And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Help comes with dangerous strings for Syrian Druze town

...
Meanwhile, Israel has continued to pay special attention to Hadar, offering the residents aid and protection while publicly declaring Hadar a red line. In 2015 Israel promised aid to the opposition on the condition it would not touch Hadar. Prominent figures within the Israeli Druze community have been calling on Israel to intervene militarily to protect the Druze of Hadar from the Syrian government.

“Israel is constantly trying to communicate with our townsfolk,” said Abu Tawfiq, adding that the residents of Hadar fiercely reject the idea of receiving aid or opening communication with Israel.

For Israel, Hadar would be both a strategic win and a PR coup. Israel has been slowly creating a buffer zone in southern Syria to create distance between itself and the Syrian government forces and their allies. It started by giving military and logistical aid to the opposition groups along the separation fence and then provided covert medical aid to fighters. Now it has expanded its program to distributing food, clothing, educational materials and medical aid to the residents within opposition-controlled areas. Opposition commanders there acknowledge the aid, but claim they do not have any choice in accepting it.

Today Israel is very openly busing both civilians and fighters on an almost daily basis into Israel to receive medical care.

By including Hadar within its buffer zone, Israel is hoping to expand its control over the area. When it comes time to negotiate a political settlement, control over this area will be a valuable card for Israel to use. Furthermore, Israel is also using Hadar as a propaganda tool for its own public. By showing its concern for Hadar — which is within spitting distance of Israeli-occupied Majdal Shams — Israel is also demonstrating to its domestic audience its concern for their Syrian brethren across the border, especially the domestic Druze population.

In January, for example, a young boy from Hadar stepped on a suspected Israeli-planted land mine in the area around the town while tending to his sheep. Witnesses told Al-Monitor that Israeli soldiers crossed into Syrian territory to retrieve him, although official statements claim UN personnel moved him. He was then transferred to a hospital inside Israel without notification to or permission from his family. Druze leaders in Israel such as Sheikh Mouaffaq Tarif capitalized on the incident, visiting him in the hospital and publicly thanking Israel for saving his life.

According to residents in Hadar, they will not fall for Israel’s game. “We know Israel is backing the opposition that attacks us, and they are still occupying the rest of the Golan Heights,” said Abu Tawfiq. “For the last time, we would accept the hell of [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad over the paradise of Israel.”

Interesting dilemma of a regime aligned town on the Golan.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE Iran considers deploying ground forces to counter US intervention in Syria: Reports

...
Autonomy in south Syria?

Iran rallied to the defence of its ally in Syria following the crackdown on anti-government demonstrators in 2011.

The IRGC has lost more than a thousand fighters in Syria, fighting against opposition forces backed by the US, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

According to reports from locals in Damascus, Iran's influence in the pro-government areas has extended to the point that they effectively dominate both the political and military scene in the country, alongside Assad's other staunch ally, Russia.

"This is my homeland. But I am a second[-class] citizen here," said a businessman talking to the Guardian newspaer.

"Syrians are second now. Iranians are first. And the Russians are gods."

According to Abdel Bari Atwan, writing in the newspaper Rai al-Youm, Damascus was angered by a plan put forward by a group of 22 Syrian opposition activists in Istanbul which called for the establishment of an autonomous region in southern Syria. The government sees the so-called Houran Pact, which would see the Syrian governorates of Deraa, Suweida and Quneitra come under local decentralised control, as the first step in the federalisation of Syria, a principle to which even Russia has expressed an openness.

Primarily, though, the Assad government sees Jordan behind the scheme, along with the US, as a means of securing the frontiers for both the kingdom and Israel.
...

What a carve up.

Iranians disappointed that Trump isn't living up to his non-interventionist stump rhetoric and US troops are popping up on Northern and Southern Syrian borders. Assad did say you can't trust a word a Presidential candidate says.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On SST Concentration and Economy of Force in War

Col Lang points out the R+6 is fighting everywhere is a recipe risking eventual failure through exhaustion. This is what Assad has always said he would do: defend in every corner. It gets worse as he wins back territory and tries to hold more with his eroding man power that is often easily thrown out of defensive positions. A less stubborn leader facing a normal enemy would seek terms from a position of strength as the Russians appear to want or settle on a shorter defensive perimeter as elements in the IRGC once recommended. The Russian may plan campaigns but Assad still appears to be in charge. Assad fears any hint of lack of resolve will end his clan's rule. The divided and often irreconcilable opposition has no real leadership to sit down with. The oppositions weakness is its divisions but it's headless quality and meddling foreign backers also makes a decisive blow elusive. Even when suppressed the Takfiri will persist and recur like an infestation of bugs. Assad's not in a hurry and may work through power brokers like the PKK but he will try to rule all of Syria again. He's winning slowly at the moment but this will not end suddenly or soon.

"Should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak." – Sun Tzu

 

[CrabbedOne]

From CSIS Russia’s Intervention in Syria — A Case Study

...
Russia eventually decided to use force openly in Syria after the West had imposed limits on its own use of force, focused on countering ISIL instead of the Syrian government. Military intervention was aimed at preventing the collapse of the Assad regime, securing Russia’s military foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, establishing a stake in any new regional order that might follow in the Middle East, countering terrorism, and deflecting attention from its intervention in Ukraine with the aim of reducing its diplomatic isolation and possibly creating eventual leverage against U.S. and European sanctions.

That's more a list of opportunistically gained possible benefits.

There's been a good deal of successful deception about this with the Russian maintaining ambiguity about Assad and Iran. The Jordanians, Israelis, American and Brits have all made optimistic assumption about Russian intent. Russia's approach in Syria like Iran's is incremental. I think you can't really separate Russia's involvement from Iran's strategy to advance their hand in Syria. Even though they have conflicting approaches to Israel. It's only the surge of IRGC backed ground forces that enabled Russian airpower to have large effects. It was a mutually dependent joint plan to escalate before the SAA reached a tipping point that would lead to its collapse. The benefits to Iran and its client HA are more obvious than those to Russia. It's of a piece with the expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq. Syria is a pivotal regional client for Russia but Iran regards Syria much the way it does its Arab populated western Khuzestan province.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TCF Syria: East Ghouta Turns on Itself, Again

...
Abu Ammar Hawwa, an influential Islam Army-aligned salafi scholar in the East Ghouta, echoes that sentiment. “In my contacts with the Islam Army leadership, I have sensed a firm decision to end the presence of the Nusra Front completely in the East Ghouta,” he told me in an online interview. According to Hawwa, the Islam Army has suffered a long series of provocations from Tahrir al-Sham and the April 28 kidnapping in Erbeen was the final straw. He claims that local civilians want to see an end to the spread of “takfiri ideology” and accuses Tahrir al-Sham of provoking internal feuds that have lead to opposition defeats in many areas, including Aleppo. “All of these things make their presence in the area a danger that needs to be removed, not to mention the fact that they are classified as a terrorist movement, with all what that brings in terms of negative repercussions for the Ghouta in general,” Hawwa says.
...

Has demonstrators calling JaI “shabbiha" i.e. not better than regime thugs.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Classy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On IRIN Turkey-Kurd feud distracts from Islamic State fight in Syria

...
In Iraq, Turkey’s interest is focused on the Sinjar area, which is at the center of an intra-Kurdish struggle for influence between local PKK affiliates and the Ankara-friendly forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, or KDP. Kurdish rivalry in this part of Iraq has its own dynamics, but Turkey is anxious to help the KDP oust its local rivals.

Sinjar is also about to take on added strategic importance, since the Syrian government and the YPG are reportedly using their recent territorial gains to re-open a road connection from Aleppo to YPG-controlled northeastern Syria, for the first time in four years.

If the PKK secures control over Sinjar and the Iraqi government eventually ousts IS from Mosul and nearby Tel Afar, the Kurds with sit astride a land link stretching all the way from the Iranian border through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean, bypassing all zones of Turkish influence. The PKK will benefit both by gaining a safe land route for trade and traffic to its Syrian and Iraqi holdings, and by using its position at the center of this network as a source of political leverage.
...

Lund again, an interesting line of supply for the Iranians as well. They worry about their own Kurds but there's been rather a lot of signs of collaboration on this in NW Iraq with the PKK. Finally the Kurds can always be relied on to fight each other and are a secondary problem to riding herd on the Arabs for the Persians.

What the Turks are trying to do here is separate the Americans from the PKK by compromising the SDF as an anti-IS force. Ankara will do this by threats and application of main force backed up by tribal diplomacy down the Euphrates. The US bonds with the PKK unlike those with the Ankara aligned KRG appear weak and focused on short term tactical gains against IS. Turkey's geopolitical weight was always liable to prevail.

Of course this succeeding as it may over time meshes with Iran's objectives in Syria as well. Convert the Syrian PKK into a Eastern client of the regime. Opening the road to Afrin and Aleppo's markets for them also serves there.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Three reasons Turkey bombed Syria and Iraq

...
A Turkish academic who asked to remain anonymous told Al-Monitor, “Turkey has been watching the Sinjar area for over a year now. The valleys and peaks of the area resemble Qandil. In this sort of terrain, aerial bombing has limited success. Once the units are dispersed and hidden, they are impossible to contain and manage. So Turkey calls it the 'second Qandil,' the new PKK headquarters, and this brings deep fears not just to the top echelons of the government but to the public as well. Since July 2015, Turkey has lost more than 1,000 [people] to PKK terror.”

Media outlets supportive of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party claimed that the United States had shared intelligence about the Turkish attack with the PKK, therefore saving hundreds of its senior officials.

Turkish officials also believe the United States should be concerned over the unchecked Iranian expansion in both Syria and Iraq. Turkish officials echoed their president in explaining why they are concerned about the situation in both countries. They said proxy Iranian agencies are indeed financially and logistically supporting the PKK and other militias. Erdogan has been referring to the Popular Mobilization Units, an Iraqi government-supported umbrella organization of dozens of different predominantly Shiite militias, as a terror organization. Turkish officials told Al-Monitor April 29, “One day, sooner or later, the US and Russians will leave along with the foreign fighters, but we will remain, and so will Iran. Hence, the PKK will become a bargaining chip against Turkey, as we experienced in the 1990s with Syria. We do not want another neighboring country providing logistical help to a terror organization against us.”
...

How does Syria look when the US and Russia draw down leaving Syria crawling with Iranian assets? The Turks have seen this before in Iraq.

Points out Erdogan appeared to be chancing it with Trump after the latter warmly congratulated him on his controversial referendum win. Trump will learn that's typical Strongman behaviour.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The National There is a way out of Syria’s vicious circle

...
I am not oblivious to the problems that could emerge in my region if Turkey had its way against the YPG and followed a similar policy in northeastern Syria. Strikingly, Turkey’s policy in northern Iraq in the wake of the US invasion in 2003 produced similar patterns, whereby its support to Turkmen militias who worked closely with Al Qaeda in Tal Afar strengthened extremists without providing any leverage for Ankara. If Turkey does not get its way in northern Syria, though, it will also continue to play a disruptive role that may perpetuate chaos and unrest in that region.

In the same breath, I see with clarity numerous problems with the unconditional support for the YPG’s project in the northern and eastern parts, which makes the current system imposed in the north-east nothing more than a vehicle for the YPG’s expansionist and unsustainable political agenda. As things stand, the unconditional support for the YPG and the lack of a long-term strategy for the US operation in eastern Syria are fundamental flaws in the current US approach in Syria. These flaws may reset the conditions for the revival of ISIL, the return of other jihadists to eastern Syria and the triggering of a secondary conflict that may prove in the future to be more intractable than the broader Syrian conflict.

All these issues are avoidable, and the US can turn that region into a success story instead, without having to undo the American alliance with the YPG. The trick is for the US to have an assertive leadership to balance the situation in that region. For the sake of Kurds and Arabs, and for the security of a Nato ally and the wider region, I can only hope that the US will seek a workable formula built on the assumption that it has to eventually exit the Syrian conflict and leave behind sustainable local structures and a neighbouring country that works to keep them afloat, not bring them down.

Hassan Hassan favouring decentralisation in Syria but not two of the major actors in Syria holding territory beyond regime control.

 

[butchersapron]

You might like this one as well:

Reluctant critique of leading Australian academic on Syria

Not "fantastic" like your one, but an effective smackdown of an Australian Assadite Academic.

With Friends Like These… Tim Anderson & NSW’s Fascists

The day begins with a cringe worthy veneration of the Australian flag, a vitriolic anti-LGBTQI+ tirade, a call-to-arms to fight ‘the Left’ and a prayer in support of Donald Trump (all that just in Sternhill’s introduction!). After Dr McGrath and Marae’s presentation and a brief lunch, Anderson finally rises to the podium to deliver his presentation on Syria, anti-imperialism and the Assad regime.

During Dr Anderson’s near thirty-minute presentation, there are an (unsurprising) number of anti-Semitic remarks, including elated chuckles from some members of the audience at the idea of Islamic State militants executing captives “Kosher” style, and bemoaning about the “Jew York Times”. Dr Anderson also fields questions from the audience, during which he agrees with May that “the Jews got a kickin’” in 1973 (referring to the Arab-Israeli War).

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's blog Administrative Decisions on Local Defence Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis

...
An important part of the emblem is the "Army and Armed Forces" reference, which according to the LDF Mahrada page in a conversation yesterday, means that an LDF member is considered to be within the official Syrian armed forces: "A soldier of the local defence is a soldier from the Syrian Arab Army. The National Defence is considered as part of the auxiliary forces and not registered in the military records."

At the same time, as I have also discussed previously (and as will become clear in the documents discussed), the LDF was set up by Iran, which has clearly played a part in training and advising the LDF. Concomitant with Iran's role in helping the LDF would be a Hezbollah role in working with the LDF. Looking at the emblem above, the Iranian role is alluded to in the inclusion of the name 'al-'Asdiqa" ("the friends" supporting the regime) in the emblem, pointing to a foreign role in the LDF. The approximate time frame for the LDF's creation and emergence was around 2013-2014. In terms of the LDF's composition, the LDF Mahrada page explained: "There has been recruitment of all personnel who are reservists [of the army] or newly withdrawn or deserted from service and their affairs have been sorted out. Most of the officers in it are Syrian officers from the well-known fighting formations." That testimony should not however obscure the Iranian role in the LDF.
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Rebels walked out of peace talks over this.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC A World Transformed

...
MY: Why were radical Islamic groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State able to make significant inroads into tribal areas in eastern Syria?

KK: Radical groups were able to expand and occupy tribal regions for a number of reasons. This may seem counterintuitive, but the first reason is the low level of religiosity in areas inhabited by tribes, which meant that tribes were unable to rally against radical groups. We can compare this with the campaign waged against the Islamic State by factions in Aleppo at the beginning of 2014. Religiosity in Aleppo has a long history and set of rules, and therefore it was easier for local society to mobilize against the Islamic State. In fact, the Islamic State’s ideology did not succeed in regions of Syria that had a long tradition of religiosity prior to 2011. At the same time, the regions inhabited by tribes are ones in which religion plays a marginal role in social life, so that there was no concerted resistance to the Islamic State’s ideology—mostly because of ignorance of religious affairs and the weakness of religious authorities.
...

One of several factors. I'd note IS got kicked out of Idlib by Idlib's radical Salafist factions which suggests he may have a point.

Fundamentally the Eastern tribes have come to depend on external power brokers particularly the regime which makes them rather vulnerable pawns for other forces. Not so much a society in revolt but one that's unable to resist being undermined, divided and set against each other.

Points out Deir really was the strategic prize for Salafi-Jihadis in Eastern Syria rather than Raqqa. Which helps explain the regime's commitment to stubbornly holding onto part of the city as a foothold in the resource rich East. Raqqa in comparison was a recently created SAA Divisional HQ and the only one that's fallen. This view also makes sense if you erase the border as IS did and think about supply lines running into the Caliphate's main theatre Iraq at al Qaim still in IS hands. The border country along the Euphrates is sometimes predicted to be where IS will regroup. It's a likely area of increasing Damascus-Teheran-Baghdad collaboration.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On FP Putin Has a New Secret Weapon in Syria: Chechens

...
“I think this represents Moscow’s grudging recognition that it’s stuck in a quagmire,” says Mark Galeotti, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. In their hybrid civil-military role, capable of a wide range of operations, these brigades have become a go-to deployment for the Kremlin as it seeks to assert itself in various theaters abroad. Chechen fighters have appeared alongside pro-separatist Russian “volunteers” in eastern Ukraine, and several battalions of Chechen servicemen also entered Georgia during its brief war with Russia in August 2008, occupying the town of Gori. At least some of the Chechen troops deployed in Syria have combat experience in eastern Ukraine, with the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reporting that one of the Chechen commanders is Apti Bolotkhanov, who spent substantial time fighting alongside pro-Russian forces in the Donbass.

But beyond their skill on the battlefield, the brigades are valuable to Moscow for other reasons. Russian society and leadership have proved extremely sensitive to casualties in Syria; the Kremlin has gone to extreme lengths to hide its losses. Casualties are often only publicly confirmed after observers find the tombstones of deceased soldiers in their hometown cemeteries. Moscow’s official figures only account for 30 dead in Syria — with the true figure likely much higher. Using nonethnic Russian special personnel might protect the Kremlin from a public backlash sparked by rising battlefield casualties. Losses incurred by the new, North Caucasian contingent are unlikely to trigger such a response. Russian society carries a deep-seated resentment toward natives of the region, in particular Chechens, after two wars in the 1990s and multiple terrorist attacks since.

Gregory Shvedov, the editor of the Caucasian Knot website and an expert on the North Caucasus, says popular disdain toward the region is a major factor for the deployment of these personnel. “Cynically speaking [it would be much easier for Putin] if the Chechens or other [troops] from the Caucasus would be killed in Syria … than those from other regions of Russia,” Shvedov notes.
...

The benefits of scary Chechens not really being "Russian" for most Russians.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On HDN PKK, sorry YPG, is part of Syrian Democratic Forces: US commander

A top U.S. commander has said the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is an element of the coalition fighting Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), only to correct his remarks later.

During a news conference via video conference from Baghdad on May 3, the U.S.-led anti-ISIL coalition’s spokesman, Col. John Dorrian, was asked about Turkey’s stance against Syrian Kurdish groups in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

“But with regard to the PKK, they are a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the Syrian Arab Coalition is a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces as well. The forces that are isolating Raqqa are now largely made up of Syrian Arabs, but they are a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces,” he said.

The spokesman corrected his wording when alerted by a journalist, saying that he initially meant the YPG, instead of the PKK.
...

Oops, a full Colonel lost in Kurdish Alphabet Soup.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC The Shi‘a Revival

...
Unlike the Shi‘a communities in Iraq and Lebanon, the Syrian Shi‘a minority is small and geographically dispersed. That is why Iran cannot afford to leave them divided, otherwise they would not represent a viable Iranian proxy. The Shi‘a militias in Homs and Damascus are the most organized, compared to the ones in Aleppo, Idlib, and Der‘a. Therefore, some sort of unification of their ranks is required, to replicate the Lebanese approach and create a Syrian version of Hezbollah. The recent population transfers of Syrian Shi‘a from the two Idlib towns of Kefraya and Al-Fou‘a to Damascus has reinforced their presence in the Syrian capital.

Since 2012, Syria’s Shi‘a community has developed institutionally. This ranges from setting up Khomeinist scout movements, for example in Homs and Damascus, to the community’s own religious authority, namely the Supreme Islamic Ja‘fari Council in Syria, which was established in 2012 along the lines of the Lebanese Supreme Islamic Shiite Council. These institutions emerged nearly simultaneously with the Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi‘a interventions in the Syrian conflict. However, while such interventions led to greater support for Syrian Shi‘a military factions, almost no overarching Shi‘a organizational structure was ever created.
...

Less than 2% of Syria's population but significant to the Iranians and increasingly mobilised for the Khomeinist cause.

 

[teqniq]

Syria government 'producing chemical weapons at research facilities' - BBC News

Syria's government is continuing to make chemical weapons in violation of a 2013 deal to eliminate them, a Western intelligence agency has told the BBC.

A document says chemical and biological munitions are produced at three main sites near Damascus and Hama.

It alleges that both Iran and Russia, the government's allies, are aware....

e2a It may well be true but I wouldn't be at all surprised if this story was in part a means of preparing the public for further military involvement.

 

[butchersapron]

A really angry Yassin Al Haj Saleh here (few months out of date but only just published):

Yassin Al Haj Saleh: I am afraid that it is too late for the leftists in the West to express any solidarity with the Syrians in their extremely hard struggle. What I always found astonishing in this regard is that mainstream Western leftists know almost nothing about Syria, its society, its regime, its people, its political economy, its contemporary history. Rarely have I found a useful piece of information or a genuinely creative idea in their analyses. My impression about this curious situation is that they simply do not see us; it is not about us at all. Syria is only an additional occasion for their old anti-imperialist tirades, never the living subject of the debate. So they do not really need to know about us. For them the country is only a black box about which you do not have to learn its internal structure and dynamics; actually it has no internal structure and dynamics according to their approach, one that is at the same time Western-centered and high-politics centered.

The problem is that their narrow anti-imperialist worldview only sees Obama, Putin, Holland, Erdoğan, Khamenei, Qatari Emir Hamad, Saudi King Abdullah, Hassan Nasrallah, and Bashar al-Assad. Possibly they see also Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. We, rank-and-file Syrians, refugees, women, students, intellectuals, human rights activists, political prisoners … do not exist.

I think this high-politics, Western-centered worldview is better suited for the right and the ultra-right fascists. But honestly I’ve failed to discern who is right and who is left in the West from a leftist Syrian point of view. And I tend to think that these are the poisonous effects of the Soviet experience, fascist in its own way. Many Western leftists are the orphans of the late father, the USSR.

Besides, what prevents them from seeing the victims of Bashar, when they see perfectly well ordinary people in Kobanê? Why wasn’t there the slightest interest in the slaughter of 700 people at the hands of ISIS thugs themselves in Deir Ezzor last August? One is forced to ask: Do victims have different values based on who their murderers are? Why, as the regime is bombing many regions in the country every day, killing dozens of people every day, are the leftists in the West as silent as the rightists? Could the reason be that the public killer Bashar and his elegant wife are symbols of the First World inside Syria, a couple with whom those in the First World identify easily?

...

YHS: To be honest, I have to admit that I do not know what leftists in the West do. I mean they are safer, they have passports, they have more opportunity to learn foreign languages, they can buy the books they want to read or at least they have access to them. So why do so many of them know nothing about Syria, feel nothing, and do almost nothing?

Again, it is not a thing they have to be making their governments do for us; it is something they have to do themselves in their countries for themselves. When they are in good shape in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and so on, this is very good for us. They are salvaging, by standing with us in our struggle or at least by showing some understanding of our struggle, our chances to resist identity politics and victim politics in our countries. As they are now, they are only helping our local right, whether “modernist” or Islamist, by being very Western-centered and high-politics anti-imperialists.

Yassin Al Haj Saleh has a book coming out in july - excerpt here:

THE SYRIAN CAUSE AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

The Western mainstream approaches Syria (and the Middle East) through one of three discourses: a geopolitical discourse, which focuses on Israeli security and prioritizes stability; a culturalist or civilizationalist discourse, which basically revolves around Islam, Islamists, Islamic terrorism and minority rights; and a human-rights discourse, which addresses Syrians as mere victims (detainees, torture victims, refugees, food needs, health services, etc.), entirely overlooking the political and social dimensions of our struggles. These three discourses have one thing in common: they are depopulated (Kelly Grotke), devoid of people, individuals, or groups. They are devoid of a sense of social life, of what people live and dream.

But what about the left? The central element in the definition of the anti-imperial left is imperialism and, of course, combatting it. Imperialist power is thought of as something that exists in large amounts in America and Europe. Elsewhere it is either nonexistent or present only in small amounts. In internationalist struggles, the most important cause is fighting against western imperialism. Secondary conflicts, negligible cause and vague local struggles should not be a source of distraction. This depopulated discourse, which has nothing to do with people’s lived experiences, and which demonstrates no need for knowledge about Syrians, has considered it unimportant to know more about the history of their local struggles.

What I am arguing based on the three points discussed above is that, our comrades are making three major mistakes, all of which are unforgivable: they appropriate our struggle against a regime with which imperial sovereignty in the Middle East is perfectly in peace, for an alleged struggle against imperialism to which they are not even remotely close, supporting an extremely brutal and reactionary bloc about which they are utterly clueless. I will conclude that their anti-imperialist tendencies signify a desirable identity-form for these groups, not an actual mode-of-action in which they are engaged. The transcendental anti-imperialist left today is but a small, bigoted sect, which is not only incapable of taking power, but is also arrogant, reactionary, and ignorant. Gramsci deserves better heirs.

 

[Buckaroo]

Yassin Al Haj Saleh has a book coming out in july - excerpt here:

THE SYRIAN CAUSE AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Some more excerpts.

"This left no longer has a living cause of any kind. It merely intrudes upon causes like our own, about which it hardly knows and to which it ultimately does a great deal of harm. This left feels guilty because it lacks nothing, so it directs its disordered anxiety at Merkel, Teresa May, Obama, and Trump. It stands with Bashar al-Assad after it has convinced itself that this vile person is against those Western politicians. It is far less knowledgeable or curious about the fate of Bashar al-Assad’s subjects, about whom it knows nothing other than confused impressions it draws from watching TV or reading newspapers.
None of the above is to suggest that Western leftists should not interfere in our affairs or should not comment on what we say about our conflicts. We want them to interfere. In turn, we do and we will interfere in their affairs. We live in one world, and universality must always be defended in both analysis and action. What we expect is that they become a bit more humble and willing to listen, less eager to give lessons, and that they develop knowledge that is not based on recollection. We expect them to be democratic, not to make our conflict secondary to others, to take our opinion into account on the subject of our affairs, and to accept that we are their equals and peers.

Neither am I suggesting that we, the Syrian democrats opposed to the Assadist state, are correct in everything that we say simply because our cause is just, or that we do not accept criticism from others. We want to be criticized and advised, but our critics do not seem to know anything about us or to even be offering criticism or advice. They do not see us at all. Their lofty perspectives render us invisible. Had they been more open over the years to the realities of the Syrian conflict, its dynamics and transformations, they would have been in a better position to synthesize more informed perceptions and to offer more nuanced criticism. Our leftist partners in the West, a multitude of radical democrats, socialists, anarchists, and Trotskyists, have come closer to the grassroots Syrian world and have listened to Syrian narratives. None of them has shaken the blood-stained and pillaging hands of the likes of Bashar al-Assad and the murderers and thieves that constitute his circle.

We are not simplistic, and we do not reduce our struggle to the single dimension of bringing down the Assadist junta. There is another dimension, the struggle against nihilist Islamic organizations. But only among us, the people who are involved in the Syrian struggle on a democratic and emancipatory basis, can radical democratic politics be formed regarding Islamists. We do not approve of essentialist hatred of Islamists, which may be driven by class or sect, and which is definitely reactionary and most probably racist. The most optimal position for a struggle against Islamism is undoubtedly the revolutionary democratic position that also resists Assadist fascism.

Having said that, we are not unaware of a third dimension to our struggle, which pertains to various interventions by conventional or emerging imperialist centers; interventions which are carried out either directly or through regional proxies, in the form of states or sub-state organizations. Here, too, we find that the most coherent and radical position against imperialism is that which takes internal, Assadist colonization into account, and takes sides with the weak and disadvantaged, in Syria and the region at-large. Those who think that Bashar al-Assad and his junta are supportive of the struggle against imperialism are insensible fools at best, and anti-democratic racists at worst."

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War Is Boring What Would Happen if Turkey Attacked U.S. Troops in Syria?

Looks at a couple of previous incidents. Regards Trump as unpredictable.

I suspect Trump would take the advice of the DoD and that advice would be to do nothing just like during the Liberty incident with the IAF. After all the US has more than had its share of blue on blue incidents.

One thing to bear in mind here is a clash with the US probably plays well with Erdogan's base. He halted at Manbij when confronted with a screen of US and Russian troops. If Turkish armour started charging into Eastern Rojava there are not enough US troops to stop them. That would be a more difficult situation. There I'd guess the lightly armed PKK would not get USAF support. They might end up asking the Russians to help.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On IRIN Can a deal in Astana wind down the six-year Syrian war?

...
An intransigent government

The most obvious problem is that the 4 May agreement was signed by Lavrentyev, Önal, and Ansari – a Russian, a Turk, and an Iranian. No Syrian has put his or her pen to the paper, despite the fact that it was written to end what remains, for all its international involvement, a civil war between Syrians.
...

A tiny flaw that given Assad's usual contempt for what may even be genuine Russian preferences for deescalation.

Colonel Lang is cynical smelling a Russian ruse which is how some rebels greeted it. Freezing regime gains while Deir is secured before US plans for the lower Syrian Euphrates can be completed would be a likely motivations and fit with Iranian priorities. That would be pretty difficult if the rebels keep up pressure elsewhere as the regime is easily overstretched. The rebels Turkish support may prefer some R+6 goals in Eastern Syria to the US's PKK reliant plans for the Caliphate. Hassan Hassan pointed out the wording of the document was very similar to the Iran-Qatar deal over the Four Towns.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Atlantic Council Infighting Continues in Eastern Ghouta as the Regime Advances

...
Jaysh al-Islam managed to capture most of the key HTS bases in the first hours of the offensive and took control of several more towns. HTS announced that two of its Jordanian commanders were killed and it was forced to withdraw towards areas controlled by Faylaq al-Rahman, from where it launched a counter attack on Arbin and Hazzah. Jaysh al-Islam then withdrew from Hazzah following a joint attack by Faylaq al-Rahman and what remained of the HTS forces, but Jaysh al-Islam continued to storm what is known as the “Middle Sector” (a section of Ghouta), saying its goal was to completely destroy HTS and capture its leaders, not to attack Faylaq al-Rahman. The latter was not convinced. It accused Jaysh al-Islam of seizing several of its bases on the pretext of attacking HTS. Ahrar al-Sham and other, smaller factions in the area announced they would remain neutral.

The current fighting is the most serious yet between Jaysh al-Islam and Faylaq al-Rahman. The former took over several of the latter’s bases. But the two announced that they had agreed not to attack each other and hoped to reach an agreement. Jaysh al-Islam argued it had responded to fire from HTS fighters, and accused Faylaq al-Rahman of protecting HTS fighters as they retreated. Faylaq al-Rahman said the offensive against its bases was deliberate, even if the HTS presence offered a pretext, and fears that Jaysh al-Islam will return to the Middle Sector due to the history of conflicts between the two. Religious notables and local parties are making efforts to bring about a reconciliation deal.

Jaysh al-Islam decided to attack Jabhat al-Nusra on the first anniversary of a major offensive against it that Jaysh al-Fustat, a coalition dominated by HTS / Nusra and Faylaq al-Rahman. That attack broke Jaysh al-Islam’s domination of Eastern Ghouta and contributed to its loss to the regime of large parts of southern Ghouta as well as a string of other defeats. On the ground, the result of the infighting was the division of Eastern Ghouta into two separate areas: Douma, controlled by Jaysh al-Islam, and the Middle Sector, which constitutes the core of Ghouta and is controlled by Faylaq al-Rahman and other factions such as Ahrar al-Sham and HTS—as well as Harasta, the stronghold of the Fajr al-Ummah faction, formerly part of the Jaysh al-Fustat coalition, but remained neutral in recent battles.
...

Points out rebel infighting led to the fall of the other big rebel urban enclave in East Aleppo.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[teqniq]

The Astana 'deal' is a joke. The rebel representatives walked out of the meeting.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Good pun.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Al Monitor Residents in Syria's eastern Ghouta face tightened siege

...
Up until the closure of the Barza crossing, the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus that were part of the truce had been serving as a second outlet for eastern Ghouta. And while the regime forces isolated the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus from Ghouta following their seizure of the Damascus-Homs highway in June 2013, there still was a network of tunnels between the two areas.

However, with the closure of the Barza and al-Wafideen crossings and the regime's seizure of most of the tunnels — al-Rahma tunnel that links Ghouta to al-Qaboun being the most recent — both the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus and Ghouta have become increasingly besieged.

The Syrian regime has seemingly become devoted to settling the battle in eastern Damascus. After the al-Wafideen crossing generated enormous profit for the regime's officials and the merchants close to the regime, as the goods entering Ghouta were priced at tenfold their price in Damascus, the regime managed to settle the battle in other Damascus suburbs: Wadi Barada, Daraya, Maadimiya and al-Tall city, which are now devoid of any opposition forces.

Activist Ammar al-Bushi, who lives in the city of Irbin, told Al-Monitor that the Ghouta residents are suffering under the harsh siege that has been imposed on them, in particular because in May 2016 the opposition forces lost southern Ghouta, which is a fertile strategic area from which most of the residents’ needs originate. In other words, this poses a threat to Ghouta’s food stocks.
...

The smuggling routes that often are the cause of rebel squabbles. Also a nice little earner for regime officials which is sometimes reckoned to be a big factor in the survival of the rebellion there despite the infighting.

 

[rekil]

Yassin Al Haj Saleh has a book coming out in july - excerpt here:

THE SYRIAN CAUSE AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

One quibble. He says "a few months ago, a number of Italian “comrades” attacked an exhibition displaying photographs of the victims of Assad’s killing industry." I assume he's referring to Forza Nuova's raid last October in the exhibition at Rome's Maxxi. Nothing to do with 'anti-imperialist' leftists as such. Why they choose to ignore how they've become water carriers for conspiraloons and fascists is another matter. It might do to get this corrected before it gets published.

 

[butchersapron]

One quibble. He says "a few months ago, a number of Italian “comrades” attacked an exhibition displaying photographs of the victims of Assad’s killing industry." I assume he's referring to Forza Nuova's raid last October in the exhibition at Rome's Maxxi. Nothing to do with 'anti-imperialist' leftists as such. Why they choose to ignore how they've become water carriers for conspiraloons and fascists is another matter. It might do to get this corrected before it gets published.

I had wondered about that - there's 11 uses of comrade in the text and that's the only ones in quotes. Maybe the point was to imply the crossover between these comrades and these "comrades" without openly equating their politics/actions?

Anyway, will find a way to inquire.