And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment Katibat Dir’ al-Watan: New Sub-Unit of the Fifth Legion

...
What is particularly interesting about this new unit is the incorporation of Lebanese fighters into this unit from the northern Beqaa/Homs countryside border areas with Russian support. The pro-Hezbollah and pro-regime outlet Lebanon Debate writes in an article about Katibat Dir’ al-Watan:

“The peoples of the border villages of the Beqaa have taken on their shoulders the protection of their security from the takfiri expansion. This area, of tribal nature, present on the shoulder of Syrian Qusayr, constituted in 2013 the tributary for the advance of Hezbollah from the Lebanese side in the operation through which the armed groups were removed from the borders of Lebanon. After four years, the area is being penetrated again from its wide doors.

According to estimates, 30,000 Lebanese live in 12 Syrian villages on the borders of Lebanon. The difference is that these people are Lebanese citizens who have fulfilled their obligations [of citizenship] and have chosen to live on the Syrian side as there are no geographic barriers separating the two sides, but rather it is a natural extension for the families and tribes of the Hermel. In the beginning of the events, these families and tribes were able through coordinating with Hezbollah and the Syrian and Lebanese armies to protect these villages through youth sharpened to raise arms, making their villages logistical rear bases securing the resistance’s back firstly, creating an aperture for it secondly, and eliminating the force of takfir thirdly.

The role that the area played in the Qusayr battles, in addition to its adhesion to the Syrian depth that is located on the line of the armed presence as well as its geographic and family value, pushed those interested in the military matter to specify for it a real role. Hezbollah worked to incorporate dozens of youth under its banner, and likewise the Syrian army that designated for them a sideline role within the National Defence Forces played a role, in addition to groups that remained within the families but were supported by the concerned parties: the development has been such that with the Russian entry into the Syrian battleground, they have worked to connect the bridges, as the Russians understood the extent of the importance of this region on the Lebanese hip first and the hip of Homs second.

A while ago, a senior Russian general visited the 12 villages that Lebanese dwell in, and he met Lebanese family and tribal groups, of whom the most prominent face was al-Hajj Muhammad Ja’afar, whose name has circulated widely in the past time from the understanding that he is one of the notables of the Hermel region and has wide links, and secondly from the understanding that his son is ‘Hadi’ who was killed at a checkpoint of the Lebanese army, and the revenge operation that followed from that.

The visit, which occurred far removed from the media, revealed the existence of a Russian intention to work with the sons of the area, in accordance with Moscow’s plans in Syria. According to what the sources of ‘Lebanon Debate’ affirm, multiple meetings occurred, resulting in a general conception, military and developmental.
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Note the Russian involvement. The Russians have shown quite and interest in working with Lebanese Shia. In this case a group resident in Syria.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE Evacuations begin under deal for Shia and Sunni towns in Syria

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The transfer of the Shia populations of two Syrian towns, in exchange for moving Sunni rebels and civilians out of two others, has started, under an evacuation deal between warring parties, an AFP correspondent and a local source said.

An AFP correspondent in rebel-held Rashidin, west of Aleppo city, said at least 80 buses arrived in the region from government-held Fuaa and Kafraya in Idlib province. A rebel source in Idlib told AFP "the implementation of the deal started in the morning".

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) confirmed the beginning of the evacuation saying that buses carrying residents left the majority Shia towns of Fuaa and Kefraya, but had not yet crossed into government-held territory.

Madaya resident Amjad al-Maleh, who spoke to AFP on the phone from one of the buses leaving opposition-controlled Madaya and Zabadani at about 6am local time, said: "We just left now, around 2,200 people in around 65 buses."

Buses carrying mostly Sunni rebel fighters and their families simultaneously left the town of Madaya near Damascus, encircled by government forces and their allies, but were still passing through government-held areas, the Observatory said.

More than 30,000 people are expected to be evacuated under the deal, which began on Wednesday with an exchange of prisoners between rebels and government forces.

All 16,000 residents of Fuaa and Kafraya are expected to leave, heading to government-held Aleppo, the coastal province of Latakia or Damascus. Civilian residents of Madaya and Zabadani will reportedly be allowed to remain if they choose.
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The Four Towns sectarian sorting out.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE 'We want anyone to get that bastard': Assad escalates air war after gas attack

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But chemical weapons have also been used again, the report states.

“In a clear challenge to the international community, the Syrian regime… used chemical weapons for a second time in an attack in al Qaboun neighbourhood in the capital Damascus after 72 hours of using the same weapons in Khan Sheikhun.”

The report does not state exactly which gas was used, but rebels and activists have also reported the use of chlorine gas this week in Syria, which is technically not banned under chemical weapons conventions, as it also has commercial uses.
...

20% hike in regime/Russian air strikes, rise in the use of cluster munitions, incendiaries.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Hezbollah’s No. 2: US strike on Syria mere ‘muscle flexing'

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Al-Monitor: Obviously, there is a big difference between the Barack Obama administration and the Donald Trump administration. The latter seems to be much more aggressive toward Iran. In light of this, do you expect any American escalation against Hezbollah?

Qassem: In my opinion, there is no difference between the Obama administration and the Trump administration. The Obama administration was also hostile to Iran [and] issued sanctions against Hezbollah while also waging bad and negative propaganda against the party. This is not to mention that it supports Israel.

Al-Monitor: But Obama said in an interview with Thomas Friedman, for instance, that the main threat to Saudi Arabia comes from inside Saudi Arabia and not from Iran. Trump has a different rhetoric, one that is closer to that of the Gulf countries, that Iran is the source of all problems.

Qassem: The difference between Obama and Trump is that the latter makes direct hostile statements with a lot of uproar and clamor. But for us, all the US administrations are alike, supporting Israel to the fullest against the Palestinians. They are also for the Saudi war on Yemen. This is why I cannot say there is a fundamental difference between the Trump administration and the Obama administration except for some media and tactical additions in Trump’s rhetoric against us and against Iran.
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Main difference with Trump V Obama on Iran so far has been much greater support for the Yemen war.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Map of Kurdistan from a Rojava textbook.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ARANEWS Swedish SDF member says Raqqa operation slightly delayed after ISIS resistance in Tabqa

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The Swedish volunteer also added that it seems the US-led coalition is not providing enough support. “If they did, I believe Tabqa would have been finished by now,” Söder stated. “The support is not enough, according to my sources on the ground here.”

He suggested that the Tabqa operation may take one or two more weeks “after which the SDF could start the battle for the city of Raqqa.”

“The Syrian Democratic Forces have completely isolated the eastside of Raqqa and are currently engaged in a tough battle to seize both the Tabqa Dam and the city of Tabqa, which is to the west of Raqqa,” said the US-led coalition’s land forces commander Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend.

“They were supported by coalition advisers, U.S. and coalition airpower, Marine heavy artillery, and Army Apache helicopter gunships. Make no mistake about it though, the coalition has taken every precaution to ensure the integrity of Tabqa Dam,” he said.

That's what they said during Manbij as well. I'd note AirWars is reporting an awful lot of Coalition air strikes and civilian casualties in the Raqqa area.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Tabqa, where that Swede is fighting.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
The PKK covets Sinjar because its presence allows it to control part of the Syrian border and smuggle goods to its Syrian affiliate, the Syrian Kurdish PYD, whose four-year-old experiment in self rule has come under increasing threat. After rebranding their units in an attempt to hide their PKK origin, the PKK fighters who had rescued the Yazidis claimed to be a local force and stayed in Sinjar. No independent observer I know has fallen for the ruse; the Turkish government, which is locked in a deadly conflict with the PKK in southeastern Turkey, certainly has not. In recent months, Turkey has taken military action against the PKK’s local affiliates in northern Syria and has imposed an economic blockade on the territory under these groups’ control.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurdish KDP sees the PKK as a foreign intruder in Sinjar, and fears both its fighting prowess and its pan-Kurdish ambitions. (PKK fighters have also deployed in other parts of northern Iraq, including Amedi, Makhmour, and Kirkuk.) In northern Syria, the PKK and its local affiliates seek to connect non-contiguous Kurdish districts while putting pressure on Turkey. Last month, a senior Iraqi Kurdish official told me, “The PKK wants to control the border with Syria and our border with Turkey, from the mountains down into the lowlands, and become leader of all Kurds.”

For Turkey, the PKK’s presence in Sinjar is especially threatening because there the interests of Iran and the PKK coincide. To consolidate its land corridor, Iran needs one other crucial link: the Turkmen town of Tel Afar, which is part-Sunni, part-Shia and is situated directly between Sinjar and Mosul. As part of the fight against ISIS in Mosul, driving up from the south and circumnavigating the city, Iran-backed Shia militias made a beeline for Tel Afar and seized its airport. As of early April, some ISIS fighters remained in the town but their defeat is imminent. Once the Shia militias control Tel Afar, they can connect with the PKK in Sinjar, and Iran will have accomplished much of its goal. Iran in 2011 had forged a tactical alliance with the PKK and its Syrian affiliates. Since then, the PKK has relied on Iranian support in Syria and Iraq in return for agreeing to halt the insurgency, carried out by another affiliate, inside Iran (which is home to a large Kurdish population of its own).

The KDP retains a small military presence on the road from Sinjar to Tel Afar and, backed by Turkey, appears ready to block both Iran and the PKK, and regain ground it lost to the PKK three years ago, especially along the Syrian border. On March 3, a KDP-backed brigade of Syrian Kurdish fighters, the so-called Rojava Peshmerga (“Rojava” denoting “western” or Syrian Kurdistan), moved from the Mosul area toward a PKK garrison in Khanasur, a village on the border, provoking a fire fight in which a number of fighters on both sides were killed and injured. Then, on March 14, the PKK retaliated with a provocation of its own, busing hundreds of Syrian civilians into the area, who started a demonstration in Khanasur. Unable to push back the throng, the Rojava Peshmerga opened fire. In the melee, a young woman operating a video camera was killed and several other protesters were injured.
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All about supply lines.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Associates this kidnapping with the four towns deal. Well it is how the Iranians roll.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Bloomberg Russia Says Evidence Growing Syria Chemical Attack Was Staged

Nine out of ten internet trolls can't be wrong!

 

[CrabbedOne]

AQ I'd guess.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The Washington Institute Assad's Chemical Attack Signals an Imminent Idlib Offensive

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THE REGIME'S COUNTERMOVE

It is in this military context that Assad decided to bomb Khan Sheikhoun with nerve gas on April 4. He likely sought to shatter local resistance and stave off further rebel offensives emanating from that area -- though understanding his military motivations does not imply that his purposeful use of strategic weapons against civilians is any less unacceptable.

Syria's military leaders now seem to be preparing for an Idlib offensive with greater urgency. Russia may not agree with launching such a campaign at the moment, but Assad may have felt that he could no longer sit idle on this front while HTS grew stronger. Moreover, Moscow's efforts to divide the rebels have apparently failed -- the success of recent HTS military operations and the furor over the Khan Sheikhoun chemical attack may bring Ahrar al-Sham back into the jihadist fold. Even if the group remains estranged, it has little chance of keeping HTS in check.

To compensate for their manpower shortage, the Syrian army and its allies will presumably continue their approach of using massive, indiscriminate bombardment to force civilians to flee. Once rebel fighters are isolated, the ground attack can begin. Khan Sheikhoun is a major strategic goal in the Hama counteroffensive -- reconquering it would allow the regime to eliminate the rebel threat to Hama and all of central Syria, including Homs. According to the pro-regime website al-Masdar, forces from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah were deployed on the Hama frontline earlier this month, while Russian troops were sent to defend Maharda.

Meanwhile, the regime is continuing its offensive to expel the last of the rebels fighting on the outskirts of Aleppo city. Toward that end, the army could conceivably seek help from Kurdish forces in the Afrin area. The two actors have apparently coordinated their military efforts in the past, namely in the Azaz corridor in February 2016 and during the recapture of East Aleppo in July. More recently, Russia deployed troops to Manbij and northern Afrin last month to protect the Kurds from a possible Turkish intervention, so they may be willing to return the favor by supporting Syrian army operations in Aleppo and Idlib provinces.

Assad's plans for Idlib may yet be constrained by one factor: the uncertain fate of the Shiite towns al-Fua and Kefraya, besieged by rebels since March 2015. Iran and Qatar mediated an agreement under which the towns would be evacuated in exchange for Hezbollah ending its siege of two rebel towns near Damascus, Madaya and Zabadani. The exchange was originally scheduled for April 5 then postponed to April 12; it is ongoing as of this writing. If the evacuation is not completed for whatever reason, a major Idlib offensive would no doubt spur HTS to massacre the Shiites of al-Fua and Kefraya or capture them as hostages.
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Balanche sees Assad resort to Sarin as an overstretched regime's desperate move to counter a multi-front AQ led HTS offensive.

Nice map showing the sectarian hot spots:

 

[CrabbedOne]

Likely the intended effect: deepen sectarian trouble. There are more toxic things than Sarin.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[Mordi]

BBC says that Russian troops are guarding the buses in Govt areas.

Rebels say Damascus breached the terms of the deal brokered by Iran and Qatar, accusing the government of trying to bring out more loyalist fighters than agreed.

According to an 24Aleppo tweet, a special unit of the Russian army surrounded the convoy from the rebel-held towns after the bombing and closed the road there to "prevent any reaction".

 

[agricola]

The buses got blown up today. Between 30 and 100 dead, depending on who you believe; the bomber disguised his bomb as an aid vehicle.

 

[Geri]

My friend Mohammad Alaa Aljaleel (AKA The Cat Man of Aleppo) was there giving sweets to the displaced children when the bomb exploded. His ambulance (that we paid for with donations) was blown into the air and completely destroyed. Some of the children died with the sweets he had given them still in their hands.

Whether this was government forces or rebels, I can't comprehend how anyone could target children like that.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TCF Lebanon Treats Refugees as a Security Problem—and It Doesn’t Work

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The rise of local Syrian strongmen known as the Shawishes within Lebanese displacement camps helps illustrate the consequences of the Lebanese government’s approach to the Syrian refugee crisis. This problematic, ad hoc method allows informal security actors, such as the Shawishes, to thrive in Lebanon’s informal refugee camps. The State Security agency provides the Shawishes with the control they use to exploit camp residents and bully international aid organizations. Most importantly, such arrangements continue to absolve the state of its duty to manage the refugee crisis.

For the first four years of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese government’s crisis response plan had been commonly known as “the policy of no policy.” Today, it is based on a “set of nos.” Political spillover from the Syrian tragedy and Hezbollah’s involvement in the war widened internal and sectarian divisions at the national level in Lebanon. As perpetuated by the government, refugees became a national security threat rather than a population in need of protection.

A non-existent national refugee policy and a proliferation of poorly coordinated emergency response plans by international aid organizations were met with strong, illegal, and hybrid security networks. These networks are unnoticed arrangements between formal security agencies and informal security actors backed by powerful landowning families, tribes, and political party bosses. In Lebanon, the security of refugees is no longer a field of protection or prevention but of control and intimidation. Security is essentially protection from refugees.
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A temporary solution shaped by experience with the Pals to what's also probably a massive permanent displacement. Big contrast to the well ordered camps in Turkey but then Turkey is a big relatively wealthy state.

 

[Mr.Bishie]

The buses got blown up today. Between 30 and 100 dead, depending on who you believe; the bomber disguised his bomb as an aid vehicle.

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: at least 126 people were killed in suicide bomb attack on bus convoy near Aleppo including 68 children

ffs

 

[agricola]

Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats take a stand on the Syria crisis:

The home secretary has been urged to consider revoking the British passport of Asma al-Assad, the UK-born wife of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, after her social media posts in support of his regime.

Led by their foreign affairs spokesman, Tom Brake, the Liberal Democrats have written to Amber Rudd calling on her to use her powers to withdraw Asma Assad’s citizenship.

Brake said: “The first lady of Syria has acted not as a private citizen but as a spokesperson for the Syrian presidency ... Boris Johnson has urged other countries to do more about Syria, but the British government could say to Asma Assad, either stop using your position to defend barbaric acts, or be stripped of your citizenship.”


The Tory MP Nadhim Zahawi backed the call, saying she was “very much part of the propaganda machine that is committing war crimes”.

She has used social media to support her husband’s presidency after the global condemnation of his alleged role in a chemical weapons attack on civilians.

After the US counterstrike on the regime, a message was posted on one of her accounts saying: “The presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that what America has done is an irresponsible act that only reflects a shortsightedness, a narrow horizon, a political and military blindness to reality and a naive pursuit of a frenzied false propaganda campaign.”

Asma Assad was was educated in Britain and worked as an investment banker before she married in 2000. Withdrawing her passport would not leave her stateless, however, because she is thought to be a dual British-Syrian national.

I think its wonderful that they can propose that someones citizenship be stripped from them - despite being born here, raised here and educated here, because of who they married and what they write on Facebook. I am sure that wouldn't set any kind of precedent that people later would regret.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Lobe Log Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: How Revolutionary?

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Far from simply materializing from the ether of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary sermons, the Guard has two historical “precedents” that go a long way toward illuminating its role within the state. One of these precedents is “pro-clerical activism,” which provided Khomeini with his own base of popular support and impelled him to form the Guard as a way of centralizing this religious practice. The other is an ancient mode of political formation called comitatus, vestiges of which live on in the Guard’s relationship to the supreme leader.

Ostovar explains that Shi’a clergy have always enjoyed the support of local devotees who do their bidding: “These pressure groups could advocate for their cleric, his rulings, help collect his taxes, or even act in his honor.” In the 19th and 20th centuries, this relationship intensified, with cleric-aligned gangs using “acts of protest–including physical violence and intimidation–as methods of coercion to influence politics at the local and national levels.” During the revolution, Khomeini’s peers had their own local constituencies and militias, which might have had sympathies for him but not allegiance. Khomeini thus had an interest in uniting a critical mass of these militants under a single banner. “The IRGC became the superstructure by which the impulse of pro-clerical activism was harnessed,” Ostovar writes. “It legitimated this social and political function.”
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Has the IRGC as perhaps being part of the Persian Imperial legacy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Well the failed mutiny pretty much destroyed TSK resistance to direct action in Syria anyway.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's blog Al-Ghalibun: Inside Story of a Syrian Hezbollah Group

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As far as the size of the group goes, al-Ghalibun is relatively small. Its fighters likely do not exceed the hundreds in number. Yet there is a clear desire to expand recruitment. In the aggregate, the Iranian desire to turn the Syrian Hezbollah movement into a real political force in Syria is evident. Yet the immediate problem such a project apparently faces is that the Shi'a constitute only a very small proportion of the Syrian population. It cannot realistically be expected that Syria can be transformed into a country with a Shi'i plurality or majority that can create the Islamic Republic of Syria on the model of Iran's system of government. Even making the Shi'a a substantive minority of 10-20% in Syria would present a significant challenge. It should also be remembered that in Lebanon, where Shi'a constitute a much larger proportion of the population, the powerful existing Hezbollah movement cannot transform the entire country into the Islamic Republic of Lebanon.

Incorporating more and more non-Shi'a into Syrian Hezbollah, with any conversions to Shi'i Islam through more subtle means a bonus, is a logical step in trying to make the movement a meaningful political force- something that will give Iran more staying power in Syria's affairs. In the nearer term, promoting Iran's ideology of wilayat al-faqih ('guardianship of the jurist') among the existing Syrian Shi'a populations through Syrian Hezbollah, and other Shi'a across the region through the jihad in Syria more generally, is a realistic goal for Iran.

The evolution of the group's banner from something very HA to a more Syrian look is interesting:

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TSG IntelBrief: The Never-Ending Nightmare for Syrian Civilians

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According to reports by the BBC, a car approached the buses as they were near Aleppo, filled with evacuees from Foah and Kefraya. The driver of the vehicle reportedly passed out crisps to the evacuees. The gesture was apparently a tactic meant to create a crowd of people around the vehicle, as many of the evacuees—particularly the children—were likely desperate for food. The explosion killed at least 120 people; according to reports, at least 68 children were among the dead.

This latest reprehensible attack was met with the usual condemnation—Pope Francis specifically mentioned the attack during his Easter sermon in St. Peter’s Square. Yet, despite the outrage, the near-daily pattern of atrocities against civilians in Syria will almost certainly continue. Each crime against civilians makes the chances for a ceasefire and negotiated end to the war more and more remote—to say nothing of a true and lasting peace. The damage done to the very fabric of Syrian society through the deliberate murder of civilians—perpetrated by all sides in the conflict—is catastrophic in every sense.

A touch more like something out or Iraq's savage terrorist war than Syria.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On AirWars New studies confirm Syrian building struck by US drones was a mosque

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US officials still insist that the target, successfully hit that night, was ‘an Al Qaeda in Syria meeting location,” and that the smaller building across the street had been identified by the Americans as a mosque, and therefore avoided.

“Intelligence indicated that al Qaida leaders used the partially-constructed community meeting hall as a gathering place, and as a place to educate and indoctrinate al Qaida fighters,” Pentagon spokesperson Eric Pahon told Airwars after the attack.

Yet Forensic Architecture concludes that this identification was incorrect, along with initial claims that the strike had taken place across the border in Idlib, and that no civilians were killed. Researchers at Bellingcat determined that the civilian casualties due to the strike “are partially the result of the building’s misidentification.” Central to the disparity in accounts was an apparent American determination that because they had identified one mosque, the building across the street – which was in fact a larger, newer mosque – couldn’t be one as well.

Witnesses, including the director of Aleppo’s Civil Defense, told Human Rights Watch that victims were not wearing military clothing. In its report, Human Rights Watch said it “has not found evidence to support the allegation that members of al-Qaeda or any other armed group were meeting in the mosque.”

“The US authorities’ failure to understand the most fundamental aspects of the target and pattern of life around the target raises the question whether officers were criminally reckless in authorizing the attack,” concluded HRW researchers.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[butchersapron]

Some syrians. If they're allowed.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aleppo24 The Assad regime threatens displaced employees from Aleppo to sack them from their positions if they do not return to their ravaged homes in the city

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This decision issued by the regime seeks to achieve a media victory about the restoring of life and security in areas they captured from the opposition in eastern Aleppo, and also to alleviate the suffering of the locals in Latikiyah province who think that the displaced are taking job opportunities from their sons.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On LAT Syria’s government helped create a rebel bastion — then attacked it with poison gas, the U.S. says

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With Idlib as their base, jihadist groups last month launched an offensive on the neighboring province of Hama — an advance that the U.S. says pushed the Syrian government to deploy chemical weapons.

The rebels have also continued to threaten Aleppo and Latakia, the Mediterranean coastal region that is the heartland of government support.

There were signs that the Syrian government was also planning to push back.

Assad, who regularly insists that his forces will “liberate every inch of the country,” said in an interview last year with the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya that Idlib’s position near Turkey meant: “You cannot cut. You have to clean.”

“You have to keep cleaning this area and to push the terrorists to Turkey to go back to where they come from, or to kill them,” he said. “There’s no other option.”

And Ali Haidar, who as the minister of reconciliation was responsible for crafting the local truces that sent rebel fighters to Idlib, said in an interview with Reuters this year that “Idlib is one of the coming hot areas.”

Unless there were an international deal to diffuse the situation, the government planned “open battle” with the rebels there, he said.

Still, the government can afford to let the rebels linger awhile longer in Idlib, Lund said.

Syrian government forces “besieged the areas they really need to clear out — basically the big cities and the central territories, the places where the war will be won or lost, which is not Idlib.”

I tend to agree with Balanche here. That last series of rebel offensives was a shock to the regime. Assad may be rising to dominance but it's still shaky with rebels too close to coastal Latakia and supply lines vulnerable to being cut.

The Idlib rebels may be divided and squabbling but they're now in two big blocks. Ahar al Sham has 20K beards and Turkey behind it distracted by the PKK but still unpredictable. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham has up to 40K fighters under AQ command. The Southern rebels are mostly mercs working for the Jordanians but can't be written off either. He must also reach out Eastward to reclaim IS as they retreat. The big rebel enclave of Eastern Ghouta has yet to be entirely reduced. Assad has more defensive troops but a deployable force of maybe 50K and an advantage in terms of air and heavy equipment. This isn't overwhelming especially when the enemy has a defensive advantage. Much of the SAA is fragile and tends to run away from IS or AQ led offensives. Sudden losses of ground as happened above Hama are common. Assad must patiently chip away at various fronts, preserve his limited resources and exploit weaknesses. It will be a slow grind.