Underscores its Financial Crisis

...
Yet this year’s campaign belied Nasrallah’s statements. Indeed, the group has described the banking sector’s compliance with the U.S. law as a “war of annihilation,” and even detonated a bomb outside of a major bank in Beirut last year as a warning. Nonetheless, it does not appear that Lebanese banks have eased their pressure on the organization. This is hindering Hezbollah’s Iranian cash-flow, leading it to turn domestically with the Equip a Mujahid campaign to fund military gear such as rifles, ammunition, uniforms, and canteens – the same types of supplies that Nasrallah had said Iran would cover. According to IRSA’s campaign, this gear costs $1,000 per fighter annually.

Finally, Hezbollah is now entering its sixth year of involvement in the Syrian civil war, with no end in sight. Paying the salaries of the 6,000 to 8,000 fighters it has in Syria – estimated at $500 to $1,200 monthly per fighter– and caring for the families of the 1,500 fighters killed and 5,000 wounded in that war are straining the organization’s purse strings.

Hezbollah’s recent fundraising efforts show the benefits of U.S. financial pressure on the group – pressure that policymakers should continue. Analysts should watch carefully, however, as Hezbollah’s shift to direct, online, and grassroots fundraising will require more creative strategies to interdict.

My bold, $1.2K/month is about three times the regional going rate for a fighter. I recall Jaish al Nusra was paying $400 and similar rates of pay are normal in Iraq. They also had a good Health Plan. Casualty rates are high in the Jihadi business. The HA social care costs associated with the dubious business of propping up Assad must be huge.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
The PYD’s military competence is also a matter of question. The vast majority of the YPG forces consist of inadequately trained 16- to 20-year-old militants with no real fighting experience. As the YPG-controlled territory expands in the north of Syria, the group, lacking heavy weapons, also suffers from lack of troops to deploy in this region; therefore it enforces compulsory military service. As witnessed in the Ayn al-Arab siege, a YPG minus U.S. air support faces serious military limitations.

Also, there are serious questions regarding how long the tactical relationship based on self-interest between the Assad regime, the U.S. and Russia will last. As such, the PYD with its federation declaration came face to face with the Assad regime resulting in large scale conflicts and the engagement established with the U.S. threatens the PYD’s relationship with Russia. Turkey, on the other hand, has made use of this conjuncture by starting the Operation Euphrates Shield and blocking the PYD’s effort to unite the cantons starting with Afrin in the west side of Euphrates. While Turkey’s entrance to Northern Syria as a military player works against the PYD, it seems that the PYD may continue to use itself as a useful tool for the great powers during the chaos and war in Syria.

Naturally slanted but worth reading for a Turkish perspective.

That most of the YPG is young cannon-fodder is true of other organisations as well. The TSK itself hasn't done that well against IS even though it deployed elite units. The Syrian rebels the Turks fielded often appeared less able than the YPG was. Some of them were obviously recently repurposed refugees barely trained and thrown into conflict. Al Bab looked like a bigger cluster fuck than Manbij mentioned here as a bit of a bloodbath for foreigners fighting with the PKK.

It's a rather weary conclusion. I'd say Rojava may be harassed by the Turks and aligned rebels but probably isn't going anywhere. They've manipulated the international players well and kept their options open with the regime. Truth is the PKK has played a weak hand well and made better choices in Syria than Ankara has.

 

[Idris2002]

Naturally slanted but worth reading for a Turkish perspective.

That most of the YPG is young cannon-fodder is true of other organisations as well. The TSK itself hasn't done that well against IS even though it deployed elite units. The Syrian rebels the Turks fielded often appeared less able than the YPG was. Some of them were obviously recently repurposed refugees barely trained and thrown into conflict. Al Bab looked like a bigger cluster fuck than Manbij mentioned here as a bit of a bloodbath for foreigners fighting with the PKK.

It's a rather weary conclusion. I'd say Rojava may be harassed by the Turks and aligned rebels but probably isn't going anywhere. They've manipulated the international players well and kept their options open with the regime. Truth is the PKK has played a weak hand well and made better choices in Syria than Ankara has.

"AKP-friendly think-tank", eh? SEEMS LEGIT

 

[CrabbedOne]

"AKP-friendly think-tank", eh? SEEMS LEGIT

We'll no more liable to indulge in creative writing than CENTCOM. The odd slur but a lot of the detail seemed to correspond with stuff from other sources.

I'd allow the Turks their own partisan position just as I would the Israelis or even the perfidious British. All Think-Tanks and policy wonks have biases and have to be read critically against other sources. The different viewpoints are revealing.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment Reconciliations: The Case of al-Sanamayn in North Deraa

...
The situation in al-Sanamayn bears a number of analytical implications for wider analysis of how the regime will deal with restive areas. It is clear that al-Sanamayn is considered by the regime to be a model for how it should eventually deal with the wider rebel-held south. Facing wider manpower shortages, it would not be feasible for the regime to retake every Deraa province town by sheer force and depopulation, which would also risk further large-scale displacements towards Jordan and likely upset the Jordanian government’s less hostile stance (in comparison with some other regional players) towards the regime. Instead, some kind of accommodation with what are largely local, more malleable factions- granting them autonomy in security affairs within ‘reconciled’ localities- is the most realistic option for the regime, even as al-Sanamayn is not a wholly identical situation because it never fell entirely out of regime control and arguably has more strategic importance than an entirely rebel-held town like Nawa. For the rebel factions, a possible additional motive to ‘reconcile’ is the risk of feeling trapped in a pincer between the regime’s forces and its allies on one side and the Islamic State-linked Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed on the other, which exploited rebel weaknesses to secure some advances earlier this year. Civilian pressure on account of war weariness may also be a motive to settle with reconciliation agreements.

At the same time, it is clear that this model does not come without its problems: namely, an atmosphere of lawlessness created by the large number of armed factions and gangs. This phenomenon exists elsewhere in regime-held territory on account of reliance on auxiliary militias, even as the regime continues to provide services and government jobs in those areas. The difference in al-Sanamayn from those other regime-held areas is that the factions occupy a curious limbo position, whereby they do not attack any regime positions or personnel and the Syrian state institutions function in their place, but they are appealing to a rebel/opposition judicial authority (Dar al-‘Adl) to resolve at least some criminal cases. Within areas controlled by Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, it is clear from some civilian residents that one perceived advantage of the group’s rule is that it is rule by one faction, and thus brings a sense of order. This issue might make the group’s rule more attractive than continued formal rebel control or a reconciliation agreement on the model of al-Sanamayn.
...

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi has the regime looking to diverse solutions to defuse the rebellion not simply brute force. Assad is simply too weak even with external support. Note here the Jordanian aspect making compromise in al Sanamayn more likely.

 

[teqniq]

Israel suggests it was behind Damascus airport blast

An Israeli minister has appeared to confirm that Israel struck a Hezbollah arms supply hub in Syria on Thursday close to the airport in Damascus where weapons from Tehran are regularly sent by commercial and military cargo planes.

Israel’s intelligence minister, Yisrael Katz, strongly suggested that Israel – which has launched a number of raids against Hezbollah in Syria but usually stops short of claiming them – was behind the military action.

“I can confirm that the incident in Syria completely conforms to Israel’s policy, [which is] to act so as to prevent the smuggling of advanced weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon by Iran,” he told Army Radio....

 

[teqniq]

Airstrikes take out 3 north Syrian hospitals in less than 24 hours: ‘A systematic tactic of destroying medical infrastructure’

More than a dozen reported Russian airstrikes destroyed three hospitals across northwestern Syria in less than 24 hours, as local administrators told Syria Direct on Thursday that “there is no such thing as a safe hospital.”

The attacks killed at least seven Syrians, the latest in a month-long Russian and regime assault on dozens of hospitals, clinics and ad hoc medical points across rebel-held Idlib and Hama provinces, the last major bastion of rebel territory.

“Warplanes are carrying out a systematic tactic of destroying medical infrastructure by targeting the greatest possible number of hospitals and medical centers in rebel-held areas,” Dr. Mustafa al-Aido, deputy director of the Idlib Health Directorate, told Syria Direct on Thursday....

 

[CrabbedOne]

A curious case is currently occupied by a public prosecutor's office in Hesse, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Military Defense Service (MAD). It is about a Bundeswehrsoldaten, which is supposed to have illegally shot a gun.

According to information from the "Welt", he registered in Syria as a Syrian refugee at the end of December 2015 in an initial reception facility in Giessen. Shortly thereafter, in January 2016, he filed an asylum application in Bavaria, which was also approved. He was then assigned a room in an asylum accommodation. The "false Syrian" should also have received services. His German origin apparently did not appear during the registration process. And although he did not speak Arabic, he only spoke French.


Against the soldiers is now determined because of the suspicion of the preparation for a serious state-endangering violence (§ 89 StGB) and because of the violation of the weapons law.

The prosecutor's office Frankfurt am Main had the 28-year-old lieutenant of the German Armed Forces in Hammelburg in Unterfranken. In all, there were 16 searches in Germany, Austria and France, where the soldier was stationed.
...

Translated by google.

This would not inspire much confidence in Kraut refugee screening procedures. Not to mention what sort of far right twit gets to be a Bundeswehr Oberleutnant.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Environment getting steadily richer in IAF targets. Note tendency to strike on fronts with opposition. I'd guess that's where intelligence is strongest.

 

[teqniq]

Translated by google.

This would not inspire much confidence in Kraut refugee screening procedures. Not to mention what sort of far right twit gets to be a Bundeswehr Oberleutnant.

Here is an english language version, which I saw yesterday.

A soldier planned a gun attack on an airport so that refugees would take the blame

However that it's already been reported in english is not my main issue. Please can you stop referring to German people as 'Kraut' I have German friends and I'm reasonably certain they would soon become not-my-friends if I started talking about them in this fashion. TIA.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
Figure 1 displays the values of respondents indicating that they would vote for an Islamist party “if there were elections tomorrow” compared to any other respondent in the surveys.[6] As can be seen clearly in the figure, Islamist voters do indeed display values in tune with Islamist core messages, most strongly when it comes to the greater role of religion in politics. In contrast, there are no discernible differences between Islamist voters and others regarding economic issues such as preferences for redistribution or economic competition.[7] Figure 2 shows a few demographic features of Islamist voters during the Arab Spring period. To some extent, Islamist parties attracted a slightly better off group compared to the average citizen, with less poverty and more education. At the same time, Islamist voters in the seven countries were, on average, not more likely to have fulltime employment. They were slightly younger but had no gender defined profile. All in all, this does not look like to typical profile of clientelistic voters nor like a pronounced economic grievance profile – at least no more than the average MENA citizen at that time.

In addition, these data contain some items that speak to the protest voter argument, at least partly. It is a sensible assumption that protest voters would be those especially concerned with corruption, given its pervasiveness and the involvement of the old political elites in it. A protest vote can be viewed partly a vote against the corrupted status quo. Figure 3 shows the results of different survey items that address these questions. Contrary to expectations, Islamist voters are not more likely than others to mention corruption as their most important problem. In fact, on all other items relating to corruption, they are less likely than other respondents to believe that corruption is pervasive, that it has increased in recent years or that the government handles it badly. As these items come from three surveys, the general finding that Islamist supporters do not match the protest voter profile when it comes to corruption appears quite robust.
...

A bit dangerous to generalise but interesting to look what motivates the Islamists that rose to prominence often after the initial wave of the Arab Spring. Islam being the answer is to be expected. I do find corruption not being a priority for them here a bit surprising.

Syria has been described as an even greater failure for the aspirations of the MB than Egypt. The revolt is now mostly Islamist too often very extreme Salafists and mostly failed as a popular movement in urban Syria. Whereas at the other end of the ideological spectrum reheated Apoism thrives under US airpower. Certainly not what anybody predicted the Arab Spring with would lead to.

The comparison with young, reactionary Le Pen voters in France is an interesting one. Strong signs of a cultural identity movement there as well even if it is Catholic and increasingly defined in opposition to Muslim immigrants.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Turkey May Launch New Ground Offensive against US-Backed Forces in Syria

...
Erdogan may use an operation against Tel Abyad to demonstrate his ability to rally Arab tribal support in order to force the U.S. to reconsider. Turkey convened 50 Sunni Arab tribal leaders from eastern Syria in the Turkish town of Sanliurfa, north of Tel Abyad, in mid-March to discuss resistance against the YPG. Turkey formed a new Syrian Arab military force named the “Eastern Shield Army” on April 19, likely drawing from the tribes represented at the summit in Sanliurfa. The group includes members from the al-Nai’m tribe, which operates near Tel Abyad, in addition to rebel fighters linked to al Qaeda that operated in eastern Syria before the rise of ISIS in late 2014. The group’s influence reportedly extends through Raqqa and into Deir ez Zour Province, although the size of its fighting force remains unclear. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik stated on April 21 that continued cooperation between the U.S. and the Syrian Kurdish YPG threatens to create “long-term instability” between Arabs and Kurds, signaling Turkey’s intent to exploit Arab discontent with YPG domination in northern Syria.

An operation against Tel Abyad would mark the start of a second phase in Turkey’s military intervention in Syria and its first major ground operation directly against the YPG. Turkey began its intervention in August 2016. It first seized the Syrian border town of Jarablus, west of Tel Abyad, from the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on August 26, 2016 using a similar partnered rebel force. Turkey then cleared the remainder of the ISIS-held Syrian-Turkish border and pushed south to recapture the ISIS-held town of al Bab on February 23. Turkey had only limited success gaining U.S. support for its operations and has not managed to weaken America’s commitment to the SDF. The U.S. provided intermittent support to Turkey’s operations against ISIS but blocked Turkey’s move to attack the SDF near al Bab. Erdogan’s resolve to prevent the SDF from taking Raqqa City has not diminished. President Trump congratulated Erdogan for his victory in the Turkish referendum earlier this month, which may have emboldened Erdogan to start a new phase of his Syrian campaign. Erdogan reciprocated on April 28, stating “I believe that we will open a fresh page with Trump” in a conference in Istanbul.
...

Stein wasn't sure if the Eastern Shield build up was aimed at Sinjar in Iraq. Tel Abyad is perhaps a more obvious target as splitting away Arab units of SDF is more likely to compromise the PKK's position as a tool of US policy. There's plenty of rebel, Arab tribal and even Kurdish hostility to the PKK for the Turks to work with. What that is is potentially an insurgency with cross border state backing in Rojava and those are very difficult to end. ISW is probably correct this can compromise the planned Raqqa operation and delay may be wiser.

Though I doubt the Turks can be swayed while there's a PKK uprising in their SE. As with IS it's a containment policy. The Turks will want to cut lines of communication to the PKK in Turkey and probably Iraq. The US insisting there's no connection with Rojava won't wash. Unfortunately political conditions in Turkey both enable Erdogan and provoke the PKK there. Obama dropped the ball on engaging with the PKK and Ankara when things were far more favourable. Trump essentially continuing the same policy suffers the consequences.

ISW is shy of the Turkish plans mainly because they believe it will lead to advances to AQ; the radical Salafist Ahar al Sham being pivotal. It's a fair criticism as growing the Salafist base in the revolt probably does provide AQ with opportunities. You could make the same observation on how US support to the rebels in Idlib has gone where Ahar have now absorbed several US supported groups and are the only thing blocking complete AQ dominance in Idlib.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The WSJ U.S. Patrolling Syrian Border to Stop Turk-Kurd Clashes

A bandaid on US policy.

 

[DownwardDog]

Environment getting steadily richer in IAF targets. Note tendency to strike on fronts with opposition. I'd guess that's where intelligence is strongest.

With this and the Damascus airport op are the Russians turning a blind eye to the boys from Hatzerim having it large all over Syria to stop Hezbollah getting too big for their Crocs?

Or is there nothing in those S-400 launchers but barrels of pickled cabbage?

 

[CrabbedOne]

From ICR Fighting ISIS: The Road to and beyond Raqqa

...
Outside majority-Kurdish areas, however, this governance model appears fragile. Thousands of Arabs now participate in YPG-led military efforts – whether due to conscription, need of salaries or desire to liberate home areas from ISIS. But they are doing so on behalf of an organisation whose militantly secular culture clashes with local norms, whose Kurdish identity many view as a threat and which has shown no inclination to share power meaningfully.

Efforts by the YPG (and its Self-Administration) to achieve Arab buy-in to its project have been partial and haphazard and do not amount to a meaningful share in governance. Official rhetoric signals inclusiveness and pluralism, but YPG flags and posters of Öcalan adorn streets and town squares (including in majority-Arab areas) in a manner typical of autocratic, single-party rule elsewhere in the region. Arab figures willing to participate in the Self-Administration are handed impressive titles but no real authority. Local governance bodies function as channels to convey complaints and petitions rather than as platforms for effective participation, while ultimate power of decision rests with the Qandil-trained PKK cadres. Beyond that, these institutions are limited to the distribution of meagre services that are unlikely to purchase the loyalty of otherwise sceptical citizens.

That leaves the Self-Administration’s security provision as the primary pillar for its claim to legitimacy. Yet, even this asset can turn into a liability: residents appear relieved at the degree of safety and order provided, but wary of the PKK cadres-led, Kurdish-dominated Asayesh security forces that uphold it. During a March 2017 Crisis Group visit to the majority-Arab town of Tel Abyad and nearby areas, the Asayesh’s efforts to staff checkpoints with local Arab personnel, while notable, were deemed insignificant by Arab residents. As an Arab professional participating in the Self-Administration put it, “most of the problems the Self-Administration is asked to solve have been created by the security forces in the first place”. Another added: “The Arab recruits have no authority; people’s [problems] come from the Asayesh cadres”. Arbitrary detentions are a particularly common complaint and a reminder that the success of the YPG and Asayesh in limiting ISIS attacks must be measured against the heavy-handed tactics they employ, which themselves can drive new recruits toward ISIS.
...

As in Iraq as IS recedes local gripes will come to the fore. Not going to be helped for having earned the hostility of all the neighbours except an untrustworthy Damascus.

Sees an R+6 battle for Deir coming with a heavy involvement of IRGC backed Shia militias. That's also going to very unpopular with the locals.

Has a series of recommendations. Undoubtedly the US frankly engaging with the PKK as a whole and trying to deescalate the war in SE Turkey is necessary. I doubt the PKK are going to tolerate many changes to their quirky way of governance and Apo idolatry; it's their revolution. As this report points out it's worked well enough in Kurdish areas. Assembling a separate force to the SDF to handle Deir as ISW recommended recently may play well with the Gulfies but I suspect the IRGC have other plans that are already far better developed. The future of Deir is going to be even more complicated than Raqqa.

Like Iraq in 2008 the conditions for a second round with IS in Syria around the Middle Euphrates appear rather favourable.

 

[CrabbedOne]

With this and the Damascus airport op are the Russians turning a blind eye to the boys from Hatzerim having it large all over Syria to stop Hezbollah getting too big for their Crocs?

Or is there nothing in those S-400 launchers but barrels of pickled cabbage?

The first thing the Russian did when they intervened was arrange deconfliction with the IAF. Unlike the Iranians they are not interested in any sort of scrap with that lot. I don't think the Russians mind Assad's palace windows getting regularly rattled Israeli bombs. That awkward bugger is best kept squittery.

They also seem to have sold the Israelis a crock on limiting Iran's influence in Syria. Iran's since escalated it's ground involvement considerably while feeding the Israelis they were doing the opposite initially. Obviously a mutual plan. I'd see tolerating the resulting escalating IAF airstrikes as a sop to a party that really got the shit end of the stick. The recent strike near Palmyra seemed to be a bit much for the Russians and wasn't repeated.

 

[Idris2002]

Or is there nothing in those S-400 launchers but barrels of pickled cabbage?

"Reds launch new hell weapon".

 

[CrabbedOne]

"Reds launch new hell weapon".

And sells it to the terrible Turk.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Thread.

The DoD is sleepwalking into being the "smurfs" of the Northern Syrian border. It's like Clinton in Kosovo and that proved to be a much longer expensive commitment that George Bush attacked him for. Bit ironic after all of Trump's anti-interventionist posturing he seems to be back to US troops being "armed social workers" within less than a quarter.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Russia's Unrelenting Attacks on Syrian Civilians

Russia’s campaign against Syrian civilians continued undeterred by the U.S. strike on April 6 in response to the Bashar al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in southern Idlib. Local reports indicate Russia regularly used incendiary munitions and bunker buster munitions in Idlib and Aleppo Provinces in order to inflict mass casualties on the population in rebel-held terrain following the U.S. strike. Russian airstrikes also targeted local civilian infrastructure from April 4 - 25, including hospitals, schools, mosques, and civil defense centers across Syria. Russia continually targeted Khan Shaykhoun, the site of the regime’s chemical attack on April 4, throughout the reporting period. Furthermore, activists claimed Russia targeted a hospital and civil defense center treating those wounded in Khan Shaykhoun immediately following the regime’s sarin gas attack. The use of chemical weapons is just one of many means the pro-regime coalition has to punish anti-Assad populations in Syria. Russia remains a principal contributor to President Assad’s purposeful campaign to target Syrian civilians. The Assad regime has a long history of violence against its own people, but the advanced capabilities Russia has brought to theater have allowed the pro-regime coalition to target civilians with even greater precision.
...

Some of this is no doubt what we would call "collateral damage" but the Russian way of COIN in Afghanistan and Chechnya also featured the punitive pounding of enemy Civ Pop. ISW will insist that this enables support for Salafi-Jihadis; it probably does. However lots of civilians have been getting killed by Coalition bombs and that feeds directly into Takfiri narratives about our malign intent as well.

I doubt locals see any great distinction. Orderly Russian authoritarian motivations in propping up Assad's oppression will poking the US in the eye may even be less obscure. Ours in enabling the PKK and Iran aligned post-Saddam Iraqi state while being allied with the Turks and Gulfies may mystify conservative Sunni Arabs. How to explain to constantly bombarded people we are mainly afraid of folk inspired by IS occasionally driving vehicles into crowds or going postal in gay nightclubs or disability centres? The Iraqi's poll as often believing we are on IS's side and that conspiracy theory is an understandable rationalisation of our strange entanglements.

Airwars are also reporting Russian airstrikes and civilian deaths in Syria are rising fast

More civilians are reportedly dying as a result of Russian airstrikes in Syria than at any time since the fall of east Aleppo, the latest Airwars research indicates. Heavy Russian backing for ongoing Assad regime campaigns in Aleppo, Hama and Idlib governorates has led to rebel groups being pushed back and scores of civilians killed.

For the first three months of 2017, the US-led Coalition was likely responsible for a greater number of civilian deaths in Iraq and Syria than Russia’s campaign in support of the Assad regime. That grim metric reflected both a reduction in the number of Russian strikes, and a stepped up and deadlier Coalition campaign around Mosul and Raqqa. However, new analysis by Airwars researchers indicates Russian strikes are once more on the increase, allegedly killing hundreds of additional civilians.

Alleged Russian civilian casualty incidents nearly doubled between February and March, rising from 60 to 114 events. Already in April at least 120 events have been tracked. Due to a backlog of cases it will be some time before Airwars researchers can more fully vet these allegations, though such event tracking has previously proved a helpful guide to the tempo of Russian actions.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

On SST “U.S. Patrolling Syrian Border to Stop Turk-Kurd Clashes” - TTG

Sees little video evidence of big Turkish build up.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Direct Power struggle between regime, Kurdish Self-Administration plays out in region’s largest public hospital

...
With no other option, Umm Mustafa went to one of the city’s private hospitals and paid SP70,000 (approx. $327) out of pocket. The unexpected amount put her painfully in debt, forced to borrow from her family members.

“What was I to do, I didn’t have any other choice,” she told Syria Direct.

“Look, I don’t care who is in charge of the National Hospital,” she said, now the mother of a girl, her first child. “All that I care about is that I am able to get the medical care that I need because like thousands of people here, I am unable to bear the burden of such high hospital costs.”

In 2014 and 2015, the Syrian Arab Army reportedly seized around 50 beds from the hospital for their guards and soldiers in the area, one of the hospital’s staff members told Syria Direct. Similarly, in 2016, the same staff member accused the Asayish of pillaging the hospital for their own use, sending medical supplies to their own frontlines, particularly during the August fighting with the regime.

“There is nothing we can do about it,” the same member of the medical team told Syria Direct.

“The average citizen doesn’t care if he’s seeing the two-star regime flag or the one-star Kurdish flag [over the hospital],” the source said. “What he cares about is that he can actually find treatment.”

An Asayish spokeswoman in the Jazira Canton, Fidan Hissi, defended the Kurdish police force’s presence within the hospital, saying “they are ensuring that the hospital can continue providing services to residents.” The Asayish, she said, “is a security force that takes its orders from the political administration, one that represents the civilian government in the Jazira canton.”

Syrian state media has not commented on the dispute beyond a brief mention earlier this month of a meeting between Al-Hasakah governor Jayez al-Hammoud al-Moussa and a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding “the restoration of the National Hospital in the city.”

Umm Sirdar, a Hasakah city resident and mother in her fifties, has kidney disease. Before the hospital ran out of fuel in March, Umm Sirdar, who suffers from kidney failure, received free dialysis treatment three times a week. Now, she has to turn to the private sector, as her son, who lives in Germany, pays SP20,000 (approx. $93.30) for each treatment. But, even with the help of his remittances, she can only afford to receive one dialysis session per week.

“It always seems that we’re the victims of this perpetual conflict between the regime and the Kurds,” she told Syria Direct.

“I can’t tell you where things are going, but I just hope that it isn’t more of a disaster than what we’re already experiencing.”

PKK becoming assertive in al Hasakah takes over the state hospital. The regime then pulls support for it and demands the Syrian flag be restored over it. PKK can't afford to fund the hospital ends up charging the penniless population for care.

Now why is the wealthy Coalition not trucking in diesel from the KRG to run the hospital generators or just handing over a slab of US Dollars to buy it on the Irbil black market? There's is not a great deal of evidence of US interest in Rojava's governance which suggests the usual very transient approach to disposable auxiliaries as hinted at by TTG above.

 

[Jeremiah18.17]

Observer journalist managed to get through KRG blockade to report on YPG
-YPJ and British international volunteers in advance on Raqqa:
'Hundreds of us will die in Raqqa’: the women fighting Isis

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War Is Boring Who Will Control Raqqa After the Islamic State?

...
It’s unclear if the Syrian government will acquiesce to long-term SDF control over Deir Ezzor or Raqqa.

Professor Joshua Landis from the University of Oklahoma, a foremost commentator and expert on Syria, said in a recent interview that Assad is “the obvious person to take it back,”—“it” being Raqqa and the wider Euphrates River Valley, which includes the entire provinces of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor—since “he has an army, he’s backed by the Russians, he’s the legitimate ruler according to the U.N. and this is going to be taken by him if the Kurds don’t take it.”

Landis also believes the Kurds have common cause with the regime insofar as both don’t want an “irredentist Sunni state created in the middle of Syria that is funded by Saudi Arabia and Turkey.”

Nevertheless, sharing a common cause with Assad doesn’t mean the SDF will easily give up its newly-won territory.

“The SDF will likely try to establish a military council with local tribes [in Raqqa] that are at least not antagonistic to the Kurdish-YPG/PYD ambitions of establishing a united Kurdish territory,” Hossam Abouzhar, an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center told War Is Boring.

“Whether or not they will cede control of it back to Damascus is a more long term question,” he added.

Abouzhar recently co-authored an article for the Atlantic Council which observed that: “The PYD is determined to gain some autonomy from the regime, which requires a de-facto border agreement (likely along the Euphrates River area).”

He also points out that the ruling Kurdish authorities in northern Syria have “effectively repressed internal competition, but the regime still pays public sector salaries in Kurdish areas, forcing the PYD to depend on it.”

Even though the PYD maintains cordial relations with Damascus—it never joined the uprising against Assad—the regime is still reluctant “to share Syrian land.”

“The question of whether or not the U.S. will push the SDF to keep control of the city is one of how the U.S. is willing to use its influence,” Abouzhar told War Is Boring. “Pushing the SDF to retain control could be a way for the U.S. to put pressure on the Syrian regime to concede on certain points, but doing so would antagonize the regime and its Russian and Iranian backers, something that the U.S. avoided until the recent military strike against Shayrat Air Base.”


Abouzhar is therefore uncertain if this longstanding U.S. position in Syria will change.

“However,” he concluded. “if the U.S. decides to be involved in reconstruction in Syria, it might be willing, and even need to, use Raqqa and other tools at its disposal to put non-military pressure on the regime to implement political changes.”

Some sort of deal between the regime and the PKK over Deir and Raqqa does appear likely. Deir city remains in regime hands. Neither appears very welcome in Raqqa though it once was an area of regime support. Both would deny Raqqa to Turkish supported rebels who the locals seem to favour. Both are going to be overstretched. In Afrin in return for covers against the Turks the PKK maintained control and just adopted regime symbols. The US and Gulfies won't like this but neither appeared committed enough to Syria to stop it happening.