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And next, Syria?


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The leaders of the South and East Mediterranean fully understand that the EU is not in a position to resist this blackmail of immigrants. In the Middle East, three regional powers (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran) are fighting for control of the region with the support of the United States and Russia. But the EU is absent from this political and military confrontation and its only flimsy tool is financial diplomacy. It must resolve to accept authoritarian regimes in its Mediterranean periphery, for the political stability of the region is the best protection against mass immigration. The EU is caught between the defences of European values, which limit its geopolitical weight, and the denial of these values for fear of retaliation, since it has deprived itself of the power of coercion. The rapid demographic inflation of sub-Saharan Africa and the stalemate in many Southern Mediterranean countries will force the EU to drastically change its immigration and foreign policies.
Balanche argues Assad isn't going to decide to leave because a few billion dollars of aid are denied him so the migrant fearing EU might as well bite the bullet and help to reconstruct Useful Syria. After all far more than that has been spent aiding the proxy war that's killed over 100K of his conscripted army and dealing with Syria's resulting IS infestation. That hasn't loosened him much. Syria isn't going to be stable with or without Assad either but denying parts of it a decent water supply isn't going to make things better there.
 
On Al Monitor Will Jordan confront IS in southern Syria?
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But the biggest threat may come from the so-called Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army, which pledged allegiance to IS in 2016 and is now in control of a number of villages in the Yarmouk River basin a few kilometers from the Jordanian border, not far from Jordan’s second largest city of Irbid. The 1,500-strong fighting group is said to be in possession of artillery and T-55 tanks. Jordan is also alarmed by the presence of Iranian-backed militias and Hezbollah fighters in southern Syria. Abdullah, in the Washington Post interview, said Iranian Revolutionary Guards were 70 kilometers (43 miles) from the Jordanian borders. “If it is bad news for us, you have to put the Israeli equation into this,” he said.

Adding to Jordan’s growing apprehension is the fact that Sham Liberation Headquarters (SLH), led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Liberation of the Sham Committee), formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, has made significant gains in the southern Syrian city of Daraa as recently as April 15. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is labeled as a terrorist organization with links to al-Qaeda and is not involved in the Geneva and Astana political processes. Jordan had reached an understanding with Russia to pacify southern Syria and deliver moderate Syrian opposition groups there to the Astana cease-fire talks. The Daraa confrontations, which have been raging for weeks, have complicated Jordan’s plans in southern Syria since other jihadi groups are now a few kilometers from the kingdom’s borders with Syria.
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Probably mostly by proxy. Note AQ's also spreading in the South.
 
On Reuters Russia's undeclared death toll in Syria battle creeps higher
Apr 18 The death toll among Russian forces in Syria during a period of intense fighting to retake the city of Palmyra now stands at 21, according to evidence gathered by Reuters, after information emerged about the deaths of three military contractors.

The Reuters tally over the period from Jan. 29 until the end of March is more than four times higher than the official toll given by the Russian defence ministry of five servicemen killed. Russian forces are backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his war with rebels and militants seeking to oust him.

Reuters reported last month, based on conversations with friends and relatives of the killed men, social media posts, and cemetery officials, that 18 Russian citizens had been killed from Jan. 29 to March 31.

Since then, Reuters has established the deaths in combat of a further three - Alexei Safonov, Vladimir Plutinsky and Mikhail Nefedov - that interviews with people close to them indicated they were military contractors rather than regular servicemen.
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Interesting thread exploring the weakness of conflict stats.

As far as I can tell the Assad regime has fought IS relatively little as they were rarely a threat to crucial urban territory in Useful Syria. The regime defended its isolated bases out in the empty East but only held Deir. The SAA collapsed easily as IS grabbed Palmyra with a tiny force. IS did that again recently even when heavy Russian and Iranian support was provided. So it's a bit daft to call the Regime "the anvil" in the war against IS.

The main significance of the regime has been holding the big urban centres were they have support. Also in having not treated the PKK as enemy as it grew stronger in the East but a preferred alternative to the rebels. If the regime had fallen in 2013 IS might well have grabbed parts of Useful Syria as there was really no coherent alternative to stop them. What's changed is the Northern revolt in Idlib is now dominated by AQ who the regime are engaged in fighting. It's not clear if that will be to any decisive end. The regime role is more like containment than anything else. It certainly comes with a price as Assad's both brutal and inconclusive methods do aid Salafi-Jihadi recruitment. We probably should appreciate Syria is likely to be a permanently troubled area no matter who rules Damascus.

It's wrong to think of this war on IS only in a Syrian context. Most of the fighting against IS has happened in their home Iraq where they controlled large urban centres. That's where IS themselves report using the majority of the resources. They regularly move forces across the border. The anvil has been battles like that for the Baghdad Belts then Tikrit, Baiji, Ramadi and Mosul. The main anti-IS force in these big urban fights the Iraqi ISF. Second to them the Peshmergas of the KRG and the irregulars of the Hashd.
 
On War Is Boring The U.S. Military Expands Its Network of Syrian Air
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The United States is unlikely gearing up for such an enormous build-up. Keeping U.S. planes based at and flying out of Incirlik requires some 5,000 American airmen maintaining the base’s facilities and supply chains. Helicopters are one thing, but basing warplanes in Syria, while not impossible, would require a sizable force of troops to protect them, and costly work bringing the runways and assorted infrastructure up to standard.

Gonul Tol of the Middle East Institute told Voice of America that Tabqa, a full-fledged—albeit now damaged—air base formerly used by the Syrian regime, “does not measure up to NATO military standards. I don’t think it can be an alternative to Incirlik.”

So, we probably won’t see F-15s and F-16s from Incirlik relocating to northeast Syria and operating as the Russians do, with regime permission, from their base in Syria’s western Latakia province. Were the U.S. to base combat aircraft in Syria, rugged AH-64 Apache helicopters and A-10 Warthog ground attackers are more realistic choices.

The Syrian regime also opposes unauthorized troop deployments on its soil. It once dropped barrel bombs on Turkish-backed militiamen during Turkey’s Euphrates Shield campaign and even threatened to shoot Turkish jet fighters out of the sky.

Neither Ankara nor Washington coordinated their respective troop deployments or campaigns in Syria with Damascus, but had deconfliction mechanisms in place with the Russian military. And since U.S. President Donald Trump’s missile strike on the regime’s Shayrat Air Base, tensions between the United States and Syria, along with Russia, have, unsurprisingly, increased.

In Iraq, the U.S. military works with the central government in Baghdad and provides it with air, logistical and training support. But even there the United States hasn’t sought to base or operate its warplanes from Iraq. The U.S. military has instead used the dilapidated Qayyarah West Airfield as a logistical hub and firebase to support the Mosul offensive and to base Apache gunships.

It’s still unclear if the United States will risk deploying gunships to Kobani or Tabqa. After all, U.S. helicopters haven’t seen extensive use in the Mosul operation, and Mosul is a far larger and more significant city than Islamic State-held Raqqa. Expect the growing U.S. presence in Syria—now including Marines and artillery—to continue resembling the American strategy in Iraq, albeit on a smaller scale.
 
Not sure if people are interested in this or how they feel about it. I see it's based on the works of a Russian photographer
Syria: A Conflict Explored

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On MEE Syria moves aircraft to Russian airbase, say US officials
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Speaking to ABC news, a US official said that "most" of Syria’s extant operational fixed wing military aircraft have been moved to the Hmeimim airbase near Latakia, which Russia recently signed a 49-year lease on.

On 6 April, the US hit Syria’s central Shayrat air base with cruise missiles, in response to a chemical weapons attack several days earlier in Idlib, which killed at least 87 civilians. The west has pointed the finger at the Syrian government, which continues to deny responsibility.

But Sam Heller, a Syria analyst at the Century Foundation, told MEE that the relocation of aircraft, if confirmed, was not necessarily an indication the US sought to renew strikes against Syrian government positions.

"This is a sensible precaution, but I don't think it necessarily means that Syria is anticipating imminent new US strikes, which, in any case, don't seem to be forthcoming," he said.

Even before the US attack on Shayrat, it was expected that "if the United States or others struck Syrian regime targets, the regime would respond by more extensively intermingling and collocating its own forces with those of Russia".

The US, Heller added, was not looking for any confrontation with Russia.

"The United States – as it signaled with the forewarning it gave to Russia ahead of the April 6 strikes – is not interested in endangering Russian personnel or risking an escalation with Russia over Syria. So this would be the logical next step for the regime and its Russian patron."

The US government has also not shown signs that it is planning to attack Syrian government positions again any time soon, Heller said.

"So far there's basically no indication that Washington is actually willing to commit to military action outside the parameters of the specific, chemical weapons-focused deterrent logic that officials outlined after the [Shayrat] strike."
 
On ISW Syria Situation Report: April 14 - 20, 2017
Russia, Iran, and Syria demonstrated their enduring partnership during a trilateral foreign ministerial meeting in Moscow on April 14 to discuss their response to the recent strike by the U.S. against Shayrat Airbase in Syria on April 6. The ministers stressed the three countries share “common procedures against any aggression” and expressed concern regarding expanded deployments by the U.S. to the Syrian-Jordanian Border. Meanwhile, activists and anonymous officials continued to report the consolidation of pro-regime warplanes onto former civilian airfields – including the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province – in anticipation of any future strikes by the U.S. in Syria.
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Thread in which he suggests the TSK might not come off that well if Erdogan sent it into Tal Abyad.

He's right that the US probably isn't going to fire on it's NATO ally. Though I'd say as at Manbij the US might throw up a screen of troops to protect the Raqqa offensive and the Turks aren't going to fire on that either. Which might actually make such an operation a low cost nibble. It would be more about what distracting gestures Erdogan wants to make. The US moving to protect the PKK in Syria might rather energise his anti-American base.
 

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Rather than confronting the Damascus regime in the west of the country, Washington might usefully explore collaboration with Moscow in clearing what will be the last significant Islamic State stronghold in the east, the oil rich area around Dier ez Zur. Because this region contains all Syria’s oil production, it is likely to be of much greater interest to the regime in Damascus than Raqqa is. Russia might be quite interested in securing American support in effecting its military operations.
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The first protests in Deraa in March 2011 might have been the spark for the revolution and later the war, but many of these areas, including Basateen al-Razi, had been simmering with socio-economic and sectarian grievances for years.

“It’s important to recognise where the early protest movement started: in the disadvantaged rural areas and these slums, these informal settlements, spreading around the major cities,” explained Leila al-Shami, British-Syrian activist and co-author of a history of Syria’s uprising, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War.

“The levels of repression in those communities was so much stronger, as well. It was the working-class communities around Damascus that were put under siege very early on… [something that] wasn’t happening in the more middle-class areas.”

Damascus had never really decided what to do with these "slums", but the war changed that. By 2012 and with the help of Decree 66, experts say urban planning had been transformed into a weapon.

It was used to "destroy the homes of opponents, places where the opposition could hide and fight... [and] to get rid of informal settlements without consultants and meetings," Valerie Clerc, a research fellow at the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development, told IRIN.

Human Rights Watch and the UN’s International Commission of Inquiry documented deliberate demolitions of hundreds of homes in neighbourhoods around Damascus and Hama between 2012-2013. In one reported but unconfirmed case, governorate officials used land registry documents to mark out the homes of pro-opposition families for destruction. Later, opposition sources allege, land registry offices were destroyed altogether — in some cases deliberately — after pro-government forces retook an area.

The Syrian economy will need revitalising whatever happens next in the conflict. But on the back of Decree 66, reconstruction that might only look like revitalising gentrification to al-Assad loyalists is already being seen as politicised population transfer by his opponents.

Reconstruction was on the agenda at this month’s Supporting Syria Conference, but the debate has not yet drawn widespread interest. In this vacuum of international attention, areas ravaged by the six-year conflict that have seen mass displacement are increasingly being treated as blank canvases on which government officials, investors, urban planners, intelligence officers, and regime allies can paint their own visions of the future of Syria.
Bashar stamping on the urban poor even as he plans to rebuild Syria.
 
CRI finishes her shift for the day, CrabbedOne clocks in for his. Everybody else on urban has given up trying to post, for it being lost in the endless copy and paste commentary.
Pretty much. If there was such a thing as a spam news service, this would be it. Ok, I've posted a fair few links on these threads with little more than the link itself, but the sheer volume is extraordinary. And what is it all for? I already had a fairly good idea of what is going on there without all the extra minutiae.
 
On War On The Rocks EVACUATION IS AMERICA’S MORAL AND STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE IN IDLIB

Heller seems rebel retreat from Idlib as inevitable while the regime and HTS led by AQ fight on. He suggests the US collaborating with Afrin to get people out if the Turks don't do it.

US doesn't have much of a relationship with Afrin. As far as I can tell it's practically R+6 aligned. I do wonder about rebels who are hostile to the PKK and the regime transiting Afrin to end up as enemies once in the Turkish held East Aleppo countryside.
 

Similar crippling deals occurred with the rebels or IS. It's only the Syrian regime that cuts the PKK slack and imposes relatively low tariffs.
 
On ARANEWS 20 Syrian Kurdish fighters killed, 18 injured in Turkish attack: YPG
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On Tuesday, the Turkish army hit 39 positions of the YPG and the PKK in Syria and Iraq.

“On the morning of Tuesday, 2017/25, the Turkish warplanes bombed the headquarters of the General Command of the People’s Protection Units in Mount Karajukh, where 20 fighters were killed and 18 others injured, three of them seriously,” he said.

Khalil pointed out that the bombardment resulted in heavy material damage at the site and destroyed civilian property near the targeted area.

Moreover, five Peshmerga fighters were killed in the Turkish airstrikes in Sinjar. “At 0200hrs on 25 April, as a result of Turkish airstrikes targeting PKK positions on and around Mt. Sinjar, five Peshmerga were martyred and nine wounded,” General Command of Peshmerga Forces of Kurdistan Region said on Tuesday.
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Not clear what kind of Pesh but I'd guess KDP i.e. close Turkish and US allies.
 
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